gplauche: Somewhat off-(this)-topic, I find it rather amusing that belief in parenting and the distinction between adults and children is being labelled conservatism.
But I think the hyper-rationalistic, deontological approach to the NAP that many libertarians have tends to lead them to bizarre, extreme, and mistaken conclusions at times, particularly with regard to hard cases.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Geoffrey Allan Plauche:Actually, I think it's a mistake to say they are all included in the NAP. This treats the NAP as an axiom in a hyper-rationalistic manner. It is rather the case that the NAP is an abstract principle derived from them. It's application will depend on how you conceive them.
Heh--sometimes you sound like an objectivist, and sometimes a humanities major.
For the record, there's no such thing as hyper-rationalism. Being "too rational" is like being "too alive." Property crimes are explicitly included, because they're part of the definition of "aggression." The other ideas are expressible in terms of non-aggression, not in a pretzel-logic fashion, but quite naturally. For example, "liberty" is what I call it when nobody is attempting to aggress against me. Do you really have a different definition?
There are some good reasons for defining the NAP broadly, and then defining libertarianism narrowly around it. It's handy for pedagogic purposes: most of the work is done once we've taught someone what "aggression" is, and how it differs from uses of force for defense, say, or property recovery. The resulting, broad definition of aggression is very close to folks' intuitive sense of the concept, which makes it handy for teaching. And it's easily summarized, hence easily remembered.
It also serves a useful rhetorical purpose. The golden rule is virtually universal, and even children can grasp the outlines of it. The NAP is a weak form of the golden rule, but it's impossible to refute without obviously confessing to an intention to do unto others what one would NOT want them doing to onself. The moral argument is as airtight as the logical argument.
It also avoids some pitfalls: more muddy-thinking libertarians can embroil themselves in contradictions, which almost always follow directly from a bad definition of "aggression."
All this, and it fits on a bumper sticker!
--Len
Perhaps. But I think the hyper-rationalistic, deontological approach to the NAP that many libertarians have tends to lead them to bizarre, extreme, and mistaken conclusions at times, particularly with regard to hard cases.
This thread is the proof that I haven't fallen into that trap.
I also think that most, if not all, "thin" libertarians are "thicker" than they think, meaning that they don't usually realize when they are drawing on implicit values, principles and beliefs in their conception and application of the NAP.
I and others I've known, such as Block, Hoppe and several on this forum, are not the sort to accidentally import extra assumptions. Also note that we all may count as "thin" libertarians, but we don't all restrict ourselves to one axiom. Hoppe includes self-ownership as an axiom, while I'd call that a simple consequence of non-aggression. I.e., I can use my body without aggressing; nobody else can use my body without aggressing against me; therefore, I'm the de facto owner of it.
How is your belief in Zeus not a principled reason?
That depends what you call "principled." I assumed that flat-out superstition wouldn't count as "principled reason" for you. Would it still count as "principled" if I made it even crazier? Like, "Non-aggression is where it's at, cuz, like, my teeth won't like me otherwise!"? It appeared that you were suggesting judgment of one's reasons for embracing the NAP.
The point was that simply refraining from violating the rights of others does not make one a libertarian.
I think that was obvious from the start: NAP stands for non-aggression principle. It's clear that there's a vast difference between, "I've never killed anyone," and, "killing is wrong." The former is a happenstance; the latter is a principle.
Morality is a matter of voluntary choice, and for an action to count as moral/virtuous it also has to be chosen because it is desired and for principled reasons.
There's that implied judgment again. Look, I believe that aggression is wrong because vanilla pudding is yummy. And I cling to that faithfully, in the name of vanilla pudding, amen. (makes the sign of the non-sequitur with thumb and pinky) So, can I be in your libertarian club, or not?
Refraining from violating the rights of others out of fear of punishment is not really respecting their rights and does not make one a libertarian.
Goes without saying. A libertarian is someone who holds the NAP, not someone who happens not to violate it.
Len Budney:For the record, there's no such thing as hyper-rationalism. Being "too rational" is like being "too alive."
