Brainpolice : Means and Ends

Insurrection vs. Pacifism: A False Dillema

Brainpolice — Thu, 04 Jun 2009 02:34:00 GMT

There is a general traditional strategic split among anarchists between insurrectionary anarchism and pacifist anarchism. Insurrection is generally associated with either individual or public violent revolution, although if one wants to be specific it is etymologically linked closely with the concept of an "insurgent", and an "insurgency" could be seen as a spontaneous defensive response to an initial invasion by a political and/or military power (like the "insurgency" in Iraq, for example). On the other hand, pacifist anarchists completely reject any degree or kind of violence, likely viewing it as inconsistent and hypocritical, and this is more than just a strategic question for absolutist pacifists because they reject self-defense as a matter of principle.

However, it would be decieving to assume that these are the only two possible options. Reasonable arguments could be given against both of them and they could be constrasted from an explicitly "libertarian anarchism" that makes a clear distinction between defense and arbitrary violence. On one hand, pacifism can be criticized on the grounds that it doesn't make any room for defense and it consequentially leaves one in a submissive position relative to power; rulers aren't likely to just voluntarily give up their power, especially when there isn't even a moderate threat of resistance. On the other hand, the traditional violent revolution can be critisized on the grounds that it threatens to undermine the end that it is a means towards and often just leads to a vangaurd state; arbitrary violence contradicts the principles that one is "fighting for" to begin with and is not likely to lead to the goal of a free society.

For a hasty insurrectionist, violence is the first resort, while for a libertarian anarchist, violence is more of a last resort of defense in comparison (there is a difference between defending yourself in the face of a police state and simply taking people out arbitrarily), and the kind of measures supported by some insurrectionists definitely crosses well over the line of defense and into the realm of assassination and rioting. From a libertarian perspective, it is hard to see how simply storming city hall and shooting the place up like it's Duke Nukem is reasonable or consistent. Aside from the possible horrors that may be endorsed by an insurrectionist as a means, the main problem that an insurrectionist faces is the question of how to avoid the phenomenon of the revoltionists becoming the new power center. Instead of "the new society in the shell of the old", there are valid concerns about "the new power center in the shell of the old". While insurrectionary anarchism is contrasted from marxist vangaurd statism on a certain level, there still may be a context in which such a distinction essentially breaks down.

The conundrum of the pacifist is sort of the opposite one: namely, that when it does come down to a question of defending oneself in the face of aggression, pacifism constrains the individual to the point of powerlessness. There are certain situations in which peaceful resistance will simply be crushed with violence, and in this sense pacifism is simply suicidal as a strategy. While the argument that anarchism could only work if everyone in the world agreed or if everyone was perfectly peaceful is not valid, it may be valid as an argument against pacifism in the sense that pacifism offers no real means to counter violence when it comes down to the nitty gritty of situations in which people use violence; that is, it could be viewed as giving carte blanch power to those who do use violence precisely because organized resistance to it is prohibited to everyone else (by their own code even).

With that being said, this should not be construed to imply that violence is necessarily the only way to counter power - I think that is too pessemistic and Hobbesian of a view. There are numerous non-violent ways to counter power that can potentially have an effect, particularly if one is focusing on the long-term. At a meta level, the most basic of these ways to combat power is a matter of philosophy and ideas, by not allowing the ideological constructs of power to hold weight for you and to spread the demystification of such ideological constructs. On another level, another way to combat power is through a myriad of forms of civil disobedience, which can potentially be effective if the proper precautions are taken. There *is* a certain extent that there's a sense in which power is dependant on compliance or asequiesance, and power can be sterilized sometimes through sheer lack of consensus and compliance. And to put the matter in positive terms, one can combat power through association to foster competition with power and more of a degree of self-reliance that lessens one's unchosen dependancies on power.

However, one shouldn't take too idealistic of a view of the matter either. Power does not dissapear overnight and in some sense anarchism is inherently a long-term project. The traditional notion of revolution can be critisized for precisely this reason, I.E. that it naively expects a singular violent uprising to dissolve power. It doesn't really work that way. On the other hand, the notion of a purely peaceful process seems naive when one considers the likelyhood (or lack thereof) of those in power to cooperating with those who wish to dismantle their power. When it actually does come down to one being explicitly threatened with violence, it seems like violent resistance is essentially the only way to counter it, and a pacifist is simply a sitting duck in such situations for the obvious reasons already mentioned. This is why a "3rd way" makes more sense than either pacifism or insurrectionism.

The matter could be thought of in terms of an anarchist contextualization of Neitzsche's dichotomy between "master morality" and "slave morality". One could say that the masses tend to embrace and follow a "slave morality" that restrains them from engaging in self-assertion while those in power tend to embrace and follow a "master morality" that gives them free reign of self-assertion (although there is a sense in which this does not absolutely hold - there are people in power who genuinely believe in a "slave morality" but are working within an institution of "master morality", and not all of "the masses" believe in a strict "slave morality"), and the combined effect of this is that "slave morality" actually has the function of enabling the master class in that it tends to render the masses powerless by virtue of their own moral dogma.

But I would say then that the purpose should not be to expand "master morality" to everyone but to overcome and transcend both "slave morality" and "master morality". By analogy, pacifism is "slave morality" and insurrectionism is "slave morality" manifested as "master morality". In the context of the state, something like state-socialism could be seen as "slave morality manifested as master morality". The problem isn't restricted to "slave morality" but to the dualistic paradigm itself. "Master morality" as it is actually generally manifested in politics is an outwardly-oriented form of self-assertion in the sense of dominating the lives of others, which is not the same thing as a more inward form of self-assertion in the sense of genuine self-improvement or concern with one's long-range interest. So I would say that both "slave morality" and "master morality" suffer from the same fundamental problem; they are both, in some sense, not "properly egoistic".

