Brainpolice : Collusion

An Apolitical Approach To Libertarianism

Brainpolice — Sun, 06 Apr 2008 00:05:00 GMT

In the discussion and debate that goes on among libertarians, it is disputed as to wether or not libertarians should vote and participate in party politics. Some see voting as the only practical option, some think that there should be a multi-pronged approach that includes voting, some are die-hard supporters of the Republican politician Ron Paul, some are adamantly opposed to the Libertarian Party, some think that voting is immoral and some think that voting is impractical and strategically counterproductive or suicidal.

In a fundamental sense, however, perhaps in this context libertarians could be broken up into two basic camps: political libertarians and apolitical libertarians or anti-political libertarians. Quite simply, it breaks down to a matter of those who support some kind of active participation in the political process, as well as engage in it themselves, and those who do not support such activity. It is important to realize, however, that this dychotomy does not entirely mirror the divide between libertarian minarchists and anarchists, for there are some anarchists who fall on the political side and there are some minarchists who surprisingly fall more on the apolitical side. Even free market anarchists do not have a particularly unanimous consensus among themselves on the question of voting and participation in the political process. And opinions among libertarians on figures such as Ron Paul may vary from the highly enthusiastic to the downright hostile.

My purpose will be to argue for an apolitical approach to libertarianism. I intend to back up the premise that libertarians, especially anarchists, should not vote or run for office or contribute so much as a penny of their money to a political campaign. This includes the official Liberty Party. My argument will primarily be a practical or strategic one, although I also intend to explore the question in terms of ethics. The arguments will particularly apply to those who hold a stateless society as an ultimate goal. It must be shown precisely why a sensible libertarian institutional analysis of modern representative democracy leads to the conclusion that active participation in the political process is not a reasonable or efficient means at obtaining that goal and that it may even violate some fundamental principles. Furthermore, I intend to demonstrate that the market itself is the proper means to substitute for the political process and that there are a plethora of non-violent alternative strategies for libertarians to persue.

Voting as a Lack of Consumer Choice

David Friedman once made an analogy between voting for politicians and the way that we "vote" for cars as consumers on the market. Imagine if we voted for cars in the same way that we voted for politicians or governments. No matter which car you vote for, or wether or not you vote for one at all, every single person gets the same car. No matter how you vote, or even if you don't vote at all, the results are the same for everyone. This is true even if only a small numerical majority of a given population "wins" in the rat-race. In short, there is no individual consumer choice in political democracy. As a voter, you cannot truly boycott the "product" or sell it off as if it were truly yours. You must bear the costs of and patronize or make use of the "product" or "service" (I.E. the government) regaurdless of wether or not you voted for it. There is no genuine option to opt out as a consumer of the state's "services". The entire thing is a great big package deal that one has no option to refuse. Even many currently existing unfree markets could be seen as at least have some degree of consumer sovereignty in comparison to states.

This is all aside from the fact that for the most part one's voting options are restricted from the get go to the "choice" between one Democrat and one Republican, or Labor and Tory. Throughout the primary process, the options are usually whittled down to two canidates. In most contemporary democracies, there is often only two or three main parties that have any significant influence over the state apparatus. Since these parties make up the same overall institution, they end up "colluding" and compromising with eachother to some degree in order to maintain the status quo. While there may be some degree of disagreement and competition between the parties, combined, they ultimately end up still constituting one ultimate party or group of individuals who are directly in control of the state apparatus. Whatever it is that such state agents end up doing, it still ends up effecting every citezen, regaurdless of their vote or lack thereof.

Representative Democracy: Oligarchy In Disguise

The very idea of representative democracy is a sham in that the control is not direct. It inherently creates a significant gulf between "the people" and the government. An exclusive elite still directly controls the state, only the citezenry is given the illusion of control by being given the option every few years to select among a handful of prepackaged people who already are from this elite to have further or continued or new access to direct control over the state. As an individual, the citezen has no real say in decision-making internal to the institution. Once the politician makes it into power it is they who have that control and they may basically defy your wishes at will. They have no real legal or institutional obligation to live up to their campaign promises. Even if you manage to vote them out of office the damage has already been done and they are legally shielded from owning up to the consequences of their actions. In effect, they are above the law. They do not have to compensate their victims and quite likely will go on to live a fairly comfortable and privileged life.

There is also an application of the calculation problem, or more broadly the information problem, to the political process in a representative democracy in that it is simply impossible for one individual or representative body to accurately or adequately represent the diverse and often conflicting desires of an entire society even if they genuinely tried to. In short, it is impossible for such an exclusive and centralized body to appease the demands of the citezentry. Furthermore, the very nature of the state as an institution cannot be a genuine case of participatory democracy. A state that fits the criteria for truly being controled by "the people" is an impossibility because the only way for the criteria to even remotely be met would be for every single citezen to literally be members of the state apparatus themselves and directly control and vote on all matters. This is a utopian impossibility due to the fundamentally exclusive and oligarchal nature of the state as an institution. But even granting such a possibility, it still would not work out in the absence of unanimous consent because the majoritarianism problem would arise and hence it could not be said that "the people" as a whole have proportional or equal control over matters. "The people" are highly conflicting in their desires and personal preferances to begin with.

