I'm under the impression that some of you consider yourselves to fall within the mutualist tradition. I wanted to know if any of you would be able to help me to understand one of the concepts at the core of this school of thought.
It's my understanding that mutualism is built upon the notion of respect for private property, to the extent that such property is being used, in the sense of being actively possessed or occupied by the alleged owner. But one of the basic elements of the structure of mutualist thought seems to be that if property is not in use in this way, it returns to the commons. I was hoping to seek some clarification about what exactly is meant by this idea.
One way to interpret it would be to say that if someone clearly abandons something, they lose their title to it. This seems uncontroversial, but also not unique to the mutualist tradition. On the other extreme, one could interpret the idea that the moment one stops using something, it becomes open game. This interpretation seems out of line with the apparent mutualist notion that persistent private property is an essential part of civilized life; it would be odd to find individuals with respect for the institution of property simultaneously suggesting that the minute I leave my house, someone could legitimately walk right in and claim it as their own. So I anticipate that neither of these interpretations is correct.
But then, what is meant by this idea that absentee ownership cannot be recognized as legitimate?
http://libertarian-left.blogspot.com/
(By the way, I recognize that a similar discussion is already being had with regard to an objection to Lockean conceptions of property rights, but I didn't want to hijack that thread; if others think those conversations should be merged, I'd be open to that)
Well I'm not a mutualist (since I reject the labor theory of value and find the usurfruct theory of property to be too vague), but I am influenced by mutualism and consider mutualists to be allies. I'll help if I can.
It's my understanding that mutualism is built upon the notion of respect for private property, to the extent that such property is being used, in the sense of being actively possessed or occupied by the alleged owner.
Yes, although I have had trouble getting mutualists specifically quantify "use", because obviously the standard of perpetual use for ownership is absurd (that would mean that as soon as I park my car and leave it, it isn't mine anymore and someone can just seize it) and the standard of perpetual ownership over what one makes no use of is likewise absurd (what is the state but a gigantic absentee land owner in this sense?). Somewhere in between is what mutualists (and market anarchists of all varieties) advocate, and the devil is in the details of specifying just ownership in light of abandonment and intergenerational issues.
But one of the basic elements of the structure of mutualist thought seems to be that if property is not in use in this way, it returns to the commons. I was hoping to seek some clarification about what exactly is meant by this idea.
By "returns to the commons", I think the implication is essentially interchangable with saying that it's "homesteadable" in that it has no current just owner. I don't interpret it as meaning that somehow everyone magically owns it if an individual doesn't actively use it, but that it is open to be taken into ownership by anyone (and hence a "commons" in the pre-ownership sense of the term).
Right, this is precisely the spectrum I refer to above. I don't think any mutualist is really advocating perpetual use as a standard. The problems arise when there are people who are obviously actively laboring upon the property for such a long period of time (intergenerationally even) that the neglect and isolation of some claimed owner in an ivory tower begins to become very suspect. I think one can make a case, based on a homesteading principle of sorts, that at a point it rightfully belongs to the peasants, just as Rothbard thought that ideally the plantations that the chattel slaves worked on ultimately belonged to them, and the state itself is just a gigantic institutionalized absentee owner in this sense as well (which can be construed as homesteadable).
It's kind of the implication of the complications with abandonment and intergenerational issues. Perhaps it's wrong to say that the opposition is to "absentee ownership" as such so much as a matter of degree, a degree of absentee ownership that is very blatant and institutionalized (usually through a perpetual legal title to the property that disregaurds justice in aquisition and maintainance of the property). When there is a conflict between justice in aquisition and the legal title to ownership, I think that the legal title must be nullified and justice in ownership takes precedence. So I think that there can be a left-rothbardian case made against some instances of absentee ownership in which there is a clear conflict between the title to ownership and the degree of labor people put into that property and amount of time that neglect takes place in.
