On the Self-Contradiction Argument Against Minarchy

"Is there not a contradiction within the very construction of [the government] as an expropriating property protector?" (Hoppe, "Private Production of Defense," p.2)

A common argument used by anarchists against minarchism is that a government is an expropriating property protector, and hence is a contradiction in terms. In "National Defense and the Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Clubs," Walter Block elaborates on this argument:

...to argue that a tax-collecting government can legitimately protect its citizens against aggression is to contradict oneself, since such an entity starts off the entire process by doing the very opposite of protecting those under its control. The government, by its very essence, does two things to its citizens incompatible with this claim. First, it forces the citizenry to enroll in its “defense” activities, and second, it prohibits others who wish to offer protection to clients in “its” geographical area from making such contracts with them, in preference to the one it itself offers to them, under duress. If true protection from violence includes the government itself, and there is no reason it should not, then it is this entity which is the prime rights violator. (The Myth of National Defense, p. 304-5)

In a previous thread, I argued that this line of argument was not sufficient to refute minarchism. Specifically, my argument was that if a minarchist argues that minarchy will protect all rights, then, yes, the self-contradiction argument is a sound refutation. But, the minarchist can avoid this contradiction by softening their position and arguing the weaker claim that minarchy will merely maximize the protection of rights relative to other political systems. The minarchist could say: "Government is a necessary evil. Yes, it violates rights, but it is better than all other political systems because it has the least rights violations, i.e. it maximizes the protection of rights."

And this position is not self-contradictory. The minarchist is not claiming that all rights will be protected. Again, they are saying that by establishing a government that violates some rights, they are able to maximize the protection of other rights. Presumably, they would argue that anarchy would be a Hobbesian jungle, and conclude that minarchy is better than anarchy because the former protects rights more effectively than the latter.

Hence I concluded that to answer this argument anarchists must engage in a comparative analysis of anarchy and minarchy: they must show that anarchy can protect rights more effectively than minarchy; that the incentive structure of anarchy will create a greater tendency to protect rights than the incentive structure of minarchy.

But now I think that while the above argument would be true for a consequentialist, it would not hold true for a deontologist. As Long explains:

"The non-aggression axiom is not to be confused with a call to minimize the total amount of aggression – first, because the axiom is purely prohibitory and does not call for positive action of any kind; second, because the axiom does not countenance, as a minimization requirement might, the inflicting of a small amount of aggression in order to prevent a greater amount (e.g., conscripting citizens in order to deter foreign invasion). The prohibition on aggression thus counts as, in Robert Nozick’s terminology, a side-constraint to be respected, rather than a goal to be promoted. To be sure, adherents of the non-aggression axiom unsurprisingly do tend to favour the overall reduction of aggression in society (so long as such reduction can be accomplished without violating the axiom), but the non-aggression axiom per se calls for no such commitment."

In other words, I was confusing the NAP with a minimization principle. But since the NAP is a prohibition on aggression, it doesn't matter if anarchy has more total rights violations than minarchy; the fact remains that "inflicting of a small amount of aggression in order to prevent a greater amount" would violate the NAP, and hence is impermissible. So long as minarchy necessitates aggression, whereas anarchy could exist without aggression, then a deontologist must accept anarchy.

Of course, if deontology rejects any consideration of consequences ("Fiat iustitia, et pereat mundus"), then it would lose much of its appeal as a moral theory. So what about a moral theory that gives at least some weight to consequences?

Long's virtue ethics approach seems to be just such a theory. As he writes in "Why Libertarians Believe There is Only One Right":

"My own position is that deontological considerations ground a strong presumption in favour of the [NAP]; that this presumption could in principle be overridden by sufficiently weighty consequentialist considerations; and that, nonetheless, consequentialist considerations in fact reinforce the [NAP] rather than overriding it."

According to this view, the self-contradiction argument against minarchy would only work if the consequences of anarchy were not so bad as to count as "sufficiently weighty" to override the NAP. (I leave it an open question what counts as "sufficiently weighty.") That is, if the anarchist can show that anarchy would not immediately break into total chaos, that there would be at least a modicum of social order, then minarchy is refuted.

Summing up, to refute minarchy:

Consequentialism requires showing that anarchy would have less total rights violations than minarchy.

Deontology requires showing that minarchy necessitates aggression while anarchy could exist without it.

Virtue ethics requires showing that minarchy necessitates aggression while anarchy could exist without it and that the consequences of anarchy would not be so horrible that they are "sufficiently weighty" to override the NAP.

