JackCuyler: Donny with an A:To put it simply, if Klemm has two choices -- break in or die -- and we call breaking in immoral, then that entails that we think the moral choice would be to choose death. If we call choosing death immoral, then that entails that we think the moral choice would be to break in. Logical fallacy.
Donny with an A:To put it simply, if Klemm has two choices -- break in or die -- and we call breaking in immoral, then that entails that we think the moral choice would be to choose death. If we call choosing death immoral, then that entails that we think the moral choice would be to break in.
Logical fallacy.
False. As I said earlier (perhaps you missed it):
Jack, the point of a moral system is to inform our actions. If we call some choice or action "immoral," what we have in mind is that the person who did it ought to have done something else. It therefore is not consistent with the nature of morality for all alternatives available to a person to be immoral. Now, you could say that Klemm was immoral to put himself in a position where the most moral thing for him to do would be to break into the cabin. Thus we would say that Klemm did something wrong, but that it wasn't breaking into the cabin; rather, it was choosing to go backpacking.
To put it simply, if Klemm has two choices -- break in or die -- and we call breaking in immoral, then that entails that we think the moral choice would be to choose death. If we call choosing death immoral, then that entails that we think the moral choice would be to break in.
Now, there's an important distinction to be made between "regrettable" and "immoral" here. It is certainly regrettable that Klemm will have to break in or die, and either of these alternatives would produce very regrettable consequences. But to say that an alternative is immoral is to say that one should not choose that alternative, and so to say that all choices are immoral is to say that one should not choose from any of the possible range of choices -- a clearly self-defeating position.
http://libertarian-left.blogspot.com/
Brainpolice: wilderness: Brainpolice: The way that Danny has clarified the scenario for us, Tom is not even remotely present or aware of the situation. It's strictly a question of what it is morally permissible for Klemm to do. The confusion is repeatedly created when you shift the emphasis towards Tom when Danny is posing the question more as one revolving around Klemm. I know this. But as I've said before. Doesn't Tom find out somebody broke into his house? And I remind you, you do not negate it's Tom's cabin. Danny and Sage have actually brought that into question. If I'm not misunderstanding Danny, he's essentially saying that he thinks it is morally permissible for Klemm to break into the Cabin, but this doesn't necessarily mean that Klemm cannot be held liable for restitution to Tom.
wilderness: Brainpolice: The way that Danny has clarified the scenario for us, Tom is not even remotely present or aware of the situation. It's strictly a question of what it is morally permissible for Klemm to do. The confusion is repeatedly created when you shift the emphasis towards Tom when Danny is posing the question more as one revolving around Klemm. I know this. But as I've said before. Doesn't Tom find out somebody broke into his house? And I remind you, you do not negate it's Tom's cabin. Danny and Sage have actually brought that into question.
Brainpolice: The way that Danny has clarified the scenario for us, Tom is not even remotely present or aware of the situation. It's strictly a question of what it is morally permissible for Klemm to do. The confusion is repeatedly created when you shift the emphasis towards Tom when Danny is posing the question more as one revolving around Klemm.
The way that Danny has clarified the scenario for us, Tom is not even remotely present or aware of the situation. It's strictly a question of what it is morally permissible for Klemm to do. The confusion is repeatedly created when you shift the emphasis towards Tom when Danny is posing the question more as one revolving around Klemm.
I know this. But as I've said before. Doesn't Tom find out somebody broke into his house?
And I remind you, you do not negate it's Tom's cabin. Danny and Sage have actually brought that into question.
If I'm not misunderstanding Danny, he's essentially saying that he thinks it is morally permissible for Klemm to break into the Cabin, but this doesn't necessarily mean that Klemm cannot be held liable for restitution to Tom.
Well Danny was all over the place and his thread of posts shows how he switched positions often. He did say Klemm could pay restitution to Tom which therefore means it's Tom's cabin, but Danny could never fully answer if it was Tom's cabin until later in the thread. Sage still can't bring himself to answer yes or no about whether it's Tom's cabin. I gave you links to show how Danny questioned if it was Tom's cabin. Then it turned into a decision Tom couldn't provide, but only a decision Danny could provide that brought up the coercion problem. The problem is simple. Danny is arrogant. He called people lunatics and switched positions so many times. He never apologized and he never would admit his befuddlement and switching of claims on the intellectual exercise.
Danny has a problem with letting Tom answer if it's ok for Klemm to enter upon his cabin in such conditions if Danny feels like even admitting that's it's Tom's cabin.
