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The question of "natural" rights

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Freiheit replied on Sat, Jul 11 2009 6:00 PM

Nitroadict:

 

Freiheit - nicht ! :
I was pretty much a Rothbardian natural rights theorist up until a few months ago. Then, after doing a lot of reading, thinking, and dialoguing with intelligent people, I realized that notions of "natural rights," and any sort of objective ethics for that matter, are not even a coherent concept.

Instead of replying with an ad-hominem, I'll ask for elaboration: how are objective ethics, let alone natural rights, not coherent, in your view?

 

(I apologize if my query ends up derailing the topic a little)

 

 

 

Because no action, type of action, or general rule for action has intrinsic value apart from the subjective valuations of each individual.  I.e. "values" are always subjective, including moral values.

If ethics are "oughts" that apply to all acting humans at all times and all places, and "oughts" are merely connectors between desired ends and the means most appropriate to achieve them, then in order for ethics to be a meaningful concept, every acting human must necessarily always share in common some desired end, which they do not.

"Anticapitalist theories share in common an inability to take human nature as it is. Rather than analyzing man as a complex creature, anticapitalist theories tend to focus on what the theorist wishes man to be." - Isaac Morehouse

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Freiheit:
every acting human must necessarily always share in common some desired end, which they do not.

they commonly desire to not have another agent initiate aggression on them

Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid

Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring

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Freiheit replied on Sat, Jul 11 2009 6:03 PM

Lilburne:

Freiheit:
I am now a moral nihilist, a la Mises and de Jasay.

I wonder how all these libertarian moral nihilists cropping up would actually behave if given the opportunity of state power.  What happens when "the system that works best" for society doesn't line up with "the system that works best" for the individual?  This isn't an argument against the tenability of moral nihilism (although I do think it's untenable): just a curiosity, and an observation that if a revolutionary moment ever does happen in my lifetime, I'm steering clear of the libertarian faction that doesn't believe in right and wrong.

If I were ever endowed with great state powers, I would do whatever gave me the most satisfaction, as would you, and every other human being, because it is impossible for acting humans to act otherwise.  Even if you relinquished your power, you would only do so because you felt that such action would give you the most satisfaction of all alternatives.

If you're asking whether we would start wars or hike taxes or impose price controls or inflate the money supply or something, I suppose this libertarian moral nihilist can only speak for himself, but I would say "No, I would not do those things," simply because I really have no desire to make myself lots of enemies or ruin the economy of the area in which I'm living. 

"Anticapitalist theories share in common an inability to take human nature as it is. Rather than analyzing man as a complex creature, anticapitalist theories tend to focus on what the theorist wishes man to be." - Isaac Morehouse

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Freiheit replied on Sat, Jul 11 2009 6:04 PM

nirgrahamUK:

Freiheit:
every acting human must necessarily always share in common some desired end, which they do not.

they commonly desire to not have another agent initiate aggression on them

Not necessarily.

"Anticapitalist theories share in common an inability to take human nature as it is. Rather than analyzing man as a complex creature, anticapitalist theories tend to focus on what the theorist wishes man to be." - Isaac Morehouse

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majevska replied on Sat, Jul 11 2009 6:06 PM

nirgrahamUK:

Freiheit:
every acting human must necessarily always share in common some desired end, which they do not.

they commonly desire to not have another agent initiate aggression on them

That's a generalization with exceptions to it. Besides, there are plenty of people who desire to aggress against others.

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Lilburne replied on Sat, Jul 11 2009 6:06 PM

laminustacitus:
But there is no evidence that Hume gives in the above statement that man is "touched with the images of Right and Wrong", and he does not define what are the "Right", and "Wrong" he speaks of.

Hume was, among other things, what I call an "inner self empiricist."  Consider it an invitation to clear your mind of prejudicial positions, reflect upon your own psychological history, and ask yourself if you have ever felt moral approbation (sense of right) or moral indignation (sense of wrong).

laminustacitus:
So if I derive a different ethical code than someone else I am a derivation from nature?

If you truly feel in your heart that there is nothing wrong with aggression (initiated violence), then yes you are.

laminustacitus:
In addition, who are we to decide whether, or not a phenomena is a "monstrosity"?

We are discerning animals with moral feelings.

laminustacitus:
Just because the Europeans never knew of the existence of black swans before they set foot upon Australia does not mean that black swans are a monstrosity.

The discovery of a thing's tendential qualities (its nature) comes from experience.  Needless to say, we have had a great deal more experience with our own psyches than we ever had with swans as a species.