The classic definition of democracy, as being "government of the people" or "government by the people", can be seen as anarchistic in that it could easily be interpreted to imply a self-governing society, as if government is literally absorbed by civil society itself. However, the concept of democracy has historically been abused by rulers and the intellectuals who weave apologia for them as to manipulate people into thinking that the current state of affairs truly is consentual and under the control of "the people". The ideal of democracy is invoked by those who truly control the state as a way to try to legitimize their power. Politicians want people to vote for them so that they can trumpet themselves as being freely chosen agents of the people, as to effectively disguise their power. Statist intellectuals try to convince the public to accept outrageous notions such as "we are the government". Democracy has thus ended up being the greatest propaganda tool a state could possibly have in modern times, as it is a convenient way of presenting the illusion that the emperor has clothes. Participation in the political process and the impression that it can lead to significant change is encouraged as a way of allowing the status quo to continue running smooth.

Checks and Balances

The problem at hand could be thought of in terms of institutional analysis and checks and balances. When working within the framework of a single institution, you cannot really have real checks and balances, even if you break that single institution up into different sections while still having these sections within the same institution. This is because real checks and balances requires external competition, that is, the existance of independant or separate institutions. So long as it’s all within one institution, it is just a vein attempt to simulate competition. You can’t break up a monopoly by creating more bereaucracies within it. You break it up through competition from other institutions. The political process in a democracy is fake competition because it is all within the framework of one monopolistic institution. At best, one is only changing which bereaucracy within the monopoly has ultimate control over the monopoly. If one truly wants to outcompete the monopoly, one must exit its framework and work within the framework of other institutions outside of it.

Unless the state actually presented everyone with the option to "vote" to dissolve the state or at least opt out of it as an individual, which seems like an absurdity, how can voting ever be a strategy for eliminating the institution itself? Voting only gives one the option to play a game of musical chairs by switching who heads the bereaucracy or which bereaucracy dominates within the institution. It could concievably lead to moderate changes in the organizational structure of the institution, but it does not present any real option to do away with the institution itself. The purpose of anarchism is not to change the organizational structure of the state but to ultimately eliminate the state. Even a libertarian political party merely presents the prospect of another group, perhaps a more benevolent one, controlling the state. The institutional framework remains. As a consequence of libertarian political participation, the libertarian movement is merely absorbed into the institution itself rather than genuinely being in competition with it.

Quite simply, voting can never lead to a stateless society because it is within the institutional framework of a state. It does not and cannot lead to the destruction of that institutional framework. As Stefan Molyneux has analogized, it’s analogous to joining the KKK with the purpose of anti-racism. The institutional framework of the KKK is for the purposes of racism, so voting for who will be grand wizard doesn’t seem like a very logical thing for an anti-racist to do. Likewise, the institutional framework of the state is for the purposes of statism. Voting for who will control the state doesn’t seem like a very logical thing to do from the standpoint of someone who wants noone to be in control of it and for the institution to cease to exist altogether. The vested interests within the institution want to keep it going and keep recieving their paychecks. Their very livelyhood depends on it. There is internal institutional inertia towards maintaining the system. A single individual or small group infiltrating the institution is not likely to have a significant impact on the overall institution. Even if people in positions of political power attempt to reduce the institution's power, they are met with a resistance from inside of the institution as well as certain segments of the population.

The Empirical Record

For a number of centuries, classical liberals and libertarians have been trying to reduce the power of the state through the political process and use of the state apparatus itself. This attempt, while perhaps noble in its intentions, must be soberly diagnosed as a total failure. Neither constitutions or voting has lead to any net decrease in the state's power, let alone the abolition of the institution itself. Instead, state power has steadily increased over time, moreso than any of the 18th and 19th century radicals could have imagined in their worst nightmares. In playing the game of politics, libertarians have had to compromise their principles and make questionable alliances. Some aquiesce to state-socialism, while others move towards conservatism. Out of desperation, many libertarians started to resort to means that are intrinsically opposed to their ends. And libertarian sentiments were effectively co-opted into the state apparatus itself as rhetorical devices. In America, this is particularly true in the case of the conservative wing of the establishment.

Barry Goldwater attempted to get into the white house using quasi-libertarian sentiments. He never made it into office and was demonized as a nutbag. Ronald Reagan ran for office and made it in using quasi-libertarian rhetoric. Once in office, he actively expanded the state in some cases and was unable to adequately resist institutional inertia against any attempts at reductionism. Ron Paul has been a congressman for decades and has deliberately tried to get reductionist measures through and for the most part he has ended up merely being a reoccuring singular no vote against a nearly unanimous consensus. Almost none of those no votes ultimately made a difference. And by even functioning within the institutional framework of the state he inevitably has to act in certain ways that may defy libertarian principles, even if they are his own cherished principles. As an individual, Ron Paul may be a very kind and ethical fellow, but as an institutional agent he cannot function without aquiescing to some degree to the fundamentally corrupt nature of the system.

