I was having an argument about private courts until I ran aground here...
...
ME:If we continue the example I gave, if I deliver my part of the contract and you don't, I can't see how you can take me to court. If in a competitive system of courts, one court consistently gave apalling rulings it wouldn't be in 'business' for much longer.
HIM: We're disputing the discharge of the contract. As far as I'm concerned, you haven't fulfilled your side of the deal; as far as you're concerned, I haven't.You've taken the matter to Acme Private Courts ltd, who've ruled in your favour. I've taken the matter to Big Dave's Judicial Services & Legbreakings ltd, who've ruled in my favour.In what way is either of us bound by the judgement of the other?
ME: And if you don't wish to be bound by the rulings of private courts then I guess you wouldn't mind being branded an outlaw?
HIM: As far as I'm concerned, you're the outlaw. I don't recognise the authority of your court to brand me anything.(and neither does Big Dave's Personal Security Services ltd, to which I am a long-standing subscriber).
Help, Dr. Phil, my head hurts.
Irish Liberty Forum
Here's a radical idea: neither of you are bound to the decision rendered in either court.
Some of us might go so far as to suggest that even if you agree on the venue, the guilty party can't be forcibly compelled to accept the judgment against him. The question then arises, what is the disincentive to breaking contracts, the glue that would hold together a voluntary society?
Social ostracism works to an extent, insofar as anyone who A) accepted a venue for settling the dispute, and then B) refused to abide by the judgment, would probably find it very difficult to transact business with anyone in the future, at the very least, others would stop offering credit and he'd have to pay in full, in advance, because the record of his actions indicate that his word (that he'll pay you in 30 days) is not worth a thin dime.
I could probably go on at length on this topic, but let's start with this.
============================
David Z
"The issue is always the same, the government or the market. There is no third solution."
This sort of possibility would be obvious to all arbitration services. They would contract ahead of time on a neutral third arbitrator who both would consider the final word on any issue where they disagree. Essentially, it would be an appeal. Even if they had for some reason not thought of this possibility beforehand, it could still be solved in the same way - by agreeing on a third arbitrator which both sides will recognize and enforce the decision of.
I think Rothbard discussed this sort of problem in either For a New Liberty or The Ethics of Liberty, though I could be wrong. I'm fairly certain it is also in Chaos Theory.
Firstly, this is a stupid hypothetical. The contract will specify who will arbitrate it in the event of a conflict between two courts. All courts do is ascertain who is in the wrong, so that the claimant can prove to the rest of society that they are not themselves aggressing against the defendant. The right to restitution lies with the victim. The court is merely the enforcer. So if the aggressor is guilty and refuses to submit to any court, well all they are doing is demonstrating their guilt. He can whine all he wants about being "branded", but if he has violated someone else's rights he will become an outlaw from the minute he refuses to submit to judicial procedures. So, his "point of view" is irrelevant, whingy protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. If a court is indeed corrupt and commands no respect from any other court or member of society, then he is correct, it has no such authority. However, if it is a normal, functioning court and has no such reputation, all he is doing is demonstrating his guilt.
-Jon
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
david_z: Here's a radical idea: neither of you are bound to the decision rendered in either court. Some of us might go so far as to suggest that even if you agree on the venue, the guilty party can't be forcibly compelled to accept the judgment against him. The question then arises, what is the disincentive to breaking contracts, the glue that would hold together a voluntary society? Social ostracism works to an extent, insofar as anyone who A) accepted a venue for settling the dispute, and then B) refused to abide by the judgment, would probably find it very difficult to transact business with anyone in the future, at the very least, others would stop offering credit and he'd have to pay in full, in advance, because the record of his actions indicate that his word (that he'll pay you in 30 days) is not worth a thin dime. I could probably go on at length on this topic, but let's start with this.
This comes up a lot with people who don't think this process through. When you enter into a contract more than likely you will agree upon a mechanism for resolution of conflict regarding the contract. What the contract specifies for the resolution will be how its resolved and in most cases will always include some enforecment mechanism for breech of contract.
For those of you who think social ostracism will be sufficient to enforce contracts without other enforcement you are in fantasy land. The idea that everyone will know the extent of what everyone else's history of contract compliance is ridiculous. A serial violator of contracts could change their name, move to a different area and whole host of other reasons why making contracts without enforcement will be very very rare.
