katja328: Wow! So you don't think that understanding what caused the boom bust cycle would not help? You don't think having the knowledge of what causes boom bust cycles allows a company to better make business decisions?
Wow! So you don't think that understanding what caused the boom bust cycle would not help? You don't think having the knowledge of what causes boom bust cycles allows a company to better make business decisions?
1) You made a strawman argument. Don't do that again.
2) Keynesians are science geeks. They want to know everything about economics. I was arguing that EVEN if the only thing GDP was good for was telling us current economic conditions it would be useful. (Obviously I believe GDP is far more useful than that and that we can' and do make predictions about what causes it to fluctuate and the underlying dynamics involved)
3) Wow! You play World of Warcraft and think computers best use is for online videogames. (This was an illustration of a Strawman)
Ixtellor
Jon Irenicus:I don't know if the physicists are to blame for that nonsense - usually it's popularizers of science who cannot get that the entity can be measured either as a particle or a wave,
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Ixtellor: 1) You made a strawman argument. Don't do that again.
slight difference between argument and question
Sometimes "majority" simply means that all the fools are on the same side
2) Is there a PM function so I don't have to spam this thread?
Yes. Go to the member''s profile, you may PM him/her from there.
3) You should get a PhD in economics and develop prediction models based on your a priori. ( I imagine its like a member of Westboro, who would view it as entering into devilhood and thus refuses)
Austrians interested in econometrics are already doing so in that group I mentioned, so speak with them if this stuff interests you.
4) Is there a composite list of a priori that Austrians do accept? I saw the NAP, it seems logical and moral. Are there others?
Just the basics: the law of identity, the law of contradiction (corollary of the former), inferential reasoning and the action axiom.
To darkness I condemn you...
Jon Irenicus: Ixtellor: Its like Newtons laws of motion. They were INCREDIBLE, they could accuratly predict a large number of confusing phenoms in the world. Then one day we discovered the theory had problems, so it was replaced with Einsteins theorys. Which have further been changed by quantom mechanics, and quantom mechanics are amazingly accurate. However they don't work in certain scenarios (read Big Bang), and thus even quantom mechanics which seems to have near perfect accuracy and predictibility, is UNTRUE. Which is to say man is fallible. Fascinating. Anything you want to inform us philosophers of that we've not heard before?
Ixtellor: Its like Newtons laws of motion. They were INCREDIBLE, they could accuratly predict a large number of confusing phenoms in the world. Then one day we discovered the theory had problems, so it was replaced with Einsteins theorys. Which have further been changed by quantom mechanics, and quantom mechanics are amazingly accurate. However they don't work in certain scenarios (read Big Bang), and thus even quantom mechanics which seems to have near perfect accuracy and predictibility, is UNTRUE.
Well, it simply means that theories (read: forms of insight) are relevant within a certain domain or context, but become unclear when extended into new ones.
Juan:Also, it's worth noting that so called 'modern physics' is built on the same radical empiricism that Ixtellor is championing here. Basically (a lot of) physicists believe that experimental data prove things like non-determinism, or the existence of observer-created reality, or that the law of non-contradiction doesn't apply, as in entities are "waves/particles" or cats are both alive and dead.
I think this is a gross misrepresentation of what many "modern physicists" believe, tbh.
Jon Irenicus: I don't know if the physicists are to blame for that nonsense - usually it's popularizers of science who cannot get that the entity can be measured either as a particle or a wave, i.e. it possesses properties that both normally exhibit. That isn't to say it is both a particle and not a particle and both a wave and not a wave, it's to say that it is something else and has a mixture of properties. If physicists are championing that nonsense interpretation though, they're being very intellectually irresponsible. Here's a good comment I found on this from comment on a book review: This reviewer confuses the mathematical formalism of quantum theory with its 'real world' interpretation. All the experimental evidence shows is that 'particle' and 'wave' are not mutually exclusive categories with respect to the properties of objects, or put another way, that a physical object can have properties that resemble both classical particle and classical wave properties. Thinking that the two categories are exclusive is a prejudice of our everyday experience and if you reflect on it for a while, you'll see that you CAN NOT derive this exclusivity by logic or pure thought alone- what reason can you give that something shouldn't be able to exhibit both kinds of properties? The entity is NEITHER PARTICLE NOR WAVE, but something else that has properties that are attributable to both classical waves and particles. Modern quantum field theory thinks of and represents particles as the quanta of specific quantum fields. Since the representation and description of a field carries wave-like properties with it, the quanta, being localized but nonetheless part of the field, have both particle-like and wave-like properties. That the object is in two states at the same time is a confusing and incorrect linguistic description of the fact that in the formalism, the 'state' of that object would be the sum of two vector 'states' in the framework of a Hilbert space- the resultant state of the object being the 'superposition' of the other two states. But no one knows what 'superposition' represents in the 'real' world- indeed, the interpretation of quantum mechanics was a taboo subject from when the theory was founded up until a few decades ago, when physicists and philosophers broke out of positivist hangover and began to try to figure out what's 'really going on.' That an object cannot be red all over and green all over is just as valid today as it ever was- it's just an implicit statement of the law of non-contradiction. One of the main differences in logical propositions verses ones that are empirical is that we can imagine what would falsify the empirical propositions. This seems to be impossible to do for logical propositions. Although I am aware of some who think there are actual mathematically existing contradictions (see books by Graham Priest for example), I find this unthinkable, and since no one has figured out how that could be of any real use yet, it remains a formal proposition with no content. I still agree with Gottlob Frege that the discovery that someone rejects a logical law, like the principle of non-contradiction, would be the discovery of a hitherto unknown form of madness. Most remarks like this are the result of not thinking clearly and not critically examining claims of this type from whoever is making them- I hope it's the popular writers and not the physicists who are doing this. For some reason a substantial proportion of the general public and even a decent number of scientists think that the title 'scientist' allows someone to make ridiculous claims that must be taken as they are, independent of whether they're reasonable or supported by empirical studies, simply because they come from the pen or mouth of a scientist. Pretty much what I was told in my Metaphysics classes too.