Brainpolice: I'm under the impression that some of you consider yourselves to fall within the mutualist tradition. I wanted to know if any of you would be able to help me to understand one of the concepts at the core of this school of thought. Well I'm not a mutualist (since I reject the labor theory of value and find the usurfruct theory of property to be too vague), but I am influenced by mutualism and consider mutualists to be allies. I'll help if I can. It's my understanding that mutualism is built upon the notion of respect for private property, to the extent that such property is being used, in the sense of being actively possessed or occupied by the alleged owner. Yes, although I have had trouble getting mutualists specifically quantify "use", because obviously the standard of perpetual use for ownership is absurd (that would mean that as soon as I park my car and leave it, it isn't mine anymore and someone can just seize it) and the standard of perpetual ownership over what one makes no use of is likewise absurd (what is the state but a gigantic absentee land owner in this sense?). Somewhere in between is what mutualists (and market anarchists of all varieties) advocate, and the devil is in the details of specifying just ownership in light of abandonment and intergenerational issues. But one of the basic elements of the structure of mutualist thought seems to be that if property is not in use in this way, it returns to the commons. I was hoping to seek some clarification about what exactly is meant by this idea. By "returns to the commons", I think the implication is essentially interchangable with saying that it's "homesteadable" in that it has no current just owner. I don't interpret it as meaning that somehow everyone magically owns it if an individual doesn't actively use it, but that it is open to be taken into ownership by anyone (and hence a "commons" in the pre-ownership sense of the term). One way to interpret it would be to say that if someone clearly abandons something, they lose their title to it. This seems uncontroversial, but also not unique to the mutualist tradition. On the other extreme, one could interpret the idea that the moment one stops using something, it becomes open game. This interpretation seems out of line with the apparent mutualist notion that persistent private property is an essential part of civilized life; it would be odd to find individuals with respect for the institution of property simultaneously suggesting that the minute I leave my house, someone could legitimately walk right in and claim it as their own. So I anticipate that neither of these interpretations is correct. Right, this is precisely the spectrum I refer to above. I don't think any mutualist is really advocating perpetual use as a standard. The problems arise when there are people who are obviously actively laboring upon the property for such a long period of time (intergenerationally even) that the neglect and isolation of some claimed owner in an ivory tower begins to become very suspect. I think one can make a case, based on a homesteading principle of sorts, that at a point it rightfully belongs to the peasants, just as Rothbard thought that ideally the plantations that the chattel slaves worked on ultimately belonged to them, and the state itself is just a gigantic institutionalized absentee owner in this sense as well (which can be construed as homesteadable). But then, what is meant by this idea that absentee ownership cannot be recognized as legitimate? It's kind of the implication of the complications with abandonment and intergenerational issues. Perhaps it's wrong to say that the opposition is to "absentee ownership" as such so much as a matter of degree, a degree of absentee ownership that is very blatant and institutionalized (usually through a perpetual legal title to the property that disregaurds justice in aquisition and maintainance of the property). When there is a conflict between justice in aquisition and the legal title to ownership, I think that the legal title must be nullified and justice in ownership takes precedence. So I think that there can be a left-rothbardian case made against some instances of absentee ownership in which there is a clear conflict between the title to ownership and the degree of labor people put into that property and amount of time that neglect takes place in.
How much of this is covered in Carson's book?
"You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows"
Bob Dylan
I have to admit that I haven't actually read Carson's book yet. Some people I know have been suggesting it to me though so I probably will read it soon. I'm getting this more from my interactions with such people and some material that I've read online.
Brainpolice, the way you make it sound, though, there isn't really a difference between mutualism and a Lockeanism which incorporates a relatively loose conception of abandonment. I gather that many mutualists today reject the labor theory of value, which eliminates that as a distinguishing characteristic, so what makes them mutualists?
I mean, if someone built an apartment building in order to house tenants, and then lived somewhere else and collected rent, would that count as absentee ownership? It seems odd to think so, given that the construction of the apartment was clearly meant for the purpose of renting it out, and so the renting would be the "use" for which is was intended. The same holds true with someone who acquires title to a piece of land and coordinates the efforts of a group of employees to plant and harvest it. The "labor" being mixed would not be physical, but rather figurative, in that the individual's efforts would be directed towards the use of the land. So by a suitably loose standard of "use," it's hard to see how any non-state-granted arrangement which arose through peaceful processes (and could not reasonably be construed as outright abandonment) would be legitimately termed "out of use by the owner."
A stricter standard, though, seems like it would eliminate the potential for a whole range of activities which involve planning and organization of resources and labor around physical property. So what gives?
^What he said.
To darkness I condemn you...
In a sense, you're right, there really isn't much of a difference, it is very much like a somewhat different application of lockean property theory in which homesteading is used to justify more cooperative forms of ownership. As for the labor theory of value, Kevin Carson has attempted to synthesize or reconcile it with the subjective theory and time preferance. I haven't looked too far into that yet, as I explained to Giles. In either case, what makes them mutualists is a more socialistic interpretation of the outcome or implication of a free market (I.E. a tendency for profit, rent and interest to diminish).
I don't follow how more cooperative forms of ownership would follow from relaxing the terms of abandonment. Is the idea that an absentee owner would lose title to a productive venture, and the workers would come to be de facto joint owners as the result?
Donny with an A: I don't follow how more cooperative forms of ownership would follow from relaxing the terms of abandonment. Is the idea that an absentee owner would lose title to a productive venture, and the workers would come to be de facto joint owners as the result?
You are sort of right. The idea is that you can only own what you can concievably and do actively use. Thus, say I homestead a large piece of land for a factory, and claim it as my own; if I cannot concievably actively use this whole piece of land myself, than it really does not qualify as my property and as such can be homesteaded and used by others. They cannot take the part that I am actively using, but they can take the part that I have not kept up with active use. But, lets say that I buy a large piece of land and hire workers to grow crops for me, because I have not kept up active use myself of this piece of land, the land it not my legitimate property or possession, rather it becomes cooperatively owned by those who actively labour and work with it. Hence, cooperatives are necessary for the ownership of large pieces of land and factories, where one person cannot concievably keep in active use, what he has claimed or paid for.
