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Economics in One Lesson校译之12. The Drive for Exports

The Drive for Exports

第12章 出口狂热

EXCEEDED ONLY BY the pathological dread of imports that affects all nations is a pathological yearning for exports. Logically, it is true, no thing could be more inconsistent. In the long run imports and exports must equal each other (considering both in the broadest sense, which includes such “invisible” terms as tourist expenditures, ocean freight charges and all other items in the “balance of payments”). It is exports that pay for imports, and vice versa. The greater exports we have, the greater imports we must have, if we ever expect to get paid. The smaller imports we have, the smaller exports we can have. Without imports we can have no exports, for foreigners will have no funds with which to buy our goods. When we decide to cut down our imports, we are in effect deciding also to cut down our exports. When we decide to increase our exports, we are in effect deciding also to increase our imports.

所有国家对出口都怀有病态的渴求，这种影响仅次于各国对进口怀有的病态恐惧。从逻辑上讲，真的没有比这种事情更矛盾的了。长期而言，进口与出口必然相等（这里的进出口指“国际收支账户”里的所有项目，包括“无形”项目，如旅游消费、海运费用等）。出口偿付了进口，反之亦然。只要我们希望得到报偿，那么我们的出口越多，进口量也就必然越大。进口的数量减少了，我们的出口也必然更少。倘使没有进口的话，我们就不可能出口，因为外国人没有美元可以用来买美国的产品。所以，当我们决定削减进口的时候，其实等于决定削减出口。当我们准备扩大出口的时候，其实等于准备扩大进口。

The reason for this is elementary. An American exporter sells his goods to a British importer and is paid in British pounds sterling. But he cannot use British pounds to pay the wages of his workers, to buy his wife’s clothes or to buy theater tickets. For all these purposes he needs American dollars. Therefore his British pounds are of no use to him unless he either uses them himself to buy British goods or sells them (through his bank or other agent) to some American importer who wishes to use them to buy British goods. Whichever he does, the transaction cannot be completed until the American exports have been paid for by an equal amount of imports.

其中的道理非常简单。一位美国出口商把商品卖给英国进口商，换回的是英镑。但是这位老兄在国内没法用英镑来支付员工工资、用英镑来给太太买衣服、或买戏票。他需要美元来支付这一切。他拿着英镑没有用处，除非他拿去购买英国的产品，或者把手里的英镑（通过银行或代理商）卖给美国进口商，让他们用于进口英国产品。不管采用哪一种方式，在美国的出口以等量的进口支付之前，都无法实现银货两讫。

The same situation would exist if the transaction had been conducted in terms of American dollars instead of British pounds. The British importer could not pay the American exporter in dollars unless some previous British exporter had built up a credit in dollars here as a result of some previous sale to us. Foreign exchange, in short, is a clearing transaction in which, in America, the dollar debts of foreigners are canceled against their dollar credits. In England, the pound sterling debts of foreigners are canceled against their sterling credits.

如果交易不是以英镑，而是以美元进行，情形也会一样。除非以前曾有英国出口商输出产品到美国，并因此有美元积累，否则英国进口商没办法以美元支付美国出口商。简单地说，外汇是一笔票据清算的交易，在美国，是将外国人的美元债权和他们的美元债务冲销。在英国，外国人的英镑债权则和他们的英镑债务冲销。

There is no reason to go into the technical details of all this, which can be found in any good textbook on foreign exchange. But it should be pointed out that there is nothing inherently mysterious about it (in spite of the mystery in which it is so often wrapped), and that it does not differ essentially from what happens in domestic trade. Each of us must also sell something, even if for most of us it is our own services rather than goods, in order to get the purchasing power to buy. Domestic trade is also conducted in the main by crossing off checks and other claims against each other through clearing houses.

我们没有必要去纠缠所有这些问题的技术细节，在任何一本关于外汇的好教科书中都找得到相关说明。然而，必须指出的一点是，对外贸易从本质上来讲并无任何神秘之处（除开那些笼罩其上的神秘难解的东西来看的话），它与国内贸易没有什么本质上的差异。每个人都必须卖些东西给别人，才能获得购买力，才有钱去买别人的东西；只不过我们中的大多数人卖的是自身的劳务，而不是出售商品。国内交易大多也是通过银行等结算机构，以注销买卖双方支票和其他支付的方式进行。

It is true that under the international gold standard discrepancies in balances of imports and exports were sometimes settled by shipments of gold. But they could just as well have been settled by shipments of cotton, steel, whisky, perfume, or any other commodity. The chief difference is that when a gold standard exists the demand for gold is almost indefinitely expansible (partly because it is thought of and accepted as a residual international “money” rather than as just another commodity), and that nations do not put artificial obstacles in the way of receiving gold as they do in the way of receiving almost everything else. (On the other hand, of late years they have taken to putting more obstacles in the way of exporting gold than in the way of exporting anything else; but that is another story.)

在国际金本位制度下，进出口贸易差额有时确实可以靠交运黄金的来结算，但也可以用交运棉花、钢铁、威士忌、香料，或其他普通商品来结算。这里主要的 区别在于，当金本位制存在的时候，黄金的需求几乎可以无限扩张（部分原因是黄金被公认为是终极国际“货币”，而不仅仅是另一种普通商品），各国不象限制其它任何商品进口那样限制黄金的输入。（另一方面，近年来，它们限制黄金的输出，采取的措施甚于限制其它任何商品出口，那却是另一码事。）

Now the same people who can be clearheaded and sensible when the subject is one of domestic trade can be incredibly emotional and muddleheaded when it becomes one of foreign trade. In the latter field they can seriously advocate or acquiesce in principles which they would think it insane to apply in domestic business. A typical example is the belief that the government should make huge loans to foreign countries for the sake of increasing our exports, regardless of whether or not these loans are likely to be repaid.

