Brainpolice : Individual Sovereignty, Libertarianism

Do slaves have "self-ownership"?

Brainpolice — Mon, 16 Mar 2009 20:31:00 GMT

I'd like to extend on my criticism of Hoppe's argumentation ethics by concretizing the point about the difference between "self-ownership" as it is used ontologically and "self-ownership" as it is used ethically. I realize that this point has been made in one way or another by others before me, but I am putting it in my own words and using my own conceptual framework to express it.

If all one really means by "self-ownership" is the capacity to purposefully act (and this capacity, at best, is all that "argumentation ethics" proves), then slaves must be said to have "self-ownership", since even though they are slaves their basic nature as human beings has not changed and therefore they retain the capacity to purposefully act despite being a slave. Liberty does not merely mean that someone has the capacity to purposefully act, it more specifically entails that their sphere of action is not infringed upon. A slave has the capacity to purposefully act, but their sphere of action is significantly limited by their master.

This is the problem with trying to prove "self-ownership" by treating it as an ontological given upon the act of argumentation. A slave completely retains the basic capacity to argue and act in general. Presumably, their state of slavery does not eliminate their will. And yet it would be absurd to proclaim that a slave proves that they have rights by engaging in argumentation. They could argue until they are blue in the face, but their rights would still be restricted by their master. In this sense, people are not "inherently free", otherwise there would be absolutely no point in proclaiming that people should be free in the first place.

The slave argues not because they have rights (and by "have rights" I mean their actualization, not "having rights" in the more basic sense of an ought), but because either their master gives them the permission to argue or they manage to argue in spite of their master's control. In terms of the actualization of rights, the slave does not have rights, or at least not completely. And in terms of rights purely as a prescription, the fact that the slave argues by itself does not does not "prove" the validity of rights as a prescription. But if argumentation ethics is to be taken seriously and applied consistent, we would have to say that the slave is "free" and implicitly proves that they have rights by arguing. Surely this is nonsensical if not outrageous.

Clearly, the fact that people engage in argumentation is not sufficient in and of itself to prove that people have rights. For in all times and all places, people who do not completely have rights have engaged in argumentation! Upon them engaging in argumentation, it is not implicitly proven that they have a certain set of rights that is consistent with a specifically libertarian social theory. To treat rights as some sort of inherent ontological fact in this way is to confuse what the meaning and purpose of rights is to begin with. The purpose of a theory of rights is not to prove some sort of ontological characteristic that people inherently have, for rights are ethical norms and not merely descriptive traits. At best, they can only sensibly be treated descriptively upon their realization as ethical norms or as a description of such ethical norms as such.

What's strange about Hoppe's argumentation ethics is that it appears to be attempting to make an "ontological proof" of libertarianism. Unfortunately, there is no such ontological proof, because libertarianism is not an ontological fact. "Liberty", strictly speaking, is not some sort of "natural state" that we cannot possibly escape any more than "tyranny" is such a "natural state". Argumentation ethics seems like a naturalistic fallacy because it treats liberty as if it an intrinsic quality of all humans. Perhaps all people have the capacity for liberty, but the realization of liberty as such is not intrinsic.

Furthermore, the attempt to derive a specific notion of rights and the general premise that people should have liberty from such an assumption of intrinsic ontology inherently is fallacious and bumps into the most obvious sense of the is-ought dichotomy. If liberty is some sort of intrinsic quality in this way, then there is no rational reason to argue that we should have liberty. An "ethics of liberty" would henceforth be completely pointless. On the other hand, if liberty is some sort of capacity that has not yet been fully realized, if liberty is prescriptive in nature and hence constitutes an ethical norm, then it makes no sense whatsoever to appeal to liberty as an intrinsic ontological fact, for in this context it is a goal that has not yet been realized (and hence in this sense it simply is not a "fact").

Revising Self-ownership

Brainpolice — Thu, 08 Jan 2009 17:16:00 GMT

In various articles in the past I have made a monist objection to a dualistic concept of self-ownership due to the problems that an absolute mind/body dichotomy leads to. To summarize the problem: who exactly is it that is doing the owning? If I own it, then it is not me. If I am owned, than I am not the owner. One cannot be both the owned and the owner at the same time. Using the analogy that the mind owns the body doesn't really work because the mind is also part of the body. There is a coherant whole in reality, the mind and body are not metaphysically detached to the point where we can treat them as completely independant entities.

Hence, the way in which libertarians commonly put foreward the concept of self-ownership is flawed and must be revised to what is really meant by the concept, I.E. individual sovereignty, which is an ethical concept rather than a descriptive one. The problem is that when libertarians argue for self-ownership, they tend to treat it as if it was descriptive. So they will put foreward an argument along the lines of what Hans Hoppe's argumentation ethics and Stefan Molyneux's UPB would put foreward: that by virtue of you argueing and generally purposefully acting, you implicitly aknowledge self-ownership. But this is to totally confuse an is with an ought, or descriptive ethics and normative ethics.