Competition and Cooperation

Brainpolice — Wed, 19 Nov 2008 12:34:00 GMT

In the economic sense of the term, competition refers to the incentive to better appease a multiplicity of demands, and cooperation refers to the most efficient and ethical means of meeting such demands. An individual's demands are better met through cooperation and production than through isolation and destruction. Competition does not refer to a war of all against all or atomism, it refers to a process in which decentralized cooperation is employed in the attempt to fulfill a dynamic and variant latticework of demands. Monopoly, on the other hand, refers to the lack of competition, the imposition of a singular or more limited array of options through coercive means. Competition and monopoly are therefore dichotomous in this sense, as competition entails a multiplicity of options pursued freely. Competition is a reflection of there being multiple methods of cooperation and multiple ends that cooperation can be used to pursue, and as such there is no absolute dichotomy between competition and cooperation.

Individualism does not regaurd the individual as if they exist in a vacuum, it merely recognizes the individual's sovereignty as co-existing with interpersonal relations, and that it is a fundamental building block of a society. It is erroneous to present a false dichotomy between uniformity and atomism, when neither of the two reflect the nature of an individual let alone a society. Society qua society is founded on voluntary cooperation, but this does not conflict with individual sovereignty. Voluntary cooperation is merely the net effect of people making use of their individual sovereignty, and competition is merely a reflection of the diversity of wants that people pursue as sovereigns. While interpersonal relations are something to take into account, the individual still retains their independance from the transgressions of others in an equilibrium, which aknowledges the competitive element of society that is responsible for creativity and innovation.

Cooperation and production is not an ethical imperative in and of itself, it is something that one has a greater incentive towards in conditions of equal liberty. However, one ultimately retains their sovereignty to not produce and not participate in a particular organization or interaction that they didn't explicitly consent to. In a voluntary society, the methods in which one cooperates and the extent to which there is a binding obligation to cooperate can only be in a contractual context in which consent is explicitly given prior to the enforcement of the obligation. One does not have an unchosen positive obligation to be a member of a particular organization or to participate in its process of decision-making. The implication of this is not the negation of society as such, but the decentralization of society as a consequence of people entering and exiting from a wide array of contractual agreements.

The coercive imposition of uniformity stifles cooperation. It disincentivizes and erodes at competitive alternatives that otherwise would have been fostered through cooperation, and it violates the individual's sovereignty. Coercion is anti-cooperative by its very nature, as it can only establish a parasitic relationship or a zero sum game, while cooperation is geared towards mutual benefit or reciprical relationships. Centralization and monopoly can only establish the elimination of individual choice in the process of cooperation, and therefore the elimination of competition. Competition is necessary to counteract thea rbitrary imposition of a particular set of preferences, otherwise there is no genuine cooperation to speak of, only subservience. Cooperation is not something that is centrally planned or coercively enforced, it is a process of spontaneous order.

Morality, Rationality, Survival and the Law

Brainpolice — Wed, 04 Jun 2008 00:27:00 GMT

I was having a bit of a debate with an Objectivist and we got into some questions about morality and rationality. It related to the question of suicide, and I maintained that suicide is irrational but not immoral and that the individual has the liberty to commit such an irrational act. The Objectivist asserted that irrationality is immorality. This doesn't make any sense to me. I'd say that what is moral is inherently rational, but not that what is rational is inherently moral. Likewise, I'd say that what is immoral is inherently irrational, but not that what is irrational is inherently immoral. This is not a paradox when one makes a proper distinction between a vice and a crime or between that which is unethical and that which is merely incorrect or counterproductive. A meaningful distinction between ethics and aesthetics also helps clear up any confusion in this regaurd.

Consider the implications of combining the two premises that (1) that which is irrational is inherently immoral and (2) the law should reflect morality. I can think of endless things that are irrational and harmless to others in and of themselves that should consequentially be viewed as "immoral" and be outlawed under this logic: suicide, not taking a shower, not brushing your teeth, discrimating based solely or primarily on the basis of race, to continue to associate with people who hurt or manipulate you, to smoke cigarettes and do hard drugs, to pray, to go to church, to stay up for 3 days, to starve yourself, to bite your nails, to have promiscous sex with strangers, to have a high time preference, to not take care of one's own property, to not defend oneself and to be boistrous and loud.

All of these things are irrational and many of them are unconductive to either the quality of one's life or its continued existance, but I consider none of them to be immoral and think that all of them should be permissible and legal. It's not conductive to certain ends for me to buy certain products or patronize certain service providers over other ones. It's not conductive to my long-term economic security to borrow and spend lots of money and not save. It's not conductive to my long-term health to eat a certain way. But am I "immoral" for making a mistake in judgement or for merely being stupid or for having aesthetic tastes? That's absurd. It's not "immoral" for me to make bad financial decisions or have bad eating habits. The expression of aesthetic tastes in general could be viewed as irrational. There is no rational way to justify the notion that someone has an obligation to make a certain aesthetic choice because it happens to be the most efficient towards survival or happiness or prosperity, and in the case of happiness there is no way to determine what will make someone else happy. The logical end of this kind of thinking would seem to lead to the legislation of economic preferances in the name of utility.

One might object to this reductio as absurdum by trying to make a distinction between the law and morality, by positing that the law doesn't have to reflect or be in accordance with morality, but one can only do so by opening up a pandora's box of inconsistancy and accepting the evils of legal positivism. This view holds the law to be above morality and consequentially functions as a way to make moral inconsistancies and acceptions. The inevitable consequence of taking this view is that the law is quite blatantly turned into a instrument of immorality. Using such an approach to politics, things that are immoral can be legitimized by merely appealing to its legality. Natural law, in contrast, holds the currently existing and positive law up to an independant standard of justice, derived from reason. Notice that rationality does play a role, but the natural law follows from morality. It's not the case that everything that is rational is moral and everything that is irrational is immoral. Rationality in this context is only an instrumental tool that is used to figure out what is moral and immoral. But it does not follow that everything that is a product of rationality is moral or that all irrational actions are immoral actions.