Maxliberty: This comes up a lot with people who don't think this process through. When you enter into a contract more than likely you will agree upon a mechanism for resolution of conflict regarding the contract. What the contract specifies for the resolution will be how its resolved and in most cases will always include some enforecment mechanism for breech of contract. For those of you who think social ostracism will be sufficient to enforce contracts without other enforcement you are in fantasy land. The idea that everyone will know the extent of what everyone else's history of contract compliance is ridiculous. A serial violator of contracts could change their name, move to a different area and whole host of other reasons why making contracts without enforcement will be very very rare.
LULZ.
This is precisely the sort of objection I've come to expect from people who don't think the process through.
Let's take the serial contract violator! As if. Credit and goodwill don't flow from freaking fountains. Given this objective fact of reality, until and unless one has established some worth reputation, he'll find it difficult to obtain either. Do you remember the "great deals" you got on mortgage applications, credit cards, store credit, auto loans, etc., when you were 18 years old, had never held a steady job in your life, and had no proven income or demonstrated propensity to repay loans? This is what it would be like, every single time the "serial violator" would have to start from scratch. And the more frequently he welches on contracts, the more likely it is that his reputation will precede him in the future.
Let's take the point about the insufficiency of social ostracism. In some markets (I seem to recall stories about investment bankers, brokers, and commodities traders) welching on even a single contract can effectively end your career. If you think that the only reason, or even the principle reason, that contracts are fulfilled is because there's a gun behind them, I object that you are the one living in a fantasy land. Most people, most of the time, are honorable individuals with a sense of fairness and equity, they repay their debts because it is generally the right thing to do.
And that straw-man, about "everyone having to know everyone else's history of compliance"... Must we? This is a service that could be provided by the market, it would be similar to what credit-rating bureaus and insurance companies use to measure risk in the present system. They take what is known about you, from your public transactions and from information that you voluntarily provide (and you would voluntarily provide some level of information because it would be beneficial to establish goodwill) and act as a sort of clearing-house for risk. Banks or insurance companies could certainly handle some of these tasks with little difficulty or objection from among their customers.
One response to this sort of dilemma is to consider what happens in instances of decentralization of the provision of legal services in today's world. One might notice that there is no world court, and in cases crossing over international boundaries, it's often the case that no court has any legitimate jurisdiction. Accordingly, in trying to understand the possibilities and limitations of decentralized provision of legal services, it might be worthwhile to consider international law as a paradigm example. For more on this, Ed Stringham's book, Anarchy and the Law, is supposedly very good, though I haven't had the chance to look at it myself. I've had the chance to hear Ed lecture on this subject, though, and he brings up a lot of interesting ideas; it seems like it might be a good place to start.
Bruce Benson's books, The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State and To Serve and Protect: Privatization and Community in Criminal Justice, might also be worth checking out, as might parts of David Friedman's The Machinery of Freedom, and the work of a law student at the University of Chicago, Tom Bell, who has been involved in researching "polycentric law." Surely there's no consensus on exactly how these sorts of problems should be handled, which is why there are anarchists in the first place. But it's definitely an area that needs to be looked into more thoroughly.
Most importantly, I think, is the idea that investigating this issue is not solely an anarchistic exercise. If law can more be effectively provided in a decentralized manner than it can through the state system, that seems like something we'd want to know about, even if we weren't advocating the complete dissolution of government. And if there are hurdles faced by a decentralized system which could be avoided through centralization, anarchists might want to take account of the possibility that individuals would want to voluntarily enter into groups which would be able to centralize the provision of legal services.
If anyone's genuinely interested in pursuing this line of research, I'd love to hear about it! If you drop me a line, I can try to help you find resources which might prove helpful, whether in the form of reading suggestions, connections to others with like interests, or connections to professors who might be able to help you in ways that I can't. Also, this.
