In note #37 of In Defense of Extreme Rationalism, Hoppe refers to “the preceding conclusion regarding the characteristic of causality as an action-produced phenomenon …”
Revisiting the discussion that precedes note #37, I cannot find quite this conclusion. I find the conclusions that the category of action implies causality, that an historical act demonstrates causality, and that successful action demonstrates that causality, though an a priori concept, says something meaningful about the real world. I find the conclusion that language is action-produced and that its use presupposes and demonstrates the existence of time-invariant causal relationships. But I do not see where Hoppe asserts that causality is action-produced.
Am I missing something important?
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I haven't read the work in question, but it seems like the relevant question would be what Hoppe is referring to with the word "causality".
On one hand, he could mean that actual cause and effect relationships in physical reality are necessarily produced by actions. But that's not likely, since it would be obviously wrong. An action involves the weighing of means and the choice and execution of an alternative in the pursuit of some end. It seems uncontroversial to suggest that rain falls as the result of a causal relationship, right? But rain doesn't fall as the result of an action; the rain doesn't choose to fall, nor could it prevent itself from falling. It just falls. I suppose he could be trying to redefine what sorts of things qualify as causal relationships, but I think it's far more likely that he means something completely different in the note you referred to.
A possibility that comes to mind immediately is that he's referring to the recognition of causal relationships by human minds. That is, it's only by conceptually atomizing the universe and abstracting separate "forces" and "objects" that we come to the idea that there's something like "causality" in the universe. The idea here would be that we have to actively acknowledge causality in a set of phenomena in order for us to perceive there to be causality involved. That is, the recognition of causality would have to be voluntaristic. I'm not sure if this is right either (and by that I mean that I firmly believe it to be false), but it's a reasonably plausible candidate for what he could be referring to here. Thinking about this sort of thing really starts with David Hume, so I'd recommend you check out An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (or more reasonably, a summary of it or Hume's metaphysical and epistemological views).
All this has been under the impression that you have no idea what Hoppe's referring to; if you could clarify or provide some context for Hoppe's point, I might be able to get a little closer to what's being argued.
http://libertarian-left.blogspot.com/
Donny with an A:A possibility that comes to mind immediately is that he's referring to the recognition of causal relationships by human minds.
A slightly simpler possibility is that, but in the sense that it is through action that we empirically observe validate causality to ourselves. Still, that's a stretch, too, and it come off as a bizarre formulation as it stands quoted here. I'm not that familiar with Hoppe - he's still alive, isn't he? Anybody have his email or contact info? We could just ask him.
The state won't go away once enough people want the state to go away, the state will effectively disappear once enough people no longer care that much whether it stays or goes. We don't need a revolution, we need millions of them.
Hoppe is a Kantian impositionist, for whom the mind structures reality. One "sees" reality through metaphorical goggles, the transcendental categories, such as causality, in order to make sense of it. This is what Danny essentially pointed out in his second paragraph. I don't agree with this view either, but it's popular, especially amongst Kantians.
-Jon
I cannot be caged. I cannot be controlled. Understand this as you die, ever pathetic, ever fools.
Irenicus' Diaries.
Jon Irenicus:Kantian impositionist, for whom the mind structures reality.... it's popular, especially amongst Kantians.
LOL
What is funny? Kantians are not the only impositionists out there.
Donny,
I was hoping for a reply from someone who had read the text cited and examined the context for himself. I provided a link to it:
In Defense of Extreme Rationalism: Thoughts on Donald McCloskey's The Rhetoric of Economics
. Note #37 apprears 16 pages in, so the context and the conclusion he refers to is in these 16 pages.
I recommend this article to anyone interested in epistemology. How about having a go at it?
I know that Hoppe considers the concept of causality to be a priori, implied in the apriori concept of action. I believe that he considers action to be the thing that establishes the link between apriori propositions (and the conclusions we deduce from them) to the real world and allows us to say that apriori propositions say something meaningful about reality. I do not believe he thinks that action produces causality, and so I would not expect him to use the term action-produced to describe it. I could dismiss it as a poor choice, but I would like to be sure I'm not missing some important point of Hoppe's.
Hoppe is presumed alive and scheduled to lecture on praxeology at the Mises University on July 28. Llew Rockwell, in the preface to Hoppe's Praxeology and Economic Science, called him "the outstanding praxeologist living today". I am engaged in a project to read everything he has written.
You are right, I could ask him. But I want to make my best effort to understand what he has written before approaching him.
My impression is that Hoppe believes that there is an objective reality of which man must take account in order to act successfully and, in fact, in order to act at all. Causality is an apriori category, and we could not make sense of reality without it, but it is, itself, an objective reality. Have I missread him?
histhasthai,
My apologies. I addressed you as Donny in my reply to you. I'm still getting used to the layout of this forum.
Jon Irenicus:What is funny? Kantians are not the only impositionists out there.
I think there was a bit of an ironic twist there. After all, Kant held that impositionism is correct, and when looking out at the world, Kantians notice that impositionism is true, and so they hold impositionist views. Of course, nature doesn't carry its own rules, and they're imposing impositionism on it...
For what it's worth, I'd point out that Hoppe is not a straight-forward Kantian, at least if that means "the group of philosophers identified as Kantians today." Instead, he holds that the mainstream misinterprets Kant, and that Kant was actually a realist.
Odd parallel that might be of interest here: Rabbi Solovetchik (sp) was Rosh Yeshiva (head of the school) at Yeshiva University in New York. He was considered the leader of the Modern Orthodox, which essentially meant Jews who practiced as Orthodox and believed in supremacy of the Torah, but also held that the study of science, philosophy, and so on were not just allowable, but part of study of God and the Torah. The phrase is also taken to mean "Orthodox but not so strict in practice" but that isn't what he meant by it. So, anyway, he has this book Halachik Man where he is taking a tack similar to that of Hoppe in reading Kant as a realist, but rather than economics, he applies the train of thought to Jewish law.
On impositionism, I tend to favor Dr. Long's denial of the dichotomy between impositionism and reflectionism.
Mises argued for the categories' connection to reality on the ground that minds that are attuned to reality in such a way survived the process of natural selection; i.e. they are the minds best equipped to deal with the real world. I wonder if Hoppe holds a similar view. He sees action as directly tied to reality. There is a problem in Mises's (and any Kantian who adopts a similar line) view though, in that this is question begging. One thing about causality, is that denying it is self-contradictory.
JAlankatz, I think Hoppe is influenced sufficiently enough by Kant to be called a Kantian, although I agree that he does not fit in with most modern Kantians.
Jpg, I've read the article, but it packs in so many arguments I'd have to re-read it to locate that particular one. It is available online. Bring it up, search it and I'll see if I can help you interpret it.