Rationality can point one to the most efficient means at achieving a desired end and it can point one to the most moral means to a desired end (and the two aren't necessarily always the same thing), but not all questions of persueing desired ends are moral questions. That's the problem. Rationality can suggest that engaging in cooperative industrial production is more efficient to my survival and general well-being to being a hunter-gatherer, but it does not follow that I have a moral obligation to choose the more efficient means. I would assert that one has the liberty to go live as a hunter-gatherer, even if it is self-destructive or nowhere near as beneficial as the alternatives, and hence there is no real moral obligation to choose to engage in industrial production. The question of whether to live as a hunter-gatherer or as an industrial worker or producer is morally irrelevant in and of itself. From my perspective, regaurdless of the utility towards life and prosperity of the choices in question, the individual essentially has free reign to choose whichever alternative they want so long as they aren't violating any ethical or metaethical principles in the process, so long as they don't force anyone else to pursue or not pursue a particular option. These become questions of personal preferance, regaurdless of any objective concerns about their utility.

It seems to me that Objectivists rely too much on the concept of survival in their ethics, which makes it take a sort of utilitarian turn. They use survival, or more broadly the achievement of desires necessary to fullfil the necessities of life, as the primarily justification for actions. That is, Objectivists essentially conclude that because liberty is necessary for survival and the achievement of certain virtues or benefits (such as happiness, prosperity and healthiness), liberty is justified because it leads to those things. However, there are some problems with this view. While liberty is a necessary condition for survival and flourishing, it does not gaurantee it. Someone could theoretically be perfectly free and not violate anyone else's rights yet be unhappy, unhealthy, uneducated and have trouble surviving. So it seems far too demanding on people to proclaim that people have an obligation to do that which is necessary to survive and benefit themselves. People have the liberty to persue their survival and happiness, and it is in their rational self-interest to do so, but they have no such obligation to do so or to choose the most efficient means to doing so.

Yes, it is irrational to not persue the continuance of one's life and improvements upon its quality. But to consider people "immoral" for not doing so or not adequately doing so seems ridiculous. It also seems to me that Objectivists extend ethics way beyond interpersonal relations and into the realm of purely personal decisions. But for me, ethics is interpersonal and thus purely personal decisions are aesthetic at best. Such purely personal decisions can be objectively evaluated as being "good for you" or "bad for you", but there is no way to genuinely make them obligatory or enforcable and an unobligatory and unenforcable ethics seems like no ethics at all. It makes no sense to proclaim that one has a moral obligation to pursue and fulfill their rational self-interest while simultaneously say that they are free to not fulfil the moral obligation. Since I think that people are free to harm themselves or to make bad personal decisions, I have no choice but to consider such actions morally neutral at best. Otherwise, the implication would be that people should be legally required to eat healthy, raise their children in a right way, read the right books and conform to an endless sea of requirements in their personal preferances.

One might object that if what I'm implying is the case, then ethics wouldn't apply to a lone man stranded on an island. My answer is: yes, ethics indeed doesn't apply to a lone man stranded on an island, because ethics has no meaning in such a scenario. There's no one else to steal from, murder, lie to, cheat, and so on. There's noone else to violate the rights of. One could do all sorts of things to further one's own survival and happiness, but morality wouldn't really come into the picture until you start introducing interpersonal relations. The choice of a man stranded on an island "to hunt or not to hunt" or "what materials should I make my home with?" has no moral significance. Such decisions are not moral decisions but purely practical ones. Morality would only come into place with such questions in terms of how it affects the rational self-interest of other people, in terms of whether or not the means one pursues in the persuit of such things violate the life, liberty and property of others.

Another problem with this erroneous conflation of rationality and morality is that it essentially implies that holding irrational thoughts is immoral in and of itself. Thought crimes! It is of course true and important to realize that ideas determine the course of history. But nonetheless it is ultimately the realization of those ideas, or at least the attempt to do so, and the means by which those ideas are implemented that is immoral. Merely believing in false or irrational ideas does not make someone immoral, and neither would they be immoral for pursueing, spreading and enacting those ideas so long as it is on a voluntary basis. Stupidity and ignorance is not immorality. Being misinformed or just flat out wrong is not immoral in and of itself. Believing in communism or the flying spagetti monster is a vice, not an immorality. Forcing communism or the church of the flying spagetti monster onto people is what would be an immorality.

It seems to me that the moral of the story is that the fetishizing of the mind and survival leads to some absurd implications and conclusions if consistantly followed through.

An Apolitical Approach To Libertarianism

Brainpolice — Sun, 06 Apr 2008 00:05:00 GMT

In the discussion and debate that goes on among libertarians, it is disputed as to wether or not libertarians should vote and participate in party politics. Some see voting as the only practical option, some think that there should be a multi-pronged approach that includes voting, some are die-hard supporters of the Republican politician Ron Paul, some are adamantly opposed to the Libertarian Party, some think that voting is immoral and some think that voting is impractical and strategically counterproductive or suicidal.

In a fundamental sense, however, perhaps in this context libertarians could be broken up into two basic camps: political libertarians and apolitical libertarians or anti-political libertarians. Quite simply, it breaks down to a matter of those who support some kind of active participation in the political process, as well as engage in it themselves, and those who do not support such activity. It is important to realize, however, that this dychotomy does not entirely mirror the divide between libertarian minarchists and anarchists, for there are some anarchists who fall on the political side and there are some minarchists who surprisingly fall more on the apolitical side. Even free market anarchists do not have a particularly unanimous consensus among themselves on the question of voting and participation in the political process. And opinions among libertarians on figures such as Ron Paul may vary from the highly enthusiastic to the downright hostile.