It goes so far as to completely conflate categories of philosophy and definitions, as this reduces to an attempt to make a metaphysical argument for self-ownership. "Individual sovereignty" is really what is usually meant by the term self-ownership, but it is also often used as a sort of mix of different concepts like conciousness, free will and individual sovereignty. This is the sense in which I think the self-contradiction argument starts to fall apart, because conciousness or free will by themselves, while they are a necessary condition for personal sovereignty, are not the same thing as the ethical right of personal sovereignty. So the argument may apply to those who deny conciousness and free will, but it is ultimately erroneous to characterize arguements against self-ownership and property rights as necessarily being in denial of conciousness or free will. In this way, I think that self-ownership has a danger of being used as a package deal concept.

What's in dispute is not necessarily conciousness or free will, I.E. the capacity to have individual sovereignty as opposed to the substance of having individual sovereignty itself, what's in dispute is a specific ethical theory or principle. Therefore it does not make any sense to put foreward purely descriptive arguments as if they justify a particular ethical premise by themselves. Proving that someone has conciosness and free will is simply not a sufficient proof by itself for the ethical right of individual sovereignty, and neither is the mere fact that individual sovereignty is internally consistant as a concept (although half the problem here is that libertarians themselves aren't always internally consistant in their definition or use of the concept).

Is self-ownership a misnomer?

Brainpolice — Tue, 16 Sep 2008 15:47:00 GMT

If something is owned, then by definition there is something external to it that is doing the owning. Likewise, something that is owned is by definition something external to the agent that owns it. Taking this very basic point into account, does it really make that much sense to think in terms of "self-ownership"? For if the self is something that is owned, then it is being owned by something or someone else. So then what is this entity that owns us and yet is us at the same time? Surely if it owns us then it is not us, or if we own the thing in question then it is not us?

In short, we run into the problem of creating a metaphysical duality in which the self is split into an essential and unessential self or a dominant and passive self in which the body is merely something that is inhabited by a "soul" or "spirit". One way of trying to get out of this problem would be to sever this duality into two separate entities, although the problem of explaining the existance and nature of this immaterial "soul" or "spirit" would remain. Another way of getting out of this problem would be to disregaurd the "soul" or "spirit" as a floating abstraction and to consequentially recognize the actual self as a coherant whole, devoid of any dominating metaphysical entity.

The idea of an external metaphysical entity that owns oneself renders the individual into nothing more than the slave of an abstraction, for their actual material being is placed into a submissive position in relation to this metaphysical entity or this particular manifestation of it. Individual autonomy and self-realization can actually be said to come under threat as a result of such a concept. In reality, this abstract metaphysical self functions as a false identity and implies some sort of internal struggle. Such an internal struggle can only be avoided by casting out or denying such a metaphysical duality to begin with, at which point the actual self can be meaningfully recognized and rights can be meaningfully derived.

None of this is being said to belittle the importance of individual sovereignty, but rather it is being said to save it from internal disintegration, while avoiding the problem of solipsism at the same time. This is a rather simple matter of recognizing the distinction between one's actual self and that which is either external to oneself or non-existant to begin with. If such a distinction is not made, then there will forevermore be a confusing haze with respect to discussions about rights and their derivation.

Liberty as a Lack of Unchosen Positive Obligations

Brainpolice — Wed, 23 Jan 2008 19:01:00 GMT

And a lack of a gaurantee of survival and flourishing

There are two fundamental ways in which liberty and rights can be defined. One definition of liberty is the freedom to use one's faculties in order to persue one's rational self-interest without infringement by others. This is a negativistic definition: you are free from the coercive, imposed or initiatory violent actions of others. This principle of liberty bestows no positive obligations on others to do certain things for you, only an obligation to abstain from doing anything to infringe on you. Consequentially, noone can legitimately murder, steal, extort, rape, enslave or you. The positivistic definition of liberty is that you are entitled to certain positive benefits, such as food, clothing, shelter, healthcare, education, daycare, and so on. This bestows positive obligations onto others. You have an abstract right to be provided with such material things and services by them. Consequentially, everyone must take certain positive actions with regaurd to the other. Based on this view of rights, it is easy to see why one would demand things such as universal healthcare, welfare, minumum wages and public housing.

In the negative view of rights, you have the right to persue such things in a voluntary manner without infringing on others or any others infringing on you, but noone else has a positive obligation to yield them to you without their explicit consent. You do not have a right to be served by others against their will. Unless there is some kind of voluntary contractual agreement previously made or some debt incurred, they have the right to refuse to yield such things. People may freely exclude others from their time, energy, labor and possessions. To use food as an example, noone may force you to buy food against your will and noone may force you to yield food against your will, but you are perfectly free to exercise your faculties in order to voluntarily trade for food or work for food or give your food away. You cannot just pop up at someone's doorstep and force them to empty out their refridgerator to feed you. In principle, even if you are starving to death, you still cannot steal from a store or rob someone at gunpoint in order to feed yourself.