Yes, there is. I'm talking about the false rationalist/empiricist dichotomy here, not about being rational.
Yours in liberty,Geoffrey Allan Plauché, Ph.D.Adjunct InstructorBuena Vista University
"Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?"(Who watches the watchmen?)-Juvenal, Satires VI.347
Len Budney: Perhaps. But I think the hyper-rationalistic, deontological approach to the NAP that many libertarians have tends to lead them to bizarre, extreme, and mistaken conclusions at times, particularly with regard to hard cases. This thread is the proof that I haven't fallen into that trap.
But others have. :o)
Len Budney: How is your belief in Zeus not a principled reason? That depends what you call "principled." I assumed that flat-out superstition wouldn't count as "principled reason" for you. Would it still count as "principled" if I made it even crazier? Like, "Non-aggression is where it's at, cuz, like, my teeth won't like me otherwise!"? It appeared that you were suggesting judgment of one's reasons for embracing the NAP.
I'm not religious, but I don't think a principled reason has to be true to count as being principled. I don't think believing in the NAP because your teeth won't like you otherwise would count though. So what? Not just any reason counts. Doing the right thing out of fear of punishment, for example, does not make one virtuous.
Len Budney: Morality is a matter of voluntary choice, and for an action to count as moral/virtuous it also has to be chosen because it is desired and for principled reasons. There's that implied judgment again. Look, I believe that aggression is wrong because vanilla pudding is yummy. And I cling to that faithfully, in the name of vanilla pudding, amen. (makes the sign of the non-sequitur with thumb and pinky) So, can I be in your libertarian club, or not?
No, because that's illogical. Look, are you suggesting total relativism here? There are no standards? For if you are, you can throw libertarianism right out the window too.
Geoffrey Allan Plauche: Len Budney:For the record, there's no such thing as hyper-rationalism. Being "too rational" is like being "too alive." Yes, there is. I'm talking about the false rationalist/empiricist dichotomy here, not about being rational.
Ah. Then I think you're being hyperphilosophical here. There is no such dichotomy, although Rand and Mises seemed to think there was. The axiom that "man acts" is only a good axiom because we live in a universe where it's true--and one learns that one lives in such a universe by observation. Mathematical and empirical research are practiced differently, but they are not dichotomous at all.
BTW, a nice illustration of that is in the axiom of choice. While the axiom as stated is "non-empirical," it's extremely probable that eventually we will run into a consequence of the axiom, and a consequence of its negation, where one or the other fits the real world (they can't both). At that time, we will finally decide whether to keep or reject the axiom, and that decision will be empirical in nature.
--Len.
Juan: gplauche: Somewhat off-(this)-topic, I find it rather amusing that belief in parenting and the distinction between adults and children is being labelled conservatism. You are free to find it amusing. I find it dissapointing (and amusing too) that conservatives think conservatism is OK if it can be repackaged as voluntarist - but of course, conservatism is not voluntarist. But I think the hyper-rationalistic, deontological approach to the NAP that many libertarians have tends to lead them to bizarre, extreme, and mistaken conclusions at times, particularly with regard to hard cases. Oh well. Principle can always be given up if the consequences of sticking to it are not PC.
I'm not giving up any principles. You just don't understand how to apply them correctly.
Len Budney:Ah. Then I think you're being hyperphilosophical here. There is no such dichotomy, although Rand and Mises seemed to think there was.
?
Rand rejected it. But many people adhere to it self-consciously and many fall into the trap of thinking in the mode of one false side of the coin or the other.
Not just any reason counts. Doing the right thing out of fear of punishment, for example, does not make one virtuous.
Libertarianism happens to be virtuous (for some reasonable definition of virtuous), but you're falling into the "true Christian" trap. Is one a "true Christian" if one fears damnation? Are a given man's beliefs "really real," or is he simply trying to bribe God for goodies or escape punishment? What if one adopts Christianity motivated by fear of punishment, and then grows to love and truly believe this new religion of his?
