Economics Questions

Re: Mises video mistake on praxeology

Paleoprax — Sat, 06 Oct 2012 21:46:00 GMT

What do you think about this diagram? It's mostly based on Hoppe.

Re: Mises video mistake on praxeology

Smiling Dave — Sun, 30 Sep 2012 19:06:58 GMT

My impression of this whole thread is that someone is totally misrepresenting Rothbard.

I reccomend the Appendix to Chapter 1 of MES, where Rothbard lays out the definitions and scope of all the concepts mentioned here.

To sum up, if we are to make a Venn diagram, biggest circle is prax, study of human action. Inside that are several other smaller circles, [aka proper subsets, for those to whom that says anything]. Each of those circles are mutually disjoint. Those circles are labelled Economics, Theory of Violent Action, Theory of Games, Theory of Voting. In other writings he has an additional circle labelled with a question mark, meaning who knows what other areas may be worked on in the future.

The Economics circle is itself divided into two subsets, Crusoe economics and Market Economics, aka Catallectics. Theory of violent Action has as subsets theory of war, theory of govt intervention in the free market.

All this is in agreement with Mises.

Re: Mises video mistake on praxeology

Adam Knott — Sun, 30 Sep 2012 17:29:46 GMT

Hi Geurt

I don't think there is universal agreement on the relationship between these. The Rotbardian explanation is different from the Misesian.

What I have argued is that in Mises's conception praxeology is conceived as a general, formal science of all forms, or classes, or types, of human action (all types of goal-directed activity).

Praxeology studies the universal or formal structure of action; those apects which all concrete actions have in common.

We can conceive of various forms of action. For example thinking is an action; an attempt to reach a conclusion or find an answer. (reference: Mises, Gordon) There are political acitons. (reference: do Soto) There are interpersonal actions, which I have written about. Thus, praxeology in the Misesian conception is a formal science (like mathematics and geometry) that studies the various types of actions with respect to their "invarient relations."

Mises conceives that economics is the study of those actions conducted on the basis of monetary calculation. (HA, 3rd rev. p.234)

The other branches of praxeology study other forms or kinds of action--those not conducted on the basis of monetary calculation: acts of government (regulating, adjudicating, punishing, etc.), interpersonal actions (fighting, talking, coercing, etc.), mental actions (thinking, deliberating, imagining, etc.), physical actions (walking, lifting, striking, etc.).

Thus, praxeology studies the same realm of activity studied by political science, ethics, and sociology, but from the point of view of the exact laws (invarient regularities) of goal-directed action. Instead of studying these realms with respect to norms (normative discipline) or with respect to inexact or empirical laws, praxeology studies these realms with respect to exact laws of human action. This conception is consistent with both Mises's and Megner's views.

As for history, in the Misesian lexicon, it belongs to the second or opposed branch of social science, Thymology. Thymology may be defined negatively in relation to praxeology and generally includes the study of the concrete, individual, and non-universal or non-necessary aspect of social phenomena. Examples are:

1. Concrete situations: John ate an apple.

2. Historial narratives depicted in terms of a number or sequence of actions: John ate an apple, then he went outside.

3. Forcasting of concrete situations: The "in" color next year will be blue.

In other words, Thymology treats the non-aprioristic aspects of human action; those concrete aspects of action that may have been different than they were, or that may be different than we project. I would argue that this distinction between Praxeology and Thymology is consistent with Menger's distinction between exact science and empirical science, and Mises's distinction between theory and history.

Re: Mises video mistake on praxeology

Paleoprax — Sun, 30 Sep 2012 16:25:38 GMT

This topic is fascinating and extremely important. There seems to be several definitions of praxeology and no consensus at all.

Does anyone know of a diagram showing the relationship between praxeology, economics, politics, ethics, sociology and history? I would be very helpful to all austrians.

