Lilburne @ Mises - All Comments

re: Summa Anthropica is Moving

Lilburne — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 03:25:56 GMT

Well, a big issue is not being able to embed the slideshows of my comics, since the software doesn't support the <embed> tag. Also, the software is super slow periodically. There are other small things too, but those are the main issues.

re: Summa Anthropica is Moving

jtucker — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 03:07:18 GMT

you didn't like the Mises software?

re: Human Action Comics #3: Marginal Theory of Value

h4x5k8 — Wed, 14 Oct 2009 23:40:10 GMT

I have been trying to explain to my Marxist acquaintance the theory of subjective value and diminishing marginal utility. I was excited to see it so simply put forth in your fine rendition, for my attempts proved to be utter failures. Here is the reply I got after sending him the link to your comics, perhaps this will interest you:

"The Robinson Crusoe thought experiment begins with the assumption of an uninhabited island, that is a wilderness in which no one owns the natural resources. There is currently nowhere on Earth where this is true; all resources are owned by individuals, corporations or governments. Humans are social, not Robinson Crusoes, so, like it or not, economies are embedded in societies and economic power equates to political power.

From an anarchist perspective, this presentation still avoids the key question I keep asking, "How can anyone be free when everything they need to simply survive is owned by someone else?" If you are forced to do the bidding of owners just to live, this seems a perverted definition of freedom. Even with a gun to your head, you still have a choice, don't you?

From Marx's point of view, the Austrians confuse use value and exchange value and focus almost exclusively on the former. If you do this, it conceals the source of profit, which is, I think, their intent. Marx doesn't focus much on use value; he takes it as a given. Probably because if something has no use, it is unlikely that significant social resources will be devoted to its production. However, it does mean that he looks fairly exclusively at the "supply side" of the equation, and spends little time on demand... e.g. on such concepts as marginal utility. You might look at all of Marx's analysis as prefixed by the phrase, "Assuming commodities do sell...," and he then proceeds to analyze the source of profit, the concentration of wealth (as capital) and its social consequences.

The Austrians concentrate on use value - i.e. under what conditions people buy goods and in what quantity; the goods satisfy a consumer's need and once the need is satisfied, additional goods have decreasing marginal utility for that consumer. The labor theory of value still creeps in, however, because if I can produce something myself with much less effort than it takes for me to produce the goods I have to exchange for it, then no exchange occurs... I just make it myself.

I think the demand side of the economic equation is not irrelevant when looking at the overall dynamics of the economy, and it my be one reason why communist economies sometimes did a poor job of matching supply to demand. On the other hand, the communist/socialist economies have done a vastly better job of meeting basic human needs, given available resources. Hence, a poor country like Cuba can do a far better job of feeding, clothing, housing, and educating its citizens than the United States. For medical care, it is at least 20 times as efficient as the US ($251 per capita, vs $6000 for US for the same quality of care), and we've just demonstrated that this problem cannot be fixed by tweaking the capitalist economy. Were it not for "socialist" Medicare, the figures for the US would look much worse."

re: For a New Libertarian Ethics

Jess Porter — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 15:28:13 GMT

This is a very fine article. That said, I have a real problem with the idea that there exists an universal ethic. It is almost imposible for me to conceive of the 'is' of human nature; it is, so far, absolutely imposible for me to conceive of the 'should be'.

I am much more drawn to Socrates than to Aristotle: questions are much more interesting than are answers.

I have studied philosophy for all of my adult life, and have at various times been relatively convinced of this or that concept, only to come to dissatifaction. Furthermore, as I not-so-gracefully age, the most compelling argument seems to be that of scepticism, not in that I cannot know, but that I do not know. And what keeps bringing me back to and closer to scepticism is that the most destructive behaviors I have observed in myself as well as in others seem to have been deeply rooted in some form of certitude.

Such shameless Bards we have; and yet 'tis true,

There are as mad, abandon'd Criticks too.

The Bookful Blockhead, ignorantly read,

With Loads of Learned Lumber in his Head,

With his own Tongue still edifies his Ears,

And always List'ning to Himself appears.

All Books he reads, and all he reads assails,

From Dryden's Fables down to Durfey's Tales.

With him, most Authors steal their Works, or buy;

Garth did not write his own Dispensary.

Name a new Play, and he's the Poet's Friend,

Nay show'd his Faults - but when wou'd Poets mend?

No Place so Sacred from such Fops is barr'd,

Nor is Paul's Church more safe than Paul's Church-yard:

Nay, fly to Altars; there they'll talk you dead;

For Fools rush in where Angels fear to tread

from Alexander Pope's An Essay on Criticism

re: Human Action Comics #1: The Basics

DD5 — Mon, 12 Oct 2009 14:08:10 GMT

This is very good!

re: Krugman's Intellectual Waterloo

Solid_Choke — Thu, 08 Oct 2009 08:05:35 GMT

My main problem with your description of Krugman is that you called him a neo-Keynesian. Krugman isn't a neo-Keynesian like Greg Mankiw, he is a plain vanilla Keynesian, just like the Keynes early advocates.

re: A Mini-Manifesto of Liberty

Solid_Choke — Thu, 08 Oct 2009 07:59:29 GMT

I feel somewhat bad that I am not posting my own manifesto after reading yours, but it isn't ready to see the light of day, but you did manage to inspire me to dust it off (not literally, as it is a computer document) and get back to work.

re: Character as Inverse Time Preference

AJ — Tue, 15 Sep 2009 11:07:41 GMT

Cleaning up the last two sentences:

Our built-in conscience protects us before the fact and impels us to make reparations after the fact.

