Neuroeconomics

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I. Ryan replied on Sun, Aug 15 2010 12:49 AM

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Neoclassical:

Since that trait is, technically, an evolutionary trick to misperceive physical processes.

Our misperception perceives itself as misperception! What a wonderful contradiction!

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Lagrange multiplier replied on Sun, Aug 15 2010 10:49 AM

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Clayton, I would personally agree that evolutionary psychology is the most scientifically grounded and informative branch of psychology we have, but I also don't consider that opinion uncontroversial (consider the "'just so' stories" criticism).

To answer your question, neuroeconomics most certainly takes account of adaptationist thinking.

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Lagrange multiplier replied on Sun, Aug 15 2010 10:54 AM

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Caley, your point is reasonable.

To be sure, I am an ontological reductionist--or, perhaps, an "ontic fundamentalist" as William C. Wimsatt might call me.

I prefer a "desert ontology" as Quine has envisioned; that is, nothing ultimately exists but physical particles, even if our epistemic limitations and practical purposes shall forever lead us to refer to various ensembles of them.

Thus, if I have pursued an intertheoretic reduction from a folk-psychological homo economicus to neural networks, then I consider this a step in the right direction, not a resting place.

"Neuroeconomics provides a model of the architecture that links brain and behavior. Mind, though it may very much exist, simply does not figure in that equation." -- Paul W. Glimcher

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AJ replied on Sun, Aug 15 2010 11:19 PM

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Neoclassical:

My point is this: what truths can emerge if you don't anthropomorphize people?

That seems reasonable: we can surely learn something useful from treating people as black boxes or automatons. I can know, for instance, that if I tell people one thing they will usually treat me better than if I tell them another thing. Sometimes analyzing this in terms of human action could be too cumbersome, and instead I just work with my statistical data.

An example is the advertiser's claim that "Sex sells!" Maybe the advertiser notices that he is motivated toward buying decisions by semi-nude women on the box and he presumes others are sufficiently like him, but in this case he seems to be making a purely statistical statement, not about humans as actors per se, but about humans as objects/robots/automatons/numbers/etc. It's still a useful observation.

However, I don't know that Austrian theory denies this.

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I. Ryan replied on Mon, Aug 16 2010 3:29 PM

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AJ:

That seems reasonable: we can surely learn something useful from treating people as black boxes or automatons. I can know, for instance, that if I tell people one thing they will usually treat me better than if I tell them another thing. Sometimes analyzing this in terms of human action could be too cumbersome, and instead I just work with my statistical data.

An example is the advertiser's claim that "Sex sells!" Maybe the advertiser notices that he is motivated toward buying decisions by semi-nude women on the box and he presumes others are sufficiently like him, but in this case he seems to be making a purely statistical statement, not about humans as actors per se, but about humans as objects/robots/automatons/numbers/etc. It's still a useful observation.

However, I don't know that Austrian theory denies this.

I think that you are talking about something like, if I see a picture X associated with good A instead of no picture X, I have a greater probability of buying it, and I expect that other people are like me, so, because I want to sell those goods, A, I will try to get people to associate those pictures, X, with those goods, A.

But using the categories good, buying, wanting, and so on, are only possible because we have praxeology, so I don't think that it is even possible to consider that sort of statistical thing only of natural science. It might be an empirical regularity that we could consider as a part of natural science, namely, psychology, but it relies on the vocabulary of praxeology. In fact, I think that praxeology is the foundation, or at least the vocabulary, of psychology, just like logic or mathematics is the foundation, or at least the vocabulary, of physics. How could you do psychology without praxeology? And how could you do physics without logic and mathematics? In both cases, you wouldn't even have any vocabulary to work with.

So I would call what you are talking about applied psychology, which is empirical, while being careful to remember that the foundation of applied psychology is praxeology, which isn't empirical.

But I think that Neoclassical is trying to go a lot further than that, and argue that we could reduce buying, selling, goods, wanting, and so on, to terms of natural science, so that we don't even need to use praxeology as the foundation anymore. I think that he is trying to say that we could reduce things like buying, selling, goods, wanting, and so on to categories of movements.

So I don't think that your example is what he is talking about.

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AJ replied on Mon, Aug 16 2010 10:27 PM

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I thought Neoclassical said elsewhere that he is not against most of Austrian theory, just that he believes there are other valid methodologies. His debate with Grayson was over whether methodological dualism is the only sound approach to the pursuit of knowledge, not whether it was sound at all.

