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November 29, 2008 - Posts

Economics in One Lesson校译之2. The Broken Window

The Lesson Applied
The Broken Window

第二编 课程的应用

第2章 破橱窗

Let us begin with the simplest illustration possible: let us, emulating Bastiat, choose a broken pane of glass.

让我们从一个有可能是最简单的例证入手;我们来效仿法国经济学家巴斯夏,从一面被砸破的橱窗讲起。

A young hoodlum, say, heaves a brick through the window of a baker’s shop. The shopkeeper runs out furious, but the boy is gone. A crowd gathers, and begins to stare with quiet satisfaction at the gaping hole in the window and the shattered glass over the bread and pies. After a while the crowd feels the need for philosophic reflection. And several of its members are almost certain to remind each other or the baker that, after all, the misfortune has its bright side. It will make business for some glazier. As they begin to think of this they elaborate upon it. How much does a new plate glass window cost? Two hundred and fifty dollars? That will be quite a sum. After all, if windows were never broken, what would happen to the glass business? Then, of course, the thing is endless. The glazier will have $250 more to spend with other merchants, and these in turn will have $250 more to spend with still other merchants, and so ad infinitum. The smashed window will go on providing money and employment in ever-widening circles. The logical conclusion from all this would be, if the crowd drew it, that the little hoodlum who threw the brick, far from being a public menace, was a public benefactor.

话说一个顽童抡起砖头,砸破了面包店的橱窗。当店主怒气冲冲追出来时,小捣蛋已经溜得没了踪影。看闹热的人围拢了过来,幸灾乐祸地盯着橱窗的窟窿以及散落在面包和馅饼上的玻璃碎片。不一会儿这个人群就会进行哲理思辩,其中必然有人开始用祸福相依的哲理宽慰起众人或者店主的心:玻璃破了很是可惜,可是这也有好的一面。这不,对面的玻璃店又有生意了。一副新的橱窗需要多少钱?要250美元?!这笔钱可不算少。话又说回来,要是玻璃永远都不破,那装玻璃的人吃啥。他们越琢磨越来劲。玻璃店多了250美元,会去别的商家那里消费,那些个商家的口袋里多了250美元,又会向更多的商家买东西,这样下去以至无穷。经这么一说,小小一片破橱窗,竟能够连环不断提供资金给很多商家,使很多人获得就业机会。要是照这个逻辑推下去,结论便是:扔砖头的那个小捣蛋,不但不是社区的祸害,反而是造福社区的善人。

Now let us take another look. The crowd is at least right in its first conclusion. This little act of vandalism will in the first instance mean more business for some glazier. The glazier will be no more unhappy to learn of the incident than an undertaker to learn of a death. But the shopkeeper will be out $250 that he was planning to spend for a new suit. Because he has had to replace a window, he will have to go without the suit (or some equivalent need or luxury). Instead of having a window and $250 he now has merely a window. Or, as he was planning to buy the suit that very afternoon, instead of having both a window and a suit he must be content with the window and no suit. If we think of him as a part of the community, the community has lost a new suit that might otherwise have come into being, and is just that much poorer.

且慢!让我们来分析其中的谬误。至少围观者所作的第一个结论没错,这件小小的破坏行为,首先会给某家玻璃店带来生意。玻璃店主对这起捣蛋事件除了略表同情之外,高兴程度不亚于棺材店老板获知新的死亡事件。但是,面包店主损失掉的250美元,原本是打算拿去做一套西装的。如今,这钱被迫挪去补破窗,出门就穿不成新西装(或者少了同等价钱的其他日用品或奢侈品)。他本来有一副橱窗再加250美元,现在只剩下一副橱窗。或者说,在准备去做西装的那个下午,他本来可以心满意足同时拥有橱窗和西装,结果却只能面对有了橱窗就没了西装的糟糕现实。如果我们把他当作社区的一员,那么这个社区就损失了一套原本会有的新西装,那就是精确的社区财富减少程度。

The glazier’s gain of business, in short, is merely the tailor’s loss of business. No new “employment” has been added. The people in the crowd were thinking only of two parties to the transaction, the baker and the glazier. They had forgotten the potential third party involved, the tailor. They forgot him precisely because he will not now enter the scene. They will see the new window in the next day or two. They will never see the extra suit, precisely because it will never be made. They see only what is immediately visible to the eye.

