I think that it is purely idiotic for one's aim to be the fulfillment of so-called 'natural rights'. Argumentation ethics or whatever, the justification doesn't even matter. By holding this as your goal, you avoid holding the idea that the best government (or lack thereof) should be what is best for the people (maximization of the utility, or however you want to define it). You necessarily hold that it is better to hold on to your moral ideals than to look at what is best for the population. How can you choose a philosophy which says that what provides the most prosperity for the people is not necessarily the best thing?
This is not meant as a justification for statism, nor does it mean that natural rights can't have a place. The truth is that you can still support natural rights, but it must be because pure adherence to the non-agression axiom is what is best for the people. It does not necessarily mean statism; you can define 'what is best for the people' in various different ways. What you cannot do is say that natural rights are best for the people because it is an end in itself.
The end, ultimately, must be prosperity for the people. Any other end is sadistic. The means may be natural rights; but in certain cases the enforcement of the non-agression axiom is not necessarily the best thing for the people. So where does that leave you?
You quickly brushed aside the problem with defining "best'.
What if I have a different idea of what's best for me than you do? Why do you get to own/control me instead of me owning/controlling myself?
Don't allow leftists to play games with definitions! Some of the libertarian-leaning leftists at this forum will try to redefine "left-wing" back to its original defition (Third Estate, limited government, free-markets, laissez-faire reforms, etc.). Fine! We non-leftists can't stop them from using their own personal definitions; they can use whatever labels they want to describe any concept they want.However, they have the audacity to then use their personal definition of "left-wing" (remember, the original definition, which is no longer valid) to prove that modern leftists are more libertarian than modern rightists! They will say that libertarianism is "inherently leftist" (again, using the original, no longer valid definition), and use that to insist that we should prefer and side with modern leftists over modern rightists.
Question their motives.
To the OP: Look, I don't mean to be rude, but you really ought to study the philosophy behind the ethics. You're conflating argumentation ethics and natural rights with deontology, and at the same time conflating the two very different approaches to ethics. Deontologists are not even saying the consequences don't necessarily matter; what they are saying is that they're not all that matters.
Argumentation ethics is a transcendental approach - it aims to solve the problem posed by the alleged ought-is gap. All moral theories must be advanced propositionally, and any theory that would violate the presuppositions of the argumenatative act - provided arg-ethics is correct - would be contradictory. Natural rights is a much broader and different category. Aristotelian arguments for natural rights are the ones I'm at least remotely familiar with; natural rights are what are necessary for individuals to be allowed to flourish, to achieve eudaemonia. Aristotelianism bypasses the consequentialist/deontological gap altogether, placing weight on both action-guiding principles and the consequences of actions. Unlike deontology, it is more contextual and unlike consequentialism, it allows for rights.
"You quickly brushed aside the problem with defining "best'."
I have, because defining "best" constitutes defining a whole philosophy. I myself go with classic maximization of utility, but with a strong emphasis on lack of information; for an action to be moral, it must not only be good for the human population, but also it must be assured.
"What if I have a different idea of what's best for me than you do? Why do you get to own me instead of me owning me?"
It's not about anybody owning anybody. But the truth is that sometimes, under NR, what's best for the people is not necessairly strict adherence to the Non-agression axiom. Think of a man who possesses the cure to cancer but refuses to give it out. It's not about who owns the cure to the cancer or the man's body. It's about what's best for the people. Obviously, either situation is not apodictically better than the other; this is just a subjective value judgment. But in most people's opinions, the lives of millions are worth more than a small violation of a person's 'natural rights'. This isn't an advocation of force as a rule because of this instance, it is just an example to show where NR does not necessarily coincide with what the vast majority of people would consider to be best for society. Now, I am as much a Libertarian as you are, but the basis for Libertarianism must be the futility of government; they do not usually have enough information to make proper decisions.
You can uphold NR because you think that they are what will give the maximum amount of prosperity to society; this, of course, depends on how the individual defines prosperity. But if you uphold natural rights just because they are 'natural', then you are assigning a value to a means. This is of course is a subjective value judgment; and your enforcement on this upon other people is just as bad as those who would support drug laws.
...which is only true if you argue and prove that rights are means of a sort.
You believe it's fair for one individual to decide what's best for everyone and use the threat of deadly force to compel another individual to do something? If I decide that it's best for everyone if you're dead, would you accept that?