The Libertarian Party

As far as the Libertarian Party goes, while it could be argued that it has brought more people towards libertarianism, it could conversely be put forth that it has brought libertarianism as a movement closer to people's already existing notions. In other words, the creed itself has been watered down to appease the ideological climate of the populace. The Libertarian Party's public relations campaign has created a misleading picture of libertarianism in public discourse. On one hand, the use of slogans such as "socially liberal, fiscally conservative" are far too vague and seems to paint libertarians as mere "moderates" on the political spectrum. On the other hand, The Libertarian Party has also engaged in rhetoric that is along the lines of traditional conservative platitudes such as "limited government" and "personal responsibility". This has lead many to view the libertarian movement has just another brand of conservatism, or "conservatives who like to smoke pot".

As a result of all of this, the libertarian movement itself has become partially infiltrated by bad tendencies on both the so-called "left" and "right", although in America it would appear to be the case that there is more of a so-called "right-wing" deviation tendency in the movement. It could be argued that the libertarian movement has experienced both paleoconservative and neoconservative infiltrations, along with various left-liberal infiltrations. Apparently many Objectivists have soaked up neoconservative notions with respect to foreign policy. Other segments of the libertarian movement have soaked up protectionist and nationalistic sentiments from the paleoconservatives. Still yet others have significant caviats in their positions on economic matters which would place them closer to the contemporary left-liberal paradime. The libertarian movement seems very confused about where it stands on the political spectrum relative to others. There clearly has been a process of ideological disorientation. The "open tent" approach has perhaps been too open to be safe.

In either case, if the Libertarian Party is viewed in light of its alleged goals it clearly must be diagnosed as a complete failure even by minarchist standards. It certainly may have made the term libertarian more visible to the public eye but it has not truly made libertarian ideas significantly more acceptable to most people. The primary concern of the party, as is the case for all political parties, is to get elected. In turn, this neglects the actual philosophy of libertarianism, which takes a back seat to institutional and pragmatic considerations. Instead of time and resources being used to educate people about libertarian ideas, it seems that the political approach to libertarianism has squandered it in the name of political acceptance and playing the game. In effect, it has lead to the de-radicalization of the overall libertarian movement. The Libertarian Party in and of itself is part of "beltway libertarianism".

The Oppurtunity Costs of Electoral Politics

Participation in the political process has an oppurtunity cost. In terms of resource allocation, in order for the process to take place, resources must be diverted away from the market. What is not seen is how those same resources would have or could have bee otherwise used on the market. And the time spent organizing for elections, campaining, researching the positions of canidates, voting and setting up poles could have otherwise been used in more productive ways. It could have been used to build private and alternative institutions to the state, private commerence, philothranpic efforts, direct education, acts of civil disobedience and valuable time with family and friends. All of the time spent trying to figure out who should govern us could have been used to make us less governable in the first place. There is no rational reason to assume that the only alternative to voting is either inaction or violent revolution. Characterizing non-voters as lazy or apathetic is nothing but a way to shame or guilt people into voting.

Some libertarians may argue that voting may sometimes have short-term benefits that at least marginally advance the cause of liberty. But when one weighs the long-term vs. short-term benefits, it should become clear that there really are no long-term benefits to voting, particularly if one's goal is to ultimately do away with the entire state apparatus. A proper understanding of the nature of the state as an institution would reveal that the long-term drawbacks outweigh any possible short-term benefits that may come about from participation in the political process. To use a Frederic Bastiat analogy: What is seen is a short-term or marginal gain in liberty for some people. What is not seen is that the productivity of the marginal liberty is then used to take liberty away elsewhere. What is not seen is the inherent negation of liberty necessary for the process to take place to begin with and that the institution of plunder is reinforced in the long-run. The political process forces its participants into a dangerous state of pragmatism that inherently leads one to sacrifice one principle or application thereof in order to protect another one. Since the individual voter does not have an option to entirely be free, they are put into a submissive position in which they beg their masters for a little bit of leeway in this, that or the other respect.

But while a slave may certainly prefer a policy of a few less beatings a day or slightly increased food rations, the implementation of such policies would not negate the fundamental ethical wrong of the situation, nor would it be a path towards the abolition of the institution of slavery itself. A more lenient policy does not mean that the slave should henceforth be content in their servitude. It could easily be argued that the slavery reformists only legitimized the institution by merely trying to soften its effects while still passively accepting its existance. Only the abolitionists had the correct position on the matter. Libertarianism is abolitionist rather than gradualist or reformist. While a more moderate or lenient policy might be preferable to a more harsh one, this does not mean that the libertarian should enthusiastically endorse the lenient policy as if it were the ideal and then go no further. All of the precious time wasted on reformism could have otherwise been used to more directly oppose the institutional problem itself. In short, politics is a high time preferance process. The greater value of the ultimate goal of abolition is sacrificed when one concentrates too much on the comparatively lesser value of moderately alleviating present ills to make them a bit more bearable. Perhaps a certain degree of patience and vigilance is called for.

Voting As Self-Defense?