总之,玻璃店主的这桩生意,不过是从做西装的缝纫店主那里转移来的。整个过程并没有新增“就业机会”。那些围观的人只想到了交易中的两个当事人,即面包店主和玻璃店主。他们却忘记了可能涉及的第三方,即缝纫店主。他们之所以忘记了他,恰恰是因为现在玻璃碎了,他也就失掉了亮相的机会。人们过两天就会看到多出一副新橱窗,但绝不会看到多出一套新西装,因为那套西装根本就不会被做出来。人们总是只看到眼前所见的东西。

Economics in One Lesson校译之1. The Lesson

PART ONE: THE LESSON 

The Lesson 

第一编 主旨
第1章 关于这堂课

Economics is haunted by more fallacies than any other study known to man. This is no accident. The inherent difficulties of the subject would be great enough in any case, but they are multiplied a thousandfold by a factor that is insignificant in, say, physics, mathematics or medicine-the special pleading of selfish interests. While every group has certain economic interests identical with those of all groups, every group has also, as we shall see, interests antagonistic to those of all other groups. While certain public policies would in the long run benefit everybody, other policies would benefit one group only at the expense of all other groups. The group that would benefit by such policies, having such a direct interest in them, will argue for them plausibly and persistently. It will hire the best buyable minds to devote their whole time to presenting its case. And it will finally either convince the general public that its case is sound, or so befuddle it that clear thinking on the subject becomes next to impossible.

在人类所知领域中,经济学总是被更多的谬误所困扰。这决非出于偶然。这门学科内在的难度原本就高,再加上人类好为追求私利掩饰辩护,对于物理学、数学、医学等其他学科而言,这种倾向无关紧要,但在经济学就把问题无数倍地复杂化了。我们将在本书中看到,尽管每个群体都有某些经济利益和所有群体的完全一致,但各自又都存在着与其他不同群体的利益相抵触的利益关系。尽管有一些公共政策从长远来看对所有人都有利,但其它的政策却是以牺牲其他群体的利益为代价来维护某些群体的利益。能够从那些政策直接获利的群体,会在利益的驱使下不遗余力地主张积极实施相关政策。他们会雇来花钱所能雇到的最好的专家来全力宣扬有利于他们的学说。这样做的结果,要不会让大众信以为真,也会让大众稀里糊涂,以至于接下来对经济科学几乎再也无法做清晰地思考。

In addition to these endless pleadings of self-interest, there is a second main factor that spawns new economic fallacies every day. This is the persistent tendency of men to see only the immediate effects of a given policy, or its effects only on a special group, and to neglect to inquire what the long-run effects of that policy will be not only on that special group but on all groups. It is the fallacy of overlooking secondary consequences.

除去这些无休无止对私人利益的辩护,还有另一个重要因素导致新的经济学谬误每天都在产生。那就是:人们有着天生短视的倾向,总是只关注某项政策的即时影响,或者只关注政策对某个特殊群体产生的影响,而不去探究那项政策对所有群体造成的长远影响。这本身就是忽略种种续发后果的谬误。

In this lies the whole difference between good economics and bad. The bad economist sees only what immediately strikes the eye; the good economist also looks beyond. The bad economist sees only the direct consequences of a proposed course; the good economist looks also at the longer and indirect consequences. The bad economist sees only what the effect of a given policy has been or will be on one particular group; the good economist inquires also what the effect of the policy will be on all groups.