The entire discussion is moot. We're not in the business of judging minds and hearts. If one "really believes in" the NAP, he's a libertarian. It doesn't matter whether he does so because he believes it will maximize prosperity, or because it's "just right," or because he thinks it will protect him from others' aggression, or keep him out of hell, or lead him to Nirvana, or give him washboard abs. It suffices that the NAP is embraced.
No, because that's illogical.
So is embracing the NAP because the FSM told you to. So what?
Look, are you suggesting total relativism here?
That's a funny question, since I maintain at least as staunchly as anyone that the NAP is an absolute. I merely state that as long as you accept this, your motivations for accepting it are of no interest to me. (Except, as I mentioned before, that some motivations might suggest instability, and prompt me to keep an eye on you.)
Len Budney:I and others I've known, such as Block, Hoppe and several on this forum, are not the sort to accidentally import extra assumptions. Also note that we all may count as "thin" libertarians, but we don't all restrict ourselves to one axiom. Hoppe includes self-ownership as an axiom, while I'd call that a simple consequence of non-aggression. I.e., I can use my body without aggressing; nobody else can use my body without aggressing against me; therefore, I'm the de facto owner of it.
Block has a few kooky ideas of his own when it comes to applying the NAP in some situations.
As for Hoppe, he tries to develop a realist rationalism but I think he is ultimately unsuccessful. I have a working paper, in need of revision, on my website critiquing his neo-Kantian conception of praxeology and arguing in favor of completing Rothbard's attempt to ground praxeology in Aristotelian philosophy.
Geoffrey Allan Plauche: Len Budney:Ah. Then I think you're being hyperphilosophical here. There is no such dichotomy, although Rand and Mises seemed to think there was. ? Rand rejected it. But many people adhere to it self-consciously and many fall into the trap of thinking in the mode of one false side of the coin or the other.
Did you not read the rest of my post? Anyone who thinks there's a genuine dichotomy between rationality and empricism is epistemologically confused. There is no dichotomy. A rationalist who eschews empiricism doesn't understand rationalism. An empiricist who eschews rationalism doesn't understand empiricism.
Rand considered herself an empiricist and eschewed rationalism (i.e., "a priorism"). To that extent, she didn't really understand empricism. Mises was a rationalist (i.e., an "a priorist") who eschewed empiricism. To that extent, he didn't really understand rationalism. (His diatribes against mathematics illustrate that further, BTW. His praxeology is not rigorous, but it is distinctly mathematical--despite the dearth of equations.)
gplauche: I'm not giving up any principles. You just don't understand how to apply them correctly.
Danno: Libertarian ideals hit a very solid grey area in this - indoctrination of the children is not ideal, but anyone preventing the parents from doing so is even worse.
many Libertarians fairly froth at the mouth (as do I) at the abuses of Church Rule in history and today, but even worse is the idea of any authority making a particular faith mandatory or prohibited.
maxpot46: Danno: An all-meat diet would be even unhealthier than a vegetarian diet. Facts: Eskimoes and other aboriginal tribes live today on all-meat diets, and are among the healthiest people on the planet.
Danno: An all-meat diet would be even unhealthier than a vegetarian diet.
Rand rejected a belief in Platonic rationalism and the analytic-synthetic dichotomy. Rationalism to her was a form of intuitionism. She did not reject the notion of necessary truths though, which many empiricists do. As for Mises' praxeological system being non-rigorous and mathematical, what do you mean?
-Jon
To darkness I condemn you...
As for Hoppe, he tries to develop a realist rationalism but I think he is ultimately unsuccessful.
That's because he tries to evade the iron law of rationalism: one cannot start without axioms and definitions. He tries, like the misguided greeks, to prove axioms. It can't be done.
Philosophers have never learned that lesson, so I hope that my emphatic statement doesn't rub you the wrong way--odds are good that you too are trying to derive morality from nothing. References to eudaimonia virtually prove it: I'm willing to bet that at the bottom of your ethics is the notion that "morality" consists in fish being fully fish, humans being fully human, and so on. The iron law will nail you every time: down deep in your discourse, your definition of being "true to one's humanity" will include the NAP. That's the spot where you're assuming what you're trying to prove.