Some libertarians have tried to defend the act of voting by referencing to Lysander Spooner's notion that it is possible for there to be certain situations where one could vote as an act of self-defense. But even if one grants the premise of voting as self-defense, this merely begs the question: is voting an efficient means of self-defense? When was the last time an individual was able to defend themselves against whatever the government happens to be doing by voting? Quite clearly, we have already established that voting does not gaurantee representation and that the whole representative structure is inherently removed from the decision-making power of the individual citezen. An agent of the state cannot be said to be defending someone against the overall institutional effects of the state, for an agent of the state must use the institutional means that cause such effects in the first place. Even if an agent of the state genuinely attempted to defend the rights of an individual or group who voted for them, it would require some kind of aggression towards or grievance imposed on innocent bystanders or 3rd parties of people, and it may also require new or continued violations of the liberty of the very people who are supposed to be defended. It's analagous to a game of russian roulette that everyone must play, and the gun is loaded in the same pattern for everyone.

The premise itself should be questioned. The effects of the institution of voting does not reflect that of self-defense. Clearly, the individual voter is not directly defending themselves. They still are effectively participating in a process that is meant to delegate such power to a master or bereaucrat. An individual is free to voluntarily choose a leader for themselves, but they do not have the legitimate decision-making power to choose a leader for other people. The individual voter cannot be said to be engaging in a free association for the purpose of self-defense. Voting isn't an act of self-defense, at best it is an act of aquiescance. While a vote for a politician does not imply consent on the part of the voter to whatever that politician goes on to do, it does imply aquiescance to one's own plunder and that of others. There is an important distinction between explicit consent and aquiescance. So while voting might not necessarily be unethical in any strict sense, it could be said to represent a certain lack of virtue or as an act of desperation. The voter cannot entirely escape the charge of complicty at least in a limited and somewhat passive sense, as they are aquiescing to the process by which institutional plunder sustains itself.

Disengagement is the only true means of self-defense against the state. The gun in the room is certainly not in the hands of the voters. It's in the hands of the state apparatus. At best, the voter is only choosing which bullet that both them and innocent 3rd parties of people will be shot with, or wether they are going to get their arm or leg broken. When the smoke clears, everyone is going to be plundered somehow. Nonetheless, the voters continue to participate in the ritualistic charade of the political process anyways. Every few years they are effectively either duped or self-deluded into thinking that this time around or next time around there will be significant changes for the better, while in reality it never seems to actually work out that way.

Apolitical Alternatives

The apolitical libertarian may often be accused of having no suggested alternatives. However, there are many alternatives to political libertarianism.

Agorism is one of the primary alternative theories that has been developed. Agorism fundamentally involves the idea that the means towards reaching a voluntary society should be persued through the market itself, especially those sections of the market that are most shunned by and far removed from the state (I.E. black and grey markets). It would seem to logically follow that if the market competition is the most efficient means towards the provision of goods and services, it is also the most efficient means towards the end of political freedom. And what better way to do that then to compete with the state by disengaging from it as much as possible and forming private and underground alternatives, I.E. economic secession? Agorism is supposed to involve a multiple staged process in which a critical mass is built until eventually the market itself essentially outcompetes or absorbs the government. The risk factor is obviously high in the early stages and perpetually lowers as critical mass is built up. Agorism is not an overnight strategy, it is actually long-term. It places emphasis on use of black and grey markets. Considering that the very existance of such black and grey markets is a product of the failure of the state to stamp out those activies and services in the first place, it isn't really possible for them to truly stamp them out in a complex and dynamic society. The more complex it becomes, the harder it is for a central institution to truly control (think the calculation problem).

Education and the spread of information is also very important. The illusory ideological cloak of the state must be removed, and it cannot be done by directly participating in the political process and as a member of the institution of the state itself. If there are statist intellectuals who attempt to ideologically legitimize political power then there must also be what Hans Herman Hoppe has called "anti-intellectual intellectuals" with the purpose of functioning as deligitimizers of political power. Except the "anti-intellectual intellectuals" should function outside of the political process and as counter-economic and market oriented agents. Organizations such as the Ludwig Von Mises Institute do a decent job at serving this function, although perhaps not necessarily in a counter-economic or agorist sense. Other strictly non-governmental organizations could be erected that serve a similar function.

Mass civil disobedience in general is a very underestimated tactic. This could include secession, which is an act of mass civil disobedience in and of itself. An entire political system could theoretically be grinded to a hault within days if the correct routes of mass civil disobedience are persued. There is much truth to Ettiene La Boetie's observations about the mystery of voluntary servitude, and it could be said that it has implications favorable towards an apolitical and anti-voting approach that substitutes civil disobedience for political means. If the people actively engaged in civil disobedience and bluntly refused to grant any legitimacy to their masters, the power of the rulers would instantly have no real weight anymore. They would be forced to either give up or resort to brute force and consequentially reveal the inherently corrupt and violent nature of their power. The masses at large outnumber the rulers by far. But so long as the people aquiesce to their own enslavement, the power of the rulers is secured despite their rather extreme numerical inferiority.

"Private" and "Public" are Misleading Terms

Brainpolice — Tue, 04 Mar 2008 20:23:00 GMT

This is a response to the following video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1b9qGxjjAP8

Hello Luke

I share your frustration with the definitional chaos surrounding these words. In many ways the meanings typically attached to the terms public and private property are juxtuposed. The word public would seem to imply that the property in question is under the control of the actual public, which would be the citezenry. The word private would seem to imply exclusivity. What is commonly called public property, however, is under the direct control of the state rather then the public. So the fact that it is labeled as being public property is very misleading and disingenous. In contemporary terminology, the term public property is an obfuscation of what should be called state property.

