Brainpolice : Personal Freedom

Revising Self-ownership

Brainpolice — Thu, 08 Jan 2009 17:16:00 GMT

In various articles in the past I have made a monist objection to a dualistic concept of self-ownership due to the problems that an absolute mind/body dichotomy leads to. To summarize the problem: who exactly is it that is doing the owning? If I own it, then it is not me. If I am owned, than I am not the owner. One cannot be both the owned and the owner at the same time. Using the analogy that the mind owns the body doesn't really work because the mind is also part of the body. There is a coherant whole in reality, the mind and body are not metaphysically detached to the point where we can treat them as completely independant entities.

Hence, the way in which libertarians commonly put foreward the concept of self-ownership is flawed and must be revised to what is really meant by the concept, I.E. individual sovereignty, which is an ethical concept rather than a descriptive one. The problem is that when libertarians argue for self-ownership, they tend to treat it as if it was descriptive. So they will put foreward an argument along the lines of what Hans Hoppe's argumentation ethics and Stefan Molyneux's UPB would put foreward: that by virtue of you argueing and generally purposefully acting, you implicitly aknowledge self-ownership. But this is to totally confuse an is with an ought, or descriptive ethics and normative ethics.

It goes so far as to completely conflate categories of philosophy and definitions, as this reduces to an attempt to make a metaphysical argument for self-ownership. "Individual sovereignty" is really what is usually meant by the term self-ownership, but it is also often used as a sort of mix of different concepts like conciousness, free will and individual sovereignty. This is the sense in which I think the self-contradiction argument starts to fall apart, because conciousness or free will by themselves, while they are a necessary condition for personal sovereignty, are not the same thing as the ethical right of personal sovereignty. So the argument may apply to those who deny conciousness and free will, but it is ultimately erroneous to characterize arguements against self-ownership and property rights as necessarily being in denial of conciousness or free will. In this way, I think that self-ownership has a danger of being used as a package deal concept.

What's in dispute is not necessarily conciousness or free will, I.E. the capacity to have individual sovereignty as opposed to the substance of having individual sovereignty itself, what's in dispute is a specific ethical theory or principle. Therefore it does not make any sense to put foreward purely descriptive arguments as if they justify a particular ethical premise by themselves. Proving that someone has conciosness and free will is simply not a sufficient proof by itself for the ethical right of individual sovereignty, and neither is the mere fact that individual sovereignty is internally consistant as a concept (although half the problem here is that libertarians themselves aren't always internally consistant in their definition or use of the concept).

"Plumbline Libertarianism" Pro and Con

Brainpolice — Fri, 19 Dec 2008 02:03:00 GMT

Those familiar with Walter Block should know that he advocates taking what he calls a "plumbline" approach to libertarianism that is neutral to the left/right scale or dichtomy. At face value, I agree with this if one is refering to the warped way in which the left/right scale is commonly construed in mainstream politics, since such a political spectrum cannot practically take libertarianism or anarchism into account. And while the Nolan Chart is certainly an improvement, I also have some problems with it due to the use of a dichotomy between economic and personal liberty.

The essence of plumbline libertarianism is that it subsumes anything that is voluntary and that the "tent" of the libertarian movement can theoretically be open enough to accomodate a wide range of groups, and at face value I agree with this as it is basically the equivolent of anarchism without adjectives. There is a degree of overlap between libertarianism and various other positions and there is a wide array of personal preferances that can be put into a libertarian context. On the other hand, the "tent" of the libertarian movement is supposed to be narrow or closed insofar as it's a question of voluntary interaction vs. coercion, and this is supposed to be represented by "the plumbline".

All this being granted, there are some serious problems that arise for someone trying to take such an approach to libertarianism, because one has to properly identify precisely where the plumbline is and what constitutes coercion, and it is at such a point that the internal divides of the libertarian movement become increasingly relevant. Various libertarians have completely different conceptions of where the plumbline starts and ends, and consequentially they have completely different conceptions of who belongs or doesn't belong in the libertarian movement. Someone could claim to be a plumbline libertarian and yet be rather partisan or incorrectly biased in terms of where they draw the lines.

There also may be a danger of plumbline libertarianism devolving into an oversimplication or a "thin" libertarianism that treats the status quo as being more voluntary or just than it actually is and brushes aside all concerns that don't directly relate to the use of force (although it may indirectly relate to it). Some of the vulgar libertarians seem convinced that they are simply remaining true to "the plumbline", but they are actually misusing libertarian theory as apologetics for currently existing structures and relationships in the economy. It is not true that libertarianism has nothing to say about anything other than the state.

While I don't believe that you need to have the exact same epistemology or metaphysics as me to be a decent libertarian, I think it's important to emphasize that the philosophical presuppositions that are used to lead to libertarianism are not irrelevant because the "libertarianism" that they lead to may not necessarily be the exact same "libertarianism". What positions one held prior to becoming a libertarian are also relevant, as they may still be reflected in someone's interpretation or understanding of libertarianism. People tend to still cling to biases held prior to their introduction to libertarianism.

In summary, I think that the notion of a plumbline libertarianism is sensible and noble at face value but it also poses certain dangers and it must be properly grounded in order to make sense. If it is not properly grounded, then it functions disingenously as a mask or cover for something more partisan or biased than what is being claimed.