This is a long post, but I want to apply my conclusions to Kinsella's article "The Irrelevance of the Impossibility of Anarcho-Libertarianism." Basically, Kinsella says that the consequences of anarchy are irrelevant to the justification of anarchy, so objections about the "workability" of anarchy are misguided.

Now, from a deontological perspective Kinsella is surely correct. If consequences don't matter, then the fact that not enough people are willing to refrain from establishing governments cannot mean that the state is justified.

A consequentialist, on the other hand, will disagree completely with Kinsella. If side-constraints don't matter, then minarchy would be justified if it is more successful in minimizing rights than anarchy.

But for the virtue ethicist, both side-constraints and consequences matter (with the former having generally more weight). Hence Kinsella would have to show both that minarchy requires aggression and that anarchy can "work" in that it would provide at least some social order.

It's actually up to the one wishing to initiate force (the minarchist) to show that it's proper. No amount of appealing to utilitarianism can help.

Knight_of_BAAWA:

It's actually up to the one wishing to initiate force (the minarchist) to show that it's proper.

I'm still fuzzy on the technicalities of the burden of proof, but as far as rhetoric goes, this works.

Knight_of_BAAWA:

No amount of appealing to utilitarianism can help.

Indeed, Molyneux makes this point.  That arguing utility ((which is subjective) is just an endless arms race of statistics, graphs and "facts".

Ultimately if someone rejects violence against innocents as immoral, then they can be lead to reject aggression in less obvious forms, by exposing the humanity of the victims of taxation, regulation etc.

But if they value ends of aggression more than peace, then there is no reasoning with them.

@Sage, Marc Stevens makes some very compelling arguments against minarchy, from a Spoonerian sort of view.  You might want to check him out if you have not done so already.

You don't need to go that deep to show the contradiction of minarchism. The difference between anarchy and minarchy is that minarchists claim that people must be made to pay for protection against their own will. It is not a matter of having fewer or more rights, but that the claim that minarchy protects those it coerces into paying is a contradiction. If the minarchist government were to leave non-taxpayers alone, then it would no longer be a contradiction, but it would also live in anarchy towards them.

Sage:

A few comments:

"Basically, Kinsella says that the consequences of anarchy are irrelevant to the justification of anarchy, so objections about the "workability" of anarchy are misguided."

This is the idea of "justifying" a theory or planned action, and in turn relies on the idea of contradiction.   This goes back to Hoppe: "I want to demonstrate that only the libertarian private property ethic can be argumentatively justified...."  And he goes on to say that any attempt to justify another ethic during argumentation would be a contradiction.  (he refers to the idea of contradiction in various ways 7 or 8 times)

So this kind of ethics theory is based on a distinct conception of ethics as something involving justification and contradiction.

The problem with this kind of theory is something like the following. 

For the sake of argument, let's assume that a nonlibertarian puts out an ethical theory, and it reads like this:

 #1)    21 = 7 x 3 = 24 - 3 = 16 + 5 = 7 x 7

All the people who agree with this nonlibertarian ethics theory read the above statement to mean:

#2)  "If you establish a nonlibertarian society, then you, your family, and all the people you care about will be happier than they would in a libertarian society. 

So the nonlibertarian continues to support nonlibertarianism based on his agreement with #2.

Then a libertarian says to him, in effect:   #2 is not "justified" because #1 is contradictory.

The libertarian is saying something like:   If #1 is contradictory, then #2 is not justified.  (let's call this assertion "Hoppe's if-then")

But the nonlibertarian is less concerned about Hoppe's if-then, than he is about the "if-then" expressed in #2.

Hoppe's "if-then" is not identical to, and really doesn't address, the "if-then" asserted in #2.  And that is the "if-then" the nonlibertarian is looking at and is concerned about.  The nonliberarian will simply continue to support #2, and not pay much attention to whether his contradiction is refuting his justification.  None of that says anything directly about his own well-being.

(for example, a left-libertarian generally isn't going to care about the relationship between a contradiction and a justification.  He will generally want to know how implementing a specific social theory will impact the well-being (i.e., happiness) of the disadvantaged and/or oppressed groups he cares about.  Thus, he will continue to support---let's say---leftism, based on the "if-then" in #2, and disregard Hoppe's if-then)

The ultimate reason is, Hoppe's theory doesn't deal with happiness or well-being directly, but deals with "justification" and "contradiction," neither of which have a clear connection to one's happiness, or to the happiness of various groups.  (always, happiness is interpreted in the broadest sense)

A famous quote attributed to Walt Whitman captures this to some degree:

"Do I contradict myself?  Very well, I contradict myself.  I am large, I contain multitudes."