如今某些人，在谈论国内贸易时，头脑清醒并且很有理智，当话题转到对外贸易，他们立刻变得情绪激动、头脑糊涂得令人难以置信。在后一种情况下，他们会极力主张或原则上默认一些在国内贸易上他们会认为是疯狂愚蠢的主张。一个典型的例子是相信政府为了达到增加出口的目的应当向国外提供大量贷款，而不考虑这些贷款有多少能收得回来。

American citizens, of course, should be allowed to lend their own funds abroad at their own risk. The government should put no arbitrary barriers in the way of private lending to countries with which we are at peace. As individuals we should be willing to give generously, for humane reasons alone, to people who are in great distress or in danger of starving. But we ought always to know clearly what we are doing. It is not wise to bestow charity on foreign people under the impression that one is making a hardheaded business transaction purely for one’s own selfish purposes. That could only lead to misunderstandings and bad relations later.

不消说，美国的公民们拿自己的钱去冒险，放贷到国外的，政府不应该设置任何障碍，阻止民间贷款给我们的友邦。作为个人，仅仅出于人道的考虑，我们就应该慷慨解囊，资助处于严重贫困和饥饿威胁之下的人们。不过，我们必须自始至终明了我们这种行为的性质。我们对于国外民族予以慈善救济时，却给人以正 在做着一笔精明的纯粹是基于自己商业利益的交易的印象，那就太不明智了。这只会造成以后的误解和恶劣关系。

Yet among the arguments put forward in favor of huge foreign lending one fallacy is always sure to occupy a prominent place. It runs like this. Even if half (or all) the loans we make to foreign countries turn sour and are not repaid, this nation will still be better off for having made them, because they will give an enormous impetus to our exports.

可是，在主张对外大量贷款的论调中，一个谬论始终占有重要位置。其说法是：即使放到国外贷款有一半（或者全部）变成呆账，得不到偿还，国家仍然可以由这种贷款而获益，因为它们将强劲地拉动我们的出口。

It should be immediately obvious that if the loans we make to foreign countries to enable them to buy our goods are not repaid, then we are giving the goods away. A nation cannot grow rich by giving goods away. It can only make itself poorer.

那些用于帮助外国购买我们产品的贷款，要是拖欠不还，就等于我们拿产品去白送，这是明摆着的事实。一个国家不可能靠无偿的商品输出而变得富有，这样做只会使这个国家变得更穷。

No one doubts this proposition when it is applied privately. If an automobile company lends a man $5,000 to buy a car priced at that amount, and the loan is not repaid, the automobile company is not better off because it has “sold” the car. It has simply lost the amount that it cost to make the car. If the car cost $4,000 to make, and only half the loan is repaid, then the company has lost $4,000 minus $2,500, or a net amount of $1,500 It has not made up in trade what it lost in bad loans.³

把这种说法用在私营企业身上，没人质疑其正确性。如果一家汽车公司贷款5,000美元给一个人买等价的车子，而这个买家最后没有偿清贷款，那么这家汽车公司不可能因为“售出”这辆车子而增加收益。它损失的是生产这辆车的所有成本。如果这辆车的生产成本是4,000美元，而买家只还一半的贷款，那么这家汽车公司的净损失是4,000美元减去2,500美元，也就是1,500美元。坏账造成的损失，并没有从它的销售业绩中赚回来。{书后注3:黑兹利特用的5 000美元这个数字并不确切。现在一辆新车的平均价格要20 000美元左右。（戴维·亨德森（David R. Henderson）的〈同通胀娱乐与博弈〉（Fun and Games With Inflation），刊于《财富》1996年3月18日，第36页）}

If this proposition is so simple when applied to a private company, why do apparently intelligent people get confused about it when applied to a nation? The reason is that the transaction must then be traced mentally through a few more stages. One group may indeed make gains—while the rest of us take the losses.

对于私人公司来说如此简单的事实，为什么用于国家，那些聪明人却会犯糊涂呢？原因在于，要认清这种交易的实质，需要人们把放宽眼界多看几步。某个群体确实可以从中获益，而其他所有的人则蒙受了损失。

It is true, for example, that persons engaged exclusively or chiefly in export business might gain on net balance as a result of bad loans made abroad. The national loss on the transaction would be certain, but it might be distributed in ways difficult to follow. The private lenders would take their losses directly. The losses from government lending would ultimately be paid out of increased taxes imposed on everybody. But there would also be many indirect losses brought about by the effect on the economy of these direct losses.

例如，专门或是主要从事出口贸易的人，可能会从政府海外贷款坏账中得到净收益，这是确实无误的。整个国家因此而蒙受损失是肯定的，只不过难以追踪哪些人遭受了多少损失。私人放贷损失由放贷者自己直接承受，而政府贷款的损失，最后则必须靠加重税负来解决。此外，这些直接的损失会对经济造成不良影响，从而造成更多间接损失。

In the long run business and employment in America would be hurt, not helped, by foreign loans that were not repaid. For every extra dollar that foreign buyers had with which to buy American goods, domestic buyers would ultimately have one dollar less. Businesses that depend on domestic trade would therefore be hurt in the long run as much as export businesses would be helped. Even many concerns that did an export business would be hurt on net balance. American automobile companies, for example, sold about 15 percent of their output in the foreign market in 1975. It would not profit them to sell 20 percent of their output abroad as a result of bad foreign loans if they thereby lost, say, io percent of their American sales as the result of added taxes taken from American buyers to make up for the unpaid foreign loans.

从长远来看，贷款收不回来对美国的企业和就业并没有好处，而是有害的。对用于购买美国产品的贷款，外国买主的赖账每多一美元，国内买主终将损失一美元。因此，出口业获益的同时，依靠内销为主的行业将蒙受损失，长期下来，二者得失大体相当，甚至许多从事出口的企业，其净收益也会受损。例如，1975年美国的汽车公司约有15%的产量销往海外市场。假如给国外贷款，出口量可增加到20%。但如果贷款收不回来，导致美国消费者的税负加重，造成汽车公司的国内销售额减退10%，对这些汽车公司来说也是得不偿失。

None of this means, I repeat, that it is unwise for private investors to make loans abroad, but simply that we cannot get rich by making bad ones.

