Knight_of_BAAWA:Nonsense. You control yourself by your direct actions over yourself and by what you do. Homesteading.
GilesStratton:Right, but I don't have any right to do that, at least, I'm not sure AE demonstrates why I have such a right.
Knight_of_BAAWA:Ah yes: the Humean nonsense.
GilesStratton:Well, Hoppe states that he wishes to remain within purely "is" statements, but it appears to me that doing so seems problematic since he cannot advise an individual to act in a certain manner, which seems problematic for any ethic. Once again, I think Frank van Dun is on better ground with this issue.
GilesStratton:Right, but all that shows is that I have control over my body, it doesn't show that I have ownership of it. The former is an "is" statement, the latter is an ought, morever Hoppe does not demonstrate why one ought to act in a certain manner.
When two people engage in propositional exchange they must both each have control over their own bodies. For A to persuade B of a proposition, he must allow B to control his own brain, and vice versa. For B to hear A's proposition, he must allow A control over his vocal chords or whatever other part of his body he uses to communicate, and vice versa. And for either of these things to take place, both must allow the other to occupy some standing room, i.e. land. These are norms which must be accepted by both participants for them to both engage in an argument with each other.
Liberals don't mean to destroy people. They just do.
GilesStratton:Right, but all that shows is that I have control over my body, it doesn't show that I have ownership of it.
Ownership is control. I think what you mean is that it doesn't show that you ought to have ownership of it. But if you are controlling your body, than you demostrate that you think you ought to control it. Ultimately what one ought to do is a preference, and cannot be proven true or untrue. However, preferences are demonstrated by action. So whether one holds preferences or not is an aspect of reality and can be proven true or untrue.
GilesStratton:The former is an "is" statement, the latter is an ought, morever Hoppe does not demonstrate why one ought to act in a certain manner.
What Hoppe does is a negative proof only. He does not try to prove what individuals ought to do. He only proves the limits of the range of norms which can be coherently defended in the course of interpersonal argumentation.
Knight_of_BAAWA: Knight_of_BAAWA:Nonsense. You control yourself by your direct actions over yourself and by what you do. Homesteading. GilesStratton:Right, but I don't have any right to do that, at least, I'm not sure AE demonstrates why I have such a right.Because you are you. If you don't have the right to, then you must ask for permission. Meaning: you're a slave. Meaning: it's not universal. Meaning: there are problems. Knight_of_BAAWA:Ah yes: the Humean nonsense. GilesStratton:Well, Hoppe states that he wishes to remain within purely "is" statements, but it appears to me that doing so seems problematic since he cannot advise an individual to act in a certain manner, which seems problematic for any ethic. Once again, I think Frank van Dun is on better ground with this issue.I think we need to eliminate the idiotic bugaboo of "is/ought" once and for all. It ranks up there with dualism as patently stupid. Connect it with desired outcome and it's bridged. Done.
I don't understand anything you just argued.
What about it don't you grasp?
Knight_of_BAAWA:What about it don't you grasp?
How this implies that others have an obligation to respect your property in your person.
Knight_of_BAAWA: Because you are you. If you don't have the right to, then you must ask for permission. Meaning: you're a slave. Meaning: it's not universal. Meaning: there are problems.
Because you are you. If you don't have the right to, then you must ask for permission. Meaning: you're a slave. Meaning: it's not universal. Meaning: there are problems.
How the Is/ought gap is nonsense.
Knight_of_BAAWA: Ah yes: the Humean nonsense.
Ah yes: the Humean nonsense.
What you are arguing here, and how it bridges the gap.
Knight_of_BAAWA: I think we need to eliminate the idiotic bugaboo of "is/ought" once and for all. It ranks up there with dualism as patently stupid. Connect it with desired outcome and it's bridged. Done.
I think we need to eliminate the idiotic bugaboo of "is/ought" once and for all. It ranks up there with dualism as patently stupid. Connect it with desired outcome and it's bridged. Done.
Stephen Forde:How this implies that others have an obligation to respect your property in your person.
Stephen Forde:How the Is/ought gap is nonsense.