Also, many people feel guilty for having a high time-preference, so in that sense, there is often conscience-induced pain for those for those holding high time preferences.

re: Character as Inverse Time Preference

AJ — Tue, 15 Sep 2009 11:02:37 GMT

This distinction seems useful on one hand, but on the other we would do well not to lose sight of the fact that our conscience does bug us a lot. People often say they do things to avoid feeling guilty later (guilt from within, as you note), as well as to avoid disapproval from others, authority, or God (guilt from without), or ostracism, or legal consequences, and to avoid having to lie later (more consequences).

All of these are a type of pain, so it seems the distinction you are speaking of constitutes a classification of pain into conscience-induced and non-conscience-induced. Our built-in conscious protects us before the fact and impels us to make reparations after the fact.

Also, many people feel guilty for having a high time-preference.

re: Character as Inverse Time Preference

Lilburne — Sun, 13 Sep 2009 23:59:25 GMT

scineram, According to Callahan, Hoppe equates time-preference with morality. I, on the other hand, am equating it with character. And in my post, I am very careful to distinguish character from morality.

re: Character as Inverse Time Preference

scineram — Sun, 13 Sep 2009 23:39:40 GMT

<a>www.gene-callahan.org/.../a>

re: A Mini-Manifesto of Liberty

Keith Ackermann — Fri, 04 Sep 2009 09:30:08 GMT

This is an excellent piece, and it is finely written. As pretty much a layperson to Libertarianism, the emphasis on property rights in a manifesto, to me, is puzzling. I just sort of take it as a given. I've never really thought about the boundaries of it.

Life, liberty, and the persuit f happiness are all vague, but purposefully so. Property rights starts getting specific, but I have no idea what the scope is. You certainly can't own people, but you sort of own your children (and spouse?) Maybe vested comes into play there. Owned doesn't sound right.

To assert it in a manifesto... does that mean it is missing and you are striving for it, or are you reaffirming?

I think your suggestion of a personal manifesto is excellent. This could take a bit.

re: Natural Morality

marquise — Tue, 25 Aug 2009 07:05:34 GMT

If you could extrapolate this theory to Liberty, how would you explain the lack of Liberty urge in most individuals?

re: For a New Libertarian Ethics

leonidia — Thu, 20 Aug 2009 23:48:26 GMT

I found your article "For a New Libertarian Ethics" very interesting. However, I think your interpretation of Rothbard's position is incorrect in a number of areas, as are the conclusions you draw. I would make the following points:

1. When Rothbard says, "For the ends themselves are selected by the use of reason", he doesn't mean the ends are the PRODUCT of reason. I think Rothbard would be the first to acknowledge that ends spring from wants, feelings, needs, or "passions" if you wish to call them that. As Mises makes very clear in HA, ultimate ends are irrational. They are not the product of reason; they are simply givens for which praxeology has no explanation. They are a psychological phenomenon. But at any given time, man has many wants, many passions, not all of which can be satisfied. And so to answer the question of which particular end to pursue, and which to discard, man must use reason. This is why Rothbard says ends are SELECTED by reason. For example, I might have a desire to eat chocolate cake, or make love, both of which spring from passion, but I must use reason to decide which one to do at any given time. I might have a desire to get high on heroin, but only reason tells me that doing so won't be good for me, at least not in the long run.

2. You quote Rothbard as follows, "The natural law, then, elucidates what is best for man -- what ends man should pursue that are most harmonious with, and best tend to fulfill, his nature" But why is this problematical? Why criticize Rothbard for eschewing methodological individualism? Methodological individualism is the process by which we analyze the class by looking at the individuals comprising the class. And in praxeology this makes sense. But in ethics, we're asking a completely different question. Here we ask, not what is the process by which men act, but rather how should they act and why? The use of methodological individualism is inappropriate in this task, so it's really not fair to criticize Rothbard for "eschewing" it. After all, Robinson Crusoe has no need for ethics, at least not until Friday comes along. Rothbard doesn't say the natural law arises because any action by an individual, that is in accordance with the natural law, will always be good for that individual. It is obvious there are instances where this is not the case. You give an example of such a case yourself. Rothbard is suggesting that individual men, by analyzing their own nature, can use reason to figure out that, in general, social cooperation is best not only for mankind, but also best for themselves as individuals; not in every case of course, but in general. How does this come about? Because aside from the logical structure of his mind, a particular person is always unique. As a result, he stands to gain the most in a system that promotes the division of labor and social cooperation. All of this is in keeping with his nature.

3. When Rothbard says, "For in natural-law ethics, ends are demonstrated to be good or bad for man in varying degrees; value here is objective -- determined by the natural law of man's being.", you are right in saying this is prescriptive. But by definition, ethics are always prescriptive, so why the criticism? Furthermore, this is not a normative prescription, nor a utilitarian one. It is not subjective in any way. It is utterly objective and rational. The natural law is, in a sense, a technological prescription for living that is in accordance with what is good for mankind, and by extension the individual. It has to be discovered. And it's also right because it is the only system of ethics that can be both UNIVERSALLY applied and EQUALLY applied. It is the only moral code where we can say to everyone, “You must abide by it” and be confident that, in its application, the rights of everyone will be the same. In fact it is impossible to conceive of any other moral code that, when universally applied, does not result in either an unequal application of rights (masters and slaves), or an unworkable situation (absolute universal communism). Here we see again why the natural law is rational and objective.

-LD

re: Ben Bernanke Was Wrong: YouTube Mashup

Floy Lilley — Sat, 15 Aug 2009 15:33:13 GMT

Lilburne,

You are doing fine work. I enjoy voice recording what ever you have written.

If this youTube has not already appeared on LRC Blog, could you submit it to Lew?

Thanking you, Floy Lilley