I say it leave up to Tom whether or not it was ok for Klemm to do this or not. I even brought up earlier that it is good we shuffle through this now to help cultivate a Tom that would help Klemm. But Danny even denied mercy. So I quit trying to figure out Danny cause I don't think Danny knows what Danny thinks.
"I used to see a mountain as a mountain.. Thereafter.. when I saw a mountain; lo! it was not a mountain.. yet now of final tranquillity: I see a mountain just as a mountain as I used to.." - Master Yuan; molon labe
liberty student: Brainpolice:If I'm not misunderstanding Danny, he's essentially saying that he thinks it is morally permissible for Klemm to break into the Cabin, but this doesn't necessarily mean that Klemm cannot be held liable for restitution to Tom. Which begs the question how can a morally permissable act necessitate restitution? How can a morally permissable act create loss?
Brainpolice:If I'm not misunderstanding Danny, he's essentially saying that he thinks it is morally permissible for Klemm to break into the Cabin, but this doesn't necessarily mean that Klemm cannot be held liable for restitution to Tom.
Which begs the question how can a morally permissable act necessitate restitution? How can a morally permissable act create loss?
exactly
And this is the issue for debate between the defenders of the duty of care standard and the defenders of the strict liability standard. If we don't think that Klemm should have chosen to die, and we agree that all things considered, it was best for him to break into the cabin, then by what standard should we hold him liable? The defenders of strict liability have some avenues open to them. One somewhat plausible tack is to contend that the legitimacy of breaking into the cabin is predicated on the subsequent restitutive act. This, however, raises the important question of what would happen if Klemm could not pay; would he be then obligated to die? Another avenue would be to contend that in breaking in, Klemm takes on a duty to do what he can to compensate Tom, and that this duty can be enforced. I tend to find this approach much more plausible.
wilderness: Brainpolice: wilderness: Brainpolice: The way that Danny has clarified the scenario for us, Tom is not even remotely present or aware of the situation. It's strictly a question of what it is morally permissible for Klemm to do. The confusion is repeatedly created when you shift the emphasis towards Tom when Danny is posing the question more as one revolving around Klemm. I know this. But as I've said before. Doesn't Tom find out somebody broke into his house? And I remind you, you do not negate it's Tom's cabin. Danny and Sage have actually brought that into question. If I'm not misunderstanding Danny, he's essentially saying that he thinks it is morally permissible for Klemm to break into the Cabin, but this doesn't necessarily mean that Klemm cannot be held liable for restitution to Tom. Well Danny was all over the place and his thread of posts shows how he switched positions often. He did say Klemm could pay restitution to Tom which therefore means it's Tom's cabin, but Danny could never fully answer if it was Tom's cabin until later in the thread. Sage still can't bring himself to answer yes or no about whether it's Tom's cabin. I gave you links to show how Danny questioned if it was Tom's cabin. Then it turned into a decision Tom couldn't provide, but only a decision Danny could provide that brought up the coercion problem. The problem is simple. Danny is arrogant. He called people lunatics and switched positions so many times. He never apologized and he never would admit his befuddlement and switching of claims on the intellectual exercise. Danny has a problem with letting Tom answer if it's ok for Klemm to enter upon his cabin in such conditions if Danny feels like even admitting that's it's Tom's cabin. I say leave up to Tom whether or not it was ok for Klemm to do this or not. I even brought up earlier that it is good we shuffle through this now to help cultivate a Tom that would help Klemm. But Danny even denied mercy. So I quit trying to figure out Danny cause I don't think Danny knows what Danny thinks.
I say leave up to Tom whether or not it was ok for Klemm to do this or not. I even brought up earlier that it is good we shuffle through this now to help cultivate a Tom that would help Klemm. But Danny even denied mercy. So I quit trying to figure out Danny cause I don't think Danny knows what Danny thinks.
It seems like the fundamental issue, therefore, is that you're argueing from the assumption that Tom's pre-existing property right in the Cabin grants him absolute decision-making power over the situation, while Danny is talking about the question of whether or not it is morally permissible for Kemm to break into the Cabin. Furthermore, the way that Danny has presented the scenario, Tom simply has no decision-making power as to whether or not it is permissible for Klemm to break in - Tom is not even present or aware of the situation. It therefore doesn't seem to make much sense to repeatedly cite Tom's ownership of the cabin and to claim that it's up to Tom when it is simply logistically impossible for Tom to make a decision about the matter during the situation in question. Danny is making a query into Klemm's moral permissibility - it's not a question of Tom's decision-making power in this context, it is a more fundamental question about what it is permissible for Klemm to do. Additionally, as has been established, the question of whether or not Klemm should be held liable for damages is a separate question from the initial moral permissibility of the act. From what I gather, Danny approaches the matter more from the perspective of moral permissability rather than "duty", and he relies on an important distinction between moral permissiblity and moral obligation.