重申一下，这里并不是说私人投资者向海外贷款是不明智的，这里要说的是，我们不能靠收不回来的贷款变得富有。

For the same reasons that it is stupid to give a false stimulation to export trade by making bad loans or outright gifts to foreign countries, it is stupid to give a false stimulation to export trade through export subsidies. An export subsidy is a clear case of giving the foreigner something for nothing, by selling him goods for less than it costs us to make them. It is another case of trying to get rich by giving things away.

基于这个道理，那些靠对外贷款呆账，或者直接赠与外国的方式，制造出口大增的做法，是愚蠢的，企图通过出口补贴的方式拉动出口的做法，愚不可及。出口补贴以低于生产成本的价格，出售产品给外国人，补贴部分等于白送。这是企图靠送人东西来发家致富的另一个例子。

In the face of all this, the United States government has been engaged for years in a “foreign economic aid” program the greater part of which has consisted in outright government-to-government gifts of many billions of dollars. Here we are interested in just one aspect of that program—the naive belief of many of its sponsors that this is a clever or even a necessary method of “increasing our exports” and so maintaining prosperity and employment. It is still another form of the delusion that a nation can get rich by giving things away. What conceals the truth from many supporters of the program is that what is directly given away is not the exports themselves but the money with which to buy them. It is possible, therefore, for individual exporters to profit on net balance from the national loss — if their individual profit from the exports is greater than their share of taxes to pay for the program.

美国政府不顾这些常识，多年来一直实施“对外经济援助”计划，主要是政府对政府的直接赠予，金额动辄高达数十亿美元。这里我们只对支持那些计划的一种说法感兴趣——许多支持此种政策的人愚蠢地相信这样可以“拉动出口”，相信这是维持美国的繁荣和就业的聪明做法，甚至是必要的措施。这依然是靠送东西能让国家致富的另一错觉。这一计划蒙蔽了许多的支持者，其关键在于：美国直接送出去的，不是出口商品本身，而是用来购买出口的钱。因此，个别出口商有可能从国家的损失中获利——如果他们从出口所得到的个人利益大于该计划分摊给他们的税负的话。

Here we have simply one more example of the error of looking only at the immediate effect of a policy on some special group, and of not having the patience or intelligence to trace the long-run effects of the policy on everyone.

只看某项政策对某个特殊群体产生的立即影响，而没有耐心或智慧去考察该政策对每个人造成的长远影响，这样的错误，我们在这里又多了一个实例。

If we do trace these long-run effects on everyone, we come to an additional conclusion—the exact opposite of the doctrine that has dominated the thinking of most government officials for centuries. This is, as John Stuart Mill so clearly pointed out, that the real gain of foreign trade to any country lies not in its exports but in its imports. Its consumers are either able to get from abroad commodities at a lower price than they could obtain them for at home, or commodities that they could not get from domestic producers at all. Outstanding examples in the United States are coffee and tea. Collectively considered, the real reason a country needs exports is to pay for its imports.

如果我们真的去考察每个人所受的长期影响，我们还可以得到另外一个结论。与几个世纪以来大部分政府官员所奉行的教条恰恰相反，这个结论，正如约翰•穆勒非常清楚地所表达的那样：对外贸易对任何国家能有利益，最终并不在于其出口，而是在于其进口。是进口，让一个国家的消费者能以比国内更便宜的价格，买到外国的商品；是进口，让他们买到国内制造商不生产的商品（在美国尤为突出的是咖啡和茶叶）。总的来说，一个国家需要出口的真正理由，是赚钱来支付其进口。

Economics in One Lesson校译之11. Who’s “Protected” by Tariffs? (6-4,5,6)

第11章 关税“保护”了哪些人？

（接前面部分）

4

It is important to notice that the new tariff on sweaters would not raise American wages. To be sure, it would enable Americans to work in the sweater industry at approximately the average level of American wages (for workers of their skill), instead of having to compete in that industry at the British level of wages. But there would be no increase of American wages in general as a result of the duty; for as we have seen, there would be no net increase in the number of jobs provided, no net increase in the demand for goods, and no increase in labor productivity. Labor productivity would, in fact, be reduced as a result of the tariff.

我们必须注意到，这种对羊毛衫征收的新关税并不会提高美国人的工资水平。更准确地说，征收这种关税将使在羊毛衫产业中工作的美国人，其工资处于美国的平均水准上下（就相当技能而言），而不是同该行业的英国工人工资水平竞争。然而，并不存在由关税而带来的美国工资水平普遍的增长。因为，象我们所看到的，这里并不存在就业数量的净增长，也没有对商品需求的净增长，以及劳动生产率的净增长。事实上，作为关税保护的一种结果，劳动生产率是降低了。

And this brings us to the real effect of a tariff wall. It is not merely that all its visible gains are offset by less obvious but no less real losses. It results, in fact, in a net loss to the country. For contrary to centuries of interested propaganda and disinterested confusion, the tariff reduces the American level of wages.

这就让我们见到关税壁垒的实质影响。不仅仅是所有看得到的利益，都被不那么明显，但一样真实的损失给冲销掉了。其结果，乃是整个国家承受了净损失。与数百年来无数出于自利的宣传与并非出于自利的认识混乱相反，关税降低了美国的工资水平。

Let us observe more clearly how it does this. We have seen that the added amount which consumers pay for a tariff-protected article leaves them just that much less with which to buy all other articles. There is here no net gain to industry as a whole. But as a result of the artificial barrier erected against foreign goods, American labor, capital and land are deflected from what they can do more efficiently to what they do less efficiently. Therefore, as a result of the tariff wall the average productivity of American labor and capital is reduced.

