Dmitry Chernikov’s Blog » Blog Archive » Contra the “Labor Theory of Property,” II

Thu, 01 Nov 2007 23:07:16 GMT

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re: Praxeology, property rights, and contracts

Dmitry Chernikov — Tue, 30 Oct 2007 19:14:21 GMT

Grant, I do not defend the thesis that "praxeology effectively presupposes property rights." Actually, I argue in the opposite direction, that property rights presuppose or require people to engage in praxeological reasoning. I ask: what does it take for a person to come to own an initially unowned object? Rothbard says: to mix your labor with it, stressing the formal cause. I say: to make it a part of a plan to use it to further your welfare, stressing the final cause.

I think my account is superior. E.g., suppose that instead of making an arrowhead, I find a stone already shaped like an arrowhead (or even a whole arrow lost by someone) in nature. Can't I appropriate it rightfully even without laboring on it? There is really no connection between the form of a thing and who should own it. But there is a definite connection between the purpose of a thing and claims of ownership of it. Even going beyond initial appropriation, on the free market ownership of a resource will gravitate toward whoever can use it most profitably.

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extrasq » Blog Archiv » Praxeology, property rights, and contracts — Wed, 24 Oct 2007 12:02:21 GMT

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