Let there exist two countries or territories bordering each other, Ruritania and Waldavia. Let the Ruritanians be "smart" and let them have developed a high civilization. On the other hand, let the Waldavians be "stupid" and remain primitive hunters-gatherers.
Finally, let a Ruritanian philosopher (and there are philosophers in Ruritania, so sophisticated its culture has become) publish an article in which he advocates a wholesale genocide of the Waldavians, which he justifies on the following grounds. The Waldavians, he says, are a miserable people; for goodness' sake, they walk around practically naked in their forests. They are barely rational and therefore barely human. They should be ashamed of themselves and of their own disgraceful way of life. Let us, that is, the Ruritanians, put them out of their misery. It may naively be objected that it is wrong to commit murder. But, our philosopher counters, once the Waldavians are gone, the Ruritanians can take their land, develop it, and consequently civilize it. The glory of Ruritania will be spread far and wide. Most important, the Ruritanians will colonize the land and have many children, until the total population becomes equal to what the combined total of the Ruritanians and the Waldavians was prior to the genocide. The population will then be the same, but the total and average happiness will be far greater. In fact, since a modern capitalistic society can support far more people than a primitive one, after awhile there will be many more Ruritanians in Waldavia than there were Waldavians in it before the war, boosting total happiness even more. Being a good utilitarian, the philosopher argues that it is our (the Ruritanians') duty to wipe out the Waldavians.
Where is he wrong?
Is this some sort of trick question? Because seriously: if it's not immediately obvious to someone as to just how much epic fail the supposed philosopher's reasoning is, I would not want to live anywhere near that person.
dchernik: Let there exist two countries or territories bordering each other, Ruritania and Waldavia. Let the Ruritanians be "smart" and let them have developed a high civilization. On the other hand, let the Waldavians be "stupid" and remain primitive hunters-gatherers. Finally, let a Ruritanian philosopher (and there are philosophers in Ruritania, so sophisticated its culture has become) publish an article in which he advocates a wholesale genocide of the Waldavians, which he justifies on the following grounds. The Waldavians, he says, are a miserable people; for goodness' sake, they walk around practically naked in their forests. They are barely rational and therefore barely human. They should be ashamed of themselves and of their own disgraceful way of life. Let us, that is, the Ruritanians, put them out of their misery. It may naively be objected that it is wrong to commit murder. But, our philosopher counters, once the Waldavians are gone, the Ruritanians can take their land, develop it, and consequently civilize it. The glory of Ruritania will be spread far and wide. Most important, the Ruritanians will colonize the land and have many children, until the total population becomes equal to what the combined total of the Ruritanians and the Waldavians was prior to the genocide. The population will then be the same, but the total and average happiness will be far greater. In fact, since a modern capitalistic society can support far more people than a primitive one, after awhile there will be many more Ruritanians in Waldavia than there were Waldavians in it before the war, boosting total happiness even more. Being a good utilitarian, the philosopher argues that it is our (the Ruritanians') duty to wipe out the Waldavians. Where is he wrong?
This was the exact argument used by the Tuetonic Knights in their Prussian Crusade against the Livonians and the Prussians...asside from all the nudity.
He is wrong because he assumes that support, land, wearing of clothes and the ability to pronounce "philosophy" requires more land than they have and it must be aquired by agression and theft.
During the Prussian Crusade the justification was the superiority of the Church and the need to eliminate pagans or convert them. Also conveniently there was a glut of Franco-Norman Nobles that had no Fiefdoms. The wrongness is apparent because it is theft of land by way of theft of life. And all the Religious , Philosophical, economic and esthetic reasons cannot change murder into something else.
http://www.comebackalive.com/phpBB2 Travel, Adventure Travel, Arguments, Recipes.
The fun part is figuring out precisely what is wrong with the philosopher's position.
Here are some possibilities:
1. That genocide of "inferior" people is legitimate is a dangerous rule. It is a distinct possibility that the people of Ruritania may themselves split into "us" and "them" (such as the redhead-haters and the redheads), such that it will be demanded that "we" kill "them," too. Logically, this process need not stop until "there is only one."
