Transcript of Bernanke's answer to Terry Easton on the Austrian school.

X: Yes, one right at the back, red tie, just underneath the cabinet rack.

Terry Easton: Thank you, that's an Adam Smith tie, eh, at the Adam Smith Foundation.

Thank you Dr. Bernanke. I really appreciate as we all do your challenge in dealing with the systemic financial systems crisis.

I'm Terry Easton with Human Events newspaper in Washington D.C. The concern that we have is that right now we're dealing with this problem looking at the forest at the tree level, in fact probably down on the ground looking at the blades of grass growing, and you seem to be dealing with it as all people are in all similar institutions worldwide, as a classic Keynesian approach to solving the problem.

And of course here in the London School of Economics, there is some knowledge of another alternative approach to the problem, known of course as the Austrian school. von Mises, Hayek, Rothbard, et cetera, have suggested an alternative to this 90-year edifice that we've built, which now is coming back to roost, and I wonder if it's possible, realizing that your position is the head of the Fed, can you talk a little bit about the underlying system that has now existed for 90 years? Are we going the right way? Can we fix it? Should we look at these alternatives to the problem? I would be interested in your philosophical comments.

Bernanke: Well, the question is related to the former one. It has to do with the value and the benefits of markets. I think economists are often accused of being market fundamentalists, I think in fact economists have done a better job than anybody of figuring out what markets can do well, and what they don't do so well, when there are problems with information or other things.

And economists have also pointed out that government interventions are not benign, perfectly executed interventions, but are also executed by individuals with interests, and so on -- this is the public policy, er, ah, school. And so, the balance between markets and the government is a delicate one.

In particular, those of us who are economists, and I think that accounts for almost everybody in the room, are always amazed by the lack of understanding in the general public about the power of markets, and in particular the Austrian school emphasized the ability of markets to aggregate information and incentives to provide outcomes which a top-down government approach can't provide. So, as an economist I have a lot of faith in markets. I don't think, for example, I completely disagree with the view that what's happened in the last year and a half is a 'crisis of capitalism', per se. I mean, after all, capitalism has done an awful lot for growth and living standards for a long time. But rather it's a crisis that arises in a particular set of situations and conditions that we've faced in the last couple of years.

In particular, as I've indicated before, because of the tendency of financial systems to the boom and bust -- which is a very long-standing problem, one that was recognized by virtually every economist who's studied these issues -- and because of the effects of that on the economy, there has been a long-standing tendency to try to find a regulatory balance that reduces the costs of those booms and busts without costing us the benefits of the market forces and the innovation and the information aggregation and so on. It's a very difficult balance. I think, what we've learned, in this case, is not necessarily that we need to have a lot more regulation, but that we need to think through what went wrong with -- what I described: when I say the financial sector what I mean is the private sector plus the regulatory overlay; that whole complex didn't perform well in this case, and we need to think hard about how to fix it.

Now, as I try to say in my speech, we have short-term and long-term considerations. I think it's very important for us to try to put out the fire. I think it's good advice in general, that if there's a fire burning, you try to put it out first, and then you think about the fire code.

So you don't try to do it all at once necessarily. We need to figure out how to solve this problem, how to stop the costs that are being borne all over the world, but going foward we have to look at the fire code: we have to think about what is the right balance of regulation, markets, that will give us a powerful, innovative financial system, but one that would be safer to use in some sense.

Published Tue, Jan 13 2009 9:38 PM by ayrnieu
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Comments

# re: Transcript of Bernanke's answer to Terry Easton on the Austrian school.

Bernanke is a retard.

Tuesday, January 13, 2009 7:54 PM by Conza88

# re: Transcript of Bernanke's answer to Terry Easton on the Austrian school.

ayrnieu, thanks for this.

I suspect that Easton was referring to"blades" of grass (not to grass on fire).

Feel free to delete this.

Tuesday, January 13, 2009 8:48 PM by TokyoTom

# re: Transcript of Bernanke's answer to Terry Easton on the Austrian school.

Ah, thanks; flash video is irritating enough to transcribe that I ought to first record it to mp3.

Tuesday, January 13, 2009 10:06 PM by ayrnieu

# re: Transcript of Bernanke's answer to Terry Easton on the Austrian school.

What I said in the first sentence was:

"Thank you.  That's an Adam Smith tie (that I'm wearing)..." in response to being identified as the person wearing a red tie and the previous comment on Adam Smith made from the podium.

The challenge, of course, is an era of new-age Keynesians, is to continually remind people that there is a rational alternative to having "faith" in the government's money: the Austrian school's solution - real money which cannot be easily counterfeited by the official printers...  

I suspect that The Mess will continue over the coming decades until we finally come full circle back to the pre-1913 era.

Wednesday, January 14, 2009 3:16 AM by Terry Easton

# re: Transcript of Bernanke's answer to Terry Easton on the Austrian school.

Well, Cousin Terry, not too sure your perspective, but based on what I see here in the transcript, Mr. Bernanke seemed to provide the typical governmental rhetoric and didn't answer the questions posed.  As a younger American, this causes great concern because we never seem to learn from history (being, I think the basis of your questions)and here we ago again to look at "the code" to solve the problem, but how long will it take to look at the code and then, when is something going to be done to amend "the code" and finally, how do we know "the fix" is right? Am I off base?

Wednesday, January 14, 2009 6:34 PM by Heather Kopicki

# re: Transcript of Bernanke's answer to Terry Easton on the Austrian school.

Terry asked the perfect question. Bernanke avoided answering that perfect question by 99%. But, after all, Bernanke is in this governmental post by political favor and he's not going to talk himself out of a job by acknowledging the role of the FED in creating the boom and bust cycle.

I'm interested in what BBC interviewers asked of Terry afterward. Terry's real message should not have been lost entirely to the LSE students and the BBC listeners.

Bravo, Terry!

Thursday, January 15, 2009 2:30 AM by Ken Schoolland

# re: Transcript of Bernanke's answer to Terry Easton on the Austrian school.

"there has been a long-standing tendency to try to find a regulatory balance that reduces the costs of those booms and busts without costing us the benefits of the market forces"

This implies that his understanding of the problem is that reducing the cost of the booms requires forgoing some of the benefits of the market... i.e. he presumes that the ony way to handle the boom-bust cycle is regulation (anti-market).

And yet that is not the Austrian position at all. So his answer makes no comment on whether or not the Austrian solution/perspective might provide a better alternative to the current strategy. He dodges the question entirely by either misunderstanding or misrepresenting the Austrian position.

Saturday, January 17, 2009 6:29 PM by jimmy