Re: Mises video mistake on praxeology

Adam Knott — Tue, 24 Jul 2012 16:27:00 GMT

"Just skim the chapter on "From Mises to Lachmann""

http://library.mises.org/books/George%20A%20Selgin/Praxeology%20and%20Understanding%20An%20Analysis%20of%20the%20Controversy%20in%20Austrian%20Economics.pdf

"That's the general idea what I was getting at. Along with the Don Lavoie use of Hermeneutics."

"Basically it seems legit to have a Weber - Shutz - Hayek - Shackel - Lachmann line under the science in so much as praxeology isn't a method."

*****

Yes, but you haven't put forth your alternate definition of praxeology or put forth an alternate definition advocated by another thinker.

Here are three that I have seen:

The aim of this orientation, which in the future we will call the exact one, an aim which research pursues in the same way in all realms of the world of phenomena, is the determination of strict laws of phenomena, of regularities in the succession of phenomena which do not present themselves to us as absolute, but which in respect to the approaches to cognition by which we attain to them simply bear within themselves the guarantee of absoluteness. It is the determination of laws of phenomena which commonly are called “laws of nature,” but more correctly should be designated by the expression “exact laws.” (Menger)

Essentially, praxeology is the study of those propositions concerning human action that can be grasped and recognized as true simply in virtue of an inspection of their constituent concepts. (Roderick Long)

...the system of tautologies---those series of propositions which are necessarily true because they are merely transformations of the assumptions from which we start... (Hayek)

What is your proposed definition of praxeology ?

Re: Mises video mistake on praxeology

vive la insurrection — Tue, 24 Jul 2012 05:01:46 GMT

Just skim the chapter on "From Mises to Lachmann"

http://library.mises.org/books/George%20A%20Selgin/Praxeology%20and%20Understanding%20An%20Analysis%20of%20the%20Controversy%20in%20Austrian%20Economics.pdf

That's the general idea what I was getting at. Along with the Don Lavoie use of Hermeneutics.

Basically it seems legit to have a Weber - Shutz - Hayek - Shackel - Lachmann line under the science in so much as praxeology isn't a method

Re: Mises video mistake on praxeology

Adam Knott — Mon, 23 Jul 2012 05:53:58 GMT

vive la insurrection

"...praxeology, in general, seems to have a broader definition."

Why not provide some of the other definitions of praxeology as proposed by other thinkers?

Re: Mises video mistake on praxeology

vive la insurrection — Sun, 22 Jul 2012 19:44:05 GMT

Praxeology: The ascertainment, discovery, or demonstration, of exact laws of human action.

Once again though, for a broad definition of praxeology (and nor just a Misean one) - I think this "exact law" can be contested. Many Austrians seem (particualrly NYU Austrians?) fine using a Weber "ideal type" that goes contrary to what Mises and Menger seemed to be driving at.

Wether or not people like Lavoie, etc are wrong isn't my issue - but the fact that praxeology, in general, seems to have a broader definition.

Re: Mises video mistake on praxeology

Adam Knott — Fri, 20 Jul 2012 17:17:56 GMT

mikachusetts

I'm aware of the interpretation of Austrian economics that seeks to establish that it derives from Aristotle. I would argue that what is essential about Austrian economics is independent of an analysis in terms of Aristotle and Kant.

In the quote you provide, Menger argues that economics investigates the general essence and the general connection of economic phenomena. He argues that economics is not about analyzing economic concepts and drawing conclusions from that analysis. Let's take this passage from Hayek:

From the fact that whenever we interpret human action as in any sense purposive or meaningful, whether we do so in ordinary life or for the purposes of the social sciences, we have to define both the objects of human activity and the different kinds of actions themselves, not in physical terms but in terms of the opinions or intentions of the acting persons, there follow some very important consequences; namely, nothing less than that we can, from the concepts of the objects, analytically conclude something about what the actions will be. If we define an object in terms of a person’s attitude toward it, it follows, of course, that the definition of the object implies a statement about the attitude of the person toward the thing. When we say that a person possesses food or money, or that he utters a word, we imply that he knows that the first can be eaten, that the second can be used to buy something with, and that the third can be understood—and perhaps many other things. ("The Facts of the Social Sciences")(emphasis added)

Here Hayek is proposing what Menger is arguing against. The argument against considering praxeology as conceptual analysis alone does not depend or rely on Aristotle, but is independent of Aristotle. I could easily make the same argument to Hayek that Menger is making toward the thinkers he has in mind. I could argue that when we realize that walking toward a location entails walking away from a different location, we did not arrive at this information via conceptual analysis, but by some other way. In arguing against the conception of economics as conceptual analysis, this does not commit me to Aristotelian ontology or any philosopher's conceptions of Aristotelian ontology.