You said that "it's not about anybody owning anybody". Well, it is. If you believed that I owned myself instead of you owning me, you would be opposed to using the threat of deadly force to compell me to do your bidding. If you'd rather use another word other than "own", how about "control"?
miksirhc:But the truth is that sometimes, under NR, what's best for the people is not necessairly strict adherence to the Non-agression axiom. Think of a man who possesses the cure to cancer but refuses to give it out. It's not about who owns the cure to the cancer or the man's body. It's about what's best for the people.
It might indeed be "better" for all but him, but since there is no rational method with which to compare good and bad quantitatively, and as you're making him worse off, there's no rational method for determining whether "better for everyone else" is greater than, less than, or equal to "worse for him". Any time you attempt to violate the non-aggression principle, you also violate pareto optimality, and thus run into this same calculation problem. What if, instead of a cure to cancer, everyone else just didn't like him and wanted him to be tortured to death? Would you still support the action? Using your primitive moral calculus, it would seem that you should.
Corporations are an extension of the state.
Asides from the first post, I have absolutely no idea what any body in this post said. What is some good beginner reading for philosophy and ethics, libertarian or otherwise?
Hey, this is a private residence man...
mark111:Asides from the first post, I have absolutely no idea what any body in this post said. What is some good beginner reading for philosophy and ethics, libertarian or otherwise?
I'm going to get shot down, but my favorite intro to philosophy is Russell's Problems of Philosophy.
Again, I never said anything about the correctness of a moral code, nor did I propose a code. Neither did I say whether or not anybody should have the power of 'deadly' force. I'm simply stating that pure deontological NR upholding does not necessarily coincide with the best-case scenario. I am making no comments or observations about if anybody should have the power or not to violate the NAA.
This is all that I'm saying:
1. Prosperity for the people (utility maximization) must be the goal of a societal arrangement.
2. Pure deontological NR and strict enforcement of the NAA does not coincide with utility maximization in all cases.
Rich333:there is no rational method with which to compare good and bad quantitatively, and as you're making him worse off, there's no rational method for determining whether "better for everyone else" is greater than, less than, or equal to "worse for him". Any time you attempt to violate the non-aggression principle, you also violate pareto optimality, and thus run into this same calculation problem.
The truth is, every time you act you violate Pareto optimality. The argument is similar to Simpson's argument against externalitites; every action, even if between two consenting parties, has external effects, and therefore diminishes somebody's utility. Humans act, and therefore Pareto optimality cannot exist. Should Ford have been prevented from wiping buggy suppliers out of business? Surely that harmed all the buggy manufacturers, since it unemployed them? Surely this violates Pareto optimality?
The only way to achieve Pareto optimality would be for nobody to act.
Rich333:Using your primitive moral calculus, it would seem that you should.
So, we now understand that moral calculus (how can it be primitive if I have not even stated my method yet?) is necessary for every action; there is no apodictic way to ever increase utility in a society. Even buying a loaf of bread has negative externalities by raising the price of bread. The best we can do is to come to some sort of a compromise. Nothing is ever black and white; there is no such thing as pareto optimality and we must realize this.
Miksirhc, the only way you can say that a new business "harms" competitors is if you believe the competitors have a right to their customers money. This, of course, means that their customers have no right to choose to patronize. Along those same logical lines, you're stealing from me by not sending me $50 via Paypal. There is a huge and not-so-subtle difference between not-helping and harming.
Ealier, I said this:
You believe it's fair for one individual to decide what's best for everyone and use the threat of deadly force to compel another individual to do something? If I decide that it's best for everyone if you're dead, would you accept that? You said that "it's not about anybody owning anybody". Well, it is. If you believed that I owned myself instead of you owning me, you would be opposed to using the threat of deadly force to compell me to do your bidding. If you'd rather use another word other than "own", how about "control"?
And I believe you were responding to me when you said:
Again, I never said anything about the correctness of a moral code, nor did I propose a code. Neither did I say whether or not anybody should have the power of 'deadly' force. I'm simply stating that pure deontological NR upholding does not necessarily coincide with the best-case scenario. I am making no comments or observations about if anybody should have the power or not to violate the NAA. This is all that I'm saying: 1. Prosperity for the people (utility maximization) must be the goal of a societal arrangement. 2. Pure deontological NR and strict enforcement of the NAA does not coincide with utility maximization in all cases.
You can't advocate using deadly force on one hand, then say that you never said "whether or not anybody should have the power of 'deadly' force". You are either advocating it, or not. Which is it? And why the scare-quotes around "deadly"?
miksirhc:The end, ultimately, must be prosperity for the people. Any other end is sadistic.
Liberty?
miksirhc:The end, ultimately, must be prosperity for the people.