让我们来进一步察考其中的机制。如前所述，消费者多花钱购买受关税保护的产品，能够用来购买其他产品的钱就会相应减少。产业作为一个整体并没有从中获得净收益。但由于人为地对外国产品设立壁垒，造成美国的劳动力、资本和土地，从相对效率较高的产业，移转到相对效率较低的产业上。因此，美国劳动力和资本的平均生产力，必然由于关税壁垒而降低。

If we look at it now from the consumer’s point of view, we find that he can buy less with his money. Because he has to pay more for sweaters and other protected goods, he can buy less of everything else. The general purchasing power of his income has therefore been reduced. Whether the net effect of the tariff is to lower money wages or to raise money prices will depend upon the monetary policies that are followed. But what is clear is that the tariff—though it may increase wages above what they would have been in the protected industries—must on net balance, when all occupations are considered, reduce real wages—-reduce them, that is to say, compared with what they otherwise would have been.

倘若我们现在从消费者的角度加以分析的话，我们会发现，用同样多的钱所能买的东西更少了。由于他不得不支付更多钱去买羊毛衫和其他受关税保护的产品，所以能买的其他每一样东西都减少了。消费者收入的整体购买力随之下滑。关税的净效果，到底是降低货币工资，还是提高货币物价，要看当时实行的货币政策。很清楚的一点是，尽管受保护产业的工资水平可能比不受关税保护时要高，若把所有产业都考虑在内的话，和本来应有的整体水平相比较，关税一定会降低实际工资水平。

Only minds corrupted by generations of misleading propaganda can regard this conclusion as paradoxical. What other result could we expect from a policy of deliberately using our resources of capital and manpower in less efficient ways than we know how to use them? What other result could we expect from deliberately erecting artificial obstacles to trade and transportation?

只有遭受一代又一代的误导性宣传腐蚀的大脑才会觉得上述结论仍有争议。资本和人力资源，由于经济政策的影响，被刻意运用在比较缺乏效率的地方，我们还能够期待得到与上面不一样的结果吗？贸易和运输，被刻意设立的人为壁垒所阻碍，我们还能期待有其他不同的结果吗？

For the erection of tariff walls has the same effect as the erection of real walls. It is significant that the protectionists habitually use the language of warfare. They talk of “repelling an invasion” of foreign products. And the means they suggest in the fiscal field are like those of the battlefield. The tariff barriers that are put up to repel this invasion are like the tank traps, trenches and barbed-wire entanglements created to repel or slow down attempted invasion by a foreign army.

设立关税壁垒的效果，跟筑墙挡道没有两样。值得注意的是，贸易保护论者习惯用战争术语，诸如，应该“击退”舶来品的“入侵”。他们在财政上的建议和在战场上所采用的招式一样。设立关税壁垒以击退舶来品的入侵，就像布设坦克陷阱、战壕、铁丝网，用以抵御或延缓敌军的攻势。

And just as the foreign army is compelled to employ more expensive means to surmount those obstacles — bigger tanks, mine detectors, engineer corps to cut wires, ford streams and build bridges—so more expensive and efficient transportation means must be developed to surmount tariff obstacles. On the one hand, we try to reduce the cost of transportation between England and America, or Canada and the United States, by developing faster and more efficient planes and ships, better roads and bridges, better locomotives and motor trucks. On the other hand, we offset this investment in efficient transportation by a tariff that makes it commercially even more difficult to transport goods than it was before. We make it a dollar cheaper to ship the sweaters, and then increase the tariff by two dollars to prevent the sweaters from being shipped. By reducing the freight that can be profitably carried, we reduce the value of the investment in transport efficiency.

就象外国军队要克服这些障碍就得付出更高的代价——部署更大的坦克；使用地雷探测器；派出工兵剪除铁丝网、架桥、抢滩一样，在外贸中要克服关税壁垒，需要加大投入开发更有效率的运输方式。一方面，我们试图通过开发速度更快和效率更高的飞机与船只，投资修筑更好的公路和桥梁，投入使用更好的火车和载货汽车，尽力去降低英国与美国，或是加拿大与美国之间的运输成本；另一方面，我们设立关税，使得从经济效益上看较以往更难运输货物，因为它抵消了我们在高效率运输上的投资。我们降低羊毛衫运输成本1美元，却又增加了2美元的关税而阻止了它的运输。由于减少了本来可以获利的部分运载量，我们减少了运输效率中投资的价值。

5
 
The tariff has been described as a means of benefiting the producer at the expense of the consumer. In a sense this is correct. Those who favor it think only of the interests of the producers immediately benefited by the particular duties involved. They forget the interests of the consumers who are immediately injured by being forced to pay these duties. But it is wrong to think of the tariff issue as if it represented a conflict between the interests of producers as a unit against those of consumers as a unit. It is true that the tariff hurts all consumers as such. It is not true that it benefits all producers as such. On the contrary, as we have just seen, it helps the protected producers at the expense of all other American producers, and particularly of those who have a comparatively large potential export market.

人们把关税当作是以消费者为代价来使生产者获益的一种手段。从某种意义上讲，这话不错。那些主张征收关税的人，只考虑到受关税保护的生产者能立即获得利益，却忽略被迫支付关税的消费者会立即遭受损失。但是，把关税只看成是生产者一方的利益与消费者一方的利益之间的冲突，却是不对的。关税的确让所有的消费者蒙受损失，但它并不使所有的生产者都能从中获益。相反，象我们刚刚看到的，关税只对受保护的生产者有帮助，为此不惜牺牲其他所有的美国生产者：尤其是以那些出口潜力相对较大的生产者利益为代价。

We can perhaps make this last point clearer by an exaggerated example. Suppose we make our tariff wall so high that it becomes absolutely prohibitive, and no imports come in from the outside world at all. Suppose, as a result of this, that the price of sweaters in America goes up only $5. Then American consumers, because they have to pay $5 more for a sweater, will spend on the average five cents less in each of a hundred other American industries. (The figures are chosen merely to illustrate a principle: there will, of course, be no such symmetrical distribution of the loss; moreover, the sweater industry itself will doubtless be hurt because of protection of still other industries. But these complications may be put aside for the moment.)