Brainpolice: It seems like the fundamental issue, therefore, is that you're argueing from the assumption that Tom's pre-existing property right in the Cabin grants him absolute decision-making power over the situation,
It seems like the fundamental issue, therefore, is that you're argueing from the assumption that Tom's pre-existing property right in the Cabin grants him absolute decision-making power over the situation,
Somewhat. I'm not for cruel and unusual punishment.
Brainpolice: while Danny is talking about the question of whether or not it is morally permissible for Kemm to break into the Cabin.
while Danny is talking about the question of whether or not it is morally permissible for Kemm to break into the Cabin.
Danny doesn't include Tom's decision, so, yes, which lead Danny to confuse whether it's Tom's cabin or not and led Danny to coerce Tom into a decision. This is why Danny has fumbled liberty and I haven't. Now if we are going to inquire repercussions and if any argument of lose of liberty occurs in that act - that is a whole other scenario that it seems Danny and you are not questioning. Yet I see at times you are. A fine line indeed.
Brainpolice: Furthermore, the way that Danny has presented the scenario, Tom simply has no decision-making power as to whether or not it is permissible for Klemm to break in - Tom is not even present or aware of the situation.
Furthermore, the way that Danny has presented the scenario, Tom simply has no decision-making power as to whether or not it is permissible for Klemm to break in - Tom is not even present or aware of the situation.
Well even after the fact, Tom finds out and Danny still doesn't want Tom to be apart of decision-making power.
Brainpolice: It therefore doesn't seem to make much sense to repeatedly cite Tom's ownership of the cabin and to claim that it's up to Tom when it is simply logistically impossible for Tom to make a decision about the matter during the situation in question.
It therefore doesn't seem to make much sense to repeatedly cite Tom's ownership of the cabin and to claim that it's up to Tom when it is simply logistically impossible for Tom to make a decision about the matter during the situation in question.
It is up to Tom when Tom finds out.
Brainpolice: Danny is making a query into Klemm's moral permissibility - it's not a question of Tom's decision-making power in this context, it is a moral fundamental question about what it is permissible for Klemm to do.
Danny is making a query into Klemm's moral permissibility - it's not a question of Tom's decision-making power in this context, it is a moral fundamental question about what it is permissible for Klemm to do.
I said it is an intellectual exercise, but Danny refuses to let Tom have a say at any point in time. That is not to be left out. I find Tom's perspective to be apart of the inquiry of repercussions by the way. The scenario has something to do with Tom. Tom is not dead.
Ok not that anyone cares, but here's my take on the variations of the last loaf of bread scenario.
Why this gets all muddied is because ethics are derived from our evolution. Protection (nurturing) and coercion (sexual aggression) are resultant from reproduction. We usually consider scenarios of common aggression and libertarians fall on the side of protection. But the last loaf of bread scenario invokes survival, and it becomes less clear. All that said, I'm not asserting that hunger creates a positive right, I'm just saying why it's intuitively problematic.
The simple fact is that even most libertarians would attempt to steal the loaf if they were starving to death. I'm not asserting that makes it moral. The simple fact is also that almost all libertarians would shoot the guy trying to steal their last loaf of bread. And given limited information a policeman with his own loaf of bread (and so not in the competition) would have to side with property rights.
But I don't think this is really the proper scope for libertarian thought. Any libertarian with a scarce loaf would have taken measures to stop a potential thief, and from an evolutionary standpoint we aren't descended from those that did not take those measures.
And from a meta-ethical standpoint we needn't address it. Libertarian thought is not properly about individual ethics, what libertarian would abdicate his individual ethics? It's about the ethics of collective activity. Certainly if anything should be free from coercion, it should be thought. Therefore it follows that ethics should be 'consensual' as well, especially as regards collective action. The proper role of government is therefore, ideally, what everyone agrees that it is. Of course this has been historically impractical to determine, but I think the USCon was a first stab at localizing collective power to minimize the number of people subject to the enforcement of ethics, ie laws, that they did not consent to. The federal govt was merely granted power to do the things ethics all the member states agreed to, based on their respective ethics and philosophies. Obviously we've gone drastically astray since then, but that's not the discussion.