好经济学与坏经济学之间的全部区别就在于此。坏经济学家只顾及眼前所见的利弊得失,而好经济学家则看得更远;坏经济学家只观察经济政策提案中的行动产生的直接结果,好经济学家还会考察更长远的间接结果;坏经济学家只关注某项政策对某个特殊群体已经产生或者即将产生的影响,好经济学家还会去探究该政策对所有群体产生的影响。

The distinction may seem obvious. The precaution of looking for all the consequences of a given policy to everyone may seem elementary. Doesn’t everybody know, in his personal life, that there are all sorts of indulgences delightful at the moment but disastrous in the end? Doesn’t every little boy know that if he eats enough candy he will get sick? Doesn’t the fellow who gets drunk know that he will wake up next morning with a ghastly stomach and a horrible head? Doesn’t the dipsomaniac know that he is ruining his liver and shortening his life? Doesn’t the Don Juan know that he is letting himself in for every sort of risk, from blackmail to disease? Finally, to bring it to the economic though still personal realm, do not the idler and the spendthrift know, even in the midst of their glorious fling, that they are heading for a future of debt and poverty?

两者的区别似乎显而易见,尽可能地探讨某项政策对每个人可能产生的所有影响,似乎应该是起码的常识。难道大家不知道,居家过日子的时候,贪图一时的纵欲享受往往会招致不幸的后果吗?每个小孩不都知道糖吃得太多会恶心不舒服吗?喝醉酒的人不都知道次日晨起之后必定胃灼头痛吗?酗酒成瘾的人不都知道狂饮烂醉会损肝折寿吗?风流成性的人不都知道纵欲贪欢劳命伤财,还容易患上性病吗?回头看看个人生活中的经济问题,游手好闲的懒汉和尽情挥霍的败家子在放纵自己时,不也知道他们是在走向负债与贫困吗?

Yet when we enter the field of public economics, these elementary truths are ignored. There are men regarded today as brilliant economists, who deprecate saving and recommend squandering on a national scale as the way of economic salvation; and when anyone points to what the consequences of these policies will be in the long run, they reply flippantly, as might the prodigal son of a warning father: “In the long run we are all dead.” And such shallow wisecracks pass as devastating epigrams and the ripest wisdom.

然而,当我们踏进公共经济学的领域时,这些起码的常识却往往被人忘得一干二净。有些被认为是当今杰出经济学家的人抨击储蓄,他们把全国性的铺张浪费推崇为拯救经济的途径。当有人质疑这些政策的长期后果究竟会如何时,他们却像败家子对待严父的告诫,俏皮地答道:“何必看得那么远呢?要知道从长远来看,我们都是要死的。”此种戏言,却被人当作至理名言和最成熟的智慧而流传下来。

But the tragedy is that, on the contrary, we are already suffering the long-run consequences of the policies of the remote or recent past. Today is already the tomorrow which the bad economist yesterday urged us to ignore. The long-run consequences of some economic policies may become evident in a few months. Others may not become evident for several years. Still others may not become evident for decades. But in every case those long-run consequences are contained in the policy as surely as the hen was in the egg, the flower in the seed.

相反很不幸的是,我们已经在承受或远或近的过去实施的政策所带来的长期影响了。坏经济学家昨天要我们置之不理的明天,转眼就成了今天。有些经济政策的长期影响,可能不出几个月就会露出弊端;有些政策产生的后果,也许需要好几年之后才会显现;还有些政策,其后遗症甚至要潜伏数十年才会爆发。这些长远影响蕴含在这些政策之中,这是确定无疑的,就像小鸡孕育于鸡蛋之中,花朵孕育于种子之中一样。

From this aspect, therefore, the whole of economics can be reduced to a single lesson, and that lesson can be reduced to a single sentence. The art of economics consists in looking not merely at the immediate but at the longer effects of any act or policy; it consists in tracing the consequences of that policy not merely for one group but for all groups.

