I think that someone who proclaims that they do not own themself is engaging in a performative contradiction, for they have to exercise their ownership over themselves in order to even make the statement. "I don't own myself" is a self-detonating statement. The most common counter-arguement to this that I've seen is that a slave doesn't own themself, that the statement would be true coming from a slave and therefore everyone does not naturally own themselves.
I think this arguement is easily countered. The slave technically has complete self-ownership, but they are being denied full exercise of it due to the threat of force by their master if they try to refuse to work and run away. They are actually fully capable of refusing to work and of running away, but the mere psychological stigma attached to the threat of force keeps them in place. An entire plantation of slaves vs. one master should actually be quite easy to escape from but it simply doesn't happen. What keeps the slaves in place is not the actual master's actions so much as the psychological manipulation that leads to the passive resignation of the slave. This is sort of related to La Boetie's observation about tyrannies resting on passive resignation.
Another related point is that, short of the advent of being able to install a chip into someone's brain that controls them like a robot, it is simply physically impossible to entirely control someone else's body in every which way. Your brain cannot attach itself to someone else's nerves and directly control their actions. You can coerce them into taking certain actions and apply force to control their bodies in some ways (such as the case of rape), but you cannot actually directly control them. You can use force on them to control them in some ways, but this would not mean that they do not own themselves, just that their ownership is being partially violated.
I hate "Real I.D."
I will drill or cut mine to break the circuit. If we the slave-ols don't continue the american revolution, I will be dead behind bars and more state goodies like physically abused. Likely any other cattle that dares to not fall into rank and order, will find that grim fate. If too many people break the circuit, more of us have a chance.
I find that the layman is not aware that they have a property right of "in and of themselves". It's a valued lesson to add whatever civil right they could concieve of rests solely on a right to property.
A lot out there will try to whip you by their chains of conformity, but only an individual can act the way they wish to.
"Shock therapy will make a monkey dance"
I would freely give of myself to those individuals I adore, in retrospect.
Individualism Rocks
I would largely agree with you, Brainpolice. I think it's Rothbard who said, "you cannot alienate your will," which seems to be a succinct way of putting it. A lot of people seem to conflate 'self-ownership' with the kind of ownership one has over one's property, like a car or television set. But such things are easily alienable, force or no force.
macsnafu: I would largely agree with you, Brainpolice. I think it's Rothbard who said, "you cannot alienate your will," which seems to be a succinct way of putting it. A lot of people seem to conflate 'self-ownership' with the kind of ownership one has over one's property, like a car or television set. But such things are easily alienable, force or no force.
What say you about Walter Block's position that there can be such thing as "voluntary slavery" then? The inalienability arguement debunks it? Or is it just a matter of semantics?
Wouldn't dictating that someone owns themselves mean you're owning them? Part of 'themselves' are their thoughts. If they choose to think in contradiction to you, should they submit to you or anything else? If Rothbard says I can't alienate my will, do I become Rothbard's will? It seems that radical self-ownership is connected to the concept of omnipotence. But we're obviously subject to things. If I totally owned myself I would not alientate myself from life, ie die. If you say I can't let someone enslave me then are you owning me? If I put myself into slavery, can I try to free myself, based not on the rightness or wrongness of slavery but upon radical self-ownership?
Maybe we're just animators, more directly controlling that space we call our bodies and more indirectly controlling that space we call other bodies.
"I don't own myself" essentially means "I don't own my self", which is a condradiction, since "my" implies that the self belongs to the speaker. I wouldn't believe someone who said that.
If BP said "I don't own BP" that might be believable. I would conclude that BP was a non-living android and is either someone's property, or up for grabs. But I would have little subjective interest in acquiring BP, because it resembles a human, and I'm afraid that it might reveal itself as such and thus invalidate my ownership over it.
Brainpolice:What say you about Walter Block's position that there can be such thing as "voluntary slavery" then? The inalienability arguement debunks it? Or is it just a matter of semantics?