david_z: Maxliberty: This comes up a lot with people who don't think this process through. When you enter into a contract more than likely you will agree upon a mechanism for resolution of conflict regarding the contract. What the contract specifies for the resolution will be how its resolved and in most cases will always include some enforecment mechanism for breech of contract. For those of you who think social ostracism will be sufficient to enforce contracts without other enforcement you are in fantasy land. The idea that everyone will know the extent of what everyone else's history of contract compliance is ridiculous. A serial violator of contracts could change their name, move to a different area and whole host of other reasons why making contracts without enforcement will be very very rare. LULZ. This is precisely the sort of objection I've come to expect from people who don't think the process through. Let's take the serial contract violator! As if. Credit and goodwill don't flow from freaking fountains. Given this objective fact of reality, until and unless one has established some worth reputation, he'll find it difficult to obtain either. Do you remember the "great deals" you got on mortgage applications, credit cards, store credit, auto loans, etc., when you were 18 years old, had never held a steady job in your life, and had no proven income or demonstrated propensity to repay loans? This is what it would be like, every single time the "serial violator" would have to start from scratch. And the more frequently he welches on contracts, the more likely it is that his reputation will precede him in the future. Let's take the point about the insufficiency of social ostracism. In some markets (I seem to recall stories about investment bankers, brokers, and commodities traders) welching on even a single contract can effectively end your career. If you think that the only reason, or even the principle reason, that contracts are fulfilled is because there's a gun behind them, I object that you are the one living in a fantasy land. Most people, most of the time, are honorable individuals with a sense of fairness and equity, they repay their debts because it is generally the right thing to do. And that straw-man, about "everyone having to know everyone else's history of compliance"... Must we? This is a service that could be provided by the market, it would be similar to what credit-rating bureaus and insurance companies use to measure risk in the present system. They take what is known about you, from your public transactions and from information that you voluntarily provide (and you would voluntarily provide some level of information because it would be beneficial to establish goodwill) and act as a sort of clearing-house for risk. Banks or insurance companies could certainly handle some of these tasks with little difficulty or objection from among their customers.
What you underestimate is the ability of people who will be a serial violator as a criminal activity. Without enforcement it becomes profitable to set-up entities or use unsuspecting third parties to obtain credit or goods and then simply violate the contract, not to mention ordinary people will now be tempted to try for the one big score. That is build up credit to a point maybe with a variety of people and then boom all at once violate all the contracts. A legal system that doesn't account for this is doomed to failure. Many people will risk ostracism to make a quick buck. Your underlying assumption is that the market place will not see enforcement as a superior solution to ostracism. Enforcement greatly reduces costs because it doesn't require for me to be an expert on every person I am doing business with. Things like loaning people money for large projects like houses or other business projects won't happen if you can't be guaranteed to use the house or other items as collateral.
I don't think anyone has posited this solution before, but here is my two cents...
Some arbitration contracts today put forth a sum of money to the private court, and upon successful completion of the contract, the money is returned.
For example, say I contract with another company for a very very large project. We agree to a private court for disputes in our contract, and both of us give a deposit to the court for, say $10k for each of us (in actually money or collateral). If the contract is completed successfully with no complaints, we both get our deposits of $10k back. If you build me a crappy bridge, I will go to court and likely not only get $20k, but you will suffer in terms of credit.
"You are correct in that Capitalism does not help with poverty, because it eliminates poverty altogether..."
"That wonderful strawman: greed."
Good call. I was too busy tearing down straw-men to worry about praxis. thanks
Morty:I think Rothbard discussed this sort of problem in either For a New Liberty or The Ethics of Liberty, though I could be wrong. I'm fairly certain it is also in Chaos Theory.
Could you point out the chapter(s) to me, please. Am currently "reading" the Ethics of Liberty audiobook. Cheers.
Fephisto:I don't think anyone has posited this solution before, but here is my two cents...
That's a really good idea, Fephisto.
Thanks for everyone else's two cents. Much appreciated.
Chapter 12 in For a New Liberty has a discussion of courts. I can't find the chapter in Ethics off-hand, but I thought I remembered it being in there, maybe chapter 19.
Fephisto: I don't think anyone has posited this solution before, but here is my two cents... Some arbitration contracts today put forth a sum of money to the private court, and upon successful completion of the contract, the money is returned. For example, say I contract with another company for a very very large project. We agree to a private court for disputes in our contract, and both of us give a deposit to the court for, say $10k for each of us (in actually money or collateral). If the contract is completed successfully with no complaints, we both get our deposits of $10k back. If you build me a crappy bridge, I will go to court and likely not only get $20k, but you will suffer in terms of credit.