因此,从这个角度来看,整个经济学的研究可以简化为一堂课,这堂课又可以归纳成一句话:经济学的艺术,在于不仅要观察任何法案或政策的即期效果,更要考察比较长远的影响;不仅要关注政策给某一群体带来的后果,更要追踪给所有群体造成的后果。

2

Nine-tenths of the economic fallacies that are working such dreadful harm in the world today are the result of ignoring this lesson. Those fallacies all stem from one of two central fallacies, or both: that of looking only at the immediate consequences of an act or proposal, and that of looking at the consequences only for a particular group to the neglect of other groups.

那些给当今世界带来严重危害的经济学谬误,十有八九是忽视这常识的一课的结果。那些谬误全都植根于两个中心谬误之一,或者兼而有之:一是只注意经济法案或提案的短期后果,二是只关注其对于某一特殊群体的影响而忽略了其他群体。

It is true, of course, that the opposite error is possible. In considering a policy we ought not to concentrate only on its long-run results to the community as a whole. This is the error often made by the classical economists. It resulted in a certain callousness toward the fate of groups that were immediately hurt by policies or developments which proved to be beneficial on net balance and in the long run.

当然,与其相反的错误也是可能有的。在考虑一项政策时,我们不应该只顾其对社会整体的长期效应。此类错误常常来自古典经济学家,那些被证明为在长期中有净利益的经济政策,往往会立即伤害到一些人的利益,而上述错误思想往往会导致一种对这些人的命运冷淡无情的态度。

But comparatively few people today make this error; and those few consist mainly of professional economists. The most frequent fallacy by far today, the fallacy that emerges again and again in nearly every conversation that touches on economic affairs, the error of a thousand political speeches, the central sophism of the new economics, is to concentrate on the short-run effects of policies on special groups and to ignore or belittle the long-run effects on the community as a whole. The “new” economists flatter themselves that this is a great, almost a revolutionary advance over the methods of the “classical” or “orthodox,” economists, because the former take into consideration short-run effects which the latter often ignored. But in themselves ignoring or slighting the long-run effects, they are making the far more serious error. They overlook the woods in their precise and minute examination of particular trees. Their methods and conclusions are often profoundly reactionary. They are sometimes surprised to find themselves in accord with seventeenth-century mercantilism. They fall, in fact, into all the ancient errors (or would, if they were not so inconsistent) that the classical economists, we had hoped, had once and for all got rid of.

但在今天犯此类错误的,相比而言仅属少数,并且大多是一些专业经济学家。当今最为盛行的那些谬误,在涉及经济事务的每次探讨中反反复复暴露出来的那些谬误、无数政治演讲中的错误、以及新经济学中核心的似是而非的论点,便是只重视政策对于特殊集团产生的短期效果,而忽略或淡化其对整个社会的长远影响。“新”经济学家们自认为这是超越“古典”、“正统”经济学家思想方法一次伟大 的、甚至是革命的进步,因为他们考虑到了昔日为经济学家们所忽视的短期效应。然而,他们自己却因为忽略或轻视长期影响,而犯下了更严重的错误。他们只对某些个别的树木作了精确细致地考验,却忽略了整片森林。他们使用的方法和得到的结论经常是倒行逆施,以至于有时会惊讶地发现自己竟和17世纪的重商主义不谋而合。事实上,他们陷入了(或者是如果他们寻求逻辑自洽的话,必定会陷入)古老的谬误之中,而这些谬误,我们过去以为传统经济学家早已根除掉了。

