I. Ryan: laminustacitus: The body is not "owned" in the sense that material objects are; rather, it is a physical extension of one's being. The body of an individual is the individual.
laminustacitus: The body is not "owned" in the sense that material objects are; rather, it is a physical extension of one's being.
The body is not "owned" in the sense that material objects are; rather, it is a physical extension of one's being.
The body of an individual is the individual.
Which is precisely why the dualism of "self-ownership" makes no sense. Ownership means an individual's control over something external to them. They cannot both be the controller and the controlled at the same time.
Knight_of_BAAWA: laminustacitus:Your "ownership" of yourself, and your ownership of external objects are on two different levels: while one can be alienated by force, one cannot.There's slavery, both voluntary and involuntary. And we go from owning ourselves to owning external objects quite easily.
laminustacitus:Your "ownership" of yourself, and your ownership of external objects are on two different levels: while one can be alienated by force, one cannot.
And we go from owning ourselves to owning external objects quite easily.
"Voluntary slavery" is an anti-concept used to justify plain old slavery. Let's not go here again, shall we?
Brainpolice: Two thumbs up for realizing this distiction, which gets at the dualistic flaw of "self-ownership". [...] Which is precisely why the dualism of "self-ownership" makes no sense. Ownership means an individual's control over something external to them. They cannot both be the controller and the controlled at the same time.
Two thumbs up for realizing this distiction, which gets at the dualistic flaw of "self-ownership".
[...]
No one has determined how to even approach the problem of monization of the distinction between mind and matter. That distinction is therefore irrelevant because the terms which we use reflect our inability to monize that distinction. Your post reveals that you either did not read my previous post or you did not read my previous post adequately because I addressed, implicitly, at the least, your objection. Read this portion:
I. Ryan: And if I completely overpower your entire body except your mind while you are still conscious and I force you to move in certain ways, I would effectively seize control of your body but not your mind.
And if I completely overpower your entire body except your mind while you are still conscious and I force you to move in certain ways, I would effectively seize control of your body but not your mind.
Notice that I explicitly said "except your mind [...] but not your mind". As I already mentioned, the terms which we use reflect our inability to unify the theory of mind and the theory of matter. The term "property" applies only to physical objects. It describes a physical object which a purposeful entity either (1) controls or (2) has the 'right' to control. Your body is a physical object which one can either (1) control or (2) have the 'right' to control and, therefore, your body is a physical object which can be property.
In this post, I will attempt to better explain my position.
Brainpolice: Which is precisely why the dualism of "self-ownership" makes no sense. Ownership means an individual's control over something external to them. They cannot both be the controller and the controlled at the same time.
If we define an individual via the specific nature of their consciousness, the body of an individual is an "external" object which the individual can (1) completely control or (2) partially control or (3) not control.
I merely claimed that one can consider the body of oneself to be property and not that one can consider the consciousness of oneself to be property. I, however, completely understand the contradiction which exists between those two propositions: If one assumes that the consciousness of an entity arises via the specific spacial arrangement of the fundamental physical constituents of the body of that entity, one must also assume that to completely own the body of oneself implies to completely own the consciousness of oneself. That contradiction, however, is unavoidable because we have yet to close the gap which resides between our knowledge of mind and our knowledge of matter; at this point, we must acquiesce to a methodologically dualistic worldview: a worldview which separates the natural sciences and the praxeological sciences, mechanical movement and purposive action, matter and mind, physical things and psychical things.
If one claims that oneself "controls the thoughts of oneself", such a claim is, at the least, merely metaphorical and, at the most, nonsensical because if one "controls the thoughts of oneself", what controls what controls the thoughts of oneself? and what controls what controls what controls the thoughts of oneself? et cetera ad infinitum. On this path, therefore, you necessarily encounter an infinite regression, a regression which human reason cannot exhaust. This infinite regression corresponds to the infinite regression one encounters when one attempts to describe the existence of the universe via a creator: what created the creator? and what created what created the creator? et cetera ad infinitum. Both the existence of consciousness and the existence of the universe, therefore, are ultimate givens, data which one cannot describe via more fundamental data and can instead only describe via the interrelations among the constituents of that data.
The terms which we use, therefore, must reflect that gap, the present inability to unify the theory of matter and the theory of mind. If an object is property, that implies that some one controls that object and in order to avoid the infinite regression which I described in the previous paragraph, one must not describe the consciousness of oneself as property. But this distinction does not disallow us to describe each of our physical bodies as property because, in the case of our physical body, no such infinite regression occurs: What controls your body? Your consciousness.
Brainpolice:"Voluntary slavery" is an anti-concept used to justify plain old slavery.
Have fun. Go whine. Don't care.
GilesStratton:Hardly, I just happen to care about people.
Time to grow up, Giles.
Knight_of_BAAWA: And you advocate tyranny and lie about the NAP not being coherently defined. Time to grow up, Giles.
And you advocate tyranny and lie about the NAP not being coherently defined.
If the instillation of anarchy would cause mass impoverishment and death, would you still advocate anarchy? If the instillation of anarchy would cause continuous and brutal war among religious factions, would you still advocate anarchy?
Does it not bother you your whole ethics collapse if someone simply rejects self-ownership?
Do you not have something more convincing?
scineram:Does it not bother you your whole ethics collapse if someone simply rejects self-ownership?
Do you have anything more convincing?
I. Ryan:If the instillation of anarchy would cause mass impoverishment and death, would you still advocate anarchy? If the instillation of anarchy would cause continuous and brutal war among religious factions, would you still advocate anarchy?
Knight_of_BAAWA: If my aunt had balls, she'd be my uncle.
If my aunt had balls, she'd be my uncle.
If you were certain about your position, you would provide an unambiguous answer.
scineram: Does it not bother you your whole ethics collapse if someone simply rejects self-ownership? Do you not have something more convincing?
Who are you addressing?
I. Ryan:If you were certain about your position, you would provide an unambiguous answer.
Knight_of_BAAWA: I am certain, and I exposed the problem with your question. Here's what you asked "What if you added 1 with another 1 and got 3"?
I am certain, and I exposed the problem with your question. Here's what you asked "What if you added 1 with another 1 and got 3"?
You have successfully reached a new level of dogmatism.
That's nice. And I'm going to give your opinion all the consideration it deserves, i.e. none whatsoever.
I am a libertarian (more or less), but I am neither a deontologist nor consequentialist.
Knight_of_BAAWA: That's nice. And I'm going to give your opinion all the consideration it deserves, i.e. none whatsoever.
Apparently you are too dogmatic because you won't drop libertarianism over a hypothetical situation
'It is difficult to imagine any normal person wishing to meet Marx for a third time.' - Alexander Gray, The Socialist Tradition
Lee Kelly: I am a libertarian (more or less), but I am neither a deontologist nor consequentialist.
So you are a libertarian for no reason? That's cool I guess.
What is your problem?
Lee Kelly:I am a libertarian (more or less), but I am neither a deontologist nor consequentialist.
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