Knight_of_BAAWA: Knight_of_BAAWA:What about it don't you grasp? Stephen Forde:How this implies that others have an obligation to respect your property in your person.If they don't, then why should I respect theirs? IOW: the universality I spoke of.
I can sorta get what you mean here. But going back to this...
Knight_of_BAAWA:Because you are you. If you don't have the right to, then you must ask for permission. Meaning: you're a slave. Meaning: it's not universal. Meaning: there are problems.
How does this...
Knight_of_BAAWA:Meaning: there are problems.
follow from this...
Knight_of_BAAWA:Because you are you. If you don't have the right to, then you must ask for permission. Meaning: you're a slave. Meaning: it's not universal.
And, other than the fact that the universalizability criterion is used as part of the proof in AE, what does the above have to do with AE?
Knight_of_BAAWA: Stephen Forde:How the Is/ought gap is nonsense.How does it make sense? Answer: it doesn't. It's more of Hume's nonsense, just like his causality garbage. You can bridge it by noting that 1. A conclusion offers something new from the premises and 2. Ought comes from desire.
Well, I think what Hume was getting at was that you can't attach truth to value judgement. If I say government is good, how can you prove that to be true or false? If I say blue is the best colour, it doesn't make sense to say that I'm wrong. If I say humility is a virtue, once again, it can't be proven or disproven. And whether or not one should or shouldn't do something belongs to this category.
Hume p.319, http://files.libertyfund.org/files/342/Hume_0213_EBk_v4.pdf: I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, befound of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto metwith, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinaryway of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observationsconcerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of theusual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is notconnected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is,however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some newrelation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and atthe same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable,how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely differentfrom it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume torecommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention wou’dsubvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of viceand virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d byreason.
I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, befound of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto metwith, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinaryway of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observationsconcerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of theusual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is notconnected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is,however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some newrelation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and atthe same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable,how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely differentfrom it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume torecommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention wou’dsubvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of viceand virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d byreason.
So you can't proove an ethical system is one that ought to be followed.
Knight_of_BAAWA:You can bridge it by noting that 1. A conclusion offers something new from the premises and 2. Ought comes from desire.
And assumming that 2 is true, it doesn't follow that all propositions are provable.
Stephen Forde:How does this...
Stephen Forde:follow from this...
Stephen Forde:And, other than the fact that the universalizability criterion is used as part of the proof in AE, what does the above have to do with AE?
Knight_of_BAAWA:How does it make sense? Answer: it doesn't. It's more of Hume's nonsense, just like his causality garbage. You can bridge it by noting that 1. A conclusion offers something new from the premises and 2. Ought comes from desire.
Stephen Forde:Well, I think what Hume was getting at was that you can't attach truth to value judgement. If I say government is good, how can you prove that to be true or false?
Further, you can find a course of action from what you want the end to be. Ought from an is. It's simple.
Knight_of_BAAWA: Stephen Forde:How does this... Knight_of_BAAWA:Meaning: there are problems. Stephen Forde:follow from this... Knight_of_BAAWA:Because you are you. If you don't have the right to, then you must ask for permission. Meaning: you're a slave. Meaning: it's not universal. Stephen Forde:And, other than the fact that the universalizability criterion is used as part of the proof in AE, what does the above have to do with AE?Everything, if you've actually read about it. Recall: having a class of people against whom it is ok to intiate force requires a reason for the distinction. Entities are multiplied without any corresponding demonstration for it.
Considering the above, this...
still doesn't make any sense.
Knight_of_BAAWA:Everything, if you've actually read about it.
I have read about it. Only bits and pieces of what you are saying make sense. Most of it is scattered and disjoint.
Knight_of_BAAWA: Recall: having a class of people against whom it is ok to intiate force requires a reason for the distinction.
Recall: having a class of people against whom it is ok to intiate force requires a reason for the distinction.
This is a variation of the universalizability criterion. It doesn't clarify what you mean here...
Nor does it or your previous response to Giles answer his point here...
