Abortion

I will say, listening to Block's Evictionism speech, that this would be the way to deal with the rape cases.

Problem is that - as I understand it - brain death occurs when cerebral neurons cease activity. So it's not just about consciousness, otherwise we'd be declaring people in vegetative state as dead. And the whole argument relies on defining the beginning of life as we define the end of life. Your argument seems to be the standard consciousness argument, which I find flawed for the reason mentioned before.

Sometimes we do claim that people who aren't brain-dead, but who are in a permanent vegetative state, aren't entitled to be kept alive.  We may not call them "dead", but we do decide that they don't have a right to life, and that's what we're really talking about.  "Death" is just a label.

What it comes down to is what you think the origin of rights are.  I don't believe in natural rights, but I do think we should assign rights, at least in part, based on whether or not harm can be felt by a being.  That's why I say a fetus should have rights once it's capable of conscious experience.  What are your beliefs about rights generally (e.g., why does a fully grown man have rights), and how do you reconcile that with your position that a fetus should have rights as soon as there's any brain activity?

Callisthenes:

Sometimes we do claim that people who aren't brain-dead, but who are in a permanent vegetative state, aren't entitled to be kept alive.  We may not call them "dead", but we do decide that they don't have a right to life, and that's what we're really talking about.  "Death" is just a label.

 So Stephen Hawking isn't entitled to be kept alive?

Kept alive forever?  I wish.

And he isn't brain dead or vegetative.  At least that the last I checked.

 Callisthenes said that people who aren't brain dead but are vegatative shouldn't be kept alive, thus I cited Stephen Hawking as an example.

I am concerned that within even our argument, there is a distinction between a fetus that is desired and one that is not.  I believe that this is the source of a fallacious distinction attempting to distinguish murder from not murder.  If I administer a drug to a pregnant woman who desires her baby, which causes the fetus to die, what crime would I have committed?  Certainly I have committed an assault on her person, but I believe that most would say that I have committed murder as well.  Certainly the mother and father that desired the baby would say I have (and in a libertarian sense would indicate that they have property rights/homesteading over their unborn child that I have violated).  If I kill a pregnant woman, I can be prosecuted for two murders.

If someone had murdered (intentionally killed) my unborn child in my wife's womb (even if they didn't otherwise hurt my wife), I would certainly treat that person as a murderer.  Are there any people on the list who would differ?  Would you hold the killing of your desired yet unborn baby to be murder, and demand the prosecution of the perp?  Or would you treat it like the person had merely removed a mole that you wanted to keep?

Desire of the mother is not what distinguishes murder versus not murder.

I've got to say I'm very pleased with the number of "pro-life" people here.  I hadn't seen a discussion of abortion in a libertarian venue before and I was expecting mostly "a woman has a right to do what she wants with her own body" responses. 

Also, I think Jason4liberty makes a great point above.

Block's eviction argument is discussed here:

http://blog.mises.org/archives/004761.asp

I am glad I read it, because I would raise similar objections:

Stowaways are entitled to passage to safety, as long as their passage doesn't affect the owner's right to life. (ie, not a lifeboat)  In my opinion, with regard to some of the statements in the post, "inconvenience" does not allow murder.

There are some that argue that parents as guardians are by a rights arguement allowed to let their child die of starvation or exposure.  They claim that there is no compelled positive action - meaning that the infant can be set in a room and not provided food, as the providing of food is a form of positive requirement or an entitlement of support.  Since the infant is incapable of taking action to remedy its own situation, its death is its own fault, not that of the parent.

I disagree.  The parent has taken the step of placing the baby in a room.  That is an action.  If I suspend a weight, with intent that it will fall at some point, and that weight kills someone (an adult, who could take action), then my action is some form of murder.  If I suspend a weight, with every intention that it remain up, and through some circumstance it falls and kills someone, then I haven't committed murder.  I may have caused their death, indirectly, but it was not my intention to cause their death.  If a parent, or guardian, or person, intentionally creates a situation wherein another person will die, the first party has committed murder.  I believe that this is also subject to a "reasonable person" decision to determine intent.

Reasonable foreknowledge of consequence must be determined.  Reasonable intent must be determined.

If a parent puts their baby in a room, then falls down the stairs and is knocked unconscious, then reawakens after some days in their unconcious state at the bottom of the stairs to find that their baby is dead, they have not committed murder.  Since the fall is accidental, there is no reasonable foreknowledge.  There is no reasonable intent.  (Of course, assuming I am a reasonable person.)

If a parent puts their baby in a room, then goes on vacation, then returns to find their baby dead, they have committed murder.  There is reasonable foreknowledge of consequence.  There is reasonable intent.  (Again, assuming I am a reasonable person.)

Mental incompetance can affect intent and foreknowledge.

I will continue to look for a posting or thread that deals with the libertarian consequences of foreknowledge and intent.  If I cannot find one, I will start a new thread to discuss them.