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The Aristotelean Monsters

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jpg posted on Fri, Jul 10 2009 10:01 PM

The Wikipedia article, Scientific Revolution, has this to say about "the Aristotelean scientific tradition":

"The Aristotelian scientific tradition's primary mode of interacting with the world was through observation and searching for "natural" circumstances. It saw what we would today consider "experiments" to be contrivances which at best revealed only contingent and un-universal facts about nature in an artificial state. Coupled with this approach was the belief that rare events which seemed to contradict theoretical models were "monsters", telling nothing about nature as it "naturally" was." (Captured 7/10/07)

If any classical scholars are watching, I would like to have their opinion. Does this description of the "Aristotelean scientific tradition" reflect what Aristotle wrote, or perhaps only the Aristotelean tradition practiced by the Scholastics, which maybe was somewhat skewed as a consequence of Church influnce.  Did Aristotle shun experimentation in his investigations of the "natural world", perhaps thinking that all nature is purposeful, or did he distinguish between purposeful behavior in men and gods on the one hand and regular causal relations, free of "monsters", in the natural world on the other? And did he recommend separate methods for investigating these different things?

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Answered (Verified) Lilburne replied on Sat, Jul 11 2009 11:22 AM
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Nature, according to Aristotle, was the inherent tendency of things.  His conception was teleological in that he thought of that which a thing tended toward as its final cause (end, goal, aim, purpose, etc).  He compared the operations of nature toward an end with how human action is always toward an end.  Just as human action can make mistakes in seeking its ends, so can nature.  Aristotle called nature's mistakes "monstrosities."

Now mistakes come to pass even in the operations of art: the grammarian makes a mistake in writing and the doctor pours out the wrong dose. Hence clearly mistakes are possible in the operations of nature also. If then in art there are cases in which what is rightly produced serves a purpose, and if where mistakes occur there was a purpose in what was attempted, only it was not attained, so must it be also in natural products, and monstrosities will be failures in the purposive effort.

Aristotle, Physics

Aristotle's methodology was to discover first premises via commonsense empirical observation and induction.  What he considered "scientific knowledge" was arrived at via "demonstrations", which were deductions (syllogisms) from those premises.

"Thus it is clear that we must get to know the primary premises by induction; for the method by which even sense-perception implants the universal is inductive."

and

What I now assert is that at all events we do know by demonstration. By demonstration I mean a syllogism productive of scientific knowledge, a syllogism, that is, the grasp of which is eo ipso such knowledge.

Aristotle, Posterior Analytics

This obviously does not entail experimentation in the post-Baconian sense.  However, I don't know if he wrote explicitly against such experimentation, or if it even crossed his mind.  I have a feeling the "contrivances" bit in the Wikipedia article is putting words in Aristotle's mouth.

The Scholastics were more experimental than Aristotle: especially the Franciscans.  The scientific revolution was not a rediscovery of Classical natural philosophy after the long slumber of medieval theology, as is characterized by many scholars; rather, it grew directly out of the medieval tradition.  See Tom Woods' book on the Catholic Church and western civilization regarding this.

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Answered (Verified) Lilburne replied on Sat, Jul 11 2009 11:46 AM
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NOTE: The way I worded one paragraph made it seem like I was characterizing demonstrations as premises, and not deductions.  So I re-worded it.

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This is a good question for Dr. Roderick T. Long. He is an Aristotelean scholar.

'It is difficult to imagine any normal person wishing to meet Marx for a third time.' - Alexander Gray, The Socialist Tradition

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Answered (Verified) Lilburne replied on Sat, Jul 11 2009 11:22 AM
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Nature, according to Aristotle, was the inherent tendency of things.  His conception was teleological in that he thought of that which a thing tended toward as its final cause (end, goal, aim, purpose, etc).  He compared the operations of nature toward an end with how human action is always toward an end.  Just as human action can make mistakes in seeking its ends, so can nature.  Aristotle called nature's mistakes "monstrosities."

Now mistakes come to pass even in the operations of art: the grammarian makes a mistake in writing and the doctor pours out the wrong dose. Hence clearly mistakes are possible in the operations of nature also. If then in art there are cases in which what is rightly produced serves a purpose, and if where mistakes occur there was a purpose in what was attempted, only it was not attained, so must it be also in natural products, and monstrosities will be failures in the purposive effort.

Aristotle, Physics

Aristotle's methodology was to discover first premises via commonsense empirical observation and induction.  What he considered "scientific knowledge" was arrived at via "demonstrations", which were deductions (syllogisms) from those premises.

"Thus it is clear that we must get to know the primary premises by induction; for the method by which even sense-perception implants the universal is inductive."

and

What I now assert is that at all events we do know by demonstration. By demonstration I mean a syllogism productive of scientific knowledge, a syllogism, that is, the grasp of which is eo ipso such knowledge.

Aristotle, Posterior Analytics

This obviously does not entail experimentation in the post-Baconian sense.  However, I don't know if he wrote explicitly against such experimentation, or if it even crossed his mind.  I have a feeling the "contrivances" bit in the Wikipedia article is putting words in Aristotle's mouth.

The Scholastics were more experimental than Aristotle: especially the Franciscans.  The scientific revolution was not a rediscovery of Classical natural philosophy after the long slumber of medieval theology, as is characterized by many scholars; rather, it grew directly out of the medieval tradition.  See Tom Woods' book on the Catholic Church and western civilization regarding this.

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Answered (Verified) Lilburne replied on Sat, Jul 11 2009 11:46 AM
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NOTE: The way I worded one paragraph made it seem like I was characterizing demonstrations as premises, and not deductions.  So I re-worded it.

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I thought it was pretty good an explanation, very clear, gets the point across well.

To darkness I condemn you...

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Lilburne replied on Sat, Jul 11 2009 11:55 AM

Thanks, fellow fan of Aristotle.  Yes

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jpg replied on Sat, Jul 11 2009 12:31 PM

I see the the change. It does clarify. Thank you.

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jpg replied on Sat, Jul 11 2009 12:41 PM

Well, the right person was watching; you totally answered my question. Thank you for your clear and careful response.

I will read Tom Woods' book.

I think I will be spending a lot of time on your blog.

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jpg replied on Sat, Jul 11 2009 12:43 PM

Anarchist Cain,

Re R. T. Long, I agree.

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jpg:
Well, the right person was watching; you totally answered my question. Thank you for your clear and careful response.

Glad to be of service.

jpg:
I will read Tom Woods' book.

Excellent.  It's at Borders, and of course Amazon.

jpg:
I think I will be spending a lot of time on your blog.

I hope you enjoy your visit in my brain.  Try not to step on my basal ganglia, and let me know if you'd like a beer from the fridge.  Beer

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jpg:
I will read Tom Woods' book.

Also, I highly, highly recommend Aristotle's Children by Richard Rubenstein.  This book is beautifully written, has an excellent analysis of Aristotle's thought, and tells a thrilling story of the intellectual sagas of the middle ages, and that era's bounteous contributions to the world of thought.

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