Let's review the practical appliaction of your idea. You contract with me to build a bridge for $10,000,000 and we each deposit 10k with an arbitration court. So let's suppose I take your 10 Million and build a lousy bridge or no bridge at all and then you go to court and get my 10K and I get lousy get but I have maybe 5 million left over. The incentive is just too large to welch on the contract and take your money if there is no enforcement.
Let's say I took the idea further and required an escrow amunt equal to the amount of the project. So the contractor puts up 10 Million and when the project is completed he gets his 10 Million back plust he has the money you gave him. So from the builder point of view he has to tie up an equal amount of his own money for every project. The other contractor who deals with enforceable contracts doesn't have to do this so his capital structure is more liquid and he cna take on more projects than the builder who deals with non-enforceable contracts.
Having enforcement is economically superior than hoping the other guy will always come through with his part. Not to mention when there are legitimate disputes by one or both parties.
If you seriously think about these issue then use real examples of what you would do and take it through all the various scenarios and what you will discover is that most people will want contracts that can be enforced. So most contracts will have an enforcement mechanism.
Maxliberty:If you seriously think about these issue then use real examples of what you would do and take it through all the various scenarios and what you will discover is that most people will want contracts that can be enforced. So most contracts will have an enforcement mechanism.
For starters, it's pointless to debate the pedantics of arbitrary numbers. All you've done with your example is assume a number that is so large that Fephisto's position is invalidated. Nice job. Now, maybe Fephisto's example was a bad number to use, but that doesn't necessarily invalidate his thesis.
Maxliberty:Let's say I took the idea further and required an escrow amunt equal to the amount of the project. So the contractor puts up 10 Million and when the project is completed he gets his 10 Million back plust he has the money you gave him.
Look, you can set up (and knock down) as many straw men as you'd like. But it's getting old. And fast. You've completely ignored the very real possibility that contract default is probably an insurable risk.
Maxliberty:Having enforcement is economically superior than hoping the other guy will always come through with his part. Not to mention when there are legitimate disputes by one or both parties.
Economically superior? It costs money to "enforce" contracts. I imagine there are situations in which it would be more expensive to enforce, and others where it is less expensive. But that doesn't answer the question, you haven't justified the use of violence in seeking specific performance.
david_z: For starters, it's pointless to debate the pedantics of arbitrary numbers. All you've done with your example is assume a number that is so large that Fephisto's position is invalidated. Nice job. Now, maybe Fephisto's example was a bad number to use, but that doesn't necessarily invalidate his thesis.
I was pointing out that as a universal solution that was not possible. In a free society there will be a whole range of contracts with a wide variety of ways to resolve conflicts. My point is that to say that having contracts where parties will agree to an enforcement mechanism will also occur and is exactly what we would expect in many cases. There is nothing wrong with two parties agreeing how to resolve a conflict in advance of the conflict even if that method is not yours or my preferred one.
david_z: Look, you can set up (and knock down) as many straw men as you'd like. But it's getting old. And fast. You've completely ignored the very real possibility that contract default is probably an insurable risk.
david_z:Economically superior? It costs money to "enforce" contracts. I imagine there are situations in which it would be more expensive to enforce, and others where it is less expensive.
That is exactly right.
david_z:But that doesn't answer the question, you haven't justified the use of violence in seeking specific performance.
When one party breeches a contract then the other party is injured. This injury then becomes a property settlement issue wherin the injured party is entitled to receive compensation for their loss of property. The refusal to grant this to the other party is essentially theft. I am entitled to use force to retreive my property which someone else may have stolen by breeching the contract.
Maxliberty:Let's say I took the idea further and required an escrow amunt equal to the amount of the project. So the contractor puts up 10 Million and when the project is completed he gets his 10 Million back plust he has the money you gave him. So from the builder point of view he has to tie up an equal amount of his own money for every project. The other contractor who deals with enforceable contracts doesn't have to do this so his capital structure is more liquid and he cna take on more projects than the builder who deals with non-enforceable contracts.
You've never heard of a performance bond?
Pretty new idea, I mean they've only been around since the Middle Ages...
Even today a 'bonded' company doesn't have to tie up the amount of their bond but merely pay some other company to provide the money if they default on the contract. Kind of like insurance you see.