3

It is often sadly remarked that the bad economists present their errors to the public better than the good economists present their truths. It is often complained that demagogues can be more plausible in putting forward economic nonsense from the platform than the honest men who try to show what is wrong with it. But the basic reason for this ought not to be mysterious. The reason is that the demagogues and bad economists are presenting half-truths. They are speaking only of the immediate effect of a proposed policy or its effect upon a single group. As far as they go they may often be right. In these cases the answer consists in showing that the proposed policy would also have longer and less desirable effects, or that it could benefit one group only at the expense of all other groups. The answer consists in supplementing and correcting the half-truth with the other half. But to consider all the chief effects of a proposed course on everybody often requires a long, complicated, and dull chain of reasoning. Most of the audience finds this chain of reasoning difficult to follow and soon becomes bored and inattentive. The bad economists rationalize this intellectual debility and laziness by assuring the audience that it need not even attempt to follow the reasoning or judge it on its merits because it is only “classicism” or “laissez faire” or “capitalist apologetics” or whatever other term of abuse may happen to strike them as effective.

常有人感叹说,坏经济学家向大众兜售谬论,往往比好经济学家宣扬真理更动听。常有人抱怨说,蛊惑人心者鼓吹经济谬论时,总是比那些点出问题要害的诚实的人更能获得大众的欢呼喝彩。这其中并没有什么奥妙:煽动家和坏经济学家,都只强调了一半的真相。他们只谈某项政策提案的即时影响,或者只谈其对某个特殊群体的影响。仅就他们所关注的东西而论,也往往是言之成理。在这种情况下,我们只需要站出来,指出政策提案也会带来长远的不良影响,或者指明这是牺牲其他一切群体的利益去满足某个特殊群体。也就是说,我们必须用另一半的事实,来补足和矫正他们所强调的半边真相。不过,要想阐明某一方案对于每个人的全部主要影响,往往需要进行冗长、复杂而无趣的推理。大多数听众总是怕听长篇大论,很快就会厌烦和不专心。坏经济学家利用了听众理性上的懒惰与低能,指出这些答案只不过是“古典主义”、“自由放任主义”、“资本主义的辩护术”、甚至其它认为有效的攻击污蔑之词,使听众相信根本没有必要去进行那样的推导与综合判断是非优劣。

We have stated the nature of the lesson, and of the fallacies that stand in its way, in abstract terms. But the lesson will not be driven home, and the fallacies will continue to go unrecognized, unless both are illustrated by examples. Through these examples we can move from the most elementary problems in economics to the most complex and difficult. Through them we can learn to detect and avoid first the crudest and most palpable fallacies and finally some of the most sophisticated and elusive. To that task we shall now proceed.

以上,我们用抽象的语言陈述了这一课的本质,及其所针对的谬误的性质。但是,如果我们不给出一些实例,并加以说明,读者将不能很好地理解这一课的真正含义,公众也将继续被那些盛行谬误所蒙蔽。我们会利用经济生活中的实例,从经济学中最基本的问题讲起,一直讲到最复杂最艰深的问题。我们会借助这些例证,先学会如何察觉和避开那些最粗浅最明显的谬误,直至学会发现和避开那些最复杂最难以捉摸的谬误。这些正是接下来要讲的内容。

Economics in One Lesson校译之PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

Preface to the First Edition 

第一版序

This book is an analysis of economic fallacies that are at last so prevalent that they have almost become a new orthodoxy. The one thing that has prevented this has been their own self-contradictions, which have scattered those who accept the same premises into a hundred different “schools,” for the simple reason that it is impossible in matters touching practical life to be consistently wrong. But the difference between one new school and another is merely that one group wakes up earlier than another to the absurdities to which its false premises are driving it, and becomes at that moment inconsistent by either unwittingly abandoning its false premises or accepting conclusions from them less disturbing or fantastic than those that logic would demand. 

本书在于分析那些盛行到几乎成为新的正统学说的经济学谬误。阻碍它们成为正统学说的一个因素,在于这些谬误本身自相矛盾,让接受同样前提的学者各执一端形成百家争鸣的“学派”。道理很简单,跟现实相联系的问题,是不可能一直错下去的。一个新兴学派与另一个的区别无非就是一群人比另一群人更早地认识到基于错误前提所进行的推导多么荒谬,那一刻,由于是无意间放弃了错误的前提,或是由于接受了相对于其内在逻辑所推导出的不那么诡异与令人难以接受的结论,那样的推导已经不自洽了。


There is not a major government in the world at this moment, however, whose economic policies are not influenced if they are not almost wholly determined by acceptance of some of these fallacies. Perhaps the shortest and surest way to an understanding of economics is through a dissection of such errors, and particularly of the central error from which they stem. That is the assumption of this volume and of its somewhat ambitious and belligerent title.

