First, I’ll note that my source for Nozick’s argument is the Stanford Philosophical Encyclopedia (entry on Distributive Justice), not Nozick himself.
According to that source Nozick employs the proviso (that acquisition is only just only if “enough and as good” is left for others) to counter the objection that “it is not clear why the first people to acquire some part of the material world should be able to exclude others from it.” (quote from the SPE)
I am confused as the proviso seems to imply some sort of obligation to all other people and that other people have some sort of prior claim on the material world.
If land is originally unowned and the first user/mixer of labor establishes a superior claim by that first use/mixing of labor, why should he or she owe any obligation to others not to take too much? How do these late-comers have any sort of claim if land is unowned?
Apart from these questions, I'd like to know:
1. Does the SPE misstate Nozick’s claim?
2. Am I misunderstanding something?
3. Are there any newer, different, more convincing conceptions of Lockean homesteading?
4. What other libertarian philosophers should I consult (other than Rothbard and Hoppe – I am aware of them and plan to consult them soon) on this issue?
Nope, he does believe that, and it's part and parcel of the original Lockean propertarian theory. David Schmidtz has an extended refutation of it in his book Elements of Justice, which is recommended reading. Basically he points out that it is latecomers who benefit most from propertarian norms, as capitalist societies transform resources into wealth.
To darkness I condemn you...
Am I right in saying that by employing the proviso Nozick (and whoever else uses it) is implicitly saying that all people have some sort of claim of the material world?
This in turn seems to undermine the premise of "originally unowned land". Am I right in my analysis?
Further, why does Nozick feel the need to use the proviso? If land is unowned does not coming first supply the superior claim?
p.s. - I'm not merely being lazy by asking, I'd just prefer to engage in dialogue so that others may point out my flawed reasoning.
p.s.s. - Okay, I am being a little bit lazy...
I don't know, it's been ages since I've read Nozick or Locke. I don't think absent some pre-existing common patrimonial right to the world that the proviso makes much sense. Keep in mind that what improvements have to be done to resources to come under ownership will be a matter of intersubjective agreement, meaning courts will generally go by local standards for what counts as sufficient for recognizing appropriation, so there might yet be a way to sneak in the proviso.
Thanks for the reply and book recommendation Jon.
Locke’s proviso required that there be “enough and as good left in common for others”. But Nozick reads it more strcitly, as that “the situation of others is not worsened”; and David Gauthier as “not taking advantage of others”. Nozick, like Locke, recognises that everybody's situations is likely to be improved and not worsened by the use made of the appropriated resources; because of this, private appropriation will mostly be legitimate since not worsening the situation of others. Actually, appropriation is assumed to be valid unless it worsens their situation; the same apply in a more limited way to legitimate transfers, in order to avoid moral catastrophies. As soon as the proviso is violated, the appropriation is deemed unjust and submitted to the ordinary rules of compensatory justice; i.e., the person whose situation has been worsened needs to be brought back to a point on the same indifference curve as they were before the appropriation took place.
Beside Nozick himself and Gauthier's Morals by Agreement, you might also want to read Israel Kirzner; who adopts a 'finders-keepers' principle of acquisition that allows him to circumvent the proviso by excluding discovery from its scope. See, in particular: Discovery, Capitalism, and Distributive Justice and The Meaning of Market Process.
Hoping this helps..
David Gauthier as “not taking advantage of others”
That's so vague though. Does he attempt to flesh it out a bit more?
Jon Irenicus: David Gauthier as “not taking advantage of others” That's so vague though. Does he attempt to flesh it out a bit more?
Yes, he does so at length -;)
Gauthier deals with the issue of rights and the proviso as the initial bargaining position for cooperative social interactions, in an entire chapter of the book (chapter VII). The main idea is that agreement is based on mutual benefit and reciprocity; hence, you end up deriving agreed upon morals from a pure rational choice process. The role of the proviso is to fix people’s initial endowments and Gauthier argues that these need to have been acquired “without taking advantage of any other person – or, more precisely, of any other co-operator”. The justification he puts forward is that, in the absence of such a proviso in the initial acquisition of goods, the persons who have been taken advantage of will consider the resulting society unfair; which would undermine the rational grounds to accept market arrangements and voluntary co-operation.
What concerns his interpretation of the proviso, he first goes on analysing the original formulation given by Locke and dismisses a literal reading of it for being unmanageable; in the sense that it would undercut any appropriation and the world would remain owned in common. Hence, he rather adopts Nozick’s (stricter) interpretation; which doesn’t present the same problem. Yet, because Locke allows ranking one’s preservation above that of others, he slightly modifies Nozick’s version of the proviso by further restricting its scope, “so that it prohibits worsening the situation of others except where this is necessary to avoid worsening one’s own position” or “bettering one’s situation through interaction that worsens the situation of another”. And this constitutes, for him, the core idea of “not taking advantage of others” [see, in particular, pp. 201-205].
I suppose it makes sense if you're a contractarian. Personally I prefer Nozick's historical approach, sans the proviso.
So, do i - both for the historical approach and because it is rights-based, unlike Gauthier's theory. But with the proviso, as Nozick construes it; in the sense that it allows avoiding catastrophic scenarios with which i'm not feeling confortable (like a monopoly over the only water hole in a desert, the example he adopts), while still permetting a good deal of appropriation in less extreme conditions and providing a serious grounding for property-rights.
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