Today I think it would be possible to minimize more optimally the incidence of individuals being subject to ethics to which they do not consent. Ideally an individual or group of individuals should be able to announce secession from any policitcal unit and cease to be subject to the benefits and obligations of that association. If this action violates any contracts to which they are party.. well they had best have previously made a new association which might afford some protection:)
In this I expose I am not an AC but merely a libertarian, because I do believe people should be free to engage in voluntary collective action. I understand this always leaves the risk of voluntary collective action of aggression toward a third party, but the other choice is coercive up front, because a purely AC society would not remain so for long without some coercion. People will always find some activity they wish to engage in collectively, and it will not always be corporate.
So the loaf of bread? I don't think it's ethically operant as regards libertarian thought, because in this scenario these two parties ethics are impossible to reconcile and if they cannot agree to some set of ethics then there can tautologically be no consent. The loaf of bread is the philosophical equivalent of X/0 in real math. It's an undefined singularity, but that's not because libertarian thought is flawed, it's just not really evolved to address this. We don't need a philosophy to know what to do when there's one loaf of bread and two people left, our biology has equipped us quite well to answer this question:)
Donny with an A: liberty student: Brainpolice:If I'm not misunderstanding Danny, he's essentially saying that he thinks it is morally permissible for Klemm to break into the Cabin, but this doesn't necessarily mean that Klemm cannot be held liable for restitution to Tom. Which begs the question how can a morally permissable act necessitate restitution? How can a morally permissable act create loss? And this is the issue for debate between the defenders of the duty of care standard and the defenders of the strict liability standard. If we don't think that Klemm should have chosen to die, and we agree that all things considered, it was best for him to break into the cabin, then by what standard should we hold him liable? The defenders of strict liability have some avenues open to them. One somewhat plausible tack is to contend that the legitimacy of breaking into the cabin is predicated on the subsequent restitutive act.
And this is the issue for debate between the defenders of the duty of care standard and the defenders of the strict liability standard. If we don't think that Klemm should have chosen to die, and we agree that all things considered, it was best for him to break into the cabin, then by what standard should we hold him liable? The defenders of strict liability have some avenues open to them. One somewhat plausible tack is to contend that the legitimacy of breaking into the cabin is predicated on the subsequent restitutive act.
"restitutive act" again with your inquiry of repercussions when you feel like it and dismiss as something in question at other times. Stay focused.
Donny with an A: This, however, raises the important question of what would happen if Klemm could not pay; would he be then obligated to die?
This, however, raises the important question of what would happen if Klemm could not pay; would he be then obligated to die?
inquiry of repercussion yet again. Klemm can break into a cabin, can't Klemm labor? He is physically fit enough to backpack. Or are you going to change the scenario again as you are trying to do here again.
Donny with an A: Another avenue would be to contend that in breaking in, Klemm takes on a duty to do what he can to compensate Tom, and that this duty can be enforced. I tend to find this approach much more plausible.
Another avenue would be to contend that in breaking in, Klemm takes on a duty to do what he can to compensate Tom, and that this duty can be enforced. I tend to find this approach much more plausible.
Well you are inquiring types of repercussion so good for you that it's plausible.
This isn't true - he aknowledged Tom's decision-making power in terms of restitution just above.
That's ex-post-facto. It is confusing and problematic that you keep shifting the context to Tom's *reaction* to the scenario after it occurs. The question of moral permissibility is not ex-post-facto. The question is: is it permissible (not according to Tom, but to principles or argumentation) for Klemm to break into the cabin? The question is posed for *when the scenario occurs*, not afterwards, and you're expected to provide an argument (not an appeal to the authority of Tom) for whether or not it is morally permissible for Klemm to break in. The fact that Tom can demand restitution after the scenario occurs is a separate question from whether or not it is morally permissible for Klemm to break in during the scenario.
Donny with an A:If we don't think that Klemm should have chosen to die, and we agree that all things considered, it was best for him to break into the cabin, then by what standard should we hold him liable?
This is just a re-wording of the problem as I explained it. Why would we think Klemm should engage in activity that makes him liable?
Also "Klemm should have chosen to die" is a non-sequitur. Klemm can chose to kill himself anytime, even after he enters Tom's cabin. Nature is making this call.