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AJ replied on Sat, Jul 11 2009 6:07 PM

laminustacitus:

AJ:
It's more efficient just to say, "because the State offends the moral senses." 

If the state offends the "moral senses", why is not the world completely disgusted at the idea of a state?

I'm not saying it does. I simply say that arguing against the State because it violates rights is just an inefficient and confusing way of saying that the State violates the moral senses.

laminustacitus:
Your argument falls to pieces once it is applied to individuals who do not agree with your own judgments of value.

Where did I mention "judgments of value"? Perhaps you only read Lilburne's quote of my post, but not the whole thing? I made it clear that my statements were predicated on the assumption that the reader believes humans have a universal moral sense. I make no claims (so far) as to the truth or falsehood of that assumption (that would be Lilburne).

Think outside the monopoly paradigm. Net-based microsecession | Why anarchy hasn't worked

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either we need to justify it before we use it.

or use it and not use it and see which works and doesnt work.

morality using it works, morality without using it does not work.

oh , and the universal element came in at the point where people who believe in moral rules,
held it universally to be a moral rule. (the (1) people) you dont hold it to be a universal moral rule
but thats only because you dont believe in any moral rules. ( (2) person)  so this is why I can treat
you anyway i please, even where unto others i need take care not to aggress against them, you
have signposted that you are not to be protected by my moral sentiment. If i was to class you as a
moral agent i would be making a category error. (even thoguh you are a possible moral agent)

thanks for the headz up.

Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid

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Freiheit:
Not necessarily.
yes necessarily, what is a counterexample? masochists invite 'violence' so they are not victims of initiatory aggression. now ask them again if they desire to not have another agent initiate aggression on them whilst putting from their minds any violence that they invite, and only consider violence that they dont invite.

 

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Lilburne replied on Sat, Jul 11 2009 6:12 PM

laminustacitus:
If the state offends the "moral senses", why is not the world completely disgusted at the idea of a state? Your argument falls to pieces once it is applied to individuals who do not agree with your own judgments of value.

Because they have been convinced of what I call the "lifeboat lie."

As I've argued, there is a moral code written in our hearts.  This inherent moral code is only shoved aside when we enter conditions of extremity (known as "lifeboat situations"), in which circumstances have forced the human community to devolve into a war of all against all. In those cases, the involuntary urge for survival overwhelms the involuntary urge for moral behavior, and we therefore cast aside our communal moral feelings for the sake of extreme short-term selfishness. In other words, we allow ourselves “necessary evils”.

The state has deceived the bulk of humanity into believing that society is inherently in constant extremity: a perpetual "lifeboat situation" in which a great many "necessary evils" must be committed by the state, else the "lifeboat" of society will keel over and everybody will drown. This is a lie. Society does not require for its survival, or even for its flowering, that certain men be above natural morality. The acts of murder, plunder, and enslavement committed by the state are not necessary evils.  They're just plain evils; just as much as if you or I committed them as private individuals.  Were this "lifeboat lie" to be exposed, I strongly believe the inherent decency of man would then kick in.  Good men would no longer tolerate (or indulge in) "necessary evils", and evil men would have nowhere to run.

 

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Freiheit replied on Sat, Jul 11 2009 6:16 PM

nirgrahamUK:

Freiheit:
Not necessarily.
yes necessarily, what is a counterexample? masochists invite 'violence' so they are not victims of initiatory aggression. now ask them again if they desire to not have another agent initiate aggression on them whilst putting from their minds any violence that they invite, and only consider violence that they dont invite.

 

Nope.  For all you and I know, there could be somebody who really gets off on the idea of having their home burglarized while they're away.  If their home, one day, does end up getting burglarized, you can choose to not call that burglary "aggression" if you like, but then you're just redefining "aggression" to "whatever the individual doesn't like."  Then your statement merely becomes that all humans don't like what they don't like, which doesn't really say anything of substance.

"Anticapitalist theories share in common an inability to take human nature as it is. Rather than analyzing man as a complex creature, anticapitalist theories tend to focus on what the theorist wishes man to be." - Isaac Morehouse

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you can say that it doesnt say anything of substance, but on the other hand. it leaves the NAP intact. and what is wrong with that? (excuse the pun Stick out tongue)

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Lilburne:

laminustacitus:
But there is no evidence that Hume gives in the above statement that man is "touched with the images of Right and Wrong", and he does not define what are the "Right", and "Wrong" he speaks of.

Hume was, among other things, what I call an "inner self empiricist."  Consider it an invitation to clear your mind of prejudicial positions, reflect upon your own psychological history, and ask yourself if you have ever felt moral approbation (sense of right) or moral indignation (sense of wrong).