In reality, those who constitute the state, in conjunction with a small amount of wealthy elites from the public who are in patronage with the state, directly and exclusively control what is called public property. If the actual public were truly in control of it, they would be able to directly determine how their portion of it is used as individual or sell their portion of it. Instead, they are taxed to maintain the exclusive control over the property by bereaucrats. The public does not directly determine how the property in question is used. They are denied the true implications of ownership over it, despite being the ones who bear the cost for its maintainence.

Private property, in my understanding, would be property that is owned and controled by private individuals, in contrast to being in the control of the state. The public is merely the sum total of private individuals. So in a quite literal sense private property is the only true public property in that it is actually under the ownership of the public. To truly "privatize" would be to transfer ownership to the public. True public ownership of the means of production, as in ownership by private individuals constituting the public, would inherently require the removal of state ownership of the means of production. However, there is a significant difference between genuine "privatization" and the bulk of what passes as "privatization" today. What usually passes as "privatization" today is merely the transferance of ownership and the granting of privilege and protection to a monopoly, to institutions that already are in collusion with the state to begin with.

Institutions such as corporations and central banks are chartered into existance by states and granted special legal privileges and protections. So-called private institutions that are in patronage with the state and that are granted the privilege of externalizing their costs onto members of the public are no longer independant. They may be viewed as extensions of the government. While to some extent they may still be under the control of certain private individuals, usually a very exclusive group, that control was granted to them by the state. They are dependant on the state for their existance and often the state is one of their main customers. This is especially true in the case of military industry, hence the term "military-industrial-complex". And of course central banks function as a mechanism of state policy. They enjoy immense macro-economic control that was granted to them by the state, a monopoly on the money supply.

In order for an institution to truly be "private" in the sense of being independant and in accordance with the principle of free association, all connections between that institution and the state have to be severed. If there is even the slightest symbiotic relationship between an institution and the state, and if an institution's very existance is that of a legal entity based on some kind of charter or protection, it cannot be considered fully "private". Unfortunately, due to the definitional confusion in public discourse, this fusion between state and private power is blamed entirely on "private" sphere and a non-existant free market. The state's role in the existance, maintainance and protection of such institutions is obfuscated. Unfortunately people like Noam Chomsky have a tendency to repeatedly conflate the distinction between laissez-faire and the fusionist corporatism that currently exists.

So those are some of my thoughts on this. I hope I haven't created more confusion then before.

How The State Thrives, How The State Falls

Brainpolice — Sun, 16 Dec 2007 02:08:00 GMT

Foreward note: inspired in part by "The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse on Voluntary Servitude" by Eteinne De La Boetie.

How the State Thrives

How does the state maintain itself? It is true that to some extent all states initially derive from conquest through devices such as war and land theft. However, once a state has been established, and once many generations have passed, it need not rely on such overt violence in order to maintain its rule. Instead, it relies on the mechanisms of propaganda, of buying out intellectuals and aristocrats within the public, and by providing bread and circuses. Ultimately, the most powerful factor keeping a state in place, once one has been established, is the compliance of the populace, driven fundamentally by ideology. For ideology is a far more dangerous weapon then any guns or bombs. The only thing truly keeping the state in place is the people's ideological support for it and the state's exploitation of any ideologies that they may adhere to.

This does not mean that everyone consents to the government. Indeed, people may have gripes with much of the various things that the government does. However, what keeps the state in place is ultimately people's passive resignation to its existance and their ideological acceptance of the notion that there is a need for one in the first place. They may strongly disagree with many policies of the government, but they have simply been born into the system and have been given the impression since birth that the government is good, necessary and inevitable, and that the only alternative to its rule would be absolute chaos and destruction. For ideological support for the state is fundamentally based on the hobbesian notion that human beings are inherently evil and conflicting when left to their own devices, and therefore they need to be ruled in order for their allegedly inherently chaotic natures to be kept in check.

In short, the state essentially dupes the bulk of the populace into believeing that, despite whatever gripes they may have with it, they benefit from its rule. The state may bolster this impression by providing various public services, ranging from the essential to the trivial and things of mere entertainment-value. In anchient Rome, this took the form of gladiator's arenas and aquaducts and booty for soldiers. Today it may take the form of anything from national healthcare to farm subsidies to federal funding for the arts. This gives the people the illusion that the state is benevolent and giving. Little do the people realize that they are only being given back a small portion of what was initially stolen from them and their ancestors.

The state is more maintainable when its subjects are dependant on it rather then self-reliant. A self-reliant citezen simply has no need to depend on the state for their well-being, and therefore the state has an incentive to create an institutional framework in which self-reliance is discouraged. Consequentially, the state has an interest in maintaining and expanding a class of people who are dependant on it for their very survival. This may be called the welfare class. The state may very well, both purposesfully and by unintended consequences, bring about circumstances that lower people's well being, therefore creating a reason for it to step in and provide relief and security.