我们不妨用一个夸张的例子，来使这最后一点更清楚些。假定我们设立的关税壁垒很高，完全是禁止性的，让人根本不可能从国外进口商品。设想一下，作为后果之一，美国羊毛衫售价刚好上涨5美元。消费者购买一件羊毛衫不得不多花5美元，他们将在其他100种行业的产品上平均少花5美分。（选这样的数字，只是为了说明其中原理。实际数字当然不会分布得这么均匀。再者，羊毛衫行业本身也无疑会由于其他行业受保护而受到一些损害。但这些复杂情形可以暂时不考虑。）

Now because foreign industries will find their market in America totally cut off, they will get no dollar exchange, and therefore they will be unable to buy any American goods at all. As a result of this, American industries will suffer in direct proportion to the percentage of their sales previously made abroad. Those that will be most injured, in the first instance, will be such industries as raw cotton producers, copper producers, makers of sewing machines, agricultural machinery, typewriters, commercial airplanes, and so on.

现在，由于外国的某些行业发现他们进入美国市场的途径被完全切断了，他们得不到美元外汇，根本没办法去购买任何美国产品。于是，结果之一，美国产业的受害程度，和以前的出口率成正比。首当其冲的受害者包括，原棉生产者、铜生产商，以及缝纫机、农业机械、打字机、商用飞机等产品的制造商。

A higher tariff wall, which, however, is not prohibitive, will produce the same kind of results as this, but merely to a smaller degree.

就算关税壁垒不是完全禁止性的，仍然会产生同样的结果，只不过损害程度小一些而已。

The effect of a tariff, therefore, is to change the structure of American production. It changes the number of occupations, the kind of occupations, and the relative size of one industry as compared with another. It makes the industries in which we are comparatively inefficient larger, and the industries in which we are comparatively efficient smaller. Its net effect, therefore, is to reduce American efficiency, as well as to reduce efficiency in the countries with which we would otherwise have traded more largely.

因此，关税的作用是改变美国的生产结构。它改变了职业的数目、职业的种类，以及一种产业相对于另一种产业的规模。关税使得相对效率较低的产业规模扩大，相对效率较高的产业规模缩小。因此，其净效果是减低美国的生产效率，同时也减低相应贸易国的生产效率。

In the long run, notwithstanding the mountains of argument pro and con, a tariff is irrelevant to the question of employment. (True, sudden changes in the tariff, either upward or downward, can create temporary unemployment, as they force corresponding changes in the structure of production. Such sudden changes can even cause a depression.) But a tariff is not irrelevant to the question of wages. In the long run it always reduces real wages, because it reduces efficiency, production and wealth.

尽管有成堆的支持和反对的意见，长期而言，关税与就业问题是无关的。的确，突然改变关税，无论调高或是调低，其所引发的产业调整，都会引起暂时的失业率上升，甚至会带来暂时的经济萧条。但是，关税与工资问题却有关系。关税的长期效应一定会使实际工资下降，因为它减低了效率、生产和财富。

Thus all the chief tariff fallacies stem from the central fallacy with which this book is concerned. They are the result of looking only at the immediate effects of a single tariff rate on one group of producers, and forgetting the long-run effects both on consumers as a whole and on all other producers.

由此可知，衍生出关税谬论的核心谬论是本书所要剖析的。也就是，只看单一关税税率对一群制造商造成的立即影响，而忽略了由此对全体消费者和其他所有制造商造成的长期影响。

(I hear some reader asking: “Why not solve this by giving tariff protection to all producers?” But the fallacy here is that this cannot help producers uniformly, and cannot help at all domestic producers who already “outsell” foreign producers: these efficient producers must necessarily suffer from the diversion of purchasing power brought about by the tariff.)

（我曾听到过某些读者提出这样的疑问：“为什么不通过对所有生产者加以关税保护来解决这个问题呢？”这里的错误在于，这样做并不能让所有生产者获得一致的裨益，那些产品销路已经具备国际优势的本国制造商，根本不可能从中获益；关税所导致购买力转向，一定会给那些生产效率高的制造商造成损失。）

6

On the subject of the tariff we must keep in mind one final precaution. It is the same precaution that we found necessary in examining the effects of machinery. It is useless to deny that a tariff does benefit—or at least can benefit—special interests. True, it benefits them at the expense of eveiyone else. But it does benefit them. If one industry alone could get protection, while its owners and workers enjoyed the benefits of free trade in everything else they bought, that industry would benefit, even on net balance. As an attempt is made to extend the tariff blessings, however, even people in the protected industries, both as producers and consum ers, begin to suffer from other people’s protection, and may finally be worse off even on net balance than if neither they nor anybody else had protection.

在关税的问题上，最后我们一定要牢记一件事。这同样是我们在探究机器的影响时发现的必须谨慎的一点。我们毋庸否认，关税确实对特殊利益集团有利，至少有可能有利于特殊利益集团。没错，关税是牺牲其他每个人的利益，来为他们造福。而他们的确得到了好处。如果受关税保护的行业只有一个，当该行业的业主和劳工购买别人的产品时，可以尽享自由贸易的好处，那么该行业将整体受益。但是，如果受关税保护的行业越来越多，最初受保护的行业中人，既包括生产者，也包括消费者，也会开始因为其他人得到保护而受害，最终结果可能在整体上比没有任何人受到保护时还要糟。

But we should not deny, as enthusiastic free traders have so often done, the possibility of these tariff benefits to special groups. We should not pretend, for example, that a reduction of the tariff would help everybody and hurt nobody. It is true that its reduction would help the country on net balance. But somebody would be hurt. Groups previously enjoying high protection would be hurt. That in fact is one reason why it is not good to bring such protected interests into existence in the first place. But clarity and candor of thinking compel us to see and acknowledge that some industries are right when they say that a removal of the tariff on their product would throw them out of business and throw their workers (at least temporarily) out of jobs. And if their workers have developed specialized skills, they may even suffer permanently, or until they have at long last learnt equal skills. In tracing the effects oftariffs, as in tracing the effects of machinery, we should endeavor to see all the chief effects, in both the short run and the long run, on all groups.