I am not a mutualist per se in terms of rejection of rent and usury, but I do adhere to a theory of appropriation that requires that you can only appropriate from the commons what you are actively using. But once something becomes someone's property, I do not think the active use constraint makes sense, so you can purchase more than you can actively use, but you cannot appropriate more than you actively use.
http://aestheticbend.blogspot.com/
I guess they will have to say goodbye to big factories and industry.
But again, what does "use" mean? If we understand "use" to include the active coordination of others to bring a part of the material world into line with one's goals and desires, then your factory example would be false. So what plausible conception of "use" would draw the line before that point? And why should we refrain from recognizing "use" of a variety which involves the coordination of the efforts of others, when that coordination clearly originates from an individual in relation to a part of the material world? Would the idea be that without the help of others, the coordination would be impossible, and so society ought to recognize all of the participants in a coordinated project as joint owners of the resulting product (or partial owners according to some other kind of ownership scheme)?
Donny with an A: But again, what does "use" mean? If we understand "use" to include the active coordination of others to bring a part of the material world into line with one's goals and desires, then your factory example would be false. So what plausible conception of "use" would draw the line before that point? And why should we refrain from recognizing "use" of a variety which involves the coordination of the efforts of others, when that coordination clearly originates from an individual in relation to a part of the material world? Would the idea be that without the help of others, the coordination would be impossible, and so society ought to recognize all of the participants in a coordinated project as joint owners of the resulting product (or partial owners according to some other kind of ownership scheme)?
Yes, I would agree with you that my factory example requires the concept of use to simply deal with land and resource and not the coordination of people.
I think the distinction that is implied is that the relationship one has with the environment is autonomous conceptually, from the relationship one has with other individuals. I think that the idea, as misguided as it is, comes from the idea that the commons are common resource to the community of mankind, and as such any appropriation from the commons should not allow someone to elevate their position over others.
In essence there is a deep seeded egalitarianism present in the distrinction between the active coordination of other's efforts and the active use of material resources. The latter would not concievably privelege one member of a society over another, whereas the former concept, if integrated into the idea of active use, enables a hierarchy to form. Implict in the use-concept there seems to be a rejection of hierarchy.
But that rejection of hierarchy seems to implicitly reject comparative advantage as well, does it not? After all, that's the point of hiring people in the first place.
But once something becomes someone's property, I do not think the active use constraint makes sense, so you can purchase more than you can actively use, but you cannot appropriate more than you actively use.
How does that work? Say I purchase a factory, will it then be mine? If so, why not just skip this unnecessary step and allow for the concept of "use" to involve hirelings or anyone else willing to act with me in bringing about a desired end?
Yes is the answer to your second question, but I am not really a mutualist; I just have a more stringent view on appropriation than most libertarian anarchists. And yes, I agree on the second point, I was not saying that I agree with mutualists on property that has come under human ownership.
If you have capital, and hire a bunch of individuals to appropriate and homestead an area for a factory that is fine. But one by themselves cannot simply fence off a large area of the wilderness by themselves, and call it your property
I agree, or at least I'd say one could, but if they failed to develop the fenced land in a short enough time, their claim would be null and void. They can, say mark out an area that they intend to develop. This is all practical stuff and thus will be decided upon by arbiters (i.e. local custom) in actuality, but I think it's reasonable to assume that much.
The point I'm getting hung up on is that if I rented a shed and some tools, and organized a bunch of people to go plant and harvest the field according to plans that I provided them with, it seems like I would be the owner of the product after I paid the people I hired what I agreed to pay them. It's like how when you hire someone to build you a house, you get to keep the house after you've paid for it. It doesn't matter if I never actually pick up a hoe and help my employees with their work, just like it doesn't matter if I never pick up a hammer and help the construction people with their job. When I pay someone to perform a labor service for me, they get paid for their labor, and I get to keep what they produced with it. That's the way exchanges like that work. So I'm having a really difficult time with this idea of rejecting absentee ownership; what am I not understanding?
Yeah, that is how I view it as well. My experience is that they shift between the notion that you can only appropriate as much as you can yourself use, which is the weaker position, with active use being a prerequisite for continued ownership being the stronger position. The former can easily be harmonized with Lockean property rights. The latter cannot.
Well it also just doesn't really accord with any view of the nature and justification of property rights that I'm familiar with. The Lockeans wouldn't like it, the utilitarians would demand evidence that such a way of arranging things would produce better outcomes, and the "property rights reflect a need to assign the right of way for using material objects so people can pursue their own goals and projects" crowd would probably be uncomfortable with all of the kinds of plans that would be effectively ruled out by such a regime. I'm just not seeing what kind of argument would justify this sort of idea.
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