In a sense the state thrives and grows based on a cycle of interventionism. That is, the state itself creates a problem, and then uses the problem as a reason to intervene to cure the problem and expand its powers, which then leads to more problems and the cycle keeps repeating itself. It may exploit the oppurtunity in order to blame the problem that it created on some inherent flaw in society so that the rulers can claim that the state's power is all the more necessary in order to fix the problems of the people. Intervention breeds more intervention.

An important aspect of the maintenance of political rule is the collusion between private interests and the state. A small band of individuals from within the public recieve special privileges from the state beyond what the average person can access in exchange for their services and loyalty to the state apparatus. This group forms an intellectual class of apologists for the state's rule, who gain control over the flow of ideas within the society. It creates a symbiotic relationship by which private interests such as religious organizations, the media, buisinesses and unions gain patronage and protection in exchange for their political support. In medieval times this took the form of the union of church and state and the economic system of fuedalism. Today it takes the form of the union of buisiness and state, central banking and union cartels.

In order to thrive, it is important for the state to buy out the intellectuals within a society. For the most intellectual people possess the most potential to challenge its authority, so they must be brought to be on the side of its authority. As Thomas Jefferson very well was aware of, a well educated populace is the most dangerous thing to the state's power. Therefore, the state tried to incorporate as many of the most educated people in a society as possible into its apparatus. Economists, scientists, inventors and technologists are all made as dependant on the state as possible and are employed by it to serve its purposes.

Critical to the state's reliance on ideology for its support in modern times is the provision of public education. For public education provides the state with an indispensible means by which to control the ideas of the people. What better way to create a passively obedient populace then to control their education from birth? Indeed, in public schools children are essentially instilled with a sense of nationalism and are spoon-fed what amounts to fairy tales about their government and leaders from times past. The history and social studies books are predictably written to portray the government in a positive light, and any blunders the government may be responsible for are blamed on the people in some way. And this control even extends to college, where vocational priorities and oppurtunities are predetermined and professors are disproportionately biased.

The state's control of the flow of ideas in a society of course does not stop once one graduates from school or finishes college. In our modern age it extends to the mass media. The state regulates the airwaves. In order to make it into the mainstream media buisiness, one must be licensed, and with the licensing comes a load of requirements for fitting state-determined criteria for content and ettiquiette. While many countries may not have state control of the media to extent that a communist country in which the state literally runs the media itself does, the patronage between the private media buisiness and the state, and the amount of regulation involved, produces a close enough effect.

There is a profound sense in which the state thrives on conflict. There are two ways in which this is true. On one hand, the state thrives by pitting the people against eachother. On the other hand, the state thrives by uniting the people against a common and external enemy. In both cases, the main emotions to be exploited are fear and distrust. Rich are pitted against poor, labor is pitted against capital, religious is pitted against secular, nation is pitted against nation and ethnicities are pitted against eachother. Pick any two opposing personal preferances and there is a potential conflict to be created by the state in exploiting them. Some of the conflict is over patronage with the state, while in other cases it is simply in the name of dominance. This encouragment of conflict functions as a distractionary device as well as a means to get people to support state power in the persuit of such conflicts.

The state is constituted by self-interested individuals just like any other institution. These individuals have every reason in the world to try to maximize their own revenues. However, if a parasite sucks too much from its host, it eventually kills its host, and dies itself in turn. Therefore, some members of the state may try to maintain a balance by which they extract as much as possible from the people while still leaving them with enough to ensure that the plunder can continue. This is of course not to say that these individuals may be particularly good at calculating exactly where the cut-off point is, nor is it to say that there are not individuals who will wrecklessly try to extract as much as possible without any such considerations for sustainance.

Nonetheless, the master politician is he or she who is best able to determine where this point of balance lies. For plunder cannot be efficiently institutionalized unless it is made sustainable, and the state is the very incarnation of institutionalized plunder. It is a protection racket. The art of rule consists of finding ways to keep the plunder repetitive and sustainable. The common criminal pales in comparison to the common ruler. For while the common criminal may manage to plunder their victim once, it is doubtful that they will return to the same victim twice, let alone convince their victim that they are actually helping them and that they are a necessary part of the social order. But the sucessful ruler gets away with this, and much more.

How the State Falls

Based on our understanding of how the state thrives, it behoovs us to understand how the state falls. Afterall, there is no such thing as a permanent institution, and the state is not exempted from this fact. We live in a world of scarce resources with mortal beings and limited abilities. No matter how sucessful a state is at maintaining its rule, one day it eventually falls. One could very well think of it in terms of entropy in that all systems are ultimately reduced to their component parts. One way in which the state falls is merely by following its natural course, which is to say that it drains and damages the source of its supply to the point where it cannot thrive any longer. In a sense, all states seal their own fates by setting up economic conditions that eventually render them helpless. For there are many unintended consequences to the economic meddling that is required to maintain the existance of a state.

Viewed another way, there is a certain social evolutionary inertia at work that makes state control harder and harder to maintain over time. As technology improves and as information spreads and complexifies, it becomes harder and harder for the state to adequately plan anything and the market itself starts to provide functions more efficiently and more cheaply then the state can manage to. The state's provision of services starts to become progressively obsolete over time. No matter what a state may do to try to control a market, the market has its own inertia and a dynamically self-correcting nature that defies all attempts to control it. And as the amount of information in a society intensifies, the ability of a state to control public opinion and the prospects for power remaining centralized decreases.