Knight_of_BAAWA: Stephen Forde:How the Is/ought gap is nonsense. Knight_of_BAAWA:How does it make sense? Answer: it doesn't. It's more of Hume's nonsense, just like his causality garbage. You can bridge it by noting that 1. A conclusion offers something new from the premises and 2. Ought comes from desire. Stephen Forde:Well, I think what Hume was getting at was that you can't attach truth to value judgement. If I say government is good, how can you prove that to be true or false?It's about what you believe. And whether or not you believe it is a matter of truth or falsity.
Yeah, whether or not people believe something is a provable matter. And this is how Hoppe gets around the problem. But it doesn't mean that there is no is/ought dichotomy.
Knight_of_BAAWA:Further, you can find a course of action from what you want the end to be. Ought from an is. It's simple.
Its not simple. And no, just because an actor aims at ends, it does not mean that they ought to aim at those ends.
Knight_of_BAAWA:Everything, if you've actually read about it. Recall: having a class of people against whom it is ok to intiate force requires a reason for the distinction. Entities are multiplied without any corresponding demonstration for it.
Stephen Forde:Considering the above, this...
Stephen Forde:still doesn't make any sense.
Stephen Forde:I have read about it. Only bits and pieces of what you are saying make sense. Most of it is scattered and disjoint.
Knight_of_BAAWA:Recall: having a class of people against whom it is ok to intiate force requires a reason for the distinction.
Stephen Forde:This is a variation of the universalizability criterion. It doesn't clarify what you mean here...
Knight_of_BAAWA:It's about what you believe. And whether or not you believe it is a matter of truth or falsity.
Stephen Forde:Yeah, whether or not people believe something is a provable matter. And this is how Hoppe gets around the problem. But it doesn't mean that there is no is/ought dichotomy.
Stephen Forde:Its not simple. And no, just because an actor aims at ends, it does not mean that they ought to aim at those ends.
Knight_of_BAAWA: I can't help you any further.
I think that says more about you than it does about me. I've been trying to figure out what you mean for a while, and have an honest discussion, looking for clarifications, but you're just all over the place. I just don't see how you could convince anyone to adopt your position, with your sloppy, lazy, and at some points obnoxious, posts.
Knight_of_BAAWA:I seriously suggest you brush up on your comprehension of English.
It's because of stuff like this that I don't even post that often.
Stephen Forde:I think that says more about you than it does about me.
Enough time wasted.
Knight_of_BAAWA:I've been clear and on-message.
How clear one has been is something determined by the listener, not ones self. In any exchange, we're only successful in trade if the other party feels they have gained value.
In the exchange of ideas, dismissing people's ability to understand, when they have clearly expressed desire to understand, means that there is something flawed in the business model of communicating that idea. Maybe it is the explanation, maybe it is the idea itself.
Either way, it's hard to increase knowledge without effective communication. That might mean better ideas, or simpler explanations. The people who place importance on communication, will spread the most ideas, even the most fallacious and ridiculous ones (like the state promulgates).
If you find something evil that wobbles, push it. - Gary North
It isn't, but all it really shows is that, as a matter of deduction, if facts are not laden with values, then no value can be deduced from them. That's it. Whether facts are so laden or not is an ontological question, not one proponents of the "ought-is" gap can assume without argument. So it's valid in its weaker sense, absolutely question-begging in its stronger sense.
To darkness I condemn you...
liberty student:How clear one has been is something determined by the listener
words are ethically neutral. only actions can be judged.
GilesStratton: Knight_of_BAAWA: Yes. But how does my arguing show anything other than control over my own body, which is different from ownership of.
Knight_of_BAAWA: Yes.
Yes.
But how does my arguing show anything other than control over my own body, which is different from ownership of.
Arguing shows that you allow your interlocutor control over his body, otherwise he could not participate in the argument and your act would be pointless.
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Stranger: GilesStratton: Knight_of_BAAWA: Yes. But how does my arguing show anything other than control over my own body, which is different from ownership of. Arguing shows that you allow your interlocutor control over his body, otherwise he could not participate in the argument and your act would be pointless.
Also an "ought" argument implies an ability to make it so, or not. By asking ought I own my body implies first that someone else can control it at the same level as I do, and also that I am able to cede this control to another.
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