Also, if a writer uses the word "essence" this does not tie or connect that writer to Aristotle.

"The starting point of praxeology is not a choice of axioms and a decision about methods of procedure, but reflection about the essence of action." (Mises)

"All that is needed for the deduction of all praxeological theorems is knowledge of the essence of human action." (Mises)

In these passages Mises is not committing himself to any kind of Aristotelian ontology by his use of the term essence.

What is essential about Austrian economics or praxeology is that it proposes a necessary relationship between an action A, and some result of or accompaniment to that action, B. This is what Hayek does in the passage above, and so in this sense he is practicing praxeology and Austrian economics. Menger may conceive the nature and source of social necessity differently, and Mises still differently.

The essential aspect is the attempt to provide a theory or rationale for social necessity. It is not essential that the rationale be an Aristotelian one or a Kantian one.

*****

Also, I believe that the position of those who try to explain the regularity of social phenomena with reference to the human mind is more subtle than the position you portray.

1. "...our mind imposed on the world..."

2. "...our minds imposing logic on the world..."

3. "...products of laws of thought..."

In your portrayal (1&2), there is an assumed objective world on the one hand, and a mind separate from that world on the other hand. This separate mind takes the objectively existing material and reconfigures it, imposing it's own structure on what was previously an independently and objectively existing substance or world.

(In #3, the conception is kind of reversed. In this conception, the mind or structure of thought "produces" something separate from the mind or the structure of thought, hence "product of thought.")

This way of thinking about things presupposes and assumes an objective world or objective substance separate from and independent of any consciousness.

The presupposition of an objective real world independent of any consciousness is essentially the beginning postulate or axiom of the philosophy of objective realism, the philosophy generally preferred by objective ethicists.

The "structure of mind" or "categories of thought" approach is not dependent on the assumption of an objective real world independent of any consciousness. In this approach, one categorizes (classifies) all the various phenomena of experience (of consciousness). This categorization or classification scheme is a formal scheme akin to formal mathematics and geometry. It differs from those in that its object is intentionality as opposed to extended space. Instead of a graph or chart that depicts things in terms of "over here" and "over there" or "higher" and "lower," the formal praxeological scheme depicts the phenomena of consciousness in terms of "means" and "ends" or in terms of "satisfaction" and "dissatisfaction."

The formal scheme is neutral with respect to a supposed objective reality. It neither affirms nor denies the existence of an objective real world.

To the extent the formal scheme categorizes the phenomena of consciousness, then of course it does not categorize those things which are not phenomena of consciousness. This is not identical to a positive assertion that such things do not "exist." It merely means that such things, posited by some to exist, do not enter a formal scheme that categorizes only phenomena of consciousness.

Re: Mises video mistake on praxeology

mikachusetts — Fri, 20 Jul 2012 13:33:31 GMT

Adam Knott:
I tend to believe that libertarian ethics theories are linked to an Aristotelian/Scholastic framework, but I would debate that Austrian economics and praxeology are tied to Aristotle.