These two views of liberty clash with eachother on a fundamental level. They are hopelessly irreconcilable. One must violate the other. If you have unchosen positive obligations to others, then your negative rights are being violated. If you do not enforce any unchosen positive obligations to others, then your positive rights are being violated. Positive rights, if consistantly and universally applied, imply that everyone is effectively enslaved to eachother in the name of providing anything from the necessities of survival to mere material wants. According to the philosophy of positive rights, survival, security, comfort and a potentially huge laundry list of non-essential special benefits are things that must be gauranteed by others. First and foremost, it puts survival above everything else. But in the philosophy of negative rights, you cannot rationally or sensibly achieve any of those others things (survival, security, health, knowledge, etc.) without first being free. By definition, you must be free to excerise your faculties in order to obtain such things in a manner that is in accordance with reason, morality and your fundamental nature. However, they are not an absolute gaurantee in life that you will survive or flourish by the provision of others.

The incentives of these two views of liberty are very different as well. In an atmosphere of negative rights, the individual has an incentive to exercise their faculties in order to find a way to provide for their survival, safety and happiness in part precisely because there is no way for them to legitimately expect others to provide such things for them for free and without any effort on the recipient's part. On the other hand, pure acts of giving are not necessarily disincentivized, but they must come about by a sheer act of will on the part of the gift giver. Negative rights is neutral to charitable acts. In an atmosphere of positive rights, self-motivation and self-reliance is disincentivized and one is given an incentive to sacrifice for the sake of everyone else. The individual's actions done to benefit themselves are viewed with distain while they are expected to simultaneously feed, clothe, shelter and associate with other people.

In the absence of unchosen positive obligations, the individual has an incentive to associate with others for the purpose of obtaining survival, security and happiness precisely because noone else is just going to deliver it to them for free on a silver platter. So such an atmosphere encourages social cooperation. In an environment of unchosen positive obligations, the incentive is not towards genuine participatory social cooperation so much as grudgingly made acts of sacrifice and social uniformity. Since such obligations were not explicitly consented to, it could not be said that the individual is necessarily willingly associating with and providing for others. They are in fact completely incapable of genuinely choosing to be "good" and benefit other people in such an environment. In contrast, in an environment in which one is simply free from others and has no unchosen positive obligations, the only way to be "good" and benefit other people is through a free act of will. By definition, you cannot be forced to be moral through coerced obligations, you are only capable of being moral as a consequence of the free choices that you make.

It is interesting to note where these different views relate to inclusion and exclusion among people. If you have no unchosen positive obligations, then you may freely include or exclude others from your property and not associate with them as you please. You have no obligation to hire someone, allow them onto your property, or be their friend against your explicit consent. On the other hand, there are natural incentives for you to consensually do such things to some degree, since you cannot survive or flourish while living as a completely isolated hermit. So while in theory you may be as exclusive towards other people as you like, you are going to have self-interested reasons for associating with others in a whole plethora of ways rangings from trade to labor to reproduction to common friendship. There is an extent to which exclusion of others may be harmful to your well-being, particularly as it relates to economic relations. On the other hand, if you do have unchosen positive obligations, then you will be forced to be inclusive even when it does not benefit you and you have no desire to act as such. As an act of servitude rather then consent born out of necessity and desire, you are obligated to associate with and hire and work for people whom you may dislike and distrust. Or, on the other side of the coin, you may be obligated to disassociate with, fire or not work with people whom you do like and trust, or at least see no compeling reason not to engage.

When it comes to universal application of principles, a world in which all unchosen positive obligations are met is a pipe dream of monstrous proportions. The resources, labor, knowledge and willpower necessary to accomplish such a feat simply does not exist. The unavoidable fact of scarcity makes this especially true. And of course it is simply physically impossible for every single person in the world to serve the other, especially not in an equal manner. A world in which the individual is free to exercise their faculties to the best of their ability without infringement by others, in contrast, does not require any positive actions and therefore is much more realistic in that it only requires a sheer act of abstaining from infringing on others and it does not make utopian demands of human perfection. Such a view is quite sober. It readily aknowledges that there will always be some degree of natural inadequacy in the world. Prosperity and security and happiness cannot rain down like mana from the sky. A free world is not a perfect one, it is only optimal. Some people may not suceed or flourish in a free world, but only as a consequence of their own actions, a lack of initiative or a lack of luck.

Brainpolice : Individual Sovereignty, Libertarianism

Do slaves have "self-ownership"?

More On The Problems Of A Thin Libertarianism

Revising Self-ownership

Is self-ownership a misnomer?

Liberty as a Lack of Unchosen Positive Obligations