I don't know if the physicists are to blame for that nonsense - usually it's popularizers of science who cannot get that the entity can be measured either as a particle or a wave, i.e. it possesses properties that both normally exhibit. That isn't to say it is both a particle and not a particle and both a wave and not a wave, it's to say that it is something else and has a mixture of properties. If physicists are championing that nonsense interpretation though, they're being very intellectually irresponsible. Here's a good comment I found on this from comment on a book review:
This reviewer confuses the mathematical formalism of quantum theory with its 'real world' interpretation. All the experimental evidence shows is that 'particle' and 'wave' are not mutually exclusive categories with respect to the properties of objects, or put another way, that a physical object can have properties that resemble both classical particle and classical wave properties. Thinking that the two categories are exclusive is a prejudice of our everyday experience and if you reflect on it for a while, you'll see that you CAN NOT derive this exclusivity by logic or pure thought alone- what reason can you give that something shouldn't be able to exhibit both kinds of properties? The entity is NEITHER PARTICLE NOR WAVE, but something else that has properties that are attributable to both classical waves and particles. Modern quantum field theory thinks of and represents particles as the quanta of specific quantum fields. Since the representation and description of a field carries wave-like properties with it, the quanta, being localized but nonetheless part of the field, have both particle-like and wave-like properties. That the object is in two states at the same time is a confusing and incorrect linguistic description of the fact that in the formalism, the 'state' of that object would be the sum of two vector 'states' in the framework of a Hilbert space- the resultant state of the object being the 'superposition' of the other two states. But no one knows what 'superposition' represents in the 'real' world- indeed, the interpretation of quantum mechanics was a taboo subject from when the theory was founded up until a few decades ago, when physicists and philosophers broke out of positivist hangover and began to try to figure out what's 'really going on.' That an object cannot be red all over and green all over is just as valid today as it ever was- it's just an implicit statement of the law of non-contradiction. One of the main differences in logical propositions verses ones that are empirical is that we can imagine what would falsify the empirical propositions. This seems to be impossible to do for logical propositions. Although I am aware of some who think there are actual mathematically existing contradictions (see books by Graham Priest for example), I find this unthinkable, and since no one has figured out how that could be of any real use yet, it remains a formal proposition with no content. I still agree with Gottlob Frege that the discovery that someone rejects a logical law, like the principle of non-contradiction, would be the discovery of a hitherto unknown form of madness. Most remarks like this are the result of not thinking clearly and not critically examining claims of this type from whoever is making them- I hope it's the popular writers and not the physicists who are doing this. For some reason a substantial proportion of the general public and even a decent number of scientists think that the title 'scientist' allows someone to make ridiculous claims that must be taken as they are, independent of whether they're reasonable or supported by empirical studies, simply because they come from the pen or mouth of a scientist.
Pretty much what I was told in my Metaphysics classes too.
This is correct, I believe.
Juan: Well, I admit that generalizing about physicists as I did is kind of sloppy, but bear in mind that ideas such as the Copenhagen interpretation of QM are not something that popularizers came up with, rather Bohr and Heisenberg did. On the other hand, things like Schroedingers cat were meant as illustration of the absurd situations that would follow from a disconnect between the microscopic and the macroscopic world. Also, replacing determinism with probability is flawed. Here are some notes from Mises : The Paradox of Probability Empiricism http://mises.org/books/ufofes/ch1~6.aspx There's a related and more interesting passage in, I think, Theory and History, but I can't find it now.
Keep in mind that the Copenhagen interpretation is but one of many interpretations of QM. I'm more of a fan of David Bohm's theories myself, which I think lead to some very interesting insights.