My purpose will be to argue for an apolitical approach to libertarianism. I intend to back up the premise that libertarians, especially anarchists, should not vote or run for office or contribute so much as a penny of their money to a political campaign. This includes the official Liberty Party. My argument will primarily be a practical or strategic one, although I also intend to explore the question in terms of ethics. The arguments will particularly apply to those who hold a stateless society as an ultimate goal. It must be shown precisely why a sensible libertarian institutional analysis of modern representative democracy leads to the conclusion that active participation in the political process is not a reasonable or efficient means at obtaining that goal and that it may even violate some fundamental principles. Furthermore, I intend to demonstrate that the market itself is the proper means to substitute for the political process and that there are a plethora of non-violent alternative strategies for libertarians to persue.

Voting as a Lack of Consumer Choice

David Friedman once made an analogy between voting for politicians and the way that we "vote" for cars as consumers on the market. Imagine if we voted for cars in the same way that we voted for politicians or governments. No matter which car you vote for, or wether or not you vote for one at all, every single person gets the same car. No matter how you vote, or even if you don't vote at all, the results are the same for everyone. This is true even if only a small numerical majority of a given population "wins" in the rat-race. In short, there is no individual consumer choice in political democracy. As a voter, you cannot truly boycott the "product" or sell it off as if it were truly yours. You must bear the costs of and patronize or make use of the "product" or "service" (I.E. the government) regaurdless of wether or not you voted for it. There is no genuine option to opt out as a consumer of the state's "services". The entire thing is a great big package deal that one has no option to refuse. Even many currently existing unfree markets could be seen as at least have some degree of consumer sovereignty in comparison to states.

This is all aside from the fact that for the most part one's voting options are restricted from the get go to the "choice" between one Democrat and one Republican, or Labor and Tory. Throughout the primary process, the options are usually whittled down to two canidates. In most contemporary democracies, there is often only two or three main parties that have any significant influence over the state apparatus. Since these parties make up the same overall institution, they end up "colluding" and compromising with eachother to some degree in order to maintain the status quo. While there may be some degree of disagreement and competition between the parties, combined, they ultimately end up still constituting one ultimate party or group of individuals who are directly in control of the state apparatus. Whatever it is that such state agents end up doing, it still ends up effecting every citezen, regaurdless of their vote or lack thereof.

Representative Democracy: Oligarchy In Disguise

The very idea of representative democracy is a sham in that the control is not direct. It inherently creates a significant gulf between "the people" and the government. An exclusive elite still directly controls the state, only the citezenry is given the illusion of control by being given the option every few years to select among a handful of prepackaged people who already are from this elite to have further or continued or new access to direct control over the state. As an individual, the citezen has no real say in decision-making internal to the institution. Once the politician makes it into power it is they who have that control and they may basically defy your wishes at will. They have no real legal or institutional obligation to live up to their campaign promises. Even if you manage to vote them out of office the damage has already been done and they are legally shielded from owning up to the consequences of their actions. In effect, they are above the law. They do not have to compensate their victims and quite likely will go on to live a fairly comfortable and privileged life.

There is also an application of the calculation problem, or more broadly the information problem, to the political process in a representative democracy in that it is simply impossible for one individual or representative body to accurately or adequately represent the diverse and often conflicting desires of an entire society even if they genuinely tried to. In short, it is impossible for such an exclusive and centralized body to appease the demands of the citezentry. Furthermore, the very nature of the state as an institution cannot be a genuine case of participatory democracy. A state that fits the criteria for truly being controled by "the people" is an impossibility because the only way for the criteria to even remotely be met would be for every single citezen to literally be members of the state apparatus themselves and directly control and vote on all matters. This is a utopian impossibility due to the fundamentally exclusive and oligarchal nature of the state as an institution. But even granting such a possibility, it still would not work out in the absence of unanimous consent because the majoritarianism problem would arise and hence it could not be said that "the people" as a whole have proportional or equal control over matters. "The people" are highly conflicting in their desires and personal preferances to begin with.

The classic definition of democracy, as being "government of the people" or "government by the people", can be seen as anarchistic in that it could easily be interpreted to imply a self-governing society, as if government is literally absorbed by civil society itself. However, the concept of democracy has historically been abused by rulers and the intellectuals who weave apologia for them as to manipulate people into thinking that the current state of affairs truly is consentual and under the control of "the people". The ideal of democracy is invoked by those who truly control the state as a way to try to legitimize their power. Politicians want people to vote for them so that they can trumpet themselves as being freely chosen agents of the people, as to effectively disguise their power. Statist intellectuals try to convince the public to accept outrageous notions such as "we are the government". Democracy has thus ended up being the greatest propaganda tool a state could possibly have in modern times, as it is a convenient way of presenting the illusion that the emperor has clothes. Participation in the political process and the impression that it can lead to significant change is encouraged as a way of allowing the status quo to continue running smooth.

Checks and Balances

The problem at hand could be thought of in terms of institutional analysis and checks and balances. When working within the framework of a single institution, you cannot really have real checks and balances, even if you break that single institution up into different sections while still having these sections within the same institution. This is because real checks and balances requires external competition, that is, the existance of independant or separate institutions. So long as it’s all within one institution, it is just a vein attempt to simulate competition. You can’t break up a monopoly by creating more bereaucracies within it. You break it up through competition from other institutions. The political process in a democracy is fake competition because it is all within the framework of one monopolistic institution. At best, one is only changing which bereaucracy within the monopoly has ultimate control over the monopoly. If one truly wants to outcompete the monopoly, one must exit its framework and work within the framework of other institutions outside of it.