Basically, I think it's just a question of defining slavery. Let's say that one agrees to a contract that is benefitial to all parties. Then at some point he discoveres some new information and decides to break the contract 'cause he can now find a better solution to his needs. At this point he would probably have to pay some kind of compensation to the second party of the original contract. Since this now puts him into a situation were he is worse off than he would be without the contract, one could say, that he is in voluntary slavery. On the other hand, when making the contract in the beginning, one certainly admits the possibility of new information and therefore also calculates with these risks. Personally, I don't think that the uncertainty of the future should be associated with slavery unless one is not allowed to breach the original contract. But this can't happen on the free-market 'cause making it compulsory to follow the contract (and not allowing to cancel it on any occasion) would be forcing one into the position which he wouldn't accept voluntarily, thereby making him worse off.
I hope it wasn't too confusing, it's about 4 a.m. here and I'm getting a bit disoriented.
One night I dreamed of chewing up my debetcard - there simply is nothing like hard cash in your pocket!
> Wouldn't dictating that someone owns themselves mean you're owning them?
No, proclaiming that someone owns themselves means that you intend to treat them as an economic actor, rather than as property. They might choose to treat themselves as property, but you have no need to respect that choice. I see it as a practical matter. If a slave-owner and slave agree to believe that they are a property-owner and property, they can continue to act that way, but it sounds unstable in the long-run and the slave isn't worth trusting. I wouldn't purchase him, for example.
On the other hand, treating someone's android as an economic actor and entering into contracts with it is not sensible either - in practice you have to recognize that it is someone's property, you should make sure you trust its owner, and you should have the ability to sue the owner
Ownership implies a normative element prohibiting others from attempting to use you in a way that you don't approve of. "I don't own myself" is perfectly coherent. It just means that others may use you against your will without unjustly crossing any ethical boundaries. "I am not in sufficient control of myself to say this sentence" is a better example of a self defeating claim. You might be interested in my article on this subject.
http://libertarian-left.blogspot.com/
Brainpolice:I think that someone who proclaims that they do not own themself is engaging in a performative contradiction, for they have to exercise their ownership over themselves in order to even make the statement. "I don't own myself" is a self-detonating statement.
I think this conflates control with ownership, an 'is' with an 'ought'. This is a problem that plagues a number of libertarian theories, particularly of the Kantian/Hoppeian variety. From the fact that one controls one's own body, it does not automatically follow that one own's it; and, contra Kinsella, it matters not that such control is direct objective link rather than indirect one. It is still just control and this control by itself has no special moral significance. Something more is required that these theories do not provide. Likewise, one cannot start one's defense of libertarian rights from self-ownership because it is not basic and primary; it is a cluster concept and a conclusion (which happens to be true, I must add) at which one must arrive by way of argument from more fundamental premises. I do agree that the right to liberty is inalienable, by the way. Saying "I do not own myself" is certainly wrong, but it is not a performative contradiction. Additionally, one can distinguish between the moral ought of ownership and ownership as recognized by positive law (which may or may not be just).
Yours in liberty,Geoffrey Allan PlaucheDoctoral CandidatePolitical ScienceLouisiana State University
"Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?"(Who watches the watchmen?)-Juvenal, Satires VI.347
Inquisitor:it shows voluntary slave contracts are pure nonsense (and with them, social 'contracts'.)
Can you give me your definition of 'social contract' and an example of a nonsensical social contract one might erroneously enter into (in addition to slavery)?
For a good argument against slavery contracts from the inalienability of rights, see Roderick Long's "Slavery Contracts and Inalienable Rights." In one of my working papers (On the Social Contract and the Persistence of Anarchy) and in my dissertation, available on my website, I generalize Roderick's argument to "contracts" with the state as well.
Pairunoyd, if you're familiar with the Hobbesian notion of the social contract, that is what I have in mind.