This is Klemm vs. Nature, not Klemm vs. Tom, unless Klemm chooses to make it so.
Donny with an A:Another avenue would be to contend that in breaking in, Klemm takes on a duty to do what he can to compensate Tom, and that this duty can be enforced.
This is a one-sided transaction however. How can it be morally permissable for Klemm to engage Tom in a transaction without his knowledge or consent?
You've added nothing to the discussion, again.
If you find something evil that wobbles, push it. - Gary North
Brainpolice: This isn't true - he aknowledged Tom's decision-making power in terms of restitution just above.
Yeah but Danny says this has nothing to do with repercussions either. So Danny's on his own.
Brainpolice: That's ex-post-facto. It is confusing and problematic that you keep shifting to Tom's *reaction*
That's ex-post-facto. It is confusing and problematic that you keep shifting to Tom's *reaction*
um, you just said it is within Tom's decision-making power above, and now you say it's not cause you say it's confusing. Well then you're the one confused cause you say it's up to Tom and here you say it's not. Stay focused.
Brainpolice: to the scenario after it occurs. The question of moral permissibility is not ex-post-facto. The question is: is it permissible (not according to Tom, but to principles or argumentation) for Klemm to break into the cabin?
to the scenario after it occurs. The question of moral permissibility is not ex-post-facto. The question is: is it permissible (not according to Tom, but to principles or argumentation) for Klemm to break into the cabin?
So it's within Tom's decision-making power, but it's not. Your dilemma.
Brainpolice: The question is posed for *when the scenario occurs*, not afterwards, and you're expected to provide an argument (not an appeal to the authority of Tom) for whether or not it is morally permissible for Klemm to break in.
The question is posed for *when the scenario occurs*, not afterwards, and you're expected to provide an argument (not an appeal to the authority of Tom) for whether or not it is morally permissible for Klemm to break in.
It's Tom's property. Tom is the authority of his property, not you, Danny, or me. It is Tom's.
No, I've been trying to explain a number of distinctions to you for pages that you have not yet grasped. You're conflating the question of whether or not Tom can demand restitution and whether or not it is morally permissible for Klemm to break in.
I don't face a dilemma - I'm explaining a distinction of questions to you, and it's not registering. For the millionth time: whether or not Tom has decision-making power to demand restitution is not the same thing as the question as to whether or not it is morally permissible for Klemm to break in. The proposition that it is morally permissible for Klemm to break in does not in and of itself negate the proposition that Tom can demand restitution.
Again, you have to provide an argument, not an appeal to authority. The fact that it's Tom's property is not an argument in and of itself against the moral permissibility of Klemm breaking in. You are expected to provide an actual moral argument against the permissibility of Klemm breaking in, and have yet to actually provide one - you just keep repeating that it's Tom's property and shifting the context to a restitutional issue that *noone is argueing against*.
Where my own separate yet related argument in this thread comes into play is in pointing out that if one truly does take such an absolutist appeal to authority approach to property rights (I.E. that the legitimacy of possession grants absolute decision-making power to the owner), then one ends up with the reductio ad absurdums I was talking about earlier in this thread - it reduces to the same level as the "love it or leave it" argument for states and it reduces "property rights" to an argument for any kind of authoritarianism that one can imagine. So it seems to me that the true dillema here is yours: either accept the implications of a "the legitimacy of possession grants absolute decision-making power" approach to property rights, or modify one's theory of property rights to avoid such internal conflicts while consistently respecting individual liberty.
Juan: GilesStratton:You guys are definately winning here, after having dealt Danny, Sage and BP a crushing blow, If we're going to stick to some, uh, objectivity, I think it must be pointed out that Brainpolice's position is not the same as Danny's (as far as I can tell).At some point Brainpolice brought up the shoot-the-gum-stealing-child scenario, which is definitely different from what Danny is talking about. I don't think Brainpolice is trying to justify attacks on property in the name of some ridiculous intellectual game ? Or is he ? Giles:[alleged objectivists] who think the fact that I drink beer is "irrational"... LOL. What qualifies as wholly irrational, Giles, are your conservative rantings while at same time being a drug user. You might want to delude yourself into thinking that some drugs are good(beer) while other drugs are bad(...) but you have no rational basis for such distinction.
GilesStratton:You guys are definately winning here, after having dealt Danny, Sage and BP a crushing blow,
Giles:[alleged objectivists] who think the fact that I drink beer is "irrational"...