然而,当今主要国家的政府所采取的经济政策,即便不是全部被那些盛行的经济学谬误所左右,也必然都受到了那些经济谬误的深刻影响。所以,剖析这些谬误,尤其是衍生出这些谬误的核心谬误,也许是了解经济学的最简捷且最可靠的方法。本书的构思,以及看上去多少有些雄心勃勃与挑战意味的书名,正是来源于这个信念。

The volume is therefore primarily one of exposition. It makes no claim to originality with regard to any of the chief ideas that it expounds. Rather its effort is to show that many of the ideas which now pass for brilliant innovations and advances are in fact mere revivals of ancient errors, and a further proof of the dictum that those who are ignorant of the past are condemned to repeat it.

本书属于阐释性质。本书所阐述的主要观点,皆非原创。相反,本书将致力于揭示,当今许多被看作是卓越的创新和发展的观点只不过是换了新马甲的古老谬误,进而印证“忘记历史,就意味着重蹈覆辙”这句格言。

The present essay itself is, I suppose, unblushingly “classical,” “traditional” and “orthodox”; at least these are the epithets with which those whose sophisms are here subjected to analysis will no doubt attempt to dismiss it. But the student whose aim is to attain as much truth as possible will not be frightened by such adjectives. He will not be forever seeking a revolution, a “fresh start,” in economic thought. His mind will, of course, be as receptive to new ideas as to old ones; but he will be content to put aside merely restless or exhibitionistic straining for novelty and originality. As Morris R. Cohen has remarked *: “The notion that we can dismiss the views of all previous thinkers surely leaves no basis for the hope that our own work will prove of any value to others.”

本书的内容,我觉得,应当算是“古典的”、“传统的”或“正统的”吧,起码,抱持那些谬误的人会用这些名义来否定我的分析。但是那些努力探求真理的学生,则不应该被几个形容词吓住。学生们不应该总想着寻找革命性的、“全新”的经济学思想,他们应该是既接纳老观念,又欢迎新观念,应该摒弃浮躁而不是好炫求酷,一味地追寻新奇和原创。莫里斯·科恩(Morris R. Cohen)说过:“如果说我们能够推翻以前所有思想家的理论,那么我也不敢奢望自己的作品对别人会有任何价值。”[footnotes:《理性与本质》(Reason and Nature), 1931]

Because this is a work of exposition I have availed myself freely and without detailed acknowledgment (except for rare footnotes and quotations) of the ideas of others. This is inevitable when one writes in a field in which many of the world’s finest minds have labored. But my indebtedness to at least three writers is of so specific a nature that I cannot allow it to pass unmentioned. My greatest debt, with respect to the kind of expository framework on which the present argument is hung, is to Frederic Bastiat’s essay Ce qu `on voit et ce qu’on ne voit pas, now nearly a century old. The present work may, in fact, be regarded as a modernization, extension and generalization of the approach found in Bastiat’s pamphlet. My second debt is to Philip Wicksteed: in particular the chapters on wages and the final summary chapter owe much to his Common-sense of Political Economy. My third debt is to Ludwig von Mises. Passing over everything that this elementary treatise may owe to his writings in general, my most specific debt is to his exposition of the manner in which the process of monetary inflation is spread.