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Jon Irenicus replied on Mon, Aug 16 2010 11:17 PM

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Methodological pluralism is the only sound approach. Methodological dualism is merely the starting point to liberate economics from the grasp of people with a scientistic view of how science should proceed, and is emphasised because it was Mises's primary concern, rather than the methodology of sciences like biology (as against physics).

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Lagrange multiplier replied on Tue, Aug 17 2010 8:39 AM

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AJ:

I thought Neoclassical said elsewhere that he is not against most of Austrian theory, just that he believes there are other valid methodologies. His debate with Grayson was over whether methodological dualism is the only sound approach to the pursuit of knowledge, not whether it was sound at all.

That's essentially correct.

Furthermore, I contend that if a priori reasoning exists at all, then it is evolutionarily contingent, a biological trait, and thus is not necessarily sound; that is, for us to believe any reasoning whatsoever, it must generally cohere with our empirical knowledge (i.e., confirmation holism). There is no foundation that offers us "irrefutable" truths or "apodictic certainty." As Georges Rey states, "Appeals to some special faculty of a priori intuition capable of unproblematically apprehending clear and distinct ideas, or forms in Plato's heaven, do seem little better than theological claims about the deliverances of revelation."

The fact that Mises and Rothbard justified their a priori faith differently should suggest something is amiss.

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Lagrange multiplier replied on Tue, Aug 17 2010 8:40 AM

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Jon Irenicus:

Methodological pluralism is the only sound approach. Methodological dualism is merely the starting point to liberate economics from the grasp of people with a scientistic view of how science should proceed, and is emphasised because it was Mises's primary concern, rather than the methodology of sciences like biology (as against physics).Methodological pluralism is the only sound approach. Methodological dualism is merely the starting point to liberate economics from the grasp of people with a scientistic view of how science should proceed, and is emphasised because it was Mises's primary concern, rather than the methodology of sciences like biology (as against physics).

In what way is the methodology of biology incompatible with the methodology of physics?

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Jon Irenicus replied on Tue, Aug 17 2010 11:46 AM

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The theory of natural selection was originally rejected by positivists because it does not conform to that model of science (which physics supposedly epitomises.) Various sciences use different methods. Positivists need to rid of their (frankly ridiculous) strait-jacket and move with the times.

Furthermore, I contend that if a priori reasoning exists at all, then it is evolutionarily contingent, a biological trait,

At best, the ability to engage in those forms of justification is. Not the actual possibility of such justification.

 and thus is not necessarily sound;

Well then empiricism is in shitloads of trouble, to put it mildly, since it relies on several a priori principles in and of itself.

that is, for us to believe any reasoning whatsoever, it must generally cohere with our empirical knowledge (i.e., confirmation holism). There is no foundation that offers us "irrefutable" truths or "apodictic certainty."

Pure assertion of an apodeictic nature in and of itself. You need logical reasoning to even establish empirical knowledge to begin with. Frankly, you need to do some reading on this as you are bringing up amateurish arguments.

As Georges Rey states, "Appeals to some special faculty of a priori intuition capable of unproblematically apprehending clear and distinct ideas, or forms in Plato's heaven, do seem little better than theological claims about the deliverances of revelation."

Again, pure assertion. How does he make inductive leaps? How does he justify the observation of facts (as opposed to mere sensations)? What if contradictions in this "Holistic" system appear? Why does coherence matter? Why should contradictions be resolved? Why should one holistic system be preferred over another?

The fact that Mises and Rothbard justified their a priori faith differently should suggest something is amiss.

Because you quoted an epistemological theory and some guy who merely makes rather blatant assertions on  a priori intuition? Yes, truly gutted.

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Lagrange multiplier replied on Tue, Aug 17 2010 12:15 PM

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Jon Irenicus:

The theory of natural selection was originally rejected by positivists because it does not conform to that model of science (which physics supposedly epitomises.) Various sciences use different methods. Positivists need to rid of their (frankly ridiculous) strait-jacket and move with the times.

If you can see how natural selection can be assumed tautologous, then you can understand the criticism. Regardless, both biology and physics demand an empirical metholodogy, so your contrast seems ill-advised.