Apparently, Juan, you missed my point. My point was not that they're talking about the same thing, merely that LS et al are displaying the same unwarranted arrogance towards all of them.
As for my tastes of drinks, I'm sure that whatever beverage I drink (tap water included) I'm going to be putting some sort of dangerous chemical into my body, but the distinction between injection heroin into myself and drinking a few bottles of beer or perhaps some wine is obvious. When will likely kill you after a while, the other will not. My fondness of beer doesn't entail drinking four kegs of it in one sitting, although, I'm certainly man enough to do if I really wanted to.
liberty student:Ah yes, the "libertarians are bad" ticket. Where have I heard this before?
liberty student:Strawman
liberty student: You have been beating the objectivist drum for days now, posting homo economicus over and over and it is very funny. It doesn't seem to me that you know what objectivism is, or where objectivists would place themselves in these debates. Have you read anything written by Rand?
You have been beating the objectivist drum for days now, posting homo economicus over and over and it is very funny. It doesn't seem to me that you know what objectivism is, or where objectivists would place themselves in these debates.
Have you read anything written by Rand?
I don't really care where you've heard the "libertarians are bad" ticket before (though, if you're into objectivism I can think of one or two places). I didn't even say that libertarians tend to be "bad", just that they tend to be emotionally and socially retarded. This topic warrants such an assertion in my opinion (with nir claiming that the father should watch his two children die and the rest of you high fiving one another afterwards). I also think libertarians would be profoundly dissatisfied with their chosen society, but that's quite besides the point. And whilst it may not be entirely accurate that you think it is moral that the man should watch his children die (although Danny made a good response to Jack wrt this), it's not too far off.
Unfortunately I have read The Virtue of Selfishness, now, I'm going to state right now that I'm no philosopher, nor do I aspire to be. But that was a shocking piece of work. It was really poor, and that is excluding the baseless assertions, blatant appeals to the emotion (yes, emotions) questionable (to say the least) psychology, countless equivocations, strawmen (I lost count of how many times completely different positions were conflated) and numerous non sequiturs, if you include those the work was appalling. It would be charitable (and I know, I know, charity is a sin or whatever) to say that the work was replete with fallacies and to say nothing else. If there was one saving grace I suppose it would be that it wasn't longer.
I think my charge of homo economicus is quite warranted to be honest. The two might not be identical (for example, the Objectivist man must smoke and must be an atheist). But there are a worrying number of similarities, such as the notion that reason can inform the ends that we choose (amongst others), especially in light of Rothbard's description of the objectivism "movement".
Harry Felker:1. Is it a funny racist joke?
Yes (and no, Guiness is terrible).
liberty student:I'm fairly certain Giles is talking about me. He's angry that Daddy debunked his pet theory about gays and time preference, so now he is going to be an insolent teenager, storming around the house with his fists clenched, slamming doors and kicking furniture.
Now, now, just because you're an egoist that does not warrant such egocentric behaviour. This actually has nothing to do with you, just, people buying into bad "philosophy", namely, objectivism. Funny thing is, I've found more profound philosophy of Back to the Drawing Board than I did in the entirety of TVS (all things considered, that not such a big compliment).
For the record, you still haven't "debunked my theory". You're just displaying the same arrogance you have elsewhere, perhaps some humility might do you well.
"You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows"
Bob Dylan
GilesStratton:(with nir claiming that the father should watch his two children die and the rest of you high fiving one another afterwards)
well, fathers should take steps to keep their children alive with legitimate moral means.
what I advocate is a moral standard that would allow fathers to look after their children in general although as acknowledge there is a logical possibility of exceptional cases which might seem to you stark or tragic.
what those advocates, who would erode the system of property in favour of emergency rights for desperate fathers do, is institute a system whereby the means for fathers in general to care for their children are eroded. so for the sake of trying to mop up theoretical exceptions, you institute a general decline in welfare. you institute a system where fathers cant afford to feed their kids, and there is no bread to be stolen from as there is no system of private property to bring it about.
even rule-utilitarians get this kind of stuff...
do you appreciate that although Soviet Socialists claimed superiority over western individualist capitalist counterparts, not least in issues of child poverty, industrial worker poverty, worker healthcare worker education, the "socialisation solution", the "erode property rights solution", led them inevitably to be worse at exactly these things that they aspired to be better at.
I put it to you that if you want fathers to feed their sons, promote an absolutist morality, and an approximation of your real world is brought closer to fruition. do the opposite and erode private property and you will have played apart in the death and misery of children of fathers. emotive enough for you?
so libertarians are good. socialists are bad. I should probably be banned from Mises forums for writing that, neh?
