Murray Rothbard famously said, "Our entry into World War II was the crucial act in foisting a permanent militarization upon the economy and society, in bringing to the country a permanent garrison state, an overweening military-industrial complex, a permanent system of conscription. It was the crucial act in creating a mixed economy run by Big Government, a system of state-monopoly capitalism run by the central government in collaboration with Big Business and Big Unionism."
It is quite telling that the Old Right and the old Republican Party of the United States had people who did not approve of US entry into the Second World War. Jeannette Rankin voted against US entry into the war, even after Pearl Harbour. Before Pearl Harbour, Republican stance was against any intervention or action related to the war in Europe. Isolationists like Vandenberg and Taft considered such intervention as unconstitutional. Many angry outspoken sort of people did not try to even be subtle and bluntly considered League of Nations and United Nations to be a move towards international communism, with the US at its forefront, which they felt to be in line with what they considered to be the "socialism" propogated by Roosevelt.
Just look at the cost of that war. Allowing the lives of thousands of young men to be thrown away. Government rationing and price controls. An industry of war profiteers. Resources of that nation diverted towards fueling that war. A massive public debt and enormous inflation which left a huge cost to be borne by anybody who bought government bonds at that time, since their real value became far less than what it was before the war. And all of it just so that US could liberate other nations for which it had responsibility, and then spend billions of dollars rebuilding their nations, whilst finding themselves confronted with the now empowered Soviets who ate up half of Europe. And in the internationalist paranoia that followed after, US was building bases all over the world and did questionable things like appointing a puppet Shah in Iran. And most of all, the terror of possible nuclear warfare. Such a cost was borned by the entire world.
Does anybody think that maybe if the US focused on protecting its seas against Japanese raids, and not go all the way with sending their troops into Europe to fight Nazi Germany, it could have secured the future of its own nation better? Instead of going for total war, and even aggravating the terrible losses they already suffered in Pearl Harbour, so as to keep focusing on their development as a peaceful industrial nation, and work rather to make the lives of its own citizens better?
Was it really the United States' war?
To a certain degree, the war in Europe is largely irrelevant in the study of why the United States went to war. Let's remember that it was Hitler, who on 8 December 1941, declared war on the United States (the United States had only declared war against Japan, up to that point). But, there is no doubt that the United States did shape its foreign policy in order to goad Japan into offensive action. It was difficult for Roosevelt to justify going to war, especially with so many economic problems, and so Japan's Pearl Harbor attack really allowed Roosevelt a political coup. It mobilized the population against a common enemy, allowing most to "forget" about the past eight years of poverty they had experienced under Roosevelt.
The United States' decision to focus on Europe before the Pacific came out not just due to solidarity with the United Kingdom. If you notice, while operations in the Pacific began almost immediately (there had to be a reconstruction of the fleet, but the fleet set out to the Pacific before there were any largescale movements to Europe), the first grand scale American operation in Europe did not occur until November 1942. That was Operation Torch, or the invasion of North Africa. Compared to American operations in the Pacific, Torch was relatively "light". There was no major resistance, originally, and the liberation of North Africa finished relatively quickly (most of North Africa was liberated by March 1943, and then the Germans launched a series of counterattacks, but then these petered out and they were forced to capitulate at Tripoli). The United States also had it easy, because the majority of German forces in North Africa were soon to be routed at Alamein by the British 8th Army and other satellite forces in the area (and the French did not put up resistance to the Allied invasion).
The Western Allies then invaded Sicily in the spring of 1943, and they would not take Rome until 4 June 1944. A large part of this was due to German resistance, but it's obvious that there was not major strategic motivation to finish the war quickly in Europe. Events were going "well" in the Pacific, and I think that the United States was really more interested in defeating the Japanese and regaining their lost assets there (including the Philipinnes).
I hope to write an article for Mises (if it's good enough to be published; something I have not suceeded at yet) on the 6 June 1944 invasion of Normandy. Before I took on economics, I used to be a WWII historian (in my personal library I have almost 100 books, and in storage this number is 3,500), and so I have always looked to tie history with economics. The topic is the reasons behind the launching of Operation Overlord. The fact of the matter was the the Americans were always reluctant to launch an amphibious invasion of France. Historians tend to cite the fear of high losses, but I don't believe that was ever the principle factor behind this reluctance. A year before, the Germans launched their last major strategic offensive on the Eastern Front. The Red Army, at this point entirely superior to the Wehrmacht in most regards, including quality and experience (the idea that the Red Army was evern truly inferior to the Wehrmacht in a myth which was propagated largely becuase of their initial defeats), was able to not only hold the attack, but launch a counterstroke and reoccupy territory which von Manstein had been able to salvage in his March 1943 Kharkov counterstroke (believe it or not, this was one of fourteen articles I managed to take to featured article status when I was active; I'm sure they have all been defiled). By early 1944 it was clear that the war against Germany had been won out of the efforts of the Red Army (the Red Army was already planning to launch Operation Bagration on 22 June 1944, which would eventually destroy German Army Group Center).
