<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="http://mises.org/Community/utility/FeedStylesheets/rss.xsl" media="screen"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/" xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"><channel><title>Brainpolice : Philosophy, Praxeology</title><link>http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/archive/tags/Philosophy/Praxeology/default.aspx</link><description>Tags: Philosophy, Praxeology</description><dc:language>en</dc:language><generator>CommunityServer 2008.5 SP2 (Build: 40407.4157)</generator><item><title>Altruism Doesn't Exist</title><link>http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/archive/2008/03/25/altruism-doesn-t-exist.aspx</link><pubDate>Tue, 25 Mar 2008 04:50:00 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">944abf2b-d1be-4bf2-990d-438cb0e377e9:23564</guid><dc:creator>Brainpolice</dc:creator><slash:comments>26</slash:comments><wfw:commentRss xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/">http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/rsscomments.aspx?PostID=23564</wfw:commentRss><wfw:comment xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/">http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/commentapi.aspx?PostID=23564</wfw:comment><comments>http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/archive/2008/03/25/altruism-doesn-t-exist.aspx#comments</comments><description>&lt;font size="2"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Is it really possible for someone to engage in a completely selfless act? A rational exploration of the question must lead to a negative rather then affirmative answer. For isn&amp;#39;t it the case that no matter what action one engages in, it involves their selves and some kind of motivation on their part? So long as the individual in question could be said to have a motivation for acting, even if this motivation is a benevolent one, it cannot be said that they are acting in a truly selfless manner. So long as one has conciousness, so long as one is self-aware, one cannot truly be selfless. In order to be selfless one would have to cease to exist altogether, or by the very least enter an inhuman state in which one has no volition. But such a state of being is not how human beings work. It could only be used to describe non-concious forms of life such as a plant. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Altruism is not an objective description of human actions so much as a rationalization used to compel people into engaging in certain actions. It is certainly true that one could engage in an action that benefits another rather then oneself, but such an action could not take place without the deliberate concious effort and motivation of the individual in question. If a benevolent act towards another is truly voluntary, then it cannot be said to be genuinely altruistic because in such a scenario the individual actually percieves the act to be in their self-interest at least on a psychological level. That is, they desire to give to others. A genuine desire originates within the individual themself. Satisfaction is obtained upon the fulfillment of the desire, even if the desire is to fulfill a percieved positive obligation towards another. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So long as human beings act to remove a source of dissatisfaction, it could not be said that they act in a void of self-interest. They act in the persuit of satisfaction, which is their percieved self-interest. They employ means for the purpose of obtaining desired ends. The statement that humans act in self-interest on a fundamental level and that human beings are rational animals does not mean that humans will always make correct choices, that the ends they desire are necessarily logical and ethical, or that the means they employ in the persuit of such ends are the proper or most efficient ones toward obtaining their goals. It is merely a description of how human action works, that human beings are volitional creatures with goals and the capacity to choose among means for the purpose of obtaining their goals. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;font face="Arial" size="2"&gt;On one hand, every single person is rational in the sense that they possess the faculty of reason and are self-aware. They have the ability to freely make choices. In this sense of the word, noone can be more rational then anyone else because this is merely a description of our fundamental natures. On the other hand, in terms of their actual beliefs and choices, noone is consistantly rational if we are using rational to mean in accordance with objective reality and their actual best interest. People make all sorts of choices that can easily be demonstrated to be harmful to them, and people believe plenty of things that are not in accordance with objective reality. In this sense of the word, some people are simply more rational then others, make more coherant arguements and better choices. But when libertarians describe human beings as inherently being rational, we are using the first sense of the word, not the second. It would be disingenous to act as if we are argueing that everyone is consistant in their beliefs, sharp as a bell and makes wonderful lifestyle choices.&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;font face="Arial" size="2"&gt; 
&lt;p&gt;Altruism cannot be a logical description of human action because it contradicts the fundamental nature of how humans act. That is, no rational agent, in the general way in which rationality is defined, can possibly act in a manner that is entirely detached from motivation or desire. No human being is actually an altruist precisely because they are human beings. It would seem to be the case that the insights of praxeology and psychological egoism demonstrate this beyond the shadow of a doubt. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;div style="clear:both;"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://mises.org/Community/aggbug.aspx?PostID=23564" width="1" height="1"&gt;</description><category domain="http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/archive/tags/Objectivism/default.aspx">Objectivism</category><category domain="http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/archive/tags/Means+and+Ends/default.aspx">Means and Ends</category><category domain="http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/archive/tags/Self-interest/default.aspx">Self-interest</category><category domain="http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/archive/tags/Rational+Egoism/default.aspx">Rational Egoism</category><category domain="http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/archive/tags/Altruism/default.aspx">Altruism</category><category domain="http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/archive/tags/Libertarianism/default.aspx">Libertarianism</category><category domain="http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/archive/tags/Philosophy/default.aspx">Philosophy</category><category domain="http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/archive/tags/Human+Nature/default.aspx">Human Nature</category><category domain="http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/archive/tags/Praxeology/default.aspx">Praxeology</category></item><item><title>On