2. In particular, the rule that the smart can rightfully kill the stupid means that smart Ruritanians can kill stupid Ruritanians. This is very ominous, too, as it entails that the smartest Ruritanian can kill everyone else in Ruritania.
3. We can accuse the philosopher of not knowing the law of comparative advantage/association. On the free market the "strong" or "smart" do not prey on the "weak" and "stupid"; the strong will benefit from dividing labor with the weak even if he is better that the weak at the both tasks being divided.
4. Violence need not be involved in the process of colonizing Waldavia. If the land and resources are unowned, as would likely be the case with only hunters-gatherers inhabiting Waldavia, then Ruritanian businessmen can exploit its land without asking anyone's permission. If they are owned, then they can be bought from the Waldavian tribes, possibly cheaply, and, again, developed without violating anyone's rights to life and property. And, once again, killing to steal is a bad and decivilizing rule, as it habituates the aggressors to do the same with their fellow Ruritanians, as well. In fact, it is likely that the Ruritanians have achieved their level of civilization precisely by scrupulous adherence to moral laws. If they had been predatory, then they would not be "smart" as the puzzle postulates.
5. Whose welfare do we care for? Utilitarianism takes benevolence as a given. Whatever the group (which may be everyone in the world) we love, (rule) utilitarianism recommends institutions, laws, character traits that will maximize general happiness over that group. It may thus be objected to the philosopher's argument that we value the happiness of the present occupants of Waldavia, as well. Hence killing them will be contrary to his own moral theory.
6. If it is replied to (5) that the disutility of removing the Waldavians will be outweighed by the utility (experienced perhaps by as yet unborn people) of colonizing their land for reasons described in the OP, then we may refer back to (3) and (4). We can also add that if the Waldavians really are stupid, then they will enjoy lessened income in the integrated Ruritania-Waldavia economy. (Though the Waldavians will still benefit tremendously from being part of social cooperation.) Therefore, given also their small numbers, their claim on social resources will be vanishingly small. There is therefore no need to wipe them out even from the Ruritanian philosopher's point of view; the market economy will naturally assign to the Waldavians a lower place in the social hierarchy, such that they may be quite invisible to the Ruritanian common man.
dchernik:Let us, that is, the Ruritanians, put them out of their misery. It may naively be objected that it is wrong to commit murder. But, our philosopher counters, once the Waldavians are gone, the Ruritanians can take their land, develop it, and consequently civilize it.
dchernik:Where is he wrong?
Um, what's wrong with the "murder is wrong" objection? The philosopher's counter-argument fails to counter it. Furthermore, the Ruritarians are claiming they know what's best for the Waldavians, whether they agree or not. Plain, old, initiation of force, no matter how you look at it.
Or are you specifically looking for utilitarian objections?
macsnafu, yes, the puzzle is that utilitarianism seems to sanction or even mandate genocide. Yet utilitarianism is a respectable moral theory. So, what goes wrong? Can we salvage utilitarianism from this perverse conclusion? Or must we abandon it or supplement it?
This puzzle can be rephrased in a stark way. Let A be the actual world, and P be an actual person within A with IQ / virtues / happiness equal to some number n, assuming contrary to reason that these things can be measured. Now let W be a possible world which is exactly like A except that P is replaced with Q whose IQ / virtues / happiness are equal to 2n. (Of course, replacing even a single person is bound to upset and reconfigure the entire existing society and production structure. So, the differences between A and W may be far greater than it would seem at first glance. But let's put that point aside.) Two questions need to be considered here. First, is W better in some sense than A? Second, if W is indeed better, can we get from A to W by killing P and having some couple have another child who will grow up to be Q?
