Does Intrinsic Value in Nonconscious Objects Create Problems for Property Rights?

re: Does Intrinsic Value in Nonconscious Objects Create Problems for Property Rights?

GarGi-Dixit — Thu, 31 Jul 2008 14:14:49 GMT

In the Randian sense, in which it is an agent-neutral value. That is, in which it is a value independent of any valuer. I don't believe there are any agent-neutral values.

Will you please mention the source from which you suggested that idea as Randian?

As far as I know, "The Objective Ethics" by Ayn Rand suggests some basic arguments ---

Value is agent-relative; things can only be valuable for particular entities. Something is valuable to an entity, only if the entity faces alternatives. No non-living things face any alternatives. Therefore, values exist only for living things. Anything an entity acts to gain or keep is a value for that entity.

Every living thing acts to maintain its life, for its own sake.

There is no other thing that they act to gain or keep for its own sake.

Therefore, its own life, and nothing else, is valuable for its own sake, for any living thing.

I am sure that Rand never talked of any "Agent neutral or Agent independent" Intrinsic value. or Intricism. And if she has talked, I am sure she might have said that there is no intrinsic value for any non-living object which I totally agree with.

re: Does Intrinsic Value in Nonconscious Objects Create Problems for Property Rights?

Geoffrey Allan Plauche — Wed, 05 Mar 2008 00:24:08 GMT

Kevin B,

Subjective in what sense? Descriptively? As in all values are values to/for someone? This is descriptive value subjectivism, or the agent-relativity of values.

Or do you mean subjectively in the normative sense? As in there is nothing inherent in the object valued and in the valuer that makes the object valuable to him? This is moral subjectivism and is not necessarily entailed by the descriptive value subjectivism of Austrian economics. Something can be objective in the moral/normative sense while being descriptively subjective.

Likewise, intrinsic value can be understood two ways. In the Randian sense, in which it is an agent-neutral value. That is, in which it is a value independent of any valuer. I don't believe there are any agent-neutral values.

But intrinsic value can also be understood in a different since. Something can be a value in itself and not as a means to anything greater. Something of instrumental value gets it value from being a means to a greater end.

So value can be agent-relative, or descriptively subjective, but still be morally objective and intrinsic.

re: Does Intrinsic Value in Nonconscious Objects Create Problems for Property Rights?

Kevin B — Tue, 04 Mar 2008 22:40:02 GMT

"Basically, I argued that some objects, like the Grand Canyon or Niagara Falls, have the inherent capacity to inspire significant reactions in people. Accordingly, it seems fair to say that they have some kind of intrinsic value..."

I suggest that objects, such as the Grand Canyon and Niagara Falls, inspire some, or even most, people, but not necessarily all. Therefore, the values of such objects are subjective.

The value of the Grand Canyon is no less subjective (and no more intrinsic) than the value of my neighbor's dog.

re: Does Intrinsic Value in Nonconscious Objects Create Problems for Property Rights?

Geoffrey Allan Plauche — Mon, 03 Mar 2008 16:04:07 GMT

For a criticism of Mises's moral subjectivism, you might find interesting <a href="www.mises.org/.../long.pdf">chapter 10</a> of Roderick Long's book manusscript Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and the Logic of Action, particularly starting at page 149.

Also, David Schmidtz is a thoughtful libertarian philosopher on environmental ethics. He seems to take a rather Aristotelian approach to instrumental and intrinsic value.

research.biology.arizona.edu/.../intro.html

I don't think animals, plants or inanimate objects have rights, but that doesn't preclude us from either having obligations regarding them or obligations to them. So there's no problem for private property rights there.