但是，我们不应该象那些热烈的自由贸易论者通常所做的那样，否认关税有可能对特殊群体产生利益。比如，我们不能妄想减少关税将有助于所有人，而不会有人受到损害。的确，降低关税对国家整体有益，但是有人会受到伤害，原先享受关税保护的群体将遭受损失。那其实就是根本不应该在一开始就实行这类保护政策的原因之一。但思考的明晰与公正让我们看到与承认，当某些企业呼吁，取消它们的产品关税，会致使工厂倒闭、工人失业（至少暂时如此），他们所言不虚。而且如果其工人已经发展了行业专门技能，他们甚至可能遭受长期的利益损害，或者直到他们最后能掌握别的专门技能为止。我们探究关税的影响时，应与探究机器的影响时相同，我们应该力求认清所有的主要影响，包括短期的以及长期的，对于所有集团的影响。

As a postscript to this chapter I should add that its argument is not directed against all tariffs, including duties collected mainly for revenue, or to keep alive industries needed for war; nor is it directed against all arguments for tariffs. It is merely directed against the fallacy that a tariff on net balance “provides employment,” “raises wages,” or “protects the American standard of living.” It does none of these things; and so far as wages and the standard of living are concerned, it does the precise opposite. But an examination of duties imposed for other purposes would carry us beyond our present subject.

作为本章的结束语，我应当补充说明一点，本章的论点并不在于反对所有类型的关税，包括不反对那些主要为了增加财政收入、或者为了扶持战时需要的产业而征收的关税；也不在于反对开征关税的所有主张。本章只是针对这样一种谬论：关税总体上可以“提供就业机会”、“提高工资”，或者“保障美国人的生活水准”。其实这些事情，它一样都办不到；而且就工资和生活水准来说，关税的作用适得其反。至于对那些为了其他目的而征收的关税，这些话题已经超出了本章的讨论范围。

Nor need we here examine the effect of import quotas, exchange controls, bilateralism and other means of reducing, diverting or preventing international trade. Such devices have, in general, the same effects as high or prohibitive tariffs, and often worse effects. They present more complicated issues, but their net results can be traced through the same kind of reasoning that we have just applied to tariff barriers.

我们无需在这里探讨进口配额、外汇管制、双边互惠，以及其他减低、转移或阻碍进行国际贸易的手段的影响。大体上讲，这些方式具有与高关税或者禁止性关税相同的影响，而且结果往往更糟。它们导致了更为复杂的问题，而运用我们在分析关税壁垒问题时所采取的推理过程，我们可以认识到这些政策的最终效果。

Economics in One Lesson校译之11. Who’s “Protected” by Tariffs? (6-1,2,3)

Who’s “Protected” by Tariffs?

第11章 关税“保护”了哪些人？
 
A MERE RECITAL of the economic policies of governments all over the world is calculated to cause any serious student of economics to throw up his hands in despair. What possible point can there be, he is likely to ask, in discussing refinements and advances in economic theory, when popular thought and the actual policies of governments, certainly in everything connected with international relations, have not yet caught up with Adam Smith? For present-day tariff and trade policies are not only as bad as those in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but incomparably worse. The real reasons for those tariffs and other trade barriers are the same, and the pretended reasons are also the same.

我们若只是单单叙述世界各国的经济政策，很可能会使得每个认真学习经济学的学生垂头丧气。同学们可能会问：当今任何与国际关系相联系的流行的思想和政府的实际政策，还没有什么能赶得上亚当•斯密的时候，我们还来讨论经济理论的改良和发展，有什么意义呢？如今的关税和贸易政策之糟糕，比起17世纪、18世纪时的政策有过之而无不及。开征关税和设立贸易壁垒的真正原因相同，当局者所搬出的理由也相同。

Since The Wealth of Nations appeared more than two centuries ago, the case for free trade has been stated thousands of times, but perhaps never with more direct simplicity and force than it was stated in that volume. In general Smith rested his case on one fundamental proposition: “In every country it always is and must be the interest of the great body of the people to buy whatever they want of those who sell it cheapest.” “The proposition is so very manifest,” Smith continued, “that it seems ridiculous to take any pains to prove it; nor could it ever have been called in question, had not the interested sophistry of merchants and manufacturers confounded the common-sense of mankind.”

自《国富论》问世两个多世纪以来，自由贸易论已经被阐述过无数次，但都不如《国富论》讲得那么简捷有力。亚当•斯密的立论大致基于这样一个基本命题：“在任何国家，人民大众的利益总在于而且必然在于，向售价最便宜的人购买他们所需要的各种物品。”他接着说道，“这个命题不证自明，费心思去证明它，倒是一件滑稽的事情；如果没有这班进出口商和制造商自私自利的诡辩混淆了人们的常识，也不会有人去质疑它。”

From another point of view, free trade was considered as one aspect of the specialization of labor:

从另一个角度来看，自由贸易可以被视为专业分工的一个方面：

It is the maxim of every prudent master of a family, never to attempt to make at home what it will cost him more to make than to buy.

The tailor does not attempt to make his own shoes, but buys them of the shoemaker. The shoemaker does not attempt to make his own clothes, but employs a tailor. The farmer attempts to make neither the one nor the other, but employs those different artificers. All of them find it for their interest to employ their whole industry in a way in which they have some advantage over their neighbors, and to purchase with a part of its produce, or what is the same thing, with the price of a part of it, whatever else they have occasion for. What is prudence in the conduct of every private family can scarce be folly in that of a great kingdom.