Stop lecturing, and start actually arguing. I accept that many of my own inner moral urges may very well be subjective valuations that are not shared by the whole of humanity.

 

Lilburne:

laminustacitus:
So if I derive a different ethical code than someone else I am a derivation from nature?

If you truly feel in your heart that there is nothing wrong with aggression (initiated violence), then yes you are.

You define nature according to your own liking, and proceed to speak as if your own subjective judgments of value are those of the entire human race. 

 

Lilburne:

laminustacitus:
In addition, who are we to decide whether, or not a phenomena is a "monstrosity"?

We are discerning animals with moral feelings.

You did not answer the rhetorical question; in fact, you completely missed it.

 

Lilburne:

laminustacitus:
Just because the Europeans never knew of the existence of black swans before they set foot upon Australia does not mean that black swans are a monstrosity.

The discovery of a thing's tendential qualities (its nature) comes from experience.  Needless to say, we have had a great deal more experience with our own psyches than we ever had with swans as a species.

We have experience with our own psyches, but that also means that we are not able to experience the psyches of those who have not undergone the same experiences as we have; plus, the swan example displays the error in generalizing experiences as law for there may very well be exceptions to that "law".

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zefreak replied on Sat, Jul 11 2009 6:20 PM

Lilburne:

laminustacitus:
So if I derive a different ethical code than someone else I am a derivation from nature?

If you truly feel in your heart that there is nothing wrong with aggression (initiated violence), then yes you are.

Can you explain?

How is it "unnatural" if it is derived from innate impulses?

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Lilburne replied on Sat, Jul 11 2009 6:20 PM

Freiheit:
Even if you relinquished your power, you would only do so because you felt that such action would give you the most satisfaction of all alternatives.

I agree.  But a satisfaction must be OF some desire, right?  A heartless or morally weak man might step down to satisfy the desire of furthering his own material well-being, if he judges that staying in power would most likely materially hurt him.  However another man might step down to satisfy the desire of assuaging guilt or disgust over his own actions.  He too is pursuing satisfaction: but MORAL satisfaction.

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laminustacitus:
plus, the swan example displays the error in generalizing experiences as law for there may very well be exceptions to that "law".
this is the problem of systematic knowledge, in general. of traditional science that we rely on an regard as 'truth' when we talk about it on this board. yet somehow its a different standard that we need to adopt when we are talking about morality? 

is there something about NAP that is undesirable/ugly/(i cant say immoral because we are denying the meaning of the word arent we?)  ?

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Freiheit replied on Sat, Jul 11 2009 6:22 PM

nirgrahamUK:

you can say that it doesnt say anything of substance, but on the other hand. it leaves the NAP intact. and what is wrong with that? (excuse the pun Stick out tongue)

Not really.  Either you redefine the NAP to "Do not initiate any action against another individual that that other individual doesn't like" or the NAP isn't a meaningful ethic.

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Lilburne:
Because they have been convinced of what I call the "lifeboat lie."

Or you have been convinced of what they might very well call the "anarchist-lie"; nevertheless, it displays a massive hole in your theory that a moral code is written in all of our hearts if you are to argue that anarchism is the only moral method of organizing society for here you, not them, are the "monstrosity", the derivation from the norm.

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Freiheit replied on Sat, Jul 11 2009 6:23 PM

Lilburne:

Freiheit:
Even if you relinquished your power, you would only do so because you felt that such action would give you the most satisfaction of all alternatives.

I agree.  But a satisfaction must be OF some desire, right?  A heartless or morally weak man might step down to satisfy the desire of furthering his own material well-being, if he judges that staying in power would most likely materially hurt him.  However another man might step down to satisfy the desire of assuaging guilt or disgust over his own actions.  He too is pursuing satisfaction: but MORAL satisfaction.

Sure.  Call it whatever you like.

I would say that even the most "moral" libertarian could become a statist tyrant under the right incentives, but that would merely be a truism.

"Anticapitalist theories share in common an inability to take human nature as it is. Rather than analyzing man as a complex creature, anticapitalist theories tend to focus on what the theorist wishes man to be." - Isaac Morehouse

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why cant i leave the NAP at its orginal formulation? (and we can just use the explanation that people trivially desire not to be aggressed against their will,
as buttressing evidence, in its favour. it certainly doesn't contradict it. now we can discuss other topics and consider other evidences, we could even
investigate why it should be that there should be an emphasis on physicallity for the classification of moral action. but im afraid that might derail the thread even further)

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