Jon Irenicus:

Pure assertion of an apodeictic nature in and of itself. You need logical reasoning to even establish empirical knowledge to begin with. Frankly, you need to do some reading on this as you are bringing up amateurish arguments.

I do? Are you sure my lack of taking you seriously actually reveals ignorance? Look, ma! I can quote BonJour, "[I]f there is no a priori insight...no prediction will follow any more than any other... any...sort of connection between the parts of the system will become essentially arbitrary"!

Let me be plain: every a priori advocate is lacking a positive characterization of this alleged knowledge--it's "not empirical"; that's all you got? I have no idea what this "rational intuition" is; it sounds very much like madmen claiming direct revelation from God.

What is it for a belief to be justified a priori? What is the nature of this nonempirical method of justification? What sort of link could there be between the brain and the external world, other than via experience, that would make states of the brain likely to be true of the world?

P.S. Don't claim that everyone opposed to your a priori obscurantism is a "positivist"; these terms should not be applied loosely.

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filc replied on Tue, Aug 17 2010 12:28 PM

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Neoclassical you're trying to refute a priorism?

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Jon Irenicus replied on Tue, Aug 17 2010 12:32 PM

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If you can see how natural selection can be assumed tautologous, then you can understand the criticism. Regardless, both biology and physics demand an empirical metholodogy, so your contrast seems ill-advised.

"Empirical methodology" is so broad a term that it frankly incorporates a variety of methodologies, including the praxeological one. So be more specific. For if you said "positivist" you know it would be incorrect, and it is positivism with its methodological monism I allude to.

I do?

Indeed. You're regurgitating "criticicism" well known to exponents of a priori  reasoning, suggesting you've zero familiarity with the literature involved.

Are you sure my lack of taking you seriously actually reveals ignorance?

If you can't take people who challenge your (flimsy) quote-based arguments seriously, bugger off elsewhere. No one's got an obligation to cater to you here if you're merely going to pull assertions out of your rear and whine non-stop.  Why should anyone take you seriously?

Look, ma! I can quote BonJour, "[I]f there is no a priori insight...no prediction will follow any more than any other... any...sort of connection between the parts of the system will become essentially arbitrary"!

Indeed. What is objectionable here?

Let me be plain: every a priori advocate is lacking a positive characterization of this alleged knowledge--it's "not empirical"; that's all you got? I have no idea what this "rational intuition" is; it sounds very much like madmen claiming direct revelation from God.

And I don't know what "empirical observation" is without certain logical underpinnings assumed to hold. What is this "induction"? It sounds like direct revelation from God. See? I can do this all day too, and we would get nowhere.

What is it for a belief to be justified a priori? What is the nature of this nonempirical method of justification? What sort of link could there be between the brain and the external world, other than via experience, that would make states f the brain likely to be true of the world?

Do you even know what the nature of empirical methods of justification is considering they are pretty worthless apart from certain a priori principles assumed to hold (principle of induction, constancy principle, LNC, law of identity; without these, empirical observation is 100% groundless as a method for acquiring knowledge)? It refers to knowledge that must be assumed to hold for epistemic pursuits to even get off the ground and as arising from certain methods of justification (a primary one being truths the denial of which results in contradictions.) I care not how this knowledge is possible biologically speaking - it is uninteresting to me. Only that it is epistemically necessary.

P.S. Don't claim that everyone opposed to your a priori obscurantism is a "positivist"; these terms should not be applied loosely.

I do not. The only obscurantism here is yours, for your refusal to come to terms with how vapid empirical methodologies are without an  a priori basis.

You remind me a lot of a certain troll passing for an intellectual called Nathyn.

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Lagrange multiplier replied on Tue, Aug 17 2010 12:36 PM

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Jon Irenicus:

You're regurgitating "criticicism" well known to exponents of a priori  reasoning, suggesting you've zero familiarity with the literature involved.

That's an entirely empty rebuttal.

I could easily state that your criticisms are "well-known" and hence ineffective; of course, even that doesn't hold (a criticism being well-known doesn't lead to its being properly rebutted; of course, maybe your superpowered intuition can prove otherwise).

I would appreciate you or someone else simply answering my questions about justification: "What is it for a belief to be justified a priori? What is the nature of this nonempirical method of justification? What sort of link could there be between the brain and the external world, other than via experience, that would make states of the brain likely to be true of the world?" It's one thing to claim "nonempirical" knowledge exists; it's another to explain how it is justified epistemically.