Unless the state actually presented everyone with the option to "vote" to dissolve the state or at least opt out of it as an individual, which seems like an absurdity, how can voting ever be a strategy for eliminating the institution itself? Voting only gives one the option to play a game of musical chairs by switching who heads the bereaucracy or which bereaucracy dominates within the institution. It could concievably lead to moderate changes in the organizational structure of the institution, but it does not present any real option to do away with the institution itself. The purpose of anarchism is not to change the organizational structure of the state but to ultimately eliminate the state. Even a libertarian political party merely presents the prospect of another group, perhaps a more benevolent one, controlling the state. The institutional framework remains. As a consequence of libertarian political participation, the libertarian movement is merely absorbed into the institution itself rather than genuinely being in competition with it.

Quite simply, voting can never lead to a stateless society because it is within the institutional framework of a state. It does not and cannot lead to the destruction of that institutional framework. As Stefan Molyneux has analogized, it’s analogous to joining the KKK with the purpose of anti-racism. The institutional framework of the KKK is for the purposes of racism, so voting for who will be grand wizard doesn’t seem like a very logical thing for an anti-racist to do. Likewise, the institutional framework of the state is for the purposes of statism. Voting for who will control the state doesn’t seem like a very logical thing to do from the standpoint of someone who wants noone to be in control of it and for the institution to cease to exist altogether. The vested interests within the institution want to keep it going and keep recieving their paychecks. Their very livelyhood depends on it. There is internal institutional inertia towards maintaining the system. A single individual or small group infiltrating the institution is not likely to have a significant impact on the overall institution. Even if people in positions of political power attempt to reduce the institution's power, they are met with a resistance from inside of the institution as well as certain segments of the population.

The Empirical Record

For a number of centuries, classical liberals and libertarians have been trying to reduce the power of the state through the political process and use of the state apparatus itself. This attempt, while perhaps noble in its intentions, must be soberly diagnosed as a total failure. Neither constitutions or voting has lead to any net decrease in the state's power, let alone the abolition of the institution itself. Instead, state power has steadily increased over time, moreso than any of the 18th and 19th century radicals could have imagined in their worst nightmares. In playing the game of politics, libertarians have had to compromise their principles and make questionable alliances. Some aquiesce to state-socialism, while others move towards conservatism. Out of desperation, many libertarians started to resort to means that are intrinsically opposed to their ends. And libertarian sentiments were effectively co-opted into the state apparatus itself as rhetorical devices. In America, this is particularly true in the case of the conservative wing of the establishment.

Barry Goldwater attempted to get into the white house using quasi-libertarian sentiments. He never made it into office and was demonized as a nutbag. Ronald Reagan ran for office and made it in using quasi-libertarian rhetoric. Once in office, he actively expanded the state in some cases and was unable to adequately resist institutional inertia against any attempts at reductionism. Ron Paul has been a congressman for decades and has deliberately tried to get reductionist measures through and for the most part he has ended up merely being a reoccuring singular no vote against a nearly unanimous consensus. Almost none of those no votes ultimately made a difference. And by even functioning within the institutional framework of the state he inevitably has to act in certain ways that may defy libertarian principles, even if they are his own cherished principles. As an individual, Ron Paul may be a very kind and ethical fellow, but as an institutional agent he cannot function without aquiescing to some degree to the fundamentally corrupt nature of the system.

The Libertarian Party

As far as the Libertarian Party goes, while it could be argued that it has brought more people towards libertarianism, it could conversely be put forth that it has brought libertarianism as a movement closer to people's already existing notions. In other words, the creed itself has been watered down to appease the ideological climate of the populace. The Libertarian Party's public relations campaign has created a misleading picture of libertarianism in public discourse. On one hand, the use of slogans such as "socially liberal, fiscally conservative" are far too vague and seems to paint libertarians as mere "moderates" on the political spectrum. On the other hand, The Libertarian Party has also engaged in rhetoric that is along the lines of traditional conservative platitudes such as "limited government" and "personal responsibility". This has lead many to view the libertarian movement has just another brand of conservatism, or "conservatives who like to smoke pot".

As a result of all of this, the libertarian movement itself has become partially infiltrated by bad tendencies on both the so-called "left" and "right", although in America it would appear to be the case that there is more of a so-called "right-wing" deviation tendency in the movement. It could be argued that the libertarian movement has experienced both paleoconservative and neoconservative infiltrations, along with various left-liberal infiltrations. Apparently many Objectivists have soaked up neoconservative notions with respect to foreign policy. Other segments of the libertarian movement have soaked up protectionist and nationalistic sentiments from the paleoconservatives. Still yet others have significant caviats in their positions on economic matters which would place them closer to the contemporary left-liberal paradime. The libertarian movement seems very confused about where it stands on the political spectrum relative to others. There clearly has been a process of ideological disorientation. The "open tent" approach has perhaps been too open to be safe.

In either case, if the Libertarian Party is viewed in light of its alleged goals it clearly must be diagnosed as a complete failure even by minarchist standards. It certainly may have made the term libertarian more visible to the public eye but it has not truly made libertarian ideas significantly more acceptable to most people. The primary concern of the party, as is the case for all political parties, is to get elected. In turn, this neglects the actual philosophy of libertarianism, which takes a back seat to institutional and pragmatic considerations. Instead of time and resources being used to educate people about libertarian ideas, it seems that the political approach to libertarianism has squandered it in the name of political acceptance and playing the game. In effect, it has lead to the de-radicalization of the overall libertarian movement. The Libertarian Party in and of itself is part of "beltway libertarianism".

The Oppurtunity Costs of Electoral Politics

Participation in the political process has an oppurtunity cost. In terms of resource allocation, in order for the process to take place, resources must be diverted away from the market. What is not seen is how those same resources would have or could have bee otherwise used on the market. And the time spent organizing for elections, campaining, researching the positions of canidates, voting and setting up poles could have otherwise been used in more productive ways. It could have been used to build private and alternative institutions to the state, private commerence, philothranpic efforts, direct education, acts of civil disobedience and valuable time with family and friends. All of the time spent trying to figure out who should govern us could have been used to make us less governable in the first place. There is no rational reason to assume that the only alternative to voting is either inaction or violent revolution. Characterizing non-voters as lazy or apathetic is nothing but a way to shame or guilt people into voting.