Human Nature</title><link>http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/archive/2008/01/02/on-human-nature.aspx</link><pubDate>Thu, 03 Jan 2008 04:43:00 GMT</pubDate><guid isPermaLink="false">944abf2b-d1be-4bf2-990d-438cb0e377e9:8447</guid><dc:creator>Brainpolice</dc:creator><slash:comments>11</slash:comments><wfw:commentRss xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/">http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/rsscomments.aspx?PostID=8447</wfw:commentRss><wfw:comment xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/">http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/commentapi.aspx?PostID=8447</wfw:comment><comments>http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/archive/2008/01/02/on-human-nature.aspx#comments</comments><description>&lt;font size="2"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It is common for humans to be presented as being separate from and even antagonistic with nature. In particular, some radical environmentalists portray human beings as inherently waging war on mother nature, that our existance is intrinsically destructive to nature. But this is erroneous. Humans are a product of and part of nature themselves. There is no separation between humans and nature in this sense. The ecosystem ultimately absorbs us back into it. It is a dynamic system. Whatever effects modern civilization has on the ecosystem are ultimately trivial. It will adapt to us and we will adapt to it. If anything, the relationship is symbiotic, not a one-way street. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A common idea, derived in part from Hobbes, is the notion that humans are inherently in a conflicting state of nature, and that we have developed the capacity to form &amp;quot;society&amp;quot; as to leave this state of nature and enter a state of civilization in which we interact for our mutual benefit. But in reality humans never leave a &amp;quot;state of nature&amp;quot;. We are always in one. The real question is &amp;quot;what will we make of this state of nature?&amp;quot;. Civilization is still a product of and a part of a state of nature. The notion that we have the power to overcome nature in this way is utopian in that it assumes that we can &amp;quot;plan&amp;quot; a change in our own basic natures. But no matter what form of social organization we opt for, human nature remains the same. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;font face="Arial" size="2"&gt;The question as to wether humans are inherently good or inherently bad is a false dychotomy. Humans are inherently neither. What they are is inherently free, capable of choice. Wether or not they are good or bad can only be determined as a result of the choices that they voluntarily make. Humans are capable choosing both good and bad. Without choice, good and bad are meaningless as concepts, for we would be no more responsible for our actions than a rock falling down a cliff. Morality ceases to exist in the absence of choice. So both Hobbes and the uber-optimists are wrong. Humans are not naturally &amp;quot;war of all against all&amp;quot;, and neither are they naturally virtuous. They can only be virtuous as a result of their free choices. Man is a rational animal, meaning that we possess the capacity to choose either path. &lt;/font&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;font face="Arial" size="2"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Determinists, particularly biological determnists, seem to make the error of thinking that nature dominates humans in the absolute. Radical subjectivists seem to make the opposite mistake of thinking that humans determine and dominate nature in the absolute. The truth lies somewhere in between these two extremes. On one hand, humans cannot act in any way that violates the laws of nature. We are bound by the confines of physics and biology. We have freedom to act, but freedom does not equate to power over nature. For a human being relying solely on their natural faculties, there is no such thing as the &amp;quot;freedom&amp;quot; to leap 1000 feet or fly into the sky. Humans cannot simply wish whatever reality they want into existance. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Of course, none of this validates the premises of the determinists. The fact that we must function within the confines of nature does not mean that our actions are causally predetermined in the absolute. Nor does it mean that we are entirely bound by our instincts. We possess a capacity to defy our insticts. If this were not so, men would mount every woman they see, noone would go on fasts and noone would commit suicide. Humans possess volition; the capacity of self-awareness. While the individual&amp;#39;s faculties are determined by biology, their use of those faculties is up to them. They must be exercised through an act of will, and if they are not exercised then they will atrophy over time. A strong man can choose to not use their strength, and an intelligent man can lay their intellect to waste. On the other hand, a weak man and an intellectually hampered man may push their abilities to their limit. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While a human being is born into a particular environment that they did not choose, they are presented with a multiple of possibilities as to what to make of that environment. Praxeologically speaking, they may choose among multiple possible means to desired ends. We act in order to remove a source of disatisfaction, otherwise we would not act. And to choose to do nothing is still an action. Acting consists of ranking our desired ends in a particular order and persueing means towards those ends, in a process of trial and error. Over time, we may change the ranking of our desires and modify the means that we persue towards obtaining them. Desires are theoretically infinite, while existing resources and the means towards obtaining them are scarce. Therefore, there is always a compelling reason for acting. Our nature is set up so that we cannot reach a stalemate in which no action is possible, unless of course we are afflicted with a serious mental disability. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;div style="clear:both;"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="http://mises.org/Community/aggbug.aspx?PostID=8447" width="1" height="1"&gt;</description><category domain="http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/archive/tags/Ethics/default.aspx">Ethics</category><category domain="http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/archive/tags/Determinism/default.aspx">Determinism</category><category domain="http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/archive/tags/Philosophy/default.aspx">Philosophy</category><category domain="http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/archive/tags/Human+Nature/default.aspx">Human Nature</category><category domain="http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/archive/tags/Praxeology/default.aspx">Praxeology</category><category domain="http://mises.org/Community/blogs/brainpolice/archive/tags/Thomas+Hobbes/default.aspx">Thomas Hobbes</category></item></channel></rss>