I think the answer to the first question is yes, and to the second, no, for two reasons. First, more sophisticated utilitarianism will not argue that utility can be increased in this manner. Some of the reasons why not I outline above. Second, suppose you have a kid who is, say, 15 years old or even a pet cat you've had for awhile; and let someone offer you a deal: he will kill your child or your cat and give you instead a better (in some sense) one. Would you accept? Of course not! You love that child, that cat for what they are. They are genuinely irreplaceable. So, if even utilitarianism commends charity and love for our fellow men, we cannot start killing people we love to replace them with better versions of themselves. That would devalue our love, substituting for it a kind of eugenics program, wherein we do not value people for their own sake nor think of them as subjects but seek to satisfy some aesthetic view of society, e.g., by allowing only "beautiful people" to live, thinking of people as mere objects, means to ends.
In addition, the problem of replacing people in this manner with regard to total (though not average) happiness could only arise in practice when the human population is at its optimal level, such that either to increase it or decrease it would yield less utility. But that limit has not been reached and will not be reached for a long time, given our commitment to freedom and capitalism.
It also has the unfortunate characteristic of treating individuals as no more than faceless atomistic placeholders for "utility", such that particularities and contingent data, which surely matter in ethics given its inherently practical nature, are brushed aside. Deontological approaches are scarcely better in this regard, except they at least posit some inherent sort of worth for the individual (even if they abstract away too many relevant features.)
-Jon
To darkness I condemn you...
I just had to answer this one.
dchernik: ...let a Ruritanian philosopher (and there are philosophers in Ruritania, so sophisticated its culture has become) publish an article in which he advocates a wholesale genocide of the Waldavians, which he justifies on the following grounds. The Waldavians, he says, are a miserable people; for goodness' sake, they walk around practically naked in their forests.
...let a Ruritanian philosopher (and there are philosophers in Ruritania, so sophisticated its culture has become) publish an article in which he advocates a wholesale genocide of the Waldavians, which he justifies on the following grounds. The Waldavians, he says, are a miserable people; for goodness' sake, they walk around practically naked in their forests.
How do we know for sure that living in a big "civilized" community is better than walking around naked in the wilderness? We might be really missing out.
dchernik: They are barely rational and therefore barely human. They should be ashamed of themselves and of their own disgraceful way of life.
They are barely rational and therefore barely human. They should be ashamed of themselves and of their own disgraceful way of life.
This assumes that being "rational" and "human" means conformity to a specific culture, preferably mine, and denies the right of each individual to choose his or her own destiny--an important right.
dchernik: Let us, that is, the Ruritanians, put them out of their misery.
Let us, that is, the Ruritanians, put them out of their misery.
Perhaps if they were in such deep misery they would put themselves out of their misery voluntarily.
dchernik: It may naively be objected that it is wrong to commit murder.
It may naively be objected that it is wrong to commit murder.
Perhaps this naive objection is what has preserved our species from annihilation thus far.
dchernik: But, our philosopher counters, once the Waldavians are gone, the Ruritanians can take their land, develop it, and consequently civilize it. The glory of Ruritania will be spread far and wide.
But, our philosopher counters, once the Waldavians are gone, the Ruritanians can take their land, develop it, and consequently civilize it. The glory of Ruritania will be spread far and wide.
Apparently, he thinks the "glory" of Ruritania is worth taking the millions of lives unprovoked. He obviously does not understand the true grandeur of nations.
