Explorations in teleocentric forms of ethics
Recently, I’ve taken up reading again in my free time. Currently, I am half-way through the excellent Norms of Liberty by Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas den Uyl. I’m not going to review the book here or engage in a full summary of their views, but I shall look at some interesting concepts they have focused on.
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the book is its underlying theme. It examines the crisis liberalism currently finds itself in, a crisis largely due to a lack of a deep foundation on which the political ideology can be grounded, or perhaps even due to a foundation that is not conducive to such an end. The authors here propose an innovative solution, which does have a degree of historical precedent within liberal theory. They propose to ground a defence of liberalism in Aristotelian teleocentric, virtue ethics. Liberalism thus becomes a matter of social cooperation and establishing the conditions necessary for flourishing, or in the words of the authors, defines the metanormative prerequisites for individual flourishing. Liberty thus is seen as the primary political principle. What the authors can claim success for is the fact that, they can thus commit themselves to political non-perfectionism and raise liberty to the status of the paramount political principle, without thereby committing themselves to moral minimalism or conflating the good with the right, at the expense of the former. It is interesting to see just how the authors achieve this. They do so by noting that given the sociality required by human flourishing, which will involve conducting relationships with a wide variety of individuals, the key question becomes how does one resolve and avoid potential conflict, such that social relations remain harmonious and individuals can develop the relations they need that are necessary to their flourishing? Given eudaemonia’s (i.e. flourishing) diverse nature, this is not an easy question to answer – yet the authors do so by responding that a feature of all human flourishing is that it must be self-directed. It is protection of this self-direction that allows the possibility of flourishing (note, this is not a consequentialist-maximalist approach) and the avoidance of conflict. Sheer brilliance.
So, how do the authors see morality then? Interestingly, they see the sharp distinction between the good and the right as untenable and undesirable. Rather, for them, as for other Aristotelians, the good is that which is the mature state of a living organism, that to which it tends towards by its very nature (thus a commitment to moderate essentialism is inherent in this approach.) Just as one may say that a tree that is infested by disease or lacking water is in a “bad” condition, one might say that a human whose life consists in little more than the pursuit of the most base pleasures is bad. By contrast, one that is consonant with man’s natural end as rational animal, will be characterized by principled, rational pursuit of and conduct in accordance with rightly considered desires. It is of utmost importance to note that the authors do not believe the political system ought to force individuals to pursue self-perfection, or that it is contingent on their pursuit of it that it will guarantee their rights. No, rather, it is up to the individual to achieve self-perfection, due to its highly self-directed nature. Moral behaviour cannot be coerced or “nudged” behaviour, so to speak (this directly contradicts the notion of a paternalistic “libertarianism”.)
At this stage, I should like to note the features of flourishing as outlined by the authors in question. They highlight that it is 1) objective (think Euthyphro dilemma here; is something good because the gods want it, or because of its very nature? Same with individuals – we desire things because they have qualities such that they fulfil our needs), 2) agent-relative (a value is such that the presence of a given value F in world W1 makes it preferable to W2 for a given agent X1, but not necessarily for an agent X2-Xn), 3) individual (what particular form flourishing will take, which virtues one will focus on &c., these are all matters to be left to the individual; the ethical theorist can only specify the generic features of flourishing), 4) inclusive (this means that flourishing is not the dominant end to which one is oriented at the expense of all other ends; indeed, the virtues are constitutive and expressive of flourishing, in the way that competing in a sport is part of the experience as much as winning is), 5) social (we need others in order to flourish; the atomist view of man is profoundly mistaken and not conducive to his flourishing) and 6) self-directed (human flourishing requires human action, judgement and coordination; it is not an automatic process nor can it be coercively attained.) Of all, self-direction is perhaps the most important and indeed is both the guide of the process and part of it. Humans are oriented towards their potentiality in virtue of their self-direction; it is not something they can avoid. A good analogy with respect to self-direction, and failure to carry it out, is a heart on a blood pump. On the one hand, we cannot say that this is a "good" heart - it clearly has failed in many ways, and is not a healthy specimen. On the other, it is not performing its function. It is dependent on another device to do so. This is not a perfect analogy, but it's good as a vivid illustration.