每一位精明的家长都知道的一句格言是，当自己制作比购买成品开销更大的时候，就永远不要自家动手做。裁缝不会自家做鞋子穿，而是向鞋匠购买。鞋匠不会自家缝衣服穿，而是请裁缝代劳。农夫既不会去做衣服也不会去做鞋子，而是雇用不同的工匠。他们全都发现，符合他们自身利益的是，他们应集中生产精力于与其邻居相比而存在着相对优势的地方，用部分自己的产品去购买，或者换个说法，用其产品价格的一部分，去购买他们所需要的其它东西。在每一个家庭的管理中是精明的举措，用于一个大国的管理中，很少会是错的。

But whatever led people to suppose that what was prudence in the conduct of every private family could be folly in that of a great kingdom? It was a whole network of fallacies, out of which mankind has still been unable to cut its way. And the chief of them was the central fallacy with which this book is concerned. It was that of considering merely the immediate effects of a tariff on special groups, and neglecting to consider its long run effects on the whole community.

然而，到底是什么使人们认为，在每一个家庭的管理中是精明的举措，用于一个大国的管理中，就可能是错的呢？这又是一张不容易梳理清楚的谬论网，而人类至今尚未能冲破它的羁绊。不过，其中的中心谬论则是本书要剖析的，即仅仅考虑了关税对特殊群体产生的立即影响，而忽略了考察关税对整个社会的长远影响。
 
2
 
An American manufacturer of woolen sweaters goes to Congress or to the State Department and tells the committee or officials concerned that it would be a national disaster for them to remove or reduce the tariff on British sweaters. He now sells his sweaters for $30 each, but English manufacturers could sell their sweaters of the same quality for $25. A duty of $5, therefore, is needed to keep him in business. He is not thinking of himself, of course, but of the thousand men and women he employs, and of the people to whom their spending in turn gives employment. Throw them out of work, and you create unemployment and a fall in purchasing power, which would spread in ever-widening circles. And if he can prove that he really would be forced out of business if the tariff were removed or reduced, his argument against that action is regarded by Congress as conclusive.

美国一家羊毛衫制造商，跑到国会或者政府部门向相关的委员会或者官员表示担忧，说对英国羊毛衫减免进口关税，会给国家带来灾难。现在，他的羊毛衫售价每件30美元，但是同样品质的英国羊毛衫的售价仅为25美元。因此，要使他可以持续经营，就必须征收这5美元关税。不消说，他声称此举并非只顾自己，而是替他雇用的成千男女员工着想，替服务于这些员工的更多人着想。任由这些人丢掉饭碗，失业率会上升，购买力会下降，负面影响会像涟漪一样往外扩散。要是这个制造商能够拿出确凿的证据，证明减免关税定会使他倒闭出局，国会肯定认为他的反对意见无可辩驳。

But the fallacy comes from looking merely at this manufacturer and his employees, or merely at the American sweater industry. It comes from noticing only the results that are immediately seen, and neglecting the results that are not seen because they are prevented from coming into existence.

然而，这里的谬误出在只看这家制造商和他的员工，或者只顾及美国羊毛衫业。这种谬误源自只注意看得见的立即结果，而忽略了那些被剥夺了出现机会而看不见的结果。

The lobbyists for tariff protection are continually putting forward arguments that are not factually correct. But let us assume that the facts in this case are precisely as the sweater manufacturer has stated them. Let us assume that a tariff of $5 a sweater is necessary for him to stay in business and provide employment at sweater-making for his workers.

向国会进行游说的人为求得关税保护，不断用与事实不尽相符证据进行申辩。然而，我们权且假设那家羊毛衫制造商以上所述的就是事实，假设为了使得它能在这个行业中继续维持下去，并能继续为现有员工提供工作机会，征收5美元的关税是必要的。

We have deliberately chosen the most unfavorable example of any for the removal of a tariff. We have not taken an argument for the imposition of a new tariff in order to bring a new industry into existence, but an argument for the retention of a tariff that has already brought an industry into existence, and cannot be repealed without hurting somebody.

我们刻意选择撤消关税这种最棘手的例子来做说明。我们没有讨论为了创造新的产业而设立新的关税这种情况，而是就维持业已保护一个行业能够存在的关税，同时撤消它又必然会伤害到一些人的既得利益的情况展开讨论。

The tariff is repealed; the manufacturer goes out of business; a thousand workers are laid off; the particular tradesmen whom they patronized are hurt. This is the immediate result that is seen. But there are also results which, while much more difficult to trace, are no less immediate and no less real. For now sweaters that formerly cost retail $30 apiece can be bought for $25. Consumers can now buy the same quality of sweater for less money, or a much better one for the same money. If they buy the same quality of sweater, they not only get the sweater, but they have $5 left over, which they would not have had under the previous conditions, to buy something else. With the $25 that they pay for the imported sweater they help employment—as the American manufacturer no doubt predicted — in the sweater industry in England. With the $5 left over they help employment in any number of other industries in the United States.

该项关税被取消了；那位制造商破了产；成千员工被遣散；靠这群人发财的商家直接遭受损失。这是看得到的立即结果。但还有一些结果，虽然追踪起来很困难，但同样直接同样真实。以往30美元一件的羊毛衫现在只卖25美元，消费者花更少的钱，就能买到同等品质的羊毛衫，或者花同样多的钱，能买到一件品质更好的羊毛衫。如果他们买到了同质的羊毛衫，那么他们不仅有羊毛衫穿，省下的5美元还可以拿去买别的东西。消费者掏25美元买进口货，是在促进英国羊毛衫业的就业，这也是那个美国制造商为我们所断言的那样。而消费者省下的5美元，则会促进美国其它产业的就业。

But the results do not end there. By buying English sweaters they furnish the English with dollars to buy American goods here. This, in fact (if I may here disregard such complications as fluctuating exchange rates, loans, credits, etc.) is the only way in which the British can eventually make use of these dollars. Because we have permitted the British to sell more to us, they are now able to buy more from tis. They are, in fact, eventually forced to buy more from us if their dollar balances are not to remain perpetually unused. So as a result of letting in more British goods, we must export more American goods. And though fewer people are now employed in the American sweater industry, more people are employed—and much more efficiently employed—in, say, the American washing-machine or aircraft-building business. American employment on net balance has not gone down, but American and British production on net balance has gone up. Labor in each country is more fully employed in doing just those things that it does best, instead of being forced to do things that it does inefficiently or badly. Consumers in both countries are better off. They are able to buy what they want where they can get it cheapest. American consumers are better provided with sweaters, and British consumers are better provided with washing machines and aircraft.