You are free to go with non-bonded people all you like, your level of risk is much different than my level of risk so I might only seek out tried and true professionals while you want to save a few bucks and get ripped off all the time. Doesn't mean you can go around shooting people because they used cheap cement on your new patio like you are advocating though.
Maxliberty:If you seriously think about these issue then use real examples of what you would do and take it through all the various scenarios and what you will discover is that most people will want contracts that can be enforced.
What, enforced by violence or the State?
Anonymous Coward: You've never heard of a performance bond? Pretty new idea, I mean they've only been around since the Middle Ages... Even today a 'bonded' company doesn't have to tie up the amount of their bond but merely pay some other company to provide the money if they default on the contract. Kind of like insurance you see.
I wasn't trying to invent something new . I was illustrating that there are some disadvantages to certain contractual arrangements and thus we would expect that there will and there is a variety of contractual relationships.
Anonymous Coward: You are free to go with non-bonded people all you like, your level of risk is much different than my level of risk so I might only seek out tried and true professionals while you want to save a few bucks and get ripped off all the time. Doesn't mean you can go around shooting people because they used cheap cement on your new patio like you are advocating though.
That is the point in a free society isn't it? That I should be able to choose the types of contractual relationships that I enter in to. What you are saying is that two parties can not enter into an agreement that has some sort of enforcement clause because you think it violates some principle. For example, I borrow money from someone to build a house and we sign a contract that says the house is collateral for the loan and if I default on the loan then the lender has the right to take the house if the agreed upon court rules against the defaulter and that force can be used if the defaulter refuses to leave. Why do you have a problem with that? Is it any of your concern what contract arrangement I make or are you saying I am not allowed to make that contract for some reason?
Anonymous Coward: What, enforced by violence or the State?
I think this thread is about private enforcement. I don't think anyone has mentioned the state.
Maxliberty:When one party breeches a contract then the other party is injured. This injury then becomes a property settlement issue wherin the injured party is entitled to receive compensation for their loss of property. The refusal to grant this to the other party is essentially theft. I am entitled to use force to retreive my property which someone else may have stolen by breeching the contract.
Breach. Anyways. The question is, what happens when both parties believe that the other party is the one in breach, both refusing to mediate or arbitrate a dispute.
So, what happens when that party, from whom you used force to retrieve your property, wants to file a grievance against you? Ultimately, the conflict ends up in court somewhere, right?
david_z: Maxliberty:When one party breeches a contract then the other party is injured. This injury then becomes a property settlement issue wherin the injured party is entitled to receive compensation for their loss of property. The refusal to grant this to the other party is essentially theft. I am entitled to use force to retreive my property which someone else may have stolen by breeching the contract. Breach. Anyways. The question is, what happens when both parties believe that the other party is the one in breach, both refusing to mediate or arbitrate a dispute. So, what happens when that party, from whom you used force to retrieve your property, wants to file a grievance against you? Ultimately, the conflict ends up in court somewhere, right?
There are two options for disputes, 1. We have a contract that specifies the dispute resolution which we both abide by. 2. We have a contract that specifies the dispute resolution which one side does not abide by. If one party refuses to abide by the cotract then the other party has two options forget about it and write it off or enforce the contract with force. So it does not have to end in the court it can end in the street.
What many libertarians have a problem accepting is that there is no guarantee that all conflict will be resolved peacefully in a free society. Violence shouldn't be universally viewed as an unacceptable means to resolve a dispute.
Maxliberty:If one party refuses to abide by the cotract then the other party has two options forget about it and write it off or enforce the contract with force. So it does not have to end in the court it can end in the street.
After having already lost a great deal of money, (by virtue of an obligor's default on contract) you're suggesting that it would be profitable to expend even more money to wage a private war against the other party? Cuckoo. Violence as a means of "dispute resolution" is really only profitable when the costs can be distributed largely among parties which have no claim to the profits.
I do not mean to suggest that all conflicts will be resolved peacefully, only that the incentive for violence as a means to resolution is severely diminished.
david_z: Maxliberty:If one party refuses to abide by the cotract then the other party has two options forget about it and write it off or enforce the contract with force. So it does not have to end in the court it can end in the street. After having already lost a great deal of money, (by virtue of an obligor's default on contract) you're suggesting that it would be profitable to expend even more money to wage a private war against the other party? Cuckoo. Violence as a means of "dispute resolution" is really only profitable when the costs can be distributed largely among parties which have no claim to the profits. I do not mean to suggest that all conflicts will be resolved peacefully, only that the incentive for violence as a means to resolution is severely diminished.