Interesting. I'm fairly convinced by Barry Smith's analysis of the Austrian tradition as an Aristotelian one. I know Mises believed that praxeological truths were such because of laws of logic our mind imposed on the world, but I have a hard time accepting that Menger held that view as well. Besides the historical connection of the broader Austrian tradition (Brentano school) to Aristotle and the scholastics, you have Menger saying things like:

"Theoretical economics has the task of investigating the general essence and the general connection of economic phenomena, not of analysing economic concepts and of drawing the conclusions resulting from this analysis. The phenomena, or certain aspects of them, and not their linguistic image, the concepts, are the object of theoretical research in the field of economy." (Investigations)

Also, in the quotes you give of Menger, its clear that he doesn't believe economic phenomena are solely a product of our minds imposing logic on the world, because he talks about the nature of phenomena separate from our cognition of them. When Menger says that we could not concieve of the exact laws as being other than absolute, it isn't because they are products of laws of thought, but because they are laws of reality -- a squarly Aristotelian attitude.

Re: Mises video mistake on praxeology

Adam Knott — Fri, 20 Jul 2012 05:55:12 GMT

Vive la insurrection

I tend to believe that libertarian ethics theories are linked to an Aristotelian/Scholastic framework, but I would debate that Austrian economics and praxeology are tied to Aristotle. Here are some passages from Menger and Mises on the source of economic and praxeological laws:

Menger:

"There is one rule of cognition for the investigation of theoretical truths which as far as possible is verified beyond doubt not only by experience, but simply by our laws of thinking."

"...or, what is in essence the same thing, that strictly typical phenomena of a definite kind must always, and, indeed in consideration of our laws of thinking, simply of necessity, be followed by strictly typical phenomena of just as definite and different a type."

"This rule holds true not only of the nature of phenomena, but also of their measure, and experience not only offers us no exception to it, but such a thing simply seems inconceivable to the critical mind."

"[Science]...does to be sure, and indeed on the basis of the rules of cognition characterized by us above, arrive at laws of phenomena which are not only absolute, but according to our laws of thinking simply cannot be thought of in any other way but as absolute. That is, it arrives at exact laws, the so-called "laws of nature" of phenomena."

(Book 1, Chapter 4, Investigation Into the Method of the Social Sciences)

Compare to Mises:

"But the characteristic feature of a priori knowledge is that we cannot think of the truth of its negation or of something that would be at variance with it. What the a priori expresses is necessarily implied in all our thinking and acting."

"If we qualify a concept or a proposition as a priori, we want to say: first, that the negation of what it asserts is unthinkable for the human mind and appears to it as nonsense; secondly, that this a priori concept or proposition is necessarily implied in our mental approach to all the problems concerned, i.e., in our thinking and acting concerning these problems."

(The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science)

The core of Mises's praxeology and Menger's theoretical exact science is independent of an analysis in terms of Aristotle versus Kant.

Both Menger and Mises are focused on regularities in the social world, specifically with "exact" or "necessary" regularities or relationships, and both attribute these exact regularities to the structure of our thinking or mind.

Exact laws are definitely not peculiar to Menger; they are the essence of Mises's praxeology:

"Praxeological knowledge makes it possible to predict with apodictic certainty the outcome (B) of various modes of action (A)."

(Human Action)(A and B added)

Mises doesn't use the term "exact laws" but prefers the term "a priori". But both terms refer to the same thing.

If we consider the proposition: "In walking toward a location (phenomenon A) an actor always walks away from a different location (phenomenon B)."

Menger would refer to this situation as an exact law, Mises would refer to it as an a priori proposition. Hayek would maintain that it is a tautological transformation which is necessarily true because it is merely a transformation of the assumption from which we start.

The name one gives to this circumstance isn't essential. What is essential is that phenomenon B occurs every time phenomenon A occurs.

Economic or praxeological laws are Mises's ultimate aim:

"Mises suggested that I explore the changing views about individual behavior which economists had, since the time of Adam Smith, adopted in order for them to grasp the possibility of a science of economics. Given the apparent unpredictability of individual behavior it is intuitively difficult to account for the economic regularities which seem to occur. It was necessary to somehow "understand" individual behavior in a way consistent with the possibility of "scientific laws."