Operation Overlord was launched out of fear that Europe would fall into Soviet hands. It was in the Western Allies' interests to land in France and advance to the East as fast as possible to make sure the least possible territory fell into the Soviet Union's sphere of political influence. If you notice, the Allied advance did not let up until territorial lines of demarcation were agreed upon. By that time, there was little motivation in fighting for land that the Western Allies would not eventually occupy. It was a political move. The war against Germany was already won (and had, in fact, been won the day it began).
In any case, back to the original point, there were obvious political manuevers which the United States took to goad Japan into war. Europe had little to do with anything. There was never a threat of Germany invading the Americas, or anything like that (even when Germany "occupied" French territories in South America, there was very little threat to the Panama Canal—they hardly had the aircraft to risk; Germany lost more aircraft over Britain than they could replace and their Luftwaffe never returned to full strength). Of course, all of these were used to incite fear into the American people so that they would throw their full support behind Roosevelt.
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Jonathan M. F. Catalán:We are not talking about the same thing, and you are discounting my points by positioning a straw man. I did not say that Roosevelt was ever explicitly neutral in the war between Great Britain and Germany. I said that to Roosevelt the priority was to goad Japan into war in the Pacific, and in that respect the European Theater was a secondary priority (as it was not as an immediate threat to U.S. interests). I am not talking about his resolve of supporting Great Britain through lend-lease to the end. I am talking about his resolve to ship men over to Europe. His interests were in the Pacific first. What forced him to reconsider and focus on Europe was political, after war had already been declared (and, as I showed, even then fighting began in the Pacific much earlier than in Europe... fighting as in men being sent on offensives, as opposed to straight defensive operations against Japanese attacks).
You too discounted my argument about your rankings of FDR's involvements on the two fronts. How are you measuring the degree to which Roosevelt wanted war with Japan more than he did with Germany? Reading through what he did on his foreign policy, it seems as though he has done equal damage to American neutrality on both fronts. If arming the Axis' enemies and attacking their ships and submarines isn't war goading then what is? Wouldn't you expect the enemy to notice?Also, why was it in the U.S.'s interest to fight Japan? The U.S. had nothing to gain from the war in the Far East; we had very close business ties in Japan.
Jonathan M. F. Catalán:Um, if you want to buy me the book, I would be happy to read it. Don't tell me to read a book that I don't have, and then come back and discuss. Were these orders to go out and look for German submarines or ships, or where they explicitly to protect American shipping to Britain in the Atlantic?
From what I remember, both. It's an important WW2 book, and I thought you held an interest in WW2 history. I was just making a suggestion. Sorry if I seem harsh.
Jonathan M. F. Catalán:I never said Roosevelt was neutral. You are misinterpreting what I wrote.
Earlier you wrote:
To a certain degree, the war in Europe is largely irrelevant in the study of why the United States went to war. Let's remember that it was Hitler, who on 8 December 1941, declared war on the United States (the United States had only declared war against Japan, up to that point).
The way I interpreted this passage is that I thought you had thought Roosevelt was acting neutral in Europe. Perhaps I did misinterpret what you said, but I only responded to you because of that feeling of neutrality in Europe. I tried to show that Roosevelt didn't actions weren't irrelevant at all in Europe. Don't hide under the accusation of "straw men" if you use words such as "irrelevant" when it comes to why the U.S. came to war in Europe. It's not irrelevant, and that's why I'm debating this with you.
Jonathan M. F. Catalán:This doesn't address what I said.
I think it shows how Roosevelt didn't act "irrelevantly" in Europe.