Some libertarians may argue that voting may sometimes have short-term benefits that at least marginally advance the cause of liberty. But when one weighs the long-term vs. short-term benefits, it should become clear that there really are no long-term benefits to voting, particularly if one's goal is to ultimately do away with the entire state apparatus. A proper understanding of the nature of the state as an institution would reveal that the long-term drawbacks outweigh any possible short-term benefits that may come about from participation in the political process. To use a Frederic Bastiat analogy: What is seen is a short-term or marginal gain in liberty for some people. What is not seen is that the productivity of the marginal liberty is then used to take liberty away elsewhere. What is not seen is the inherent negation of liberty necessary for the process to take place to begin with and that the institution of plunder is reinforced in the long-run. The political process forces its participants into a dangerous state of pragmatism that inherently leads one to sacrifice one principle or application thereof in order to protect another one. Since the individual voter does not have an option to entirely be free, they are put into a submissive position in which they beg their masters for a little bit of leeway in this, that or the other respect.

But while a slave may certainly prefer a policy of a few less beatings a day or slightly increased food rations, the implementation of such policies would not negate the fundamental ethical wrong of the situation, nor would it be a path towards the abolition of the institution of slavery itself. A more lenient policy does not mean that the slave should henceforth be content in their servitude. It could easily be argued that the slavery reformists only legitimized the institution by merely trying to soften its effects while still passively accepting its existance. Only the abolitionists had the correct position on the matter. Libertarianism is abolitionist rather than gradualist or reformist. While a more moderate or lenient policy might be preferable to a more harsh one, this does not mean that the libertarian should enthusiastically endorse the lenient policy as if it were the ideal and then go no further. All of the precious time wasted on reformism could have otherwise been used to more directly oppose the institutional problem itself. In short, politics is a high time preferance process. The greater value of the ultimate goal of abolition is sacrificed when one concentrates too much on the comparatively lesser value of moderately alleviating present ills to make them a bit more bearable. Perhaps a certain degree of patience and vigilance is called for.

Voting As Self-Defense?

Some libertarians have tried to defend the act of voting by referencing to Lysander Spooner's notion that it is possible for there to be certain situations where one could vote as an act of self-defense. But even if one grants the premise of voting as self-defense, this merely begs the question: is voting an efficient means of self-defense? When was the last time an individual was able to defend themselves against whatever the government happens to be doing by voting? Quite clearly, we have already established that voting does not gaurantee representation and that the whole representative structure is inherently removed from the decision-making power of the individual citezen. An agent of the state cannot be said to be defending someone against the overall institutional effects of the state, for an agent of the state must use the institutional means that cause such effects in the first place. Even if an agent of the state genuinely attempted to defend the rights of an individual or group who voted for them, it would require some kind of aggression towards or grievance imposed on innocent bystanders or 3rd parties of people, and it may also require new or continued violations of the liberty of the very people who are supposed to be defended. It's analagous to a game of russian roulette that everyone must play, and the gun is loaded in the same pattern for everyone.

The premise itself should be questioned. The effects of the institution of voting does not reflect that of self-defense. Clearly, the individual voter is not directly defending themselves. They still are effectively participating in a process that is meant to delegate such power to a master or bereaucrat. An individual is free to voluntarily choose a leader for themselves, but they do not have the legitimate decision-making power to choose a leader for other people. The individual voter cannot be said to be engaging in a free association for the purpose of self-defense. Voting isn't an act of self-defense, at best it is an act of aquiescance. While a vote for a politician does not imply consent on the part of the voter to whatever that politician goes on to do, it does imply aquiescance to one's own plunder and that of others. There is an important distinction between explicit consent and aquiescance. So while voting might not necessarily be unethical in any strict sense, it could be said to represent a certain lack of virtue or as an act of desperation. The voter cannot entirely escape the charge of complicty at least in a limited and somewhat passive sense, as they are aquiescing to the process by which institutional plunder sustains itself.

Disengagement is the only true means of self-defense against the state. The gun in the room is certainly not in the hands of the voters. It's in the hands of the state apparatus. At best, the voter is only choosing which bullet that both them and innocent 3rd parties of people will be shot with, or wether they are going to get their arm or leg broken. When the smoke clears, everyone is going to be plundered somehow. Nonetheless, the voters continue to participate in the ritualistic charade of the political process anyways. Every few years they are effectively either duped or self-deluded into thinking that this time around or next time around there will be significant changes for the better, while in reality it never seems to actually work out that way.

Apolitical Alternatives

The apolitical libertarian may often be accused of having no suggested alternatives. However, there are many alternatives to political libertarianism.

Agorism is one of the primary alternative theories that has been developed. Agorism fundamentally involves the idea that the means towards reaching a voluntary society should be persued through the market itself, especially those sections of the market that are most shunned by and far removed from the state (I.E. black and grey markets). It would seem to logically follow that if the market competition is the most efficient means towards the provision of goods and services, it is also the most efficient means towards the end of political freedom. And what better way to do that then to compete with the state by disengaging from it as much as possible and forming private and underground alternatives, I.E. economic secession? Agorism is supposed to involve a multiple staged process in which a critical mass is built until eventually the market itself essentially outcompetes or absorbs the government. The risk factor is obviously high in the early stages and perpetually lowers as critical mass is built up. Agorism is not an overnight strategy, it is actually long-term. It places emphasis on use of black and grey markets. Considering that the very existance of such black and grey markets is a product of the failure of the state to stamp out those activies and services in the first place, it isn't really possible for them to truly stamp them out in a complex and dynamic society. The more complex it becomes, the harder it is for a central institution to truly control (think the calculation problem).