(Kirzner, in his article "Human Action, Freedom, and Economic Science," recalling Mises's suggestion for a topic for his, Kirzner's, dissertation)

Here is part of page 2 of Human Action:

"In the course of social events there prevails a regularity of phenomena to which man must adjust his actions if he wishes to succeed. It is futile to approach social facts with the attitude of a censor who approves or disapproves from the point of view of quite arbitrary standards and subjective judgments of value. One must study the laws of human action and social cooperation as the physicist studies the laws of nature."

Thus, the science that Menger and Mises envision is primarily concerned with regularities in social phenomena, and specifically with those regularities for which no exception is possible, or seems possible. We can call these regularities exact laws, scientific laws, economic laws, praxeological laws, etc... They are the essence of Austrian economics and praxeology.

However, exact laws need not be the primary focus of every discipline within a broader Austrian framework. In Mises's conception, the compliment or counterpart to praxeology is thymology. Essentially, thymology means the non-universal or non-necessary aspects of action. For example, considering a proposition such as "if taxes are increased (phenomenon A), businessmen will hire less employees (phenomenon B)." It refers to specific content (businessmen and taxes as opposed to actors and objects of action generally) and it asserts a regularity which is "inexact" (the relationship between A and B may not hold in every single instance). This proposition also refers to a sequence of seperate actions (as opposed asserting a relationship between an action A and its necessary accompaniment B)

When we treat specific content, assert inexact or "empirical' regularities, or depict a sequence of separate actions, we leave praxeology proper, but we do not necessarily leave a broader Austrian framework. In other words, a broad Austrian framework might include, besides praxeology, both historical and predictive disciplines (forecasting). But these are by definition "inexact" disciplines.

Re: Mises video mistake on praxeology

vive la insurrection — Fri, 20 Jul 2012 00:24:45 GMT

Praxeology: The ascertainment, discovery, or demonstration, of exact laws of human action.

Thanks for the response Adam. One follow up question

While I tend to agree that Austrianism is linked to some Aristotelian/Scholastic framework, even in Mises tried reframe it in a neo-Kantian framework, isn't this a peculiarly Mengarian outlook?

That is to say, if one is looking broadly at the debates and splits that could be allowed within an Austrian framework as a whole, is exact laws an appropriate generic definition/ broad scope outlook for the definition of praxeology?

Re: Mises video mistake on praxeology

Adam Knott — Thu, 19 Jul 2012 20:25:12 GMT

Hi Graham

Yes, economics in the wider sense is praxeology. Economics in the narrower sense is the study of market phenomena.

The traditional and historical definition of economics is the narrow definition:

"There have never been any doubts and uncertainties about the scope of economic science. Ever since people have been eager for a systematic study of economics or political economy, all have agreed that it is the task of this branch of knowledge to investigate the market phenomena, that is, the determination of the mutual exchange ratios of the goods and services negotiated on markets, their origin in human action and their effects upon later action." (Human Action)

Regarding Crusoe economics, I would rather not get involved in trying to untangle Rothbard's conceptions or trying to translate Rothbard's conceptions into Mises's conceptions. This will probably cause more confusion than necessary. If you read the first two hundred pages of Human Action, Mises doesn't rely much on the Crusoe construct.

*****

In general, I think the part you're not seeing is the difference between an "objective" description of events and the description of an event from the point of view of the individual actor. Misesian praxeology is concerned with the latter and not the former.

Objectivity (the notion of objectivity) is arrived at by taking a description of events, and omitting reference to a describer and/or his act of description.

In subjective analysis, there is no act of description without reference to an actor who describes; there is no act of observation without reference to an actor who observes, there is no act of envisioning without reference to an actor who envisions, etc...

"For it is obvious that an action has only one subjective meaning: that of the actor himself. It is X who gives subjective meaning to his action, and the only subjective meanings being given by F and S in this situation are the subjective meanings they are giving their own actions, namely, their actions of observing X." (Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World)

The "method" of praxeology is methodological individualism or what may be called "individual subject analysis" in which all phenomena are conceived from the point of view of the individual actor, and no activity is depicted without an actor who performs that activity.