Cam Nedland: I largely agree, without American intervention, the Central Powers would have won. The withdrawal of Russia would have meant that Germany, Austria, and Turkey all had one less front to fight on. The Germans would have been able to pour into France, in this case unaugmented by Americans. Also, German troops could have been sent to regain colonies they had lost earlier in the war. The Austrians would be charging down the Italian peninsula, able to attack Venice easily, probably Genoa, Pisa, and Milan within a year, opening a Southern Front for France. Ottoman troops could be moved from the Caucuses to the Middle East. All the Allied fronts would have additional strain, strain, they could not hold.
I largely agree, without American intervention, the Central Powers would have won. The withdrawal of Russia would have meant that Germany, Austria, and Turkey all had one less front to fight on. The Germans would have been able to pour into France, in this case unaugmented by Americans. Also, German troops could have been sent to regain colonies they had lost earlier in the war. The Austrians would be charging down the Italian peninsula, able to attack Venice easily, probably Genoa, Pisa, and Milan within a year, opening a Southern Front for France. Ottoman troops could be moved from the Caucuses to the Middle East. All the Allied fronts would have additional strain, strain, they could not hold.
Theorethising about the situation on the various fronts is meaningless in the context of WWI. It was a war of attrition. The only factor that matters is for how much longer could the belligirents hope to stay in the war. Rather than geting all Rommel on us you should examine indications like the effects of naval blockade, prevelance of desertion and mutinies, industrial output, discontent among the civilian population, mortality due to disease...BTW, there were no "Allies" in WWI.
Even a war of attrition is affected by troop numbers. All the fronts would have had more German, Austrian, and Turkish soldiers due to Russian withdrawal. The Middle Eastern front was never as static as the Western Front, and the war in Italy was already turning into a generic retreat by the Italians.
Also, "Allies" is the term generally used to describe the participants against the Central Powers: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allies_of_World_War_I
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Middle East was a meaningless sideshow and Italy had been long neutered by the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo (incidentaly the only time in WWI an outcome of a battle actually had a decisive effect on the big picture) wether it was forced to surrender or not was meaningless, its had been rendered incapable of offensive action due to a large number of POWs taken in 1917 and the blow to the fighting spirit caused by endless manifestations of the incompetence of their command. In this situation for Austro-Hungary to take decisive action to take further territory would have been counter-productive. You fantasize about Austrians taking Milan within a year and opening a front with France, but you are forgetting at this point in time every combatant was very close to a breaking point and a collapse, Austro-Hungary more so than most. The last thing they needed was more costly offensives to exhaust themselves further. If anything Austro-Hungary is the ultimate example of the meaninglesness of triumphing on the front (in a war of attrition like WWI). In the spring of 1918 on paper the situation for Austro-Hungary had never been better. Serbia had been crushed in autumn of 1915, Italy pushed back and the spine of its army ripped out in autumn 1917 and Russia had just pulled out of the war (and had been due to low fighting spirt of its troops it had been drawing down its commitment since a year earlier). On the map Austro-Hungary was secure from all directions and (thanks to Germany) triumphant on every front.
In reality though its navy was mutinous, its nationalities discontent, its people hungry and its army hit by desertions and defections unseen in armies of any other remaining combatant. And to make things worse POWs taken earlier in the war by Russia were as by the terms of Brest-Litovsk on their way back to Austria and were going to be reincorporated into the army. Having been convinced the war was over for them when they were taken prisoner and now learning they would be sent back to the front, they quickly proved a mayor source of instability, lack of discipline, insubordination and even Bolshevik agitation in the army and an enormous headache.
Austro-Hungary was utterly incapable of attempting let alone surviving one year of offensives against Italy and an additional front with France would have killed it as surely as a bullet. Wether a lack of American intervention would have meant a victory for the Central Powers is open to speculation, but in whichever case the war would not have been concluded as a result of some dash accross the map, but by factors of attrition. By hunger, epidemic, blockade, mutinies and green brotherhoods. US involvment or not, the war was in 1918 breathing its last breath.
Cam Nedland: Also, "Allies" is the term generally used to describe the participants against the Central Powers: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allies_of_World_War_I
Stranger: In other words, the United States of America would be completely, utterly alone, the last imperial Republic. WWII was more of the same, only with a much more dangerous form of government, and thus justifiably an imperative for America to intervene.
In other words, the United States of America would be completely, utterly alone, the last imperial Republic.
WWII was more of the same, only with a much more dangerous form of government, and thus justifiably an imperative for America to intervene.
I'm not sure what you mean by completely utterly alone. Would all Europe have ganged up and tried to conquer us? Seems unlikely to me. Would they have closed our embassies worldwide and refused to trade with us? Also unlikely, Would no one seek us as allies against their enemies? Why not?
