I am serious. Who has ownership over the stars? Can anyone claim ownership?
Schools are labour camps.
I have also been thinking about this. The answer is nobody.
Nature is unowned until it is homesteaded - after which it becomes property. As stars are giant balls of hot gas it's a bit difficult to "mix your labour with them".
Anyone who buys a "certificate of ownership" for a star has just bought a very expensive, but meaningless piece of paper.
Irish Liberty Forum
The basis of the right to property is that of first occupancy in order to establish exclusive control over objects in order to avoid conflict. The capacity to physically alter something would be a necessary condition for ownership because, if you physically alter something and then someone else comes along and physically alters it another way, then there would be a conflict as there would be more than one controller.
But why are these conflicts bad? That is, what are property rights meant to protect?
http://libertarian-left.blogspot.com/
The conflicts are bad because, by appropriating resources, we demonstrate our preference for jurisdiction over certain physical quantity. If we did actually want someone to control our resources, we would transfer our jurisdiction over said physical quantity over to them. However, without this kind of transfer we continue to demonstrate our preference for jurisdiction over our property, and as such property rights exist to uphold our demonstrated preference for that which we have appropriated whether through initial homesteading or transfer from another person.
Well but demonstrating a preference for something doesn't generate a duty in others to respect your preference. If I use some stuff you had been using before, I demonstrate a preference for having your stuff, much like the preference you demonstrated by using it before me. Why does your getting there first generate a duty in me to not use the object in question?
Donny with an A: Well but demonstrating a preference for something doesn't generate a duty in others to respect your preference. If I use some stuff you had been using before, I demonstrate a preference for having your stuff, much like the preference you demonstrated by using it before me. Why does your getting there first generate a duty in me to not use the object in question?
Two answers, both philosophical and subject to obvious violation from which people will not follow.
1. It is the inherent right of a person to possess and maintain control over his possessions without infringement by others. God affords this right for man giving it to him. God is the ultimate authority, ergo, if one does not respect rights in this life, the LORD will deal with them in the next.
2. As a rule, possession rights generate the best society for people to live in. If people want the best society to live in, they should generally accept and promote the right to possession.
I don't think that appeal to God can really settle this issue, so I suppose I'd ask if we could avoid invoking divine authority, since it'll either involve a debate over scripture which I'm not qualified to have, or a debate I'm really not excited to have over whether claims about God's will are even relevant in discussing ethics. Hopefully we can appeal to a considerable tradition in theology which claims that although God is infallible and right, we should be able to understand what's right and what's wrong through reason. That way we can avoid getting side tracked in a religious debate.
With regard to your second point, I'd hesitantly identify that justification as rule utilitarian in nature. If we think about property rights in that way, I'm not sure that such a claim determines exactly what rule we should advocate with regard to star ownership. That is, it's not clear why we'd want one rule over another in this arena, since I'm not sure whether any rule would make a difference to anyone's life in a foreseeable way. Accordingly, we'd likely want to take the stance that in our current state of affairs, it's not necessary to determine what rule would be best for star ownership. Once we develop to a point where stars are scarce, perhaps then we will be in a better position to evaluate the social desirability of one rule over another, but until then, it seems reasonable to say that we should have no rule at all.
I'd point out, however, that rule utilitarianism is not the only way to justify property rights, and also that it's not entirely clear that a rule utilitarian would support a libertarian homesteading theory of property rights. It seems reasonable to me that if we are looking only at the overall consequences as viewed from some collective standpoint (e.g., from behind the veil of ignorance), we might want rules that are more flexible than the ones that libertarians generally advocate. A variant of mutualism, perhaps, or sufficientarianism -- or perhaps a softer liberalism -- might be more appealing, since those systems might systemically provide opportunities for net gains in wellbeing due to opportunities offered to the least well off. I'm not saying that those systems are in fact more consistent with rule utilitarianism -- a libertarian private property structure might in fact produce the best overall outcomes -- but if it were true that one of those other systems produced better social outcomes, the rule utilitarian would be compelled to accept that there is nothing wrong with rejecting the libertarian view.
On the other hand, the preceding has assumed that when you said "best" in your reply, you meant the sort of thing that a rule utilitarian means by "best," which is more or less that people would generally be happiest in that society. It's quite possible that you meant something else by "best," in which case I'd ask you to clarify exactly what makes a society "good."
Where did I say that it generates a "duty" for someone to respect your preferences, or that there are any "duties" in the first place? I mean simply that the only way to have a norm, which we establish to avoid conflict (if we did not want to establish norms to avoid conflict, we would simply engage in violence), is to have only one controller of each scarce object, of which control is necessarily exclusive (i.e. there can only be one controller at a time, and having another person come in to control it is conflict.)
Whether one should adopt this value is up to the valuer himself.