Giles, when did you stop calling yourself libertarian....?
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Brainpolice: No, I've been trying to explain a number of distinctions to you for pages that you have not yet grasped. You're conflating the question of whether or not Tom can demand restitution and whether or not it is morally permissible for Klemm to break in.
you don't grasp... If it's not about Tom's decision-making power then don't say it is. Obviously you trip over yourself.
Brainpolice: I don't face a dilemma - I'm explaining a distinction of questions to you, and it's not registering. For the millionth time: whether or not tom has decision-making power to demand restitution is not the same thing as the question as to whether or not it is morally permissible for Klemm to break in.
I don't face a dilemma - I'm explaining a distinction of questions to you, and it's not registering. For the millionth time: whether or not tom has decision-making power to demand restitution is not the same thing as the question as to whether or not it is morally permissible for Klemm to break in.
Let Tom figure it out. We can sit in the stadium seats all we want and protest and cheer. I've already said what I would do. Aren't you for individual sovereignty? You need to start showing it cause you're miserably failing in that regard.
Brainpolice: Again, you have to provide an argument, not an appeal to authority.
Again, you have to provide an argument, not an appeal to authority.
I don't need to do anything. I don't tell my neighbor what to do, unless, as I've said rights have been violated counter to NAP and questions of cruel and unusual punishment arise. In a society that recognizes rights and has decided upon types of repercussion the law steps in.
Brainpolice: The fact that it's Tom's property is not an argument in and of itself
The fact that it's Tom's property is not an argument in and of itself
I never exclude Klemm, but you disapprove of Tom's voice thus teeter upon coercing Tom.
Brainpolice: against the moral permissibility of Klemm breaking in.
against the moral permissibility of Klemm breaking in.
It's up to Tom. As I said hopefully Tom's not an ass.
Brainpolice: You are expected to provide an actual moral argument against the permissibility of Klemm breaking in, and have yet to actually provide one - you just keep repeating that it's Tom's property and shifting the context to a restitutional issue.
You are expected to provide an actual moral argument against the permissibility of Klemm breaking in, and have yet to actually provide one - you just keep repeating that it's Tom's property and shifting the context to a restitutional issue.
Seeing that Tom is not even around. Tom could only object after the fact. This is a personal issue of Klemm's, unless the law shows up and brings Klemm in. Then Klemm can pay restitution if Tom so wants. Outside of Tom performing anything cruelly against Klemm, the community would have no need to charge to Klemm's side. Yet Tom can't even do anything cruelly against Klemm. Tom's not around. Nobody is around. Klemm's on his own in a personal experience.
Klemm broke into somebody's cabin unless of course Klemm is willing to pay the consequences which via justice all debts are removed.
Again it's up to Tom. You can't force Tom to do anything.
GilesStratton:Apparently, Juan, you missed my point. My point was not that they're talking about the same thing, merely that LS et al are displaying the same unwarranted arrogance towards all of them.
Oh that's rich. Someone else is arrogant according to Giles, the master of humility.
GilesStratton:I also think libertarians would be profoundly dissatisfied with their chosen society, but that's quite besides the point.
Both the latter and the former are true.
GilesStratton:And whilst it may not be entirely accurate that you think it is moral that the man should watch his children die (although Danny made a good response to Jack wrt this), it's not too far off.
I'm just following the ten commandments Giles. It is thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal, not "thou shalt steal so thou doest not die".
It doesn't get a lot more absolute than "thou shalt not steal". I find it hard to believe that a non-objectivist Christian would promote aggression, when clearly the example of Christ was a life of tolerance and peace, not violence and compromise.
GilesStratton:But there are a worrying number of similarities, such as the notion that reason can inform the ends that we choose
I'm surprised that one would propose reason cannot inform the ends that we choose. What are we relying on? A galactic puppeteer? Mystical energies? Fate? Prophecy?
GilesStratton:Now, now, just because you're an egoist that does not warrant such egocentric behaviour.
I'll never feel bad about being right. Guilt is a tool used by inferior people to level the playing field without merit. Which is precisely what you are doing right now. Rather than making an argument on merit, you have tried to engage in emotional rhetoric.
GilesStratton:For the record, you still haven't "debunked my theory". You're just displaying the same arrogance you have elsewhere, perhaps some humility might do you well.