I for one am very glad Hitler was defeated, don't get me wrong. But I think the q's being addressed here is: was it the USAs interest to enter WW2? Was it moral?
I think the answers are no and yes.
About a diferent post here:
I think the guy who tries to help out a person being attacked by a motorcycle gang is a hero, pure and simple. In the illustration given here he was inept and bumbling, but that doesn't make him wrong or less heroic.
And if libertarianism says don't help innocents who are being attacked, because that's wrong, then to hell with libertarianism. But I doubt it says that. Any relevant links, someone?
Marko, say what you will about the Austrian mutinies, in 1917 half of the french front line army mutinied. The only thing that got them back to the line was the promise by the new Marshall that only the Americans would go on the offensive from then on.
Had there not been an American intervention, there would have been no resistance to a German assault. It was over, France was out of the war, probably turning communist if not liberated by the Germans.
Smiling Dave: I'm not sure what you mean by completely utterly alone. Would all Europe have ganged up and tried to conquer us? Seems unlikely to me. Would they have closed our embassies worldwide and refused to trade with us? Also unlikely, Would no one seek us as allies against their enemies? Why not?
Europe would not have tried to conquer America. Europe was exhausted. Ideologically, however, America would be seen as a sham of a nation, on par with France and Britain. Remember that the French and American revolutions paralleled each other, and the Statue of Liberty was given to the U.S. as a celebration of republicanism.
Men like Wilson took ideology very seriously. Democracy and republicanism was worth every sacrifice. That is why they couldn't allow France to return to monarchy, or fall to communists.
As I said, the choice in WWII was much clearer. Everyone hated the fascists.
And think of it this way, Mises had a direct line to the Habsburg's court. Upon returning from the war he saved the Republic of Austria from hyperinflation. Had he returned to a restored Austro-Hungarian Empire, he could have turned it into an economic powerhouse a million times more productive than America.
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Stranger: Marko, say what you will about the Austrian mutinies, in 1917 half of the french front line army mutinied. The only thing that got them back to the line was the promise by the new Marshall that only the Americans would go on the offensive from then on. Had there not been an American intervention, there would have been no resistance to a German assault. It was over, France was out of the war, probably turning communist if not liberated by the Germans.
I do not know how you can go from the French soldiers demanding to only be used in defensive action to concluding there would be no resistance to a German assault. The French troops resented their lives being spent in pointless offensives that inevitably achieved nothing, but they were ready to defend their country. They mutinied because they correctly saw that the costly offensives were leading France into ruin.German army maintained a higher morale during 1915-1917 because they spent most of that time on the defensive exhausting themselves less, as they moved over to the offensive they would be the ones hit harder by attrition and that advantage would slowly evaporate.In any case the French army only knew mutinies. Austrian army actualy knew of soldiers, and sometimes whole units, crossing over to the enemy to carry arms in its ranks. France was in an unenviable position and may have turned communist, but Austria is one country that actually disintegrated into dust with the war and from being at war with itself. That had very little to do with US involment, but much more with the nature of the empire and the anachronism that prison of nations represented.
Stranger: And think of it this way, Mises had a direct line to the Habsburg's court. Upon returning from the war he saved the Republic of Austria from hyperinflation. Had he returned to a restored Austro-Hungarian Empire, he could have turned it into an economic powerhouse a million times more productive than America.
Since this topic also has come to WW1, could any good have come to Serbian citizens from their government agreeing to let Austria-Hungary freely investigate the Archduke's murder in their territory?
I once knew a libertarian who said that it could have avoided a lot of hostilities, and let people go on with their lives than instigating violent militarist nationalism that caused a war.
Somehow, I can't be sure that if giving a nation a free hand in investigating you would ever be a good thing. They'd be allowed to come in and conduct arbitrary arrests and detainment all over your country, and forcefully invade the privacy of any or every man in the nation. It's very difficult for me to imagine decent Serbian leadership acting differently.
The Austrian ultimatum was intentionaly written in such a way that it could not possibly be accepted. They wanted war not an investigation. Austrians were horrified when Serbia despite that sent back a reply agreeing to nearly everything. It had nearly ruined their plans.From a consequentialist point of view it may have been better if Serbia capitulated, since Serbia lost per capita more people than any other participant in WWI. But it would have meant that Serbia would have reverted to being a satellite of Vienna (as it had been between 1881 and 1903).
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