When I make a distinction between several various actions, this refers to the nature of the action or the content of the action as the actor himself sees it at the time of his action.

"The explanation of an action must have the same content as was in the person's head when he performed the action or when he reasoned toward his intention to perform the action." (Searl, Minds, Brains and Science)

I'm not referring to the point of view of an observer Y, who watches actor X performing various tasks, and I'm not referring to a later action of X (action 2) wherein X appraises or considers some previous action he performed (action 1). I'm referring to the action X performs, as X understands it, at the time he performs it.

I believe what you want to talk about is the objective point of view. I the observer watch actor X put money in the vending machine. I the observer watch actor Y take money out of the vending machine. Now, I omit reference to my acts of observation. This leaves:

Actor X put money in the vending machine, actor Y took money out of the vending machine. (an objective event)

You want to ask: how does praxeology deal with this event, a description of events from the point of view of an observer in which reference to the observer and his act of observation is omitted.

I want to deal only with what was in the mind of the actor himself (his intention or purpose) at the time he performed the action.

I want to deal with subjective data not objective data.

I think this is the difference.

Adam

("It is important to remember that the so-called "data," from which we set out in this sort of analysis, are....all facts given to the person in question, the things as they are known to (or believed by) him to exist, and not, strictly speaking, objective facts. It is only because of this that the propositions we deduce are necessarily a priori valid and that we preserve the consistency of the argument." Hayek, "Economics and Knowledge")

Re: Mises video mistake on praxeology

Graham Wright — Thu, 19 Jul 2012 18:06:01 GMT

Adam Knott:
For the diagram showing the relationship between the definitions of praxeology, economics, and catallactics, in the Misesian conception:

Praxeology: The ascertainment, discovery, or demonstration, of exact laws of human action.

Economics (catallactics): The ascertainment, discovery, or demonstration of exact laws of human action, specifically with regard to market phenomena.

In other words, the the discovery of exact laws of man's actions on the market or man's conduct with regard to the market.

Here is Mises:

Economics is mainly concerned with the analysis of the determination of money prices of goods and services exchanged on the market. (HA-234)

The scope of praxeology, the general theory of human action, can be precisely defined and circumscribed. The specifically economic problems, the problems of economic action in the narrower sense, can only by and large be disengaged from the comprehensive body of praxeological theory. (HA-234)

Considerations of expediency and traditional convention make us declare that the field of catallactics or of economics in the narrower sense is the analysis of the market phenomena. This is tantamount to the statement: Catallactics is the analysis of those actions which are conducted on the basis of monetary calculation. (HA-234)

Thus, Mises clearly conceives that as an economist, he is studying only a circumscribed realm of action. He knows that there are other actions that are not the subject matter of economics as economics. Praxeology is the general science of human action, economics studies man's actions on the market, a specific class of actions.

Because of the parts I've bolded above, your Misesian definition of economics above must mean "economics proper" or "economics in the narrower sense". So what is "economics in the broader sense"? Is that equal to praxeology, or is it still a subset?

Rothbard said in MES that economics is 'Crusoe economics' + catallactics. Is Crusoe economics something that Mises would consider outside of "economics proper" but inside of "economics in the broader sense"?

Rothbard also said that catallactics is the study of interpersonal actions, not the stricter Mises class of "actions which are conducted on the basis of economic calculation". So how would Mises categorise interpersonal actions that are NOT based on economic calculation - and what kinds of actions are these?

As I mentioned in the previous post, we can conceive of at least four broad classes of actions:

Physical actions, interpersonal actions, mental actions, and catallactic actions, Economics is primarily concerned with catallactic actions. That leaves three other classes of actions to which three other branches of praxeology might correspond.

I really don't get how this could be the case. Suppose you and I exchange an apple for an orange. This is certainly a physical action, and it's certainly an interpersonal action, and it certainly required prior mental action by us both. It could be an action "based on monetary calculation" but I'm not sure. Would that only be the case if either apples or oranges happened to be the money in society? It seems like the difference is not really important enough to be categorised as a whole different class of action and analysed within a whole different subset of praxeology.