I don't try to prove the NAP, because I know it can't be done. Any argument I use will lead back to the most basic assumptions, one of which is guaranteed to be the NAP (or a disguised equivalent). Instead I try to convince people, by appealing to their desire not to be aggressed against.
Len Budney: Not just any reason counts. Doing the right thing out of fear of punishment, for example, does not make one virtuous. Libertarianism happens to be virtuous (for some reasonable definition of virtuous), but you're falling into the "true Christian" trap. Is one a "true Christian" if one fears damnation? Are a given man's beliefs "really real," or is he simply trying to bribe God for goodies or escape punishment? What if one adopts Christianity motivated by fear of punishment, and then grows to love and truly believe this new religion of his?
It's not a trap. It's sound ethical theory. We're not concerned here with epistemic problems like whether we can tell someone is really virtuous. But from the standpoint of ethical theory, he doesn't count as virtuous if he only does it out of fear of punishment.
Len Budney:The entire discussion is moot. We're not in the business of judging minds and hearts. If one "really believes in" the NAP, he's a libertarian. It doesn't matter whether he does so because he believes it will maximize prosperity, or because it's "just right," or because he thinks it will protect him from others' aggression, or keep him out of hell, or lead him to Nirvana, or give him washboard abs. It suffices that the NAP is embraced.
Not from the standpoint of ethical theory it doesn't, and libertarianism is in part an ethical theory. You seem to be falling back on your conception of libertarianism as only a legal philosophy here but in doing so you are in danger of excluding morality from it as well. You've claimed that you don't exclude morality from it but by excluding principle reasons from consideration you are effectively doing that.
Len Budney:That's a funny question, since I maintain at least as staunchly as anyone that the NAP is an absolute. I merely state that as long as you accept this, your motivations for accepting it are of no interest to me. (Except, as I mentioned before, that some motivations might suggest instability, and prompt me to keep an eye on you.)
They may not be of any interest to you. But from the standpoint of ethical theory they are important. As far as the law is concerned, motivations don't generally matter. As far as being concerned with you leaving me in peace is concerned, your motivations don't matter much either (except to the extent you pointed out). But motivations do matter for whether someone counts as respecting rights or merely refraining from violating them.
Jon Irenicus:As for Mises' praxeological system being non-rigorous and mathematical, what do you mean?
Mathematics is reasoning logically from axioms--no more, no less. It has very little to do with equations. In fact many areas of mathematics don't have any equations at all. So whenever someone reasons logically from axioms, he's doing math. Mises attempts to do just that in Human Action, so he's doing math. He thought he wasn't, though, because he wasn't using equations.
It was non-rigorous because he didn't pin down his axioms and definitions well enough to make them airtight. A cranky mathematician might call that "bad" mathematics, but ALL mathematics was "bad" in that sense up until about 150 years ago. Mises was a pioneer, and plowed ahead rather than stopping to dot his i's and cross his t's. Praxeology can be made rigorous, and I'd like to see it done (but it's bloody hard, so I've basically given up looking for low-hanging fruit there).
Len Budney: As for Hoppe, he tries to develop a realist rationalism but I think he is ultimately unsuccessful. That's because he tries to evade the iron law of rationalism: one cannot start without axioms and definitions. He tries, like the misguided greeks, to prove axioms. It can't be done.
I think you're speaking in ignorance here. Aristotle, for example, never tried to prove any axiom. And how does Hoppe try to prove any axiom for that matter?
Proof refers to logical deduction. By definition one can't prove an axiom (i.e., via logical deduction). Aristotel knew that. I think Hoppe knows that too.
Len Budney:Philosophers have never learned that lesson, so I hope that my emphatic statement doesn't rub you the wrong way--odds are good that you too are trying to derive morality from nothing. References to eudaimonia virtually prove it: I'm willing to bet that at the bottom of your ethics is the notion that "morality" consists in fish being fully fish, humans being fully human, and so on. The iron law will nail you every time: down deep in your discourse, your definition of being "true to one's humanity" will include the NAP. That's the spot where you're assuming what you're trying to prove.