This brings up another interesting matter –whether the morality in question is assertoric, hypothetical or categorical in its classification as an imperative? The answer the Aristotelian must give, is that it is assertoric. Since it is in one’s nature to be the kind of thing which has the potential for self-perfection, the good will be the realization of that potential state. Right and good are harmonized by noting that it is right conduct that will lead to the good state. Man’s ultimate end is choice-worthy, and thus that which ought to be realized. Humans are choosing beings, but not to the extent that they are free to choose absent reasons. It is inherent in our nature to act with reasons in mind, whether good or bad (this, Henry Veatch has shown, is the ontological basis for morality.) This precludes the possibility of morality being merely hypothetical in nature (of the form, if you want X, then do Y to achieve X. Self-direction is not merely instrumental to our well-being – it is part of it.) Morality cannot be categoric, in that anything which we ought to do must have an end. To say we ought to be virtuous because we ought to, is to beg the question and to fail to show why exactly virtuous conduct of our actions is the sort of thing that’d matter to us. Such is the result of neglecting human nature. It makes both the explanation of and justification for morality seem arbitrary and groundless.
Finally, the authors develop interesting ideas with regard to the right to property (which is a right that stems from the fact that man is a being which is not merely noumenal, not an ethereal wraith, but a being that must command resources in the real world so that it may direct its activities so as to achieve its purposes.) The right to property is a right to action, the particular characteristic of which is the legitimate exploitation of opportunities (all action consists in seeing opportunities; the right to property involves the exploitation of them.) Because man by his nature has the natural, negative basic right to liberty (basic in the sense that it is the foundation of all other rights), he must be free to direct his actions so as to bring material goods under his control so as to achieve his goals. This is a highly personal, individual affair. Rather than seeing objects in the world which must somehow be allocated, we now see unowned, un-transformed opportunities that man must transform in order to bring under his control and exploit to his advantage. Given that man’s self-direction must be protected in order for flourishing to be possible, and given that no one has a right to an opportunity per se, any interference with property rights now becomes a matter for which a third party advocating interference must bear the burden of proof. Because, all that has occurred when unowned resources are transformed is that an opportunity has been exploited. No one has been deprived of anything that was their due. So out of the window goes the Lockean proviso. What particular form appropriation (i.e. transformation) must take will vary with local standards and is a contingent, particular matter that cannot be determined a priori. Likewise, any exchange of legitimately acquired goods cannot be interfered with absent justification, so long as it is consensual. All this may seem somewhat confusing to the libertarian accustomed to seeing the right to property as the corollary of the right to self-ownership. However, I believe this mode of analysis is superior in that it avoids pitfalls that the traditional approach is prone to (such as the Lockean proviso), has a better justification than the so-called axiom of self-ownership and is consistent with teleocentric forms of ethics. Given that politics is concerned with matters of social cooperation, and given that scarcity is the ultimate source of all conflicts, one can retain Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s observations on the matter, and insure that scarcity remains the prime requisite for legitimate appropriation, thus potentially ruling out the possibility of intellectual property rights. Another benefit of this way of regarding matters, is that action is inherently part of oneself, and is not merely separable in the way objects are. Thus, appropriation becomes a matter of extending oneself, and one’s boundaries, which by right are not to be interfered with.
Well, that was an unusually long entry for one as laconic as myself... let me know your thoughts. I apologize in advance for any misrepresentations of the authors’ views I might have made, and if anything is unclear please ask for clarification. I am still learning the basics of Aristotelian natural-end ethics myself, so my understanding is by no means complete, but I’d be happy to try and discuss these matters in further depth.