The simplest example is party A lends money to party B to build a house with the house as collateral. Party B refuses to pay but wants to keep the house. Per the contract Party A sends his enforcers to evict Party B. This isn't that expensive as oppose to say Party A losing $100,000. party B will be hard pressed to find much support for his apparent theft. So enforcement in this case is not likely to be very expensive. In some cases the costs of enforcement outweighs the benefit. This happens all the time in small disputes where the dollar is so small it is easier for people to write off the loss. Again, my point is that to universally rule out any particular option in a free society is pointless. Why shouldn't a free market have more than one way of dealing with contracts, including enforcement. What principle is violated by having an enforceable contract?
Maxliberty:What you underestimate is the ability of people who will be a serial violator as a criminal activity. Without enforcement it becomes profitable to set-up entities or use unsuspecting third parties to obtain credit or goods and then simply violate the contract, not to mention ordinary people will now be tempted to try for the one big score....Many people will risk ostracism to make a quick buck. Your underlying assumption is that the market place will not see enforcement as a superior solution to ostracism
I'm not sure what you mean by "entities"... Unsuspecting third parties would quickly find themselves in financial distress (i.e., without doing due-diligence)
There is a strong disincentive, in a free market, towards anonymous transctions, because (as you note) the risk is generally higher. Insofar as anonymous transactions occur, they will probably command a premium. It's more difficult, for instance, for a brand new eBayer to sell something for top-dollar compared to an established seller.
I notice that social ostracism works quite well for enforcing compliance with norms in the orthodox Jewish community. If I do something uncalled for in New York, and move to the Jewish community in Denver, I'll hear about it there.
david_z: Maxliberty:What you underestimate is the ability of people who will be a serial violator as a criminal activity. Without enforcement it becomes profitable to set-up entities or use unsuspecting third parties to obtain credit or goods and then simply violate the contract, not to mention ordinary people will now be tempted to try for the one big score....Many people will risk ostracism to make a quick buck. Your underlying assumption is that the market place will not see enforcement as a superior solution to ostracism I'm not sure what you mean by "entities"... Unsuspecting third parties would quickly find themselves in financial distress (i.e., without doing due-diligence) There is a strong disincentive, in a free market, towards anonymous transctions, because (as you note) the risk is generally higher. Insofar as anonymous transactions occur, they will probably command a premium. It's more difficult, for instance, for a brand new eBayer to sell something for top-dollar compared to an established seller.
So why is it a violation of some principle to have contracts that are enforced? I think that I have already stated that the options you mentioned would most likely be available and many others we haven't even discussed. Your arguements imply that enforceable contracts will not happen or that they are a violation of some unstated principle.
What you have here is a condition where "ownership" of the house is in question. Perhaps a free market doesn't tolerate this sort of arrangement? I haven't given it too much thought, but it seems to me that in your example, like the present, when you buy a house on loan, you're not actually the owner of the house; the lender is. So,the question is, who owns the house? You can easily solve the problem by maintaining ownership of the house until and unless a predetermined sum is paid.
There are ways around this, I believe, that don't involve the outright use of force, only the exercise of ownership rights. A person who is publicly accused of such theft, should find it very difficult to interact with other people, assuming their protection/insurance agencies frown (severely) on dealing with people who refuse to submit to judgments or to lawfully contest accusations. In this sense, it's possible to besiege the thief, in a figurative (or, literal) sense. He can't leave, because when he's on someone else's property, that person or their agent can certainly apprehend him. He will have a hard time buying things because he's a known liability. Service providers might, in sympathy and for posteriority's sake, shut off his utilities, etc...