From The Book of Peace, 1845:
"I propose to inquire what are the true objects of national ambition, what is truly national glory, national honor.... The true honor of nations is found only in deeds of justice, and in the happiness of its people, all of which are inconsistent with war. In the clear eye of Christian judgement, vain are its victories, imfamous are its spoils. He is the true benefactor, and alone worthy of honor, who brings comfort where before was wretchedness, who dries the tear of sorrow; who pours oil unto the wounds of the unfortunate; who feeds the hungry, and clothes the naked; who unlooses the fetters of the slave; who, by words or actions, inspires a love for God and for man.... Here, then, will be found the true grandeur of nations--not in extent of territory, nor in vastness of population, nor in wealth; not in fortifications, or armies, or navies; not in the phosphorescent glare of fields of battle; not in Golgothas, though covered by monuments that kiss the clouds; nor yet in triumphs of the intellect alone, in literature, learning, science, or art. The true grandeur of nations is in moral elevation, sustained, enlightened, and decorated by the intellect of man; and the truest tokens of this grandeur in a State are the diffusion of the greatest happiness among the greatest number, and that passionless, God-like justice, which controls the relation of States to other States, and to all people committed to its charge. Peace has its own peculiar victories, in comparison with which Marathon, and Bannockburn, and Bunker Hill shall lose their luster. Our own Washington rises to a truly heavenly stature, not when we follow him over the ice of the Delaware to the capture of the Trenton, not when we behold him victorious over Cornwallis at Yorktown; but when we regard him, in noble deference to justice, refusing the kingly crown which a faithless soldiery proffered, and at a later day upholding the peaceful neutrality of the country, while he received unmoved the clamor of the people wickedly crying for war."
Just my two cents.
"As long as there are sovereign nations possessing great power, war is inevitable."
dchernik:Yet utilitarianism is a respectable moral theory.
That, of course, was your fundamental mistake in reckoning ;)
In any case, it seems that there is a simple solution to this problem which the philosopher is overlooking. If Ruritanian control of the land was truly more valuable than the current state of the affairs - why not simply pay all Waldavians to move or commit suicide? After all, if it can be so obviously expected that Ruritania will gain so much more value from the area than the Waldavians ever could from living there, then it follows that such would be an excellent investment - practically risk-free. For a less expensive proposition (as I would imagine it would take a great deal to convince someone to kill themselves), perhaps simply a payment to be made sterile, so as to wipe out the Waldavian population after this generation? It would take a bit more time, but the lower cost might be worth it. In any case, there is no need to resort to violence if the philosopher's premise that the land would be more valuable under Ruritanian control is correct.
But...but...what would the Ruritanians do with all of their weapons? They need a war to use them up.
ama gi:How do we know for sure that living in a big "civilized" community is better than walking around naked in the wilderness? We might be really missing out.
I thought about this objection but opted against voicing it, because, I mean, why have a civilization, then? Why be a libertarian? As Mises writes, classical liberalism presupposes that "people prefer life to death, health to sickness, nourishment to starvation, abundance to poverty. It teaches man how to act in accordance with these valuations. ... There is no need to argue with the bucolic dreams of Virgil and of eighteenth-century poets and painters. There is no need to examine the kind of security which the real shepherds enjoyed. No one really wishes to change places with them." If you or anyone you know is really willing to live as the National Geographic-type tribes actually live, they are welcome to perform that experiment and tell us the results. But I bet they'll agree with Mises on this one.
ama gi:From The Book of Peace, 1845:
Good stuff, that.
Morty: dchernik:Yet utilitarianism is a respectable moral theory. That, of course, was your fundamental mistake in reckoning ;)
You can replace "utilitarianism" with the more general "consequentialism," interpreted not as "only consequences matter," but simply as "consequences matter." As John Rawls writes, correctly, "All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy."
Morty:In any case, it seems that there is a simple solution to this problem which the philosopher is overlooking. If Ruritanian control of the land was truly more valuable than the current state of the affairs - why not simply pay all Waldavians to move or commit suicide? After all, if it can be so obviously expected that Ruritania will gain so much more value from the area than the Waldavians ever could from living there, then it follows that such would be an excellent investment - practically risk-free. For a less expensive proposition (as I would imagine it would take a great deal to convince someone to kill themselves), perhaps simply a payment to be made sterile, so as to wipe out the Waldavian population after this generation? It would take a bit more time, but the lower cost might be worth it. In any case, there is no need to resort to violence if the philosopher's premise that the land would be more valuable under Ruritanian control is correct.