Education and the spread of information is also very important. The illusory ideological cloak of the state must be removed, and it cannot be done by directly participating in the political process and as a member of the institution of the state itself. If there are statist intellectuals who attempt to ideologically legitimize political power then there must also be what Hans Herman Hoppe has called "anti-intellectual intellectuals" with the purpose of functioning as deligitimizers of political power. Except the "anti-intellectual intellectuals" should function outside of the political process and as counter-economic and market oriented agents. Organizations such as the Ludwig Von Mises Institute do a decent job at serving this function, although perhaps not necessarily in a counter-economic or agorist sense. Other strictly non-governmental organizations could be erected that serve a similar function.

Mass civil disobedience in general is a very underestimated tactic. This could include secession, which is an act of mass civil disobedience in and of itself. An entire political system could theoretically be grinded to a hault within days if the correct routes of mass civil disobedience are persued. There is much truth to Ettiene La Boetie's observations about the mystery of voluntary servitude, and it could be said that it has implications favorable towards an apolitical and anti-voting approach that substitutes civil disobedience for political means. If the people actively engaged in civil disobedience and bluntly refused to grant any legitimacy to their masters, the power of the rulers would instantly have no real weight anymore. They would be forced to either give up or resort to brute force and consequentially reveal the inherently corrupt and violent nature of their power. The masses at large outnumber the rulers by far. But so long as the people aquiesce to their own enslavement, the power of the rulers is secured despite their rather extreme numerical inferiority.

Political Philosophy Is Dead

Brainpolice — Sun, 30 Mar 2008 13:30:00 GMT

Clearly, conservatism and liberalism have become anti-concepts, devoid of any objective meaning. They used to have fairly clear definitions, but now they are meaningless terms that change with the context and times at the drop of a hat. The people refering to themselves as "conservatives" don't really favor a free economy and small government. The people refering to themselves as "liberals" don't really favor peace and progress. Both contemporary ideologies function within the same framework. They fundamentally support the exact same system. They've devolved into silly disagreements over how political power should be used and who it should be used to benefit, rather then actual substantial disagreements in political philosophy and over means. They no longer are political philosophies at all. Just group think and identity-politics. Cultural preferences. Not meaningful concepts.

Gay marriage? Prayer in school? Intelligent design? Flag burning? The wage gap between men and women? Abstinance-only programs or passing out condoms? Which alternative energy source to subsidize? Who's universal healthcare plan is better? What religion a canidate adheres to? How charismatic they are? Which thug in a suite with a smile is better then the other? Why the hell are you people even argueing about this stuff? What a waste of time! These are not substantial issues or matters of political philosophy. They are personal preferences and opinions. These things are either trivial or entirely irrelevant. It amounts to people debating over which arm they should be punched with or what kind of gun they should be shot with. Hardly anyone is standing up and saying "I don't want to be shot!".

I am not concerned with how the system should be used or whom it should be used on the behalf of (absolutely irrelevant!), I am interested in holding the system up to an independant standard and exploring wether or not it is justifiable. I am not concerned with what cultural and personal preferences people hold (absolutely irrelevant!), I am primarily concerned with what means they advocate in the persuit of those preferences (voluntarism and pluralism or coercion and monocentrism?). Most people no longer address fundamental questions of political philosophy. Instead, they quibble endlessly over semantics and irrelevancies and pragmatics. This is why I am disillusioned with politics itself. Everyone is busy fighting with eachother over absolutely meaningless and stupid ***, which distracts them from the fundamental problems at hand. They should all be uniting against the system. Not wasting their time trying to dress it up all nice to their preferences and use it to their personal advantage and to crush those who they personally disfavor.

Altruism Doesn't Exist

Brainpolice — Tue, 25 Mar 2008 04:50:00 GMT

Is it really possible for someone to engage in a completely selfless act? A rational exploration of the question must lead to a negative rather then affirmative answer. For isn't it the case that no matter what action one engages in, it involves their selves and some kind of motivation on their part? So long as the individual in question could be said to have a motivation for acting, even if this motivation is a benevolent one, it cannot be said that they are acting in a truly selfless manner. So long as one has conciousness, so long as one is self-aware, one cannot truly be selfless. In order to be selfless one would have to cease to exist altogether, or by the very least enter an inhuman state in which one has no volition. But such a state of being is not how human beings work. It could only be used to describe non-concious forms of life such as a plant.

Altruism is not an objective description of human actions so much as a rationalization used to compel people into engaging in certain actions. It is certainly true that one could engage in an action that benefits another rather then oneself, but such an action could not take place without the deliberate concious effort and motivation of the individual in question. If a benevolent act towards another is truly voluntary, then it cannot be said to be genuinely altruistic because in such a scenario the individual actually percieves the act to be in their self-interest at least on a psychological level. That is, they desire to give to others. A genuine desire originates within the individual themself. Satisfaction is obtained upon the fulfillment of the desire, even if the desire is to fulfill a percieved positive obligation towards another.

So long as human beings act to remove a source of dissatisfaction, it could not be said that they act in a void of self-interest. They act in the persuit of satisfaction, which is their percieved self-interest. They employ means for the purpose of obtaining desired ends. The statement that humans act in self-interest on a fundamental level and that human beings are rational animals does not mean that humans will always make correct choices, that the ends they desire are necessarily logical and ethical, or that the means they employ in the persuit of such ends are the proper or most efficient ones toward obtaining their goals. It is merely a description of how human action works, that human beings are volitional creatures with goals and the capacity to choose among means for the purpose of obtaining their goals.