I have a flight to catch, shortly. Don't dismiss brevity of my response with unwillingness to continue dialogue.
david_z: What you have here is a condition where "ownership" of the house is in question. Perhaps a free market doesn't tolerate this sort of arrangement? I haven't given it too much thought, but it seems to me that in your example, like the present, when you buy a house on loan, you're not actually the owner of the house; the lender is. So,the question is, who owns the house? You can easily solve the problem by maintaining ownership of the house until and unless a predetermined sum is paid. There are ways around this, I believe, that don't involve the outright use of force, only the exercise of ownership rights. A person who is publicly accused of such theft, should find it very difficult to interact with other people, assuming their protection/insurance agencies frown (severely) on dealing with people who refuse to submit to judgments or to lawfully contest accusations. In this sense, it's possible to besiege the thief, in a figurative (or, literal) sense. He can't leave, because when he's on someone else's property, that person or their agent can certainly apprehend him. He will have a hard time buying things because he's a known liability. Service providers might, in sympathy and for posteriority's sake, shut off his utilities, etc... I have a flight to catch, shortly. Don't dismiss brevity of my response with unwillingness to continue dialogue.
The underlying question is why am I not allowed to have a contract that has an enforcement clause? As far as the ownership question well that is the prupose of the contract regarding the house, it's the enforcement that is a problem from your point of view.
Not everyone is concerned with ostracism. Imagine the whole world is a free society, do you think a person who has a bad reputation in one place can't simply go somewhere else with a new identity and start again or if he makes enough money he lives like a king off his scam. Plenty of people will associate with him just because he has money irregardless of what his reputation might be.
david_z:In this sense, it's possible to besiege the thief, in a figurative (or, literal) sense. He can't leave, because when he's on someone else's property, that person or their agent can certainly apprehend him. He will have a hard time buying things because he's a known liability. Service providers might, in sympathy and for posteriority's sake, shut off his utilities, etc...
This is a lot more complicated than me sending five guys over to throw him out of the house. So why wouldn't people adopt the more economical solution?
Maxliberty:The underlying question is why am I not allowed to have a contract that has an enforcement clause? As far as the ownership question well that is the prupose of the contract regarding the house, it's the enforcement that is a problem from your point of view.
You can have a contract that says I'm your slave. That doesn't make it tolerable. One of the risks inherent in doing business is default risk, and it can certainly be insured against especially in tandem with some other mechanisms, like ostracism, blacklisting, etc. If the party in question has debtors, himself, the injured party can certainly subrogate the offendors claims to these receipts. If he's truly as black-and-white guilty as your argument presumes, his debtors shouldn't have any problem diverting their payments to the subrogor, after all, why continue paying money to a known criminal? If the offendor then challenges this subrogation, well, he has to either initiate the violence, himself, (at which point its clearly appropriate to resist with force) or he can take it back to the court that initially ruled against him where he will likely lose.
Maxliberty:Not everyone is concerned with ostracism.
They are, when it works. Ever hear of Law Merchant. Quite effective in dealing with scofflaws, until it was co-opted by the Crown.
Maxliberty: Imagine the whole world is a free society, do you think a person who has a bad reputation in one place can't simply go somewhere else with a new identity and start again
Asked, and answered. Re-read the thread.
Maxliberty:or if he makes enough money he lives like a king off his scam. Plenty of people will associate with him just because he has money irregardless of what his reputation might be.
*if* he makes enough money. He'd need to scam an awful lot of people, all at once, for an awful lot of money. Moreover, it's likely that interactions with "outlaw" status would be to an extent, prohibited by whatever agencies you're using to protect your own assets.
Maxliberty:This is a lot more complicated than me sending five guys over to throw him out of the house. So why wouldn't people adopt the more economical solution?
It becomes far less economical the second he decides to fight back. a BAR is a very effective weapon. If he's cunning enough to con a lot of people in this manner, he's probably wise enough to think about the repercussions of his actions, and take measures to protect himself from enforcement.
david_z:It becomes far less economical the second he decides to fight back. a BAR is a very effective weapon. If he's cunning enough to con a lot of people in this manner, he's probably wise enough to think about the repercussions of his actions, and take measures to protect himself from enforcement.
Just try specifically addressing the question. Are contracts that allow enforcement clauses allowed or do they violate some prinicple that you are trying to articulate.
If your arguement is solely that you think other options will be more economical then the market can decide. I am not trying to guess what the optimal form of contract is just if you think that enforcement of contracts is wrong.
Ludwig von Mises Institute | 518 West Magnolia Avenue | Auburn, Alabama 36832-4528
Phone: 334.321.2100 · Fax: 334.321.2119
[email protected] | webmaster | AOL-IM MainMises
Mises.org sitemap