I agree with some of that. It would be in obedience to sophisticated utilitarianism to pay the Waldavians for the land, as I argue above. And you are right, it may be cheaper in the narrow sense than to start a genocide. Forests can hide people quite well; Waldavians can steal or loot powerful weapons; and anyway, look what happened with the US in Vietnam.
Utilitarianism is a logical extreme of consequentialism though, which itself is a far way from an ethic that merely takes consequences into account. e.g. virtue ethics.
dchernik: ama gi:How do we know for sure that living in a big "civilized" community is better than walking around naked in the wilderness? We might be really missing out. I thought about this objection but opted against voicing it, because, I mean, why have a civilization, then? Why be a libertarian? As Mises writes, classical liberalism presupposes that "people prefer life to death, health to sickness, nourishment to starvation, abundance to poverty. It teaches man how to act in accordance with these valuations. ... There is no need to argue with the bucolic dreams of Virgil and of eighteenth-century poets and painters. There is no need to examine the kind of security which the real shepherds enjoyed. No one really wishes to change places with them." If you or anyone you know is really willing to live as the National Geographic-type tribes actually live, they are welcome to perform that experiment and tell us the results. But I bet they'll agree with Mises on this one. ama gi:From The Book of Peace, 1845: Good stuff, that.
I never said that I would "change places" with a Waldavian; I only meant to say that the Waldavians might prefer their position to ours.
ama gi:I never said that I would "change places" with a Waldavian; I only meant to say that the Waldavians might prefer their position to ours.
In other words, you meant that a Waldavian might not want to change places with you. Which is the same thing as saying that if that particular Waldavian found himself in your position, then he would want to go back to his tribe. You might not want to change place with a Waldavian, but someone else in your position easily might, according to your argument. And that's precisely what Mises would judge highly unlikely.
Jon, yes, I think you are right that utilitarianism proper says that only happiness matters.
I think it is perhaps because of its maximization element. An ethic that states "do X because it is good" is consequentialist, but does not make the mistake of going to the extreme "divert all your energies into maximizing X because it is good." That effectively reduces it to the absurd level of negating the importance of individuals and regarding them as little more than vessels for utility, arguably making it more like a religion than an ethic.
dchernik: ama gi:I never said that I would "change places" with a Waldavian; I only meant to say that the Waldavians might prefer their position to ours. In other words, you meant that a Waldavian might not want to change places with you. Which is the same thing as saying that if that particular Waldavian found himself in your position, then he would want to go back to his tribe. You might not want to change place with a Waldavian, but someone else in your position easily might, according to your argument. And that's precisely what Mises would judge highly unlikely. Jon, yes, I think you are right that utilitarianism proper says that only happiness matters.
Well, if the Waldavian thought his position was worse than a Ruritanian's, he would emigrate, right?
ama gi:Well, if the Waldavian thought his position was worse than a Ruritanian's, he would emigrate, right?
Let me rephrase to avoid all these problems. If an arbitrary person were situated behind some sort of veil of ignorance, and the only information given to him were that he could choose whether he would be actualized as a Ruritanian or a Waldavian, it is very likely that he would pick Ruritania.
dchernik: macsnafu, yes, the puzzle is that utilitarianism seems to sanction or even mandate genocide. Yet utilitarianism is a respectable moral theory. So, what goes wrong? Can we salvage utilitarianism from this perverse conclusion? Or must we abandon it or supplement it?
I agree in principle, utilitarism is at the bottom, at least no defense against genocide or mass murder. What than makes a respectable moral theory? The amount of people that agree to it? Than, Nazism was a "respectable" moral theory or better still is? Why should we salvage a collectivist theory as individualists?
In the begining there was nothing, and it exploded.
Terry Pratchett (on the big bang theory)
When an inferior society that cannot participate in the market society occupies valuable resources, there is nothing wrong with invading such a society. If it cannot participate in rational argumentation, then no rationality can be employed to cooperate with them. The morality of killing off whole tribes is questionable, and the history of colonization shows that it is unnecessary and unproductive, but the need for force to integrate the resources it occupies into the market society is unquestionable.
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