There comes a certain point where the exploitive nature of the state becomes blatantly obvious to the public at large and the possibility of revolution enters the horizon. The instinct of people to be free can only be bottled up for so long. And information cannot be suppressed completely or eternally. Violent revolution is of course not the only possibility for the fall of states, and it is probably the most risky route that can be taken. But wether violent or not, some sort of rebellion becomes inevitable after a point. Iron curtains cannot be kept in place infinitely. Artificial divisions cannot be indefinitely maintained. Prohibitions can be defied almost as if they didn't exist at all. With enough effort, taxes can be resisted and avoided.

If we accept the premise that the state is fundamentally kept in place by ideology and passive resignation, another way by which the state may fall is by the mass withdrawl of consent by the populace. Mass civil disobedience has proven to be a surpisingly effective strategy for change in many instances. For as soon as people stop believing in the state, it essentially dissapears unless its members wish to resort to overt violence. And if it tries to resort to overt violence in order to maintain its rule, it risks delegitimizing itself even more in the eyes of the populace and facing what amounts to a domestic insurgency of the people, which can be a very tough thing to beat in battle. Civil war and domestic insurgency is hardly a desirable state of affairs for the members of the state.

The withdrawl of consent can also be manifested in terms of competition, even on black and grey markets. If people want to avoid the state schools, they may try resorting to home schooling or private and alternate methods of schooling. If people want to avoid the mainstream media, they may try opening up alternative media organizations and using the internet. If people are displeased with the government's courts, they may start resorting to private arbitration. If people are displeased with the police, they may start relying more on self-defense, engaging in limited forms of vigalantaism or even opening and patronizing alternative institutions for defensive purposes. If people resent ridiculous and archiac laws enough, they may simply start defying them in mass.

Never underestimate the power of a massive withdrawl of consent. It can potentially grind a political system to a hault within days, much in the same way that a massive enough boycott can eventually drive a company out of buisiness. A buisiness cannot survive without customers. And a state cannot survive without participants and dependants. It would be an interesting scenario indeed if on one election day noone showed up at the ballot box, or if large numbers of people decided to simply stop filling out their tax forms, or if soldiers and policemen and bereaucrats simply quit in mass. What a quagmire that would be for the top dogs!

For rulers are reduced to nothing but feeble individuals as soon as obedience is simply denied to them outright and in mass. They only constitute a tiny portion of society. They most borrow the eyes, ears and labor of their subjects to maintain their power. The lone ruler is truly powerless without the complicity of people willing to enforce their will for them. They do not directly enforce anything themselves or pay for anything out of their own pocketbooks. They are quite cowardly individuals. They do not fight their wars themselves. They do not do the paperwork themselves. They do not patrol the streets themselves. They have no more power over you then that which you lend to them by joining their ranks and directly participating in their institutional framework.

And therefore the key to dismantling their power is to simply stop participating in it.

Checks and Balances: Two Kinds

Brainpolice — Wed, 28 Nov 2007 22:37:00 GMT

Checks and balances should be a fairly familiar concept to Americans. The standard definition of checks and balances is that the state must be broken up into multiple segments that function as checks against eachother's power and perform different functions, while these segments still remain within one central institution. Traditionally, the idea is that there must be three separate branches (executive, legislative and judicial) within one central government in order to prevent the accumulation of power into one group. At least superficially, this view slightly recognizes the principle of decentralization. Another somewhat more powerful conception of checks and balances is the idea that there must be multiple and separate levels of government, each with their own branches and jurisdictions, and that in order to combat the accumulation of power, individual states or parishes and cities should remain "independant" from the central state.

This is the doctrine of internal checks and balances. Both separation between branches and levels of government are internal theories of checks and balances. But how well do these theories stand up in the face of logic and empirical evidence? Not very well. The fundamental flaw in the idea that separation between branches within one institution will stop power from being concentrated should be fairly obvious: it is still within one institution. There is theoretically no "third party" outside of that institution functioning on a check on it, which is to say that the overall institution is a judge in its own case. The supreme court is still part of the federal government. All historical evidence shows a great deal of collusion between branches, and when there is collusion between branches, there is centralization of powers into one expanding group. Clearly, merely having three branches under one institution will not stop power from accumulating in that institution. Much heftier criterion must be met.

While the doctrine of state's rights is a step up from this, since it maintains at a minimum that there should be a multitude of jurisdictions within the overall territory bestowed to the central government, it nonetheless contains a similar flaw. The states are still ultimately subject to the territorial dominion of the federal government and there is once again collusion between the levels of government. If a central government still exists, it doesn't matter how many territorial jurisdictions that one tries to split the central state's control into, political power is still concentrated at a central point. Surely expanding the amount of people in the government or the number of sub-governments within a government's territorial monopoly is not necessarily a way to restrict political power. In order to at least be a "pure" advocate of "state's rights", one must support a more radical approach, with no federal government.