First off, who are "the people"? The majority? Does the benefit of a simple majority of 51% then permit the exploitation and abuse of the other 49%? Surely, you are forcing the minority into something, otherwise you would not need to argue that the violation of natural rights is necessary to do it.
Secondly, by what do you mean prosperity? Material wealth? An abundance of stuff? Central heating? What is prosperity? Is it good if the people are wealthy but live in fear of being violated for the "prosperity" of the "people"?
Finally, as more of a comment (though I admit my questions are somewhat rhetorical), it always amuses me when people have the unmitigated hubris to think that they, or anyone, can determine what is best for everyone else. You think that somehow, through a measure of some hazily objective idea like prosperity, you can quantify the subjective goods and evils of which life consists. Utilitarian philosophies seem inevitably to lead to monstrous conclusions, justifying any abuse for the common good. If there is a tyrant that did not justify himself so, I have not heard of him.
miksirhc, as Ego said, you're just assuming one has a right to certain things, e.g. the market value of their product. But they do not. This requires prior demonstration.
Mark111, I think Mill's Utilitarianism and On Liberty, Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature, Hobbes' Leviathan, Plato's The Republic, Locke's Two Treatises of Government, Kant's The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, Rand's The Virtue of Selfishness and Rothbard's The Ethics of Liberty are all good starting points, and they concern original materials. More advanced but also good are Philippa Foot's Natural Goodness, Veatch's Rational Man, Rasmussen and Den Uyl's The Norms of Liberty and Liberty and Nature, Narveson's The Libertarian Idea, Sciabarra's Towards a Dialectical Libertarianism, David Schmidtz's Elements of Justice, Lester's Escape from Leviathan, Hoppe's The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia, Flew's Could There be Universal Natural Rights?, Harsanyi's Does Reason Tell Us What Moral Code to Follow and, Indeed, to Follow Any Moral Code at All? and Judith Thomson's Rights, Restitution and Risk. Two compilations you might find helpful are Singer's A Companion to Ethics and the anthology Arguing about Metaethics. The reading list I put up in this forum should also help. Mises also had his own ideas on ethics, and some situate him closer to the natural rights tradition than utilitarianism, although I can't recall which article in particular does so. Reading through his own works on the topic would thus also be a good idea.
Ego:the only way you can say that a new business "harms" competitors is if you believe the competitors have a right to their customers money. This, of course, means that their customers have no right to choose to patronize. Along those same logical lines, you're stealing from me by not sending me $50 via Paypal. There is a huge and not-so-subtle difference between not-helping and harming.
I am simply pointing out that actions can have perverse consequences (negative externalities) on parties not involved. Force is not required to harm utility. Therefore, the idea of Pareto Optimality is impossible in a world where humans act. Nobody would disagree that Ford harmed the buggy manufacturers by putting them out of business (not that I would have advocated interfering, not by a long shot). But even this condition violates Pareto Optimality, so in your own terms, where nobody has the power to decrease one's utility, this wouldn't be allowed. Violent force is not necessary to decrease utility. Rights have nothing to do with it.
Ego:You can't advocate using deadly force on one hand, then say that you never said "whether or not anybody should have the power of 'deadly' force". You are either advocating it, or not. Which is it? And why the scare-quotes around "deadly"?
I am a minarchist, because I believe that the goal of complete enforcement of the NAA is not only undesirable for the people but also unattainable. There must, however, be strict restrictions on the use of violent force.
There's another way of looking at it - that a given society A following x set of rules may involve some being better off and no one worse off than society B following y set of rules; in this sense, Pareto optimality can be maintained in spite of interdependence. Contractarians usually argue on such grounds.
Wait, why does it even matter if Pareto optimality is violated? As long as no rights were violated when Company A produced a better product than Company B, what's the issue? Why does that justify you vioating my rights and controlling what I do?
Why the unhealthy obsession with 'rights'? My stance on government or the lack thereof is that whatever societal arrangement occurs it should maximize utility. Utility can be diminished without harming the abstract artificial construct of 'rights'. Something is bad if it decreasese the overall utility of the society, irrespective of whether or not it violates one of your 'rights'. Something is justified if it increases utility; if it makes the people better off. Your 'rights' are artificial constructs that don't refer to anything innate.
Inquisitor:There's another way of looking at it - that a given society A following x set of rules may involve some being better off and no one worse off than society B following y set of rules; in this sense, Pareto optimality can be maintained in spite of interdependence. Contractarians usually argue on such grounds.
Perhaps, compared on large abstract terms; but even under the liberal (and I mean socialist) society we have now, everybody is better off than they would have been without it altogether. That could be used to argue for almost anything. Maximization of utility must be the goal.
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