Well, I admit that generalizing about physicists as I did is kind of sloppy, but bear in mind that ideas such as the Copenhagen interpretation of QM are not something that popularizers came up with, rather Bohr and Heisenberg did. On the other hand, things like Schroedingers cat were meant as illustration of the absurd situations that would follow from a disconnect between the microscopic and the macroscopic world. Also, replacing determinism with probability is flawed. Here are some notes from Mises : The Paradox of Probability Empiricism http://mises.org/books/ufofes/ch1~6.aspx There's a related and more interesting passage in, I think, Theory and History, but I can't find it now.
Yeah, Mises has some interesting thoughts on this stuff. Usually what I see happening is either various logical laws are confused for one another (the law of contradiction for the law of the excluded middle) or they're confused for something they're not (e.g. something can't be an apple and an orange, or a particle and a wave, when what the law of contradiction says is it cannot be and not be an orange, for example) or confusion of epistemological issues (vagueness/uncertainty) for metaphysicaly issues (e.g. many repudiations of the law of the excl. middle suffer from this issue, and again they usually formulate the law incorrectly.)
Juan:There's a related and more interesting passage in, I think, Theory and History, but I can't find it now.
Ludwig von Mises:Quantum mechanics deals with the fact that we do not know how an atom will behave in an individual instance. But we know what patterns of behavior can possibly occur and the proportion in which these patterns really occur. While the perfect form of a causal law is: A"produces" B, there is also a less perfect form: A "produces" C in n% of all cases, D in m% of all cases, and so on. Perhaps it will at a later day be possible to dissolve this A of the less perfect form into a number of disparate elements to each of which a definite "effect" will be assigned according to the perfect form. But whether this will happen or not is of no relevance for the problem of determinism. The imperfect law too is acausal law, although it discloses shortcomings in our knowledge. And because it is a display of a peculiar type both of knowledge and of ignorance, it opens a field for the employment of the calculus of probability. We know, with regard to a definite problem, all about the behavior of the whole class of events, we know that class A will produce definite effects in a known proportion; but all we know about the individual A?s is that they are members of the A class. The mathematical formulation of this mixture of knowledge and ignorance is We know the probability of the various effects that can possibly be "produced" by an individual A. What the neo-indeterminist school of physics fails to see is that the proposition: A produces B inn% of the cases and C in the rest of the cases is, epistemologically, not different from the proposition: A always produces B. The former proposition differs from the latter only in combining in its notion of A two elements, X and Y, which the perfect form of a causal law would have to distinguish. But no question of contingency is raised. Quantum mechanics does not say: The individual atoms behave like customers choosing dishes in a restaurant or voters casting their ballots. It says: The atoms invariably follow a definite pattern. This is also manifested in the fact that what it predicates about atoms contains no reference either to a definite period of time or to a definite location within the universe. One could not deal with the behavior of atoms in general, that is, without reference to time and space, if the individual atom were not inevitably and fully ruled by natural law. We are free to use the term "individual" atom, but we must never ascribe to an individual" atom individuality in the sense in which this term is applied to men and to historical events. In the field of human action the determinist philosophers referred to statistics in order to refute the doctrine of free will and to prove determinism in the acts of man. In the field of physics the neo-indeterminist philosophers refer to statistics in order to refute the doctrine of determinism and to prove indeterminism in nature. The error of both sides arises from confusion as to the meaning of statistics.
What the neo-indeterminist school of physics fails to see is that the proposition: A produces B inn% of the cases and C in the rest of the cases is, epistemologically, not different from the proposition: A always produces B. The former proposition differs from the latter only in combining in its notion of A two elements, X and Y, which the perfect form of a causal law would have to distinguish. But no question of contingency is raised. Quantum mechanics does not say: The individual atoms behave like customers choosing dishes in a restaurant or voters casting their ballots. It says: The atoms invariably follow a definite pattern. This is also manifested in the fact that what it predicates about atoms contains no reference either to a definite period of time or to a definite location within the universe. One could not deal with the behavior of atoms in general, that is, without reference to time and space, if the individual atom were not inevitably and fully ruled by natural law. We are free to use the term "individual" atom, but we must never ascribe to an individual" atom individuality in the sense in which this term is applied to men and to historical events.
In the field of human action the determinist philosophers referred to statistics in order to refute the doctrine of free will and to prove determinism in the acts of man. In the field of physics the neo-indeterminist philosophers refer to statistics in order to refute the doctrine of determinism and to prove indeterminism in nature. The error of both sides arises from confusion as to the meaning of statistics.
pg. 87-89, Theory and History
I am becoming a Burkean Whig.
- F.A. Hayek
Ixtellor:2) Why did they predict a housing bust, when did they do it, and can you give me a link?