This is all mistaken and confused.
The NAP is not an axoim, btw; it is a conclusion derived from a long chain of reasoning. It simply can't be a philosophically satisfactory starting point.
Len Budney:I don't try to prove the NAP, because I know it can't be done. Any argument I use will lead back to the most basic assumptions, one of which is guaranteed to be the NAP (or a disguised equivalent). Instead I try to convince people, by appealing to their desire not to be aggressed against.
This is mistaken in a number of ways. And I think it's based on mistaken assumptions about metaphysics, epistemology, and ethical theory. Yes, any argument in favor of the NAP will lead back to discussions of metaphysics and epistemology because the NAP is not an axiom. And no, the NAP will not be at the base of all premises.
Your approach may be good for persuading people, good rhetorically, but it doesn't suffice for providing a philosophical defense of the NAP.
Geoffrey Allan Plauche:It's not a trap. It's sound ethical theory. We're not concerned here with epistemic problems like whether we can tell someone is really virtuous. But from the standpoint of ethical theory, he doesn't count as virtuous if he only does it out of fear of punishment.
Then you're setting yourself an unsolveable problem. The depths of the human psyche are vast and murky--you yourself can't even say whether you do something "only" for this reason or that. It's extremely rare that a person has "only" one reason anyway. I'm honest to my wife, not only because I uphold that virtue, but also because I know I won't like the consequences if I don't. So am I virtuous? Evil? 30% virtuous? 50%? God alone knows--I sure don't, and you certainly have no idea.
The whole quest is a fool's errand. But I'm leery of entering into conflict with you on this point, because we're also on the boundaries of a religious war between philosophers and mathematicians. I think that most of what philosophers do is a fool's errand, because it always boils down to arguing definitions through an infinite regression.
But from the standpoint of ethical theory they are important.
Aside from the philosopher/mathematician thing, I have a pragmatic question: would you rather get your theory just right, and die in slavery, or would you rather be free, though you don't finish your theory? Does your theory matter more to you, or the reality of freedom? Having watched Christians go through the same tail-chasing regression, I can tell you: first, you'll end up either concluding that nobody is a "real" libertarian, or divorcing your model from reality and accepting us at face value despite your theory to the contrary; second, you'll not get much closer to attaining actual freedom while you try to chase this recursion to its bottom. It has no bottom. It should suffice for me to assure you that I embrace non-aggression. If I turn out to be a liar, call me on it. Otherwise, take me at my word.
Len Budney: Geoffrey Allan Plauche: Len Budney:Ah. Then I think you're being hyperphilosophical here. There is no such dichotomy, although Rand and Mises seemed to think there was. ? Rand rejected it. But many people adhere to it self-consciously and many fall into the trap of thinking in the mode of one false side of the coin or the other. Did you not read the rest of my post? Anyone who thinks there's a genuine dichotomy between rationality and empricism is epistemologically confused. There is no dichotomy. A rationalist who eschews empiricism doesn't understand rationalism. An empiricist who eschews rationalism doesn't understand empiricism.
Did you not read mine? From the beginning I called it a false dichotomy. But your post seemed to treat it as if no one ever accepted one side or the other of this false dichotomy.
Len Budney:Rand considered herself an empiricist and eschewed rationalism (i.e., "a priorism"). To that extent, she didn't really understand empricism. Mises was a rationalist (i.e., an "a priorist") who eschewed empiricism. To that extent, he didn't really understand rationalism. (His diatribes against mathematics illustrate that further, BTW. His praxeology is not rigorous, but it is distinctly mathematical--despite the dearth of equations.)
This is quite simply mistaken and evinces misinterpretations of both Rand and Mises. Rand criticized Mises' "apriorism" because she saw it as Kantian and rationalist. Mises rejected positivist-empiricism and rightly so. But Rand accepted conceptual truths. She most emphatically did not consider herself an empiricist in the sense implied by the false dichotomy. And Mises didn't reject experience and a non-positivist-empiricist conception of the empirical. There are problems with Mises's conception of praxeology along Kantian lines, but you grossly overstate them.
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