Okay, I know that this may sound like a contradiction, but please bear with me. I've been thinking a lot about natural rights and from where they derive, and I've come to a few conclusions on the matter.
To me, it seems that natural rights are derived from answering the following question: Given that human beings are individual actors with free wills living in a world of scarcity, conflict among human beings is all but inevitable; what, then, are humans free to do, and what are the general rules of interaction? The rational answer, as we all know, is that humans should be free to do whatever they wish so long as they do not initiate force or violence against others and their property.
That's simple enough, but then I began asking myself, "if this is the rational answer to this question, what, then, is the reasoning behind it?" Well, people highly value the freedom to use their free will and generally dislike being forced or told what to do. This concept of rights also makes the most sense because people would hardly be able to function in society knowing that at any time they could be killed and nobody else would condemn that action. People also find that they value the ability to work and accumulate property, and generally appreciate others' desires to do the same. Pretty easy.
But then I realized that all of these answers are basically utilitarian in nature. Basically it comes down to the fact that if everybody gives up their right to violate property rights, then society as a whole will be better off. In other words, the answer to how humans should interact boils down to, "in whatever way will generally leave people best off."
Now, I reject the concept of utilitarianism, especially considering that it is frequently used to advocate government intervention and violence. However, I fail to see how my concept of natural rights isn't somwhat utilitarian. It is true that natural rights are universal, giving it a different distinction from the way utilitarianism is traditionally applied, but I'm having a hard time seeing why natural rights are not somehow a form of utilitarianism applied universally. It's a type of utilitarianism that does not involve harming some to help others, but rather sets restrictions on the actions of people as to help everybody.
I apologize if this is somewhat confusing, but I would appreciate your comments or criticisms of my analysis. Please feel free to point out any premises that I may be mistaken on or have missed. Many thanks!
Natural rights are based on the idea that human beings are creatures with a specific nature.
The system that most accurately recongizes human nature is going to provide the best result. Obviously any system that forces men to act against their nature is not going to be a productive systme.
JonBostwick: Natural rights are based on the idea that human beings are creatures with a specific nature. The system that most accurately recongizes human nature is going to provide the best result. Obviously any system that forces men to act against their nature is not going to be a productive systme.
I think that you and I are saying the same thing, only you've left out exactly what that nature is, what that system that recognizes human nature is, and why that system is the most rational.
But I think your post reinforces my idea. As you said, we're looking to rationally find a "productive system" that provides the "best result." As I described, these justifications for natural rights seem somewhat utilitarian.
Mtew, many rule utilitarians would argue that some system of rights recognition would be better for facilitating desirable outcomes than a system without any recognition of rights. For example, in his essay, "Does Reason Tell Us What Moral Code to Follow and, Indeed, to Follow Any Moral Code at All?", John Harsanyi writes:
"No doubt, most of us would very much prefer to live in a society whose moral code requires people to respect individual rights and personal obligations, except in some special situations, as would be the case in a rule utilitarian society--rather than in a society without such morally protected individual rights and personal obligations, as would be the case in an act utilitarian society" (47).
But these rights could not be thought of as "natural rights." The idea of a natural right is that it proceeds from some property inherent in the bearer of the right. Utilitarian theories don't place inherent value on individuals, but rather on the wellbeing of individuals. A rule utilitarian would therefore need to do a bit of translating before being able to state her position in terms of natural rights, if it could even be done at all. It seems like you'd need to talk about the natural relationship between individuals and the set of rules which would best promote human wellbeing, but I feel like that might lead to problems pretty quickly, since ultimately the epistemological problem facing the rule utilitarian is fundamentally different than the one faced by the natural rights theorist, and it seems like by trying to translate one view into the other, you'd also have to find a way of translating the concept of moral epistemology as understood by each system of thought.
http://libertarian-left.blogspot.com/
mtew: But then I realized that all of these answers are basically utilitarian in nature. Basically it comes down to the fact that if everybody gives up their right to violate property rights, then society as a whole will be better off. In other words, the answer to how humans should interact boils down to, "in whatever way will generally leave people best off."