This is another way of saying that when person A tells you that your contradiction refutes your justification, and person B tells you that implementing X society is going to make you and all your loved ones wretchedly unhappy, you are likely going to pay more attention to what person B is saying.

This is the essential problem with viewing ethics as a discipline of justification and contradiction.

*****

I see in your post that you used quotation marks when writing "sufficiently weighty," whereas Long didn't use them in the passage you quote.  I would tend to agree with your sentiment.   I thought that every single government intervention in the last century was based on consequentialist considerations that were considered "sufficiently weighty."    Cash for Clunkers!!      : - )

*****

Here was an excellent insight by Long:

"The non-aggression axiom is not to be confused with a call to minimize the total amount of aggression – first, because the axiom is purely prohibitory and does not call for positive action of any kind; ...... To be sure, adherents of the non-aggression axiom unsurprisingly do tend to favour the overall reduction of aggression in society (so long as such reduction can be accomplished without violating the axiom), but the non-aggression axiom per se calls for no such commitment."

Thus, it is consistent with the NAP that the overall level or amount of coercion in society (and the level of any particular person) might increase, not due to the initiation of aggression on the part of NAP adherents, but due to their defense of their property rights consistent with NAP theory.  If a relationship exists between the amount of coercion a person initiates or undertakes, and his personal happiness, then it is consistent with NAP theory that people may generally be less happy than they were, even though private property is being defended.

This isn't saying anything profound, because NAP is not a theory of human happiness; it is a theory of property.  The NAP and libertarian property theory aren't designed to promote happiness specifically, they are designed to promote property.  Those two things are not identical.

As Van Dunn wrote recently:

"Either way, there seems to be something wrong with equating libertarian law with the rigorous application of the nonaggression principle.

That should not come as a surprise. The principle does not refer to freedom, only to property; it would be adequate as the axiomatic law of freedom only if freedom and property were synonymous — but they are not. To paraphrase Anthony de Jasay,[4] we do not need a theory of "freedom as private property" any more than we need any other theory of "freedom as something else.""

http://mises.org/story/3794

Property theory is not identical to liberty just as Mormonism is not identical to Christianity.  Property theory is also not identical to a theory of human well-being or happiness.  Nonlibertarian social theories are promising their adherents well-being and happiness, while the argumentation ethics is telling them how not to contradict their justification.   And that is a huge problem for libertarianism.

 

 

 

Stranger:

The difference between anarchy and minarchy is that minarchists claim that people must be made to pay for protection against their own will. It is not a matter of having fewer or more rights, but that the claim that minarchy protects those it coerces into paying is a contradiction.

Well, as I argue in the article, this would be true for a deontologist, but it wouldn't be true for a consequentialist, and would only be partly true for a virtue ethicist.

Sage:

Well, as I argue in the article, this would be true for a deontologist, but it wouldn't be true for a consequentialist, and would only be partly true for a virtue ethicist.

Going down the consequentalist route, anarchists respond with anti-monopoly theory, citing the probable abuse of government power versus the checks and balances of free market security.

Sage:

Stranger:

The difference between anarchy and minarchy is that minarchists claim that people must be made to pay for protection against their own will. It is not a matter of having fewer or more rights, but that the claim that minarchy protects those it coerces into paying is a contradiction.

Well, as I argue in the article, this would be true for a deontologist, but it wouldn't be true for a consequentialist, and would only be partly true for a virtue ethicist.

It is true as soon as you agree on the definition of the words "protection" and "coercion".

Snowflake:

Going down the consequentalist route, anarchists respond with anti-monopoly theory, citing the probable abuse of government power versus the checks and balances of free market security.

Yep. I should point out that I think anarchy would have vastly better consequences than minarchy. My purpose here is to determine what is the minimum required to refute minarchy.

Sage:

Yep. I should point out that I think anarchy would have vastly better consequences than minarchy. My purpose here is to determine what is the minimum required to refute minarchy.

Unfortunately, if minarchists give up the goal to protect all rights, then only consequentalism can disprove it, as you've pointed out. This is really true for all statists, who  certainly do not rely on deontology to justify the state :P

In my view, statists can be attacked on two issues: Their choice not to protect all rights, and their claim to utility.

Sage:

My purpose here is to determine what is the minimum required to refute minarchy.

It's different in every debate, with every person.

The cold hard truth of it is that even if a perpetual minimal state is theoretically possible, no such state has ever existed, or currently exists. Even if such a state were to be established, and would survive, it's service provision would end up being split for simple efficiency. The state would, following 100% libertarian principles, fall into anarcho-capitalism. There is no reason to believe that one entity can handle the many jobs of a state as opposed to several perhaps cooperating ones.