No, I debunked Hoppe's theory. Like most of the stuff you subscribe to, it is based on an anachronism, and doesn't transcend the specific conditions the idea is conceived under.
Keep fuming Giles. No sense in only burning down your bedroom, might as well torch the whole house.
I'm about ready to strangle both Klemm and Tom at this stage...
To darkness I condemn you...
Jon Irenicus: I'm about ready to strangle both Klemm and Tom at this stage...
I'll supply the noose.
I am becoming a Burkean Whig.
- F.A. Hayek
wilderness: Brainpolice: No, I've been trying to explain a number of distinctions to you for pages that you have not yet grasped. You're conflating the question of whether or not Tom can demand restitution and whether or not it is morally permissible for Klemm to break in. you don't grasp... If it's not about Tom's decision-making power then don't say it is. Obviously you trip over yourself. Brainpolice: I don't face a dilemma - I'm explaining a distinction of questions to you, and it's not registering. For the millionth time: whether or not tom has decision-making power to demand restitution is not the same thing as the question as to whether or not it is morally permissible for Klemm to break in. Let Tom figure it out. We can sit in the stadium seats all we want and protest and cheer. I've already said what I would do. Aren't you for individual sovereignty? You need to start showing it cause you're miserably failing in that regard. Brainpolice: Again, you have to provide an argument, not an appeal to authority. I don't need to do anything. I don't tell my neighbor what to do, unless, as I've said rights have been violated counter to NAP and questions of cruel and unusual punishment arise. In a society that recognizes rights and has decided upon types of repercussion the law steps in. Brainpolice: The fact that it's Tom's property is not an argument in and of itself I never exclude Klemm, but you disapprove of Tom's voice thus teeter upon coercing Tom. Brainpolice: against the moral permissibility of Klemm breaking in. It's up to Tom. As I said hopefully Tom's not an ass. Brainpolice: You are expected to provide an actual moral argument against the permissibility of Klemm breaking in, and have yet to actually provide one - you just keep repeating that it's Tom's property and shifting the context to a restitutional issue. Seeing that Tom is not even around. Tom could only object after the fact. This is a personal issue of Klemm's, unless the law shows up and brings Klemm in. Then Klemm can pay restitution if Tom so wants. Outside of Tom performing anything cruelly against Klemm, the community would have no need to charge to Klemm's side. Yet Tom can't even do anything cruelly against Klemm. Tom's not around. Nobody is around. Klemm's on his own in a personal experience. I don't need to provide a moral argument against Klemm? Klemm broke into somebody's cabin unless of course Klemm is willing to pay the consequences which via justice all debts are removed. Again it's up to Tom. You can't force Tom to do anything.
I don't need to provide a moral argument against Klemm? Klemm broke into somebody's cabin unless of course Klemm is willing to pay the consequences which via justice all debts are removed.
You're missing the point. This is how rational argumentation works, and you're avoiding having to actually provide an argument. You're being reactionary and are demonstrating a total lack of comprehension of the what the people you are argueing with are saying. Noone is proposing to force Tom to do anything, they are asking if it is morally permissible for Klemm to break into the cabin, and you have not provided an argument beyond an appeal to authority, and you've continually strawmanned. Noone is saying that you have to tell your neightbor what to do: I'm asking you to actually provide a rational argument about whether or not it is morally permissible for Klemm to break into the cabin - that's how formal debate works. As for Klemm, I have not argued that the answer to the philosophical question of moral permissibility is up to Klemm any more than it is Tom: What Klemm and Tom think are irrelevant to us here, on a message board, trying to answer the question ourselves. By repeatedly missing the point and misunderstanding the arguments, you have continued to talk about the ex-post-facto question of restitution while completely avoiding answering the question being asked. It's more than annoying.
I've practically written a book to you on this already (I didn't even initially spawn the topic, I've mostly been merely clarifying the terms of the debate for you ad nauseum and in vain) and yet you still don't get it!
Answer the question already: is Klemm morally obligated to die in the name of respecting Tom's property rights, and if so, please provide a rational argument for why - not a mere statement of the fact that it's Tom's property and not a shift of context to the question of whether or not Tom can demand restitution from Klemm if Klemm breaks into the cabin. Or is it morally permissible for Klemm to break in, and if so, please provide a rational argument for why.
laminustacitus: Jon Irenicus: I'm about ready to strangle both Klemm and Tom at this stage... I'll supply the noose.
so long as its not a stolen noose,
.. or a noose necessary for the sustenance of the children....
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