Once one has made it to this point, the same problem keeps repeating itself at each level of government. The states in themselves would now be the central governments, only over smaller territories. The size of the dominion of power may have been reduced, but the essential feature of territorial monopoly is still maintained. Counties, parishes and cities would synergize with and the states. If the states were gotten rid of, the counties would be the territorial monopolies and the cities and towns would synergize with them. And even down to the city-state level, the problem of territorial monopoly would persist. The advantages of so-called "state's rights" or "city's rights" mostly only have to do with the size of the territorial monopoly, but they do almost nothing to address the problem of territorial monopoly itself. All such mechanisms are ultimately within the structure of the institution of the state itself. A monopoly cannot be broken up without competition from other institutions external to it.

This is why external checks and balances are much stronger and more meaningful than internal ones. Checks and balances in which governmental institutions are held in check by non-governmental ones, which requires a separation between buisiness and state, constitutes an example of external checks and balances. An honest private institution that opens up a buisiness in competition with the state in a particular area, which inherently requires that the given buisiness not engage in any kind of patronage and protectionism with the state, is functioning as a check on state power by providing an alternative option for people and lowering dependance on the state. The improvement of technology and the availability of private alternatives to the state in a given field, and the long-term decrease in prices it often leads to, can function as an external "check and balance" on the state much better than any internal "check and balance" ever can.

On the other hand, a private institution that colludes with the state is participating in the centralization and expansion of power. Indeed, the leaders of such institutions become part of the ruling class. When such synergy between industry and government takes place, various buisinesses start to become more centralized, modeled more similarly to the structure of the state than would otherwise have been possible. When buisiness starts to merge at the hip with the state, this presents an oppurtunity to obtain and expand political power for both select private interests and members of the government itself. The union of church and state is a perfect historical example of territorial monopolies further centralizing and expanding as a consequence of collusion between the state and external organizations. The ultimate end of such collusion is the merging of a more multi-centered order into one large central organization.

In a sense, everyone who is outside of the ruling class of a given society is a potential check on political power, by the mere virtue of not being within or in control of it. There are many external methods of checking and resisting political power, which includes various types of civil disobedience and economic decisions. From the perspective of an individual as a consumer, withdrawing consumption from the state's "services" and merely patronizing a private alternative at a lower price and participating in peaceful black markets is an important haven from state power. On the other hand, actively and enthusiastically participating in the state's "services" transforms one into either a state of dependance on the state, or worse, part of the ruling class. Here too, collusion has a negative effect because it is internal to the institution. It's working within the system, which is precisely why it does not work.

Economic incentives is a very important check and balance on state power. A defining feature of the state as an organization is that it is an externalizer of costs, which is to say that those who hold the political power in a society do not actually bear the costs of the laws and policies that they work with. Therefore, mechanisms that internalize costs provide a disincentive towards political power. Political power cannot be obtained or maintained without externalizing costs through mechanisms such as taxation and eminent domain. If the state is denied access to external resources then it will eventually crumble, as the state as an organization depends entirely on the production of those who are not in it. If it is either cut off from recieving that production then political power obviously cannot be maintained for very long.

The ultimate check on political power is philosophy. In short, it is impossible to maintain or expand political power without the propagation of ideological ideas in favor of political power or encouraging resignation to it. What ideas people adhere to ultimately effects the course of history. All that is required to combat political power is the action of withdrawl of support to the best that one can manage. And in order for this to be done, it must be philosophically accepted that the only possible checks against the state that can possibly exist are external to the institution because the institution of the state is a compulsory territorial monopoly regaurdless of what one tries to do with it internally. It is logically inconsistant to maintain that one can reduce, restrict or abolish political power by using political power, and it is nonsensical to claim that one can provide checks and balances on an institution through mechanisms that are entirely within the framework of that very institution and when that institution has a territorial monopoly.

What about so-called "competition" between nation-states? If there can be said to be anything resembling checks and balances between goverments, it would be the total lack of both collusion and offensive intervention between governments. When states engage in economic hegemony with eachother they begin a gradual trend towards international or global government, taking the centralization process to the extreme of there being virtually no territory immune from being within the jurisdiction of the government monopoly. International government possesses all of the problems previously mentioned about federal and state government. It just conglomerates power even more than nation-states and has a larger monopolistic jurisdiction.

Modern state warfare essentially cannot be done without collusion and contracting with particular banking and buisiness interests through contracting. War is the most costly endeavor a government can possibly engage in and it can only be waged by externalizing the costs, particularly through the mechanism of monetary inflation and borrowing from from foreign governments and banking interests. War has historically been a means of maintaining and expanding political power. As such, it would be disingenous to use it as an example of free competition. It is, by definition, a flexing of state power, of monopoly. Even if a state is overthrown by another, the victor state usually has increased power when the smoke clears. War has been the main mechanism of expanding state power throughout history.

In conclusion, it should be clear that true checks and balances lies within the domain of private and decentralized mechanisms that are external to and not in any kind of collusion with any political power. That is, market competition is true checks and balances, while the state can only attempt to simulate competition in vein. The more standard concept of checks and balances, while a well intended attempt to form a structural means for restricting political power, is incredibly mistaken in its premises as to how the state functions as an institution. It is rather niave about the nature of political power. In order to truly have checks and balances, the state as an organization must be questioned altogether and participitation in the activities of and consumption of the loot of such an organization must begin to be abandoned in favor of a multitude of alternatives.