由于这是一部阐释性著作,我会自由地利用他人的观点而不必作具体说明(除了少数脚注和引文外)。在经济学这个诸多先贤辛勤耕耘过的领域写作,这样做在所难免。不过,有三位作者对我有特别的帮助,我不能不提及。首先要感谢弗雷德里克·巴斯夏(Frederic Bastiat),本书中的阐释所采用的框架得益于巴斯夏一百年前发表的文章<看得见的与看不见的>(Ce qu’on voit et ce qu’on ne voit pas)。事实上,本书可视为巴斯夏原文所用的分析方法的现代版,是其延伸和扩展。其次,要感谢菲利普·威克斯第德(Philip Wicksteed),特别是关于工资的章节和课后温习那一章,多得益于他所著的《政治经济常识》(The Common Sense of Political Economy)。最后要感谢路德维希·米塞斯(Ludwig von Mises),除了他对我这本粗浅的入门著作在写作上的指点,特别地要感谢他对通货膨胀过程散播方式的说明。

When analyzing fallacies, I have thought it still less advisable to mention particular names than in giving credit. To do so would have required special justice to each writer criticized, with exact quotations, account taken of the particular emphasis he places on this point or that, the qualifications he makes, his personal ambiguities, inconsistencies, and so on. I hope, therefore, that no one will be too disappointed at the absence of such names as Karl Marx, Thorstein Veblen, Major Douglas, Lord Keynes, Professor Alvin Hansen and others in these pages. The object of this book is not to expose the special errors of particular writers, but economic errors in their most frequent, widespread or influential form. Fallacies, when they have reached the popular stage, become anonymous anyway. The subtleties or obscurities to be found in the authors most responsible for propagating them are washed off. A doctrine becomes simplified; the sophism that may have been buried in a network of qualifications, ambiguities or mathematical equations stands clear. I hope I shall not be accused of injustice on the ground, therefore, that a fashionable doctrine in the form in which I have presented it is not precisely the doctrine as it has been formulated by Lord Keynes or some other special author. It is the beliefs which politically influential groups hold and which governments act upon that we are interested in here, not the historical origins of those beliefs.

我认为在分析谬误时,不同于对贡献的评价,要避免指名道姓。若要指名道姓,就得公允地对待每一位被批评的学者,引录其著述原文,叙述其对某个问题的特殊见解,列明其所给定的限定条件,指出其表达暧昧或前后矛盾之处等。因此,书内并没有具体提及卡尔·马克思(Karl Marx)、索尔斯坦·凡勃伦(Thorstein Veblen)、大道格拉斯(Major Douglas)、凯恩斯爵士(Lord John M. Keynes)、阿尔文·汉森(Alvin Hansen)和其他人,但愿读者不会太失望。本书的目的并不在于揭露某某学者所犯下的某个错误,而是在于分析经济生活中那些最常见的、流传最广的、影响力最大的经济学谬误。谬论一旦流行开来,便责怪不到谁的头上,散布谬误负有主要责任的作者的细节与隐晦之处会在流传中消失。当用于包装谬误的理论被简化成泛泛的教条,那些可能隐藏在一堆限定条件、含混表达或数学方程式中的诡辩就会显现出来。本书所讨论的流行教条跟凯恩斯或其他某位学者所陈述的学说不完全相同,希望大家不要因为这些不同就责怪我处理不公。我们在这里所感兴趣的,是那些有强大政治影响力的集团抱持的信条,以及政府的政策行动所依据的信条,而不是这些信条的历史渊源。

I hope, finally, that I shall be forgiven for making such rare reference to statistics in the following pages. To have tried to present statistical confirmation, in referring to the effects of tariffs, price-fixing, inflation, and the controls over such commodities as coal, rubber and cotton, would have swollen this book much beyond the dimensions contemplated. As a working newspaper man, moreover, I am acutely aware of how quickly statistics become out of date and are superseded by later figures. Those who are interested in specific economic problems are advised to read current “realistic'’ discussions of them, with statistical documentation: they will not find it difficult to interpret the statistics correctly in the light of the basic principles they have learned.

