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The Hard Case: When Electing Anarchists Is Counterproductive

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Clayton:

@Graham: But I think there is something conceptually wrong with your "libertarian Nuremberg trials" - most of the people who presently work in the State order in an aggressive capacity simply would not be in their current line of work if libertarian law had sway all along. I don't mean this merely as a descriptive statement of fact but as an exoneration of a large part of their actual culpability.

This is why the role of law is so damned important. Without just law, morality itself is actually perverted. Many police officers are very upright individuals. In fact, the scum bullies are able to get away with what they do by leeching off the upright image which is the result of the genuine uprights within police forces. But - on a libertarian analysis - most of what even the upright officers are doing is inherently aggressive. If the law were otherwise, I do not believe that these same individuals would pursue the same career choice, "the law be damned". They're police officers precisely because the law is what it is.

I agree, but I don't see how that makes the idea "conceptually wrong".  It makes it more complicated for the judge to determine who is really responsible, but that's all.  You are just saying that the Nuremberg defense ("I did it because I was hired to") is valid for many state "hitmen", and I agree.  Take a cop who confiscates/steals a bag of weed from someone the day before the revolution.  Now the weed smoker goes to court to sue the (ex-)cop for theft.  Is the cop guilty?  You could well argue that he should not be punished, on the basis that he was only doing his job, and only doing what he thought was right at the time.  This kind of defense wouldn't usually stand up, but in this case it might, given the pervasive influence of the state on morality that you talk about.  In this case, the "hitman" (cop) is entirely innocent, and all the responsibility lies with the "hirer" (ruling class) who established and maintained the "law" that made weed illegal in the first place.  That's not an unreasonable interpretation of the libertarian principle that individuals who are responsible for acts of aggression ought to be punished.

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Clayton:

This seems to conflict with your view of strict unlimited liability.  Could you explain a little more?

Well, strict liability is "the way things oughtta be" but things aren't this way and I think that fundamentally alters the balance of culpability.

For example, consider a slaveowner who inherited his property from his father, who had inherited it from his father before him, and so on. In a society where slave ownership is legal, is this slaveowner really a "criminal" who needs to be tried once the laws are changed to abolish slavery? I think the answer is no and I think that, in general, we should not seek ex post facto liability for crimes committed under a corrupt legal order. Instead, we should seek to set the law straight (by opening up competition in the market for arbitrated resolution of disputes) and then hold people accountable to the law as it is/was when they committed the act in question. All forms of ex post facto evaluation of actions smacks of statism and inquisitionism.

I'm not saying slaves should be prohibited from suing their former slaveholders but I don't think that free-market law arbitrators are going to think that it makes sense to hold people liable for violation of the law as it is in 2012 for things that were not torts under the law as it was in 2011.

You contradict yourself here, as gotlucky already implied.  What you say you're "not saying" is exactly what you are saying.

It's interesting that you think "All forms of ex post facto evaluation of actions smacks of statism and inquisitionism" because I feel the opposite way.  It's the state that tends to change laws arbitrarily and abruptly and ignore actions that took place before the law was brought in.  Like a few years ago, it was fine to smoke in pubs in the UK, and now it's illegal.  So the state is trying to say that smoking in pubs is aggression, while at the same time saying that no one should be punished for doing so when it was not illegal.  It's confusing... did morality change overnight?  Private law would be much more stable, I feel, and court would have no problem with ex post facto evaluation of actions.  In fact the whole idea of ex post facto doesn't make much sense in a private law context, where all laws are rightly viewed as resolutions to conflicts.

I also think this principle is important in reducing the resistance of a move towards liberty - a great deal of the resistance is generated by people who fear they could actually be held legally liable for the acts they committed under the old legal regime. Consider the many - obviously politicized - threats of war crimes charges against George Bush, for example - this illustrates the nature of the resistance. But introspecting on the past won't fix the only thing that we can change: the future. We shouldn't offer amnesty but neither should we promise a witch-hunt.

This is the totally separate question of strategy, of course.  And here I agree with you in that we need to be forward-looking.  So I'm saying in principle, there is a group of people, relatively small in number, who ought to be held responsible for the crimes of the state and duly punished, but strategically, this should not be the focus.

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RE: Voting is not aggression because it does not consent to being ruled. 

Technically correct.  That act occurs during voter registration.

I HEREBY DECLARE THAT:

(1)On the day of the next election I will have been a United States citizen for
at least one month, I will be at least 18 years of age, and I will have
resided in (state) and in my election district for at least 30 days;

(2)I am legally qualified to vote.

AND I HEREBY AFFIRM THAT the information I have provided in this registration
declaration is true. I understand that this registration declaration will be accepted
for all purposes as the equivalent of an affidavit; and if the registration contains a
materially false statement, I will be subject to penalties for perjury.

Is there some confusion as to the definition of a citizen. as in "United States citizen."

A legally recognized subject or national of a state or commonwealth, either native or naturalized.

Voluntarily pledging your allegiance as a citizen in order to be a subject of a state or commonwealth in sworn testimony is not consenting to be ruled?  Give me a break.  That is the very meaning of consenting to be ruled....

RE: Roads

The primary source of government funding for roads comes from property taxes.  If you don't believe me go research it.  There exists extensive analysis of how roads are paid debunking myths they are paid for soley by user fees such as fuel taxes, licensing, registration, etc.  Considering property taxation is currently inescapable from any locality in the several states or other jurisdictions within the United States (at least until a libertarian enclave geographically organizes and abolishes it... just pointing out the voluntary nature of things in that it is not impossible to abolish it), it is a non argument to say someone ought not use that which has been stolen from them.

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