Two Fallacies (Or Three?)

Brainpolice — Fri, 07 Dec 2007 05:26:00 GMT

In discussing and debating economic and political issues, there are some rather ridiculous fallacies that are commonly manifested in public discourse. These fallacies are not directed at the content of one's ideas so much as the character of those advocating them, and therefore can be seen as ad hominems. They are misunderstandings or misrepresentations of the character of people who adhere to certain ideas.

One of the most common of these fallacies in political discourse is the accusation that someone opposes a given goal because they disagree with the means that other people advocate towards achieving the goal. This is fallicious because it assumes that there is only one possible means to the desired end in question. In particular, when people get so used to a traditional method of doing things, when it seems to people that this is how it always was and always must be, they tend tend to assume that the given means is the only possible one towards the end in question. This method of looking at the world ends up as a defacto defense of the status quo, for any proposed alternative can be immediately shot down as insane or impossible. And any objection to the currently popular means towards the goal in question is misrepresented as an objection to the goal in itself.

But the fact that I may oppose the compulsory provision of something does not mean that I oppose that thing in itself. What I oppose is not the ends but the use of coercive means towards those ends. I simply do not think that the ends ever justify the means. I am a non-utilitarian or non-consequentialist. This is not to say that I don't care about consequences at all so much as the fact that I view the consequences as becoming irrelevant if the given means towards those consequences is immoral in itself.

To use an example, I oppose the government provision of welfare. A common reaction would be to accuse me of being a heartless *** that lacks empathy for the poor and needy. But this would be a complete misreading of my character and intentions. In opposing government welfare, I am not opposing the act of giving money to the less fortunate in itself, I am opposing the political means towards that end, which is the forced redistribution of wealth by the state through taxation. I fully support any individual's choice to personally give their wealth away to others or to voluntary form institutions to cater to the needy. What I oppose is the means of stealing from anyone else in order to do this. My opposition to government welfare says nothing about my personal willingness to voluntarily give my money away to or give help to poor people.

This fallacy is all over this place in public discussion of economic policy. The great French laissez-faire economist Frederic Bastiat pointed out this very problem over a century ago when he stated the following: "Socialism, like the ancient ideas from which it springs, confuses the distinction between government and society. As a result of this, every time we object to a thing being done by government, the socialists conclude that we object to its being done at all. We disapprove of state education. Then the socialists say that we are opposed to any education. We object to a state religion. Then the socialists say that we want no religion at all. We object to a state-enforced equality. Then they say that we are against equality. And so on, and so on. It is as if the socialists were to accuse us of not wanting persons to eat because we do not want the state to raise grain."

Another common fallacy is the accusation that someone personally supports a given goal or preferance because they support someone's freedom to persue that goal or preferance. Or, alternatively, the accusation that someone does not support someone's freedom to persue a given goal or preferance because they do not personally prefer the thing in question. These fallacies are used to imply that people have personal preferances which they do not actually hold in reality, or in the case of the alternative fallacy, that they are authoritarians who wish to impose their whims onto everyone else. One could in theory hold onto all sorts of illogical and horrible personal views yet confine them to a voluntary context. Even such nonsensical ideas such as racism.

To address the initial fallacy equating support for people's freedom to do something with a personal preferance for it, the fact that I support someone's right to engage in a given activity does not necessarily mean that I personaly favor or advocate that activity. As the classic Voltaire saying goes, I disagree with what you say but to the death I will fight for your right to say it. I do not personally support or engage in polygamy, homosexual activity, prostitution, heroine use, gambling or racist speech.

Yet I fully support the freedom of anyone else to voluntarily engage in such activities provided that they do not force me to engage in them myself. This in no way makes me a polygamist or racist coddler or what have you. To paint a picture of me in which I am some kind of active and supporter of these things is an inaccurate assault on my character. My support for personal freedom does not necessarily translate into a personal preferance for whatever activies people engage in with their personal freedom.

In short, I make a clear distinction between that which is immoral for any human being to engage in and that which I do not personally prefer. On one hand, I actually think that ethics should be absolute and universally applied to all human beings. I am am as far from being an ethical subjectivist or hedonist as it gets. On the other hand, things that are mere personal preferances cannot really count as ethics. They are matters of taste or whim.

There are plenty of things in this world that I do not personally prefer. But I do not advocate the prohibition of these things. I personally dislike B.C. Rich guitars. Rap music annoys me. I hate the taste of beer and find drunks to be generally beligerant in their behavior. I never understood how people could appriciate a nearly blank canvas with a dot on it as good art. I find McDonald's burgers to be too small, not particularly tasty and a rip off. I dislike religious beliefs with a burning passion. And if I see anyone doing the Macarena one more time, my head is going to explode!

But you won't ever see me advocating a government ban on any of these things. In economic terms, I can oppose them using my own freedom by simply abstaining from purchasing or funding them, and urging others to do likewise. In social terms, I can oppose them by writting and speaking against them to other people. And on some level at the end of the day I'm just going to have to put up with the fact that not everyone shares my sense of aesthetics. Besides, the world would be boring if everyone were clones.