This is not an easy question to answer, as different libertarians will have different reasons for being libertarian, be it natural rights, the NAP, utilitarianism, pragmatism, or something else. There's often a lot of heat between those who hold a principled view versus those who hold a pragmatic view, but I think, properly understood, a principied view such as natural law or the NAP will be the most pragmatic view, and that the apparent conflict is a false dichotomy. Libertarians obviously believe that a libertarian society would be a better one, producing the best possible results. Does that make it utilitarian? Only if utilitarianism is defined in a certain way, or perhaps we should say only if utilitarianism is broad enough to encompass "the best possible results" without having to 'calculate' it. I would say that many would not define utilitarianism so broadly.
mtew:But I think your post reinforces my idea. As you said, we're looking to rationally find a "productive system" that provides the "best result." As I described, these justifications for natural rights seem somewhat utilitarian.
You are putting the cart before the horse.
Natural rights are not justified by utility. Human nature simply is.
Its recognizing these rights that is beneficial.
By the way, Mises based his defense of capitalism on utility.
Natural right libertarians do not even accept a sharp divide between deontic principles and consequences. A natural right is justified because of some specific features of the being in question. The Aristotelian form is based on the social and rational nature of humans. Note that consequences matter, of course. However, they are neither the only thing that matters, nor must one even accept the notion of "maximization", as if individuals are nothing but placeholders for "utility". You might be confusing a recognition of the moral import of consequences with consequentialism, and particularly utilitarianism.
-Jon
To darkness I condemn you...
mtew: Basically it comes down to the fact that if everybody gives up their right to violate property rights, then society as a whole will be better off.
But no such right exists.
I'd like to turn it around and say that most utilitarians actually assume some deontological principles, and the rest of them are amoralists.
Thanks for all of your responses.
I do feel like I’m in a bit over my head here. I haven’t studied ethics or philosophy much. Most of what I understand about natural rights comes from reading Aristotle and the underlying ethics of Rothbard’s writings such as Man, Economy, and State. I understand that Mises did use a utilitarian basis for defending his views, but I’ve never been able to accept that point of view.
My problem, I believe, is that I have a hard time accepting the idea that rights simply exist and all we are doing is recognizing these rights. How do we know what rights humans should have and what rights they should not? At what point did we become satisfied that we’ve figured out what rights we have, given our nature? What about human nature gives people certain rights and bars them from others? Banned, you mentioned that human beings never had the right to use violence against others to give up, but why? When I try to find rational answers as to why, I find myself appealing to utility. It’s true, as macsnafu said, that doing so does require a broad use of the term utilitarianism, and I accept that, I just found it was an interesting point. Sometimes I do feel like a child constantly asking “but, why?” and it is frustrating. But I haven’t seen a convincing explanation as to why humans have these rights.
Honestly, when it comes down to it, it seems like I just “feel” that human beings should have these certain rights, but I’m not satisfied with that. I do thank you for being patient with me, though. If anybody can point me in the direction of some good reads on the subject, I’d be very appreciative.
You might be interested in checking out Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia and David Schmidtz's book, Elements of Justice.
Then you're glossing over the fact that utilitarianism itself is in need of justification (i.e. the principle it is based on is by no means obvious and cannot just be taken for granted, no more than NR can). If you want solid arguments for NR, look up Douglass Rasmussen and Douglas den Uyl's Norms of Liberty and Liberty and Nature and Veatch's Human Rights; Fact or Fancy? and For an Ontology of Morals. Very few libertarians merely just assert you have NR. They offer arguments for it.
Where is Len when we need him? Long time no see.
Need him for what?
Jon Irenicus: Then you're glossing over the fact that utilitarianism itself is in need of justification (i.e. the principle it is based on is by no means obvious and cannot just be taken for granted, no more than NR can). If you want solid arguments for NR, look up Douglass Rasmussen and Douglas den Uyl's Norms of Liberty and Liberty and Nature and Veatch's Human Rights; Fact or Fancy? and For an Ontology of Morals. Very few libertarians merely just assert you have NR. They offer arguments for it. -Jon
It also tends to assume happiness or utility as a value or end, which must be justified in some manner. Utilitarians can either simply assume it without justifying it, establish it deontologically, or cease to be utilitarians and go for something else.
Do natural rights support veganism? Herein lies the answer to your question.
Mises Community Natural Rights Discussion Group
The answer to the question is "That depends on what natural rights view you have in mind"?
I have not read it but what do you think of The Myth of Natural Rights by Robbins? Is there a concise critique available?
IIRC Roderick Long has one on his website. Search this forum or Long's site.
The ultimate utility for a living organism is survival.
Struggling for survival is in the nature of every living organism.
There you have it.
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