I would say that mainstream Economics is provisional, for example, classical economics was partially rejected for Keynesianism at one point. But, is Austrain Economics provisional? Does it provide temporary theory that is modified by new evidence, or does it simply expand on old conclusions?
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the latter.
Austrian Economics, as a branch of praxeology, infers the apodictic implications of the concept of action, just as geometry infers the apodictic implications of the concept of position.
So, no, it is not provisional or modified by new evidence.
Trying to disprove a praxeological law with statistics is like trying to disprove the Pythagorean Theorem with measuring tape.
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Lilburne: Austrian Economics, as a branch of praxeology, infers the apodictic implications of the concept of action, just as geometry infers the apodictic implications of the concept of position. So, no, it is not provisional or modified by new evidence. Trying to disprove a praxeological law with statistics is like trying to disprove the Pythagorean Theorem with measuring tape.
Yes, but the status of economics (broadly defined) as a part of praxeology is provisional. It was once believed that Euclidean geometry was true of space in the real world (not simply the teasing out of the logical consequences of the axioms). Now we believe it is only a good approximation for small patches of space. Might we find that praxeology doesn't perfectly describe human behavior, but is at best an approximation of it? I think the same is a true of praxeology, which is why I think it must be silent on many issues that people will use psychology and economics to try to explain.
"I cannot prove, but am prepared to affirm, that if you take care of clarity in reasoning, most good causes will take care of themselves, while some bad ones are taken care of as a matter of course." -Anthony de Jasay
Solid_Choke: It was once believed that Euclidean geometry was true of space in the real world (not simply the teasing out of the logical consequences of the axioms). Now we believe it is only a good approximation for small patches of space. Historically, this happened because Euclid assumed as self evident an axiom about parallel lines that wasn't as obvious as the others, mainly that they never meet no matter how far they go on. No one has ever followed two parallel lines to the very ends of the universe, so it was considered by some a bit shaky to say something about what happens out there, much less to assume it as "self evident". In other words Euclid's downfall was in assuming as self evident something that turned out to be wrong. This happened because he assumed something he and no other human ever saw or could see. Have you found an axiom of Prax. that is [or might be] shaky? Or a hole in its method of teasing out the logical consequences? Might we find that praxeology doesn't perfectly describe human behavior, but is at best an approximation of it? We might, if it turns out one of the axioms is wrong. Have you a candidate? I think the same is a true of praxeology, Based on? which is why I think it must be silent on many issues that people will use psychology and economics to try to explain. If it assumes a false axiom, it must be silent about everything, pretty much, because it's wrong. If it doesn't, it need be silent only about things not deducible from its axioms. I don't think the axioms of Prax. have much to say about how to treat mental illness or what color calms a person, stuff that psychology may be good for. More power to them. When you say "economics" can explain something, can you give an example? In any case, every logical system will always fall short, as Godel showed.
It was once believed that Euclidean geometry was true of space in the real world (not simply the teasing out of the logical consequences of the axioms). Now we believe it is only a good approximation for small patches of space.
Historically, this happened because Euclid assumed as self evident an axiom about parallel lines that wasn't as obvious as the others, mainly that they never meet no matter how far they go on. No one has ever followed two parallel lines to the very ends of the universe, so it was considered by some a bit shaky to say something about what happens out there, much less to assume it as "self evident".
In other words Euclid's downfall was in assuming as self evident something that turned out to be wrong. This happened because he assumed something he and no other human ever saw or could see.
Have you found an axiom of Prax. that is [or might be] shaky? Or a hole in its method of teasing out the logical consequences?
Might we find that praxeology doesn't perfectly describe human behavior, but is at best an approximation of it?
We might, if it turns out one of the axioms is wrong. Have you a candidate?
I think the same is a true of praxeology,
Based on?
which is why I think it must be silent on many issues that people will use psychology and economics to try to explain.
If it assumes a false axiom, it must be silent about everything, pretty much, because it's wrong.
If it doesn't, it need be silent only about things not deducible from its axioms. I don't think the axioms of Prax. have much to say about how to treat mental illness or what color calms a person, stuff that psychology may be good for. More power to them.
When you say "economics" can explain something, can you give an example?
In any case, every logical system will always fall short, as Godel showed.
Yes, but the status of economics (broadly defined) as a part of praxeology is provisional. It was once believed that Euclidean geometry was true of space in the real world (not simply the teasing out of the logical consequences of the axioms). Now we believe it is only a good approximation for small patches of space.
If that ever happens it'll have to be revised somewhat. It hasn't, though, so it remains an 'if'. And it definitely need not be 'silent' on issues of economics (unless it actually isn't economics but pop 'econ'), though obviously psychology has a broader and more 'primitive' scope.
To darkness I condemn you...
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