不过，由此带来的结果还不止这些。通过购买英国的羊毛衫，他们向英国人提供了美元，从而使得英国人可以拿这些美元去购买美国产品。事实上，英国人手上的美元最终只有拿去购买美国产品（这里暂且忽略汇率波动、贷款、信用等复杂因素）。由于关税减免，英国人得以出售更多的产品给我们，现在他们才有能力从美国买更多的产品。事实上，美元最终只能用来买美国产品，除非外国人持有美元永远不用。因此，作为允许进口更多英国产品的结果，是我们必然出口更多的美国产品。尽管美国羊毛衫业中就业的人数减少了，但更多人得以被其他行业雇用，而且是更有效率地雇用，例如洗衣机或飞机制造业。美国总的就业率并未下降，但是美国和英国的整体生产却增加了。两国的劳动力资源都充分流向了各自的优势产业，而不必继续窝在缺乏效率或者成果差的产业里。两国的消费者都得到了实惠。他们可以买到最便宜的产品。美国的消费者能买更多的羊毛衫，英国消费者可以得到更多的洗衣机和飞机。

3

Now let us look at the matter the other way round, and see the effect of imposing a tariff in the first place. Suppose that there had been no tariff on foreign knit goods, that Americans were accustomed to buying foreign sweaters without duty, and that the argument were then put forward that we could bring a sweater industry into existence by imposing a duty of $5 on sweaters.

现在，让我们换个角度来看一下这个问题，看看新开征一种关税会带来的影响。假设美国对进口针织品还不曾征收关税，美国人已经习惯购买售价不含关税的进口羊毛衫。现在，有种论调说：我们可以通过对进口羊毛衫征收5美元的关税来催生国产羊毛衫制造业。

There would be nothing logically wrong with this argument so far as it went. The cost of British sweaters to the American consumer might thereby be forced so high that American manufacturers would find it profitable to enter the sweater business. But American consumers would be forced to subsidize this industry. On every American sweater they bought they would be forced in effect to pay a tax of $5 which would be collected from them in a higher price by the new sweater industry.

这种论调本身逻辑并没有什么问题。关税抬高了英国羊毛衫在美国的售价，使得美国厂商进入羊毛衫行业有利可图。然而，美国消费者将被迫补贴这个产业。他们每买一件国产羊毛衫，事实上就等于被迫缴纳5美元的税，这体现为新羊毛衫产业的较高价格。

Americans would be employed in a sweater industry who had not previously been employed in a sweater industry. That much is true. But there would be no net addition to the country’s industry or the country’s employment. Because the American consumer had to pay $5 more for the same quality of sweater he would have just that much less left over to buy anything else. He would have to reduce his expenditures by $5 somewhere else. In order that one industry might grow or come into existence, a hundred other industries would have to shrink. In order that 50,000 persons might be employed in a woolen sweater industry, 50,000 fewer persons would be employed elsewhere.

一些原来并不受雇于羊毛衫产业的美国人现在改入这一行，这当然是事实。但是整个国家的从业人数或就业机会并无任何净增长。由于消费者不得不多花5美元去购买同品质的羊毛衫，可用于购买其他产品的钱就少了5美元。他将不得不因此缩减相应的开支。为了使一个产业发展或生存而开征关税，很多其他产业将不得不萎缩。为了让50 000人能够受雇于羊毛衫产业而开征关税，其他产业的从业人数将不得不因此损失50 000人。

But the new industry would be visible. The number of its employees, the capital invested in it, the market value of its product in terms of dollars, could be easily counted. The neighbors could see the sweater workers going to and from the factory every day. The results would be palpable and direct. But the shrinkage of a hundred other industries, the loss of 50,000 other jobs somewhere else, would not be so easily noticed. it would be impossible for even the cleverest statistician to know precisely what the incidence of the loss of other jobs had been—precisely how many men and women had been laid off from each particular industry, precisely how much business each particular industry had lost—because consumers had to pay more for their sweaters. For a loss spread among all the other productive activities of the country would be comparatively minute for each. It would be impossible for anyone to know precisely how each consumer would have spent his extra $5 if he had been allowed to retain it. The overwhelming majority of the people, therefore, would probably suffer from the illusion that the new industry had cost us nothing.

然而，新产业是容易看得见的。其从业人数、投入的资本、产品市场规模，测评起来都很容易。邻居们每天都能看见羊毛衫厂的工人上下班。这些结果直接并且明显。但是，许多其他产业的萎缩、及其损失的50 000个工作机会，却不是能够很容易被觉察到的。即使是对最聪明的统计专家来讲，要确切地了解因为消费者不得不在羊毛衫上多花一些钱而给其他产业造成的损失——确切地知道有多少男女工人被某一个别的行业所解雇，确切地知道每一个行业所丢掉的生意——也是不可能的。因为损失被分摊到了美国其他所有生产活动中，人们一时很难看出某种生产活动承受损失前后的明显差别。要知道倘使那5美元可以被留下来，每个消费者原本会怎么花掉它是不可能的。因此，绝大多数人都可能会罹患此种错觉，以为新产业并没有使他们付出任何代价。

（未完待续）