On one hand, every single person is rational in the sense that they possess the faculty of reason and are self-aware. They have the ability to freely make choices. In this sense of the word, noone can be more rational then anyone else because this is merely a description of our fundamental natures. On the other hand, in terms of their actual beliefs and choices, noone is consistantly rational if we are using rational to mean in accordance with objective reality and their actual best interest. People make all sorts of choices that can easily be demonstrated to be harmful to them, and people believe plenty of things that are not in accordance with objective reality. In this sense of the word, some people are simply more rational then others, make more coherant arguements and better choices. But when libertarians describe human beings as inherently being rational, we are using the first sense of the word, not the second. It would be disingenous to act as if we are argueing that everyone is consistant in their beliefs, sharp as a bell and makes wonderful lifestyle choices.

Altruism cannot be a logical description of human action because it contradicts the fundamental nature of how humans act. That is, no rational agent, in the general way in which rationality is defined, can possibly act in a manner that is entirely detached from motivation or desire. No human being is actually an altruist precisely because they are human beings. It would seem to be the case that the insights of praxeology and psychological egoism demonstrate this beyond the shadow of a doubt.

Two Fallacies (Or Three?)

Brainpolice — Fri, 07 Dec 2007 05:26:00 GMT

In discussing and debating economic and political issues, there are some rather ridiculous fallacies that are commonly manifested in public discourse. These fallacies are not directed at the content of one's ideas so much as the character of those advocating them, and therefore can be seen as ad hominems. They are misunderstandings or misrepresentations of the character of people who adhere to certain ideas.

One of the most common of these fallacies in political discourse is the accusation that someone opposes a given goal because they disagree with the means that other people advocate towards achieving the goal. This is fallicious because it assumes that there is only one possible means to the desired end in question. In particular, when people get so used to a traditional method of doing things, when it seems to people that this is how it always was and always must be, they tend tend to assume that the given means is the only possible one towards the end in question. This method of looking at the world ends up as a defacto defense of the status quo, for any proposed alternative can be immediately shot down as insane or impossible. And any objection to the currently popular means towards the goal in question is misrepresented as an objection to the goal in itself.

But the fact that I may oppose the compulsory provision of something does not mean that I oppose that thing in itself. What I oppose is not the ends but the use of coercive means towards those ends. I simply do not think that the ends ever justify the means. I am a non-utilitarian or non-consequentialist. This is not to say that I don't care about consequences at all so much as the fact that I view the consequences as becoming irrelevant if the given means towards those consequences is immoral in itself.

To use an example, I oppose the government provision of welfare. A common reaction would be to accuse me of being a heartless *** that lacks empathy for the poor and needy. But this would be a complete misreading of my character and intentions. In opposing government welfare, I am not opposing the act of giving money to the less fortunate in itself, I am opposing the political means towards that end, which is the forced redistribution of wealth by the state through taxation. I fully support any individual's choice to personally give their wealth away to others or to voluntary form institutions to cater to the needy. What I oppose is the means of stealing from anyone else in order to do this. My opposition to government welfare says nothing about my personal willingness to voluntarily give my money away to or give help to poor people.

This fallacy is all over this place in public discussion of economic policy. The great French laissez-faire economist Frederic Bastiat pointed out this very problem over a century ago when he stated the following: "Socialism, like the ancient ideas from which it springs, confuses the distinction between government and society. As a result of this, every time we object to a thing being done by government, the socialists conclude that we object to its being done at all. We disapprove of state education. Then the socialists say that we are opposed to any education. We object to a state religion. Then the socialists say that we want no religion at all. We object to a state-enforced equality. Then they say that we are against equality. And so on, and so on. It is as if the socialists were to accuse us of not wanting persons to eat because we do not want the state to raise grain."

Another common fallacy is the accusation that someone personally supports a given goal or preferance because they support someone's freedom to persue that goal or preferance. Or, alternatively, the accusation that someone does not support someone's freedom to persue a given goal or preferance because they do not personally prefer the thing in question. These fallacies are used to imply that people have personal preferances which they do not actually hold in reality, or in the case of the alternative fallacy, that they are authoritarians who wish to impose their whims onto everyone else. One could in theory hold onto all sorts of illogical and horrible personal views yet confine them to a voluntary context. Even such nonsensical ideas such as racism.

To address the initial fallacy equating support for people's freedom to do something with a personal preferance for it, the fact that I support someone's right to engage in a given activity does not necessarily mean that I personaly favor or advocate that activity. As the classic Voltaire saying goes, I disagree with what you say but to the death I will fight for your right to say it. I do not personally support or engage in polygamy, homosexual activity, prostitution, heroine use, gambling or racist speech.

Yet I fully support the freedom of anyone else to voluntarily engage in such activities provided that they do not force me to engage in them myself. This in no way makes me a polygamist or racist coddler or what have you. To paint a picture of me in which I am some kind of active and supporter of these things is an inaccurate assault on my character. My support for personal freedom does not necessarily translate into a personal preferance for whatever activies people engage in with their personal freedom.

In short, I make a clear distinction between that which is immoral for any human being to engage in and that which I do not personally prefer. On one hand, I actually think that ethics should be absolute and universally applied to all human beings. I am am as far from being an ethical subjectivist or hedonist as it gets. On the other hand, things that are mere personal preferances cannot really count as ethics. They are matters of taste or whim.

There are plenty of things in this world that I do not personally prefer. But I do not advocate the prohibition of these things. I personally dislike B.C. Rich guitars. Rap music annoys me. I hate the taste of beer and find drunks to be generally beligerant in their behavior. I never understood how people could appriciate a nearly blank canvas with a dot on it as good art. I find McDonald's burgers to be too small, not particularly tasty and a rip off. I dislike religious beliefs with a burning passion. And if I see anyone doing the Macarena one more time, my head is going to explode!

But you won't ever see me advocating a government ban on any of these things. In economic terms, I can oppose them using my own freedom by simply abstaining from purchasing or funding them, and urging others to do likewise. In social terms, I can oppose them by writting and speaking against them to other people. And on some level at the end of the day I'm just going to have to put up with the fact that not everyone shares my sense of aesthetics. Besides, the world would be boring if everyone were clones.