书中极少引用统计资料,望读者见谅。倘若要引述统计资料作论据,去论证关税、政府限价、通货膨胀,去论证政府对于煤炭、橡胶、棉花等商品的进行管制所产生的影响,那么本书的篇幅势必远远超出预先的设想。还有,作为一个报界从业人士,我非常清楚统计数字更新的频率有多快。我建议那些对特定的经济问题感兴趣的读者,结合统计资料,去翻阅即时的“现实”问题讨论:相信大多数读者会发现,用学到的基本原理去正确解读统计数字并非难事。

I have tried to write this book as simply and with as much freedom from technicalities as is consistent with reasonable accuracy, so that it can be fully understood by a reader with no previous acquaintance with economics.

本书中的文字力求通俗易懂,力求在不丧失合理的准确性的前提下,尽量避免过分专业化,以便还不了解经济学的读者同样能充分理解。

While this book was composed as a unit, three chapters have already appeared as separate articles, and I wish to thank the New York Times, the American Scholar and the New Leader for permission to reprint material originally published in their pages. I am grateful to Professor von Mises for reading the manuscript and for helpful suggestions. Responsibility for the opinions expressed is, of course, entirely my own.

 

Henry Hazlitt
New York
March 25, 1946

当本书编为单行本时,先已有三个章节分别独立发表于《纽约时报》(New York Times)、《美国学人》(American Scholar)、《新领袖》杂志(New Leader),感谢三家允许我将这些篇章收集于本书中。米塞斯教授校阅了本书手稿,并且提出了许多有益的建议,这里表示感谢。当然,对于书中所表述的各种观点,言论责任完全由作者本人承担。

亨利·黑兹利特
于纽约
1946年3月25日

Economics in One Lesson校译之PREFACE TO THE NEW EDITION

Preface to the New Edition 

新版序

The first edition of this book appeared in 1946. Eight translations were made of it, and there were numerous paperback editions. In a paperback of 1961, a new chapter was added on rent control, which had not been specifically considered in the first edition apart from government price-fixing in general. A few statistics and illustrative references were brought up to date.

本书第一版于1946年面市,该版曾被译成八种文字,并出过好些平装版本。在1961年版的平装本中,我加写了新的一章,探讨租金管制的问题,这个课题在第一版中并没有从一般的政府定价中拿出来单独讨论。1961年版还更新了部分统计数据和用作说明例证的参考资料。

Otherwise no changes were made until now. The chief reason was that they were not thought necessary. My book was written to emphasize general economic principles, and the penalties of ignoring them-not the harm done by any specific piece of legislation. While my illustrations were based mainly on American experience, the kind of government interventions I deplored had become so internationalized that I seemed to many foreign readers to be particularly describing the economic policies of their own countries.

此外,本书内容在此新版前再无其他改动,主要是我认为没有大改的必要。本书是为了强调一般性的经济科学原理,强调忽视这些原理会受到的惩罚,而不是去探讨特定政策法规对经济可能造成的危害。书中的例证虽然主要取材于美国经验,但作者所责难的政府干预行为在各个国家是如此普遍,以至于在许多外国读者看来,作者就像特地在描述他们自己国家的经济政策。

Nevertheless, the passage of thirty-two years now seems to me to call for extensive revision. In addition to bringing all illustrations and statistics up to date, I have written an entirely new chapter on rent control; the 1961 discussion now seems inadequate. And I have added a new final chapter, “The Lesson After Thirty Years,” to show why that lesson is today more desperately needed than ever.

H.H.
Wilton, Conn.
June 1978

时隔32年,该对此书作一个全面修订了。我对例证资料和统计资料做了全面更新,并彻底重写了租金管制那一章,因为1961年版的讨论现在看来还不够充分。另外,我加写了最后一章——“三十年后的这堂课”,以说明今天我们上这堂课比以往更为迫切的原因。

亨利·黑兹利特
于康涅狄格州,威尔顿镇
1978年6月