The Action-Axiom: A Kantian Understanding of the Action-Axiom, and Its Praxeological Conclusions

The synthetic a priori judgment can guide our comprehension of the action-axiom, and similarly can do so for our comprehension of the entire structure of praxeology, more specifically its advantages over empirical techniques. The synthetic a priori is true because it is the manner by which we necessarily experience the world, there is no way beyond how the understanding orders, and unifies, and it is in that sense where the validity of praxeology can truly be beheld because the science of praxeology yields for us the very laws of society that we need in order to steer the course of the social sciences. In fact, the action-axiom, and praxeology are true for the reason that we cannot experience the world, with respect to the sphere of the social sciences, though any other mode than through the proposition “man acts,” and its logical consequences.

The action-axiom is a synthetic a priori judgment that is the necessary foundation for our comprehension of economics, and the entire manner by which we understand the world, though I shall not delve into applying Mises' insight into the teleological nature of the human understanding. The reason why it is a synthetic judgment rather than an analytic one is that the predicate of action is not contained in our concept of man, rather it is synthesized with it in the statement: “man acts.” It is necessary here to remember the Kantian notion that though all knowledge stems from experience, with analytical judgments yielding no more knowledge than we started off with, that does not mean that it is from the content of the experience that we learn. Rather, we can analyze our experience itself in order to discover the preconditions of it whence we discover the synthetic a priori truths, and the action-axiom perfectly fits in this category. As established above, the judgment “man acts” is not an analytic one, rather it is a self-evident, irrefutable statement about the way by which man must experience his reality; truly, the very action of trying to refute it results in its validation. In the end, the axiom-action is a synthetic a priori judgment that is one of the many foundations of human experience.

Since the action-axiom is undeniable true, the basis of praxeology also rests on such grounds, and the synthetic a priori nature of the former also shines light on a fact of the entire praxeological framework: that we need it construct it antecedent of our analysis of society. It is only with the conclusions, and laws of praxeology that theorists can understand the workings of society, without them, he is doomed to linger in the dark for he is without a compass in his endeavor for understanding. Much like how synthetic a priori truths structure, and unify our perceptions through our understanding, praxeology does so for our understanding of society: there are far too many factors at work for empirical methods to yield any understanding, not to mention the fact that man is also a moral agent who does not react to the same stimuli similarly as atoms, or stones do, but I digress. From the action-axiom, praxeology derives similarly necessary truths that are required for our very experience of the world that are unattainable from any empirical inquiries; no experiment will yield the fact that in all transactions both parties will result in a psychic profit for both, and that the entire affair would have never manifested had both thought they could not gain from it. Had we relied on purely empirical methods we would never have discovered crucial truths about society, truths that are the very basis of our experience, and hence synthetic a priori.

Overall, the action-axiom is a synthetic a priori truth in that the judgment “man acts” is a necessary foundation for experience, and it gives similar truth to praxeology. Ergo, it is the role of praxeology to guide our analysis of human society by illuminating for us the laws that elucidate manner by which man must act by necessity, laws that the theorist would be condemned never to discover had he relied on an empiricism.