Sure. http://mises.org/story/1533
Now do you have an article showing that Keynesian economics always predicts GDP within .75% and how far out it predicts it?
At most, 5% of the population would need to stop complying to bring down the government.
Spideynw: Ixtellor:2) Why did they predict a housing bust, when did they do it, and can you give me a link? Sure. http://mises.org/story/1533
I read his article and he did a great job of using empirical evidence to make possible predictions. I noticed he gave himself a lot of outs with some vague language. I don't blame him, but a more consise prediction would have been nice. ("Given the government's encouragement of lax lending practices, home prices could crash") Overall it was great empirical analysis, and I won't even question if he stole his thesis and give him full credit.
I assume you will admit LOTS of Keynsians predicted the housing bubble as well. If not, here is one of the biggies :
http://www.amazon.com/Irrational-Exuberance-Robert-J-Shiller/dp/0691050627
Shiller wrote all about the housing bubble in his 2005 edition, in addtion to many scholarly articles. He was not nearly alone, as lots of Keynesians predicted a bubble.
Greenspan, predicted what your link called "Rather, the air in housing bubbles tends to leak out slowly—painfully slowly—while in commercial real estate markets there is a more noticeable hiss" This is exactly what Greenspan predicted. Not to take anything away from your article, but Greenspan reached the same conclusion only later. So your Austrian beat that 1 Keynsian to the punch for sure. (In addition to countless others he beat)
Spideynw:Now do you have an article showing that Keynesian economics always predicts GDP within .75% and how far out it predicts it?
I never said it always predicts gdp within .75%. I said in several responses, that is is sometimes as bad as 2-3%.
P.S. Thanks again for that informative article.
Jon Irenicus:Just the basics: the law of identity, the law of contradiction (corollary of the former), inferential reasoning and the action axiom.
The contradiction law keeps getting mentioned, and I only have 12 hours of philosophy, but that included basic logic.
So I looked it up and... What is your response to Dialetheism. I copied this from a wiki page. I don't get the dialetheism, but what is the counter logic to this. I saw it called the "principle of explosion".
Ok, the text appeared in my response but not in the posted message, so here is a link
Using some commonly accepted and intuitively plausible rules of logic, we can easily show that the formula P & ¬P implies everything; taking a contradiction as a premise, we can prove any A.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialetheism
The explosion principle is simply the principle that anything follows from a contradiction (which is why they are so infectious.) The motivation of dialetheism seems to be to avoid logical paradoxes (e.g. "This statement is false."). I do not see how asserting that contradictions exist to avoid them makes any sense as opposed to actually solving them without asserting anything as fatuous as that. Sort of like saying we know nothing to avoid the problem of sometimes being wrong. I don't think that is quite what is going on though, because the explosion principle is not itself the law of contradiction and so rejecting it is not the same as rejecting the latter, but I'd need to read up on this; they seem to be trying to "contain" contradictions, but alone that will not sufficie to show they exist, or indeed just what that is supposed to mean. If they simply assert contradictions exist to solve paradoxes they can't otherwise solve, I'm not going to lend them much credibility. The criticisms on the Wiki article also seem pretty sound.
Anything else you wish to add? If not, I am going to close this thread, because it has veered way off topic. You can start threads on particular things you want to discuss.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B0XJu9l3Mfk
schiff predicting the bust in 2002.... when interest rates start to rise again (as they must) , the bubble will collapse,.....and then they will panic!
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Ixtellor:So I looked it up and... What is your response to Dialetheism. I copied this from a wiki page. I don't get the dialetheism, but what is the counter logic to this. I saw it called the "principle of explosion".
It looks like bull to me, and I would shy you against it. Only because it rests on the Stolen Concept fallacy (it attempts to refute non-contradiction principle in a non-contradictory manner).
"The power of liberty going forward is in decentralization. Not in leaders, but in decentralized activism. In a market process." -- liberty student
Ixtellor: 4) Is there a composite list of a priori that Austrians do accept? I saw the NAP, it seems logical and moral. Are there others?
Libertarians believe that:
(1) Humans are individually sovereign
And this follows to:
(2) NAP(3) Right to "fruits of labour"
The difference between libertarianism and socialism is that libertarians will tolerate the existence of a socialist community, but socialists can't tolerate a libertarian community.
(3) Right to "fruits of labour"
what???????????
shouldnt this be swapped out for 'private property' i.e. you own what you homesteaded, or received in trade, and what you transformed from inputs you owned. 'fruits of labour' is marxist........
Actually, it isn't. It predates Marx and one can find that language in Locke already.
adam smith had it too, right? reisman talks about it laying the foundation for marxist exploitation theory. is this an area of dispute in the austrian camp?
No, not really. It doesn't really enter into Austrian theory, so much as libertarian theory. Reisman is right on that, but my point is the term is not Marxist: the classical liberals originated the concept, and it's perhaps even more ancient than that.
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