Well if there's no duty to respect your property claim, then it's not a property right. At best, we'd be talking about property "agreements."
Certificate of ownership? Which ones whould you like? the north star? $100,000
I have the certificate of ownership.
Donny with an A: I don't think that appeal to God can really settle this issue, so I suppose I'd ask if we could avoid invoking divine authority, since it'll either involve a debate over scripture which I'm not qualified to have, or a debate I'm really not excited to have over whether claims about God's will are even relevant in discussing ethics. Hopefully we can appeal to a considerable tradition in theology which claims that although God is infallible and right, we should be able to understand what's right and what's wrong through reason. That way we can avoid getting side tracked in a religious debate. With regard to your second point, I'd hesitantly identify that justification as rule utilitarian in nature. If we think about property rights in that way, I'm not sure that such a claim determines exactly what rule we should advocate with regard to star ownership. That is, it's not clear why we'd want one rule over another in this arena, since I'm not sure whether any rule would make a difference to anyone's life in a foreseeable way. Accordingly, we'd likely want to take the stance that in our current state of affairs, it's not necessary to determine what rule would be best for star ownership. Once we develop to a point where stars are scarce, perhaps then we will be in a better position to evaluate the social desirability of one rule over another, but until then, it seems reasonable to say that we should have no rule at all. I'd point out, however, that rule utilitarianism is not the only way to justify property rights, and also that it's not entirely clear that a rule utilitarian would support a libertarian homesteading theory of property rights. It seems reasonable to me that if we are looking only at the overall consequences as viewed from some collective standpoint (e.g., from behind the veil of ignorance), we might want rules that are more flexible than the ones that libertarians generally advocate. A variant of mutualism, perhaps, or sufficientarianism -- or perhaps a softer liberalism -- might be more appealing, since those systems might systemically provide opportunities for net gains in wellbeing due to opportunities offered to the least well off. I'm not saying that those systems are in fact more consistent with rule utilitarianism -- a libertarian private property structure might in fact produce the best overall outcomes -- but if it were true that one of those other systems produced better social outcomes, the rule utilitarian would be compelled to accept that there is nothing wrong with rejecting the libertarian view. On the other hand, the preceding has assumed that when you said "best" in your reply, you meant the sort of thing that a rule utilitarian means by "best," which is more or less that people would generally be happiest in that society. It's quite possible that you meant something else by "best," in which case I'd ask you to clarify exactly what makes a society "good."
Are you saying that if people were behind a veil of ignorance they would agree to use rule-utilitarianism to decide the proper institutions to select? Why will people behind the veil of ignorance choose rule-utilitarianism instead of the minimax principle?
"I cannot prove, but am prepared to affirm, that if you take care of clarity in reasoning, most good causes will take care of themselves, while some bad ones are taken care of as a matter of course." -Anthony de Jasay
Sorry I didn't see this earlier. I wasn't endorsing rule utilitarianism; I was only saying that Anton's point sounded a lot like rule utilitarianism, and that if we accept that rule utilitarianism is the correct way to evaluate different institutional structures, it wouldn't be necessarily true, or even clearly conventionally true, that libertarian conceptions of property rights satisfy the criteria necessary for endorsement.
To answer your question, though, I think that behind the veil of ignorance people wouldn't endorse either principle. A maximin principle implies that people are perfectly risk-averse expected welfare maximizers, and nothing else. A rule utilitarian view is similar, but with perfectly risk-indifferent maximizers. I like the veil of ignorance as a tool for thinking about different kinds of social orders, but I don't think that matters of welfare would be the only thing that would matter to people behind the veil. When I think of the kind of society I would want to live in, I certainly think about what kinds of lives people will be able to live, but I also think about matters more closely tied to justice: Will people be protected in their entitlements? Will people generally deserve what they get, and will opportunities go to those who deserve them? Will people be treated with respect and deference to their individuality and dignity? Will norms of reciprocity and goodwill be fostered? Will those in need be provided for in a way that reflects their importance and worth as individuals, but is also respectful of the individuality of those who will be supporting them? Will the society progress in a way that gradually reduces the frequency of instances of serious need? Will people feel connected to others in their communities so that mutual assistance and cooperation will flourish?
These sorts of things seem fundamentally important to evaluating a society, and don't seem to be directly captured in the idea of welfare maximization. Of course, consequentialists would likely disagree, claiming that either these matters are only instrumentally important, or that it is irrational to value them for themselves. But I think that the mark of a good society is that it embodies both an attitude of respect for individuals and the fact their lives are the only ones they have, and also the idea that we all share our common humanity, and that should be celebrated and cherished. I think that both rule utilitarianism and maximin views are better at the second part, and not quite as good at the first part. A more complete approach to institutional evaluation, I think, would take into account both consequences and justice.
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