I can't see how it's useful to think of each class of action as representing a different subset of praxeology, when most (all?) actions fall within more than one of your classes.

Mathematics and geometry could be considered forms or types (early forms and rudimentary types) of exact sciences of physical action. I don't claim that mathematics and geometry are, self-consciously, branches of praxeology.

But mathematics and geometry have nothing to do with action at all. Where's the purposefulness in those disciplines?

Game theory, on the other hand, seems to require purposefulness... would you consider game theory a branch or subset of praxeology?

Regarding how, exactly, Rothbard conceived the relationship between the various realms of human conduct, I would leave that up to Rothbardian scholars to explain. From my point of view, there was a time when Rothbard was more a student of Mises. This is when MES was written, and much of MES follows a Misesian view of things. Later in his life, when Rothbard more strongly developed and asserted his own view of things, this is when his conception of praxeology as largely synonymous with economics became more apparent.

But you can see the seeds of his conception even in the passage from MES you provided above:

"...and violence in the form of government has been treated by political philosophy and by praxeology in tracing the effects of violent intervention in the free market..."

The view of things described here is one where violence, as a mode or form of conduct, is considered in relation to its effect on the market.

What is missing in this conception is the question whether there are any regular occurences or consequences that must occur, generally, when an actor employs violence? In the above conception, the idea is to trace the effects of violent intervention in the market, after which economic laws become operant, and we can then say, "violent intervention in the market ( action X), must cause effect Y".

There is no conception of a praxeological analysis of violence and its necessary effects generally, when violence is employed as a means by an actor generally, regardless whether such violence has an effect on the market or not. That is the oversight.

That's interesting. What kind of action would have no effect on the market? Give me an example.

When Rothbard and Hoppe turn to interpersonal realations, they automatically switch to normative theorizing.

The Ethics of Liberty is a book about violence and non-violence used as means of interpersonal relations. In this book Rothbard explicitly distances himself from the value-free, praxeological approach. Either he did not believe interpersonal relations (the traditional realm of ethics and morals) were an appropriate subject matter of praxeology, or, he did not know how to extend praxeology past its historical association with economics. Maybe it was some of both. The fact is that the realm of interpersonal action is treated by Rothbared and Hoppe, but only treated by them with normative theory, not by praxeology.

(if you are asserting that in Power and Market Rothbard extends praxeology to study violent actions generally, and as such, this would be a great topic for a seperate thread)

I am asserting that Rothbard was both a political philosopher and a praxeologist. TEOL is him analysing violence as a political philosopher. P&M is him analysing violence as a praxeologist. I think we can set aside TEOL because that is Rothbard using a different mode of analysis, for better or worse.

I don't know if P&M could be said to cover "violent actions generally" because I can't think of any violent actions that don't also come under "violent actions that affect the market".

"All physical actions require a prior mental action." (action 2 is preceded by action 1)

Whether true or not, an interpretation of a squence of actions would be a matter of thymology not praxeology. Praxeology is concerned with the formal structure of action as such. (concerned with those things that action 1 and action 2 must have in common)

Possibly, but I would class my statement that all physical actions require a prior mental action as an exact law and so a praxeological statement. "I act therefore I think", you might say. It is implied by the action axiom that humans think: we think when we choose a goal, and we think when we choose a means to achieve the goal.

"Catallactic actions are always interpersonal actions"

Perhaps in the objective sense, but not in the subjective sense. If I purchase something from a vending machine, this could count as an action that could be based on monetary calculation, but it is not interpersonal action in the strict sense. I need not act toward another actor (toward another consciousness) to make a vending machine purchase.

I don't know what you mean. Buying from a vending machine you are making an interpersonal exchange with the owner of the goods inside the vending machine. I don't see what difference it makes that you don't meet face-to-face with the person you are exchanging with.

We could possibly start a new thread on some of these issues if you wanted to. In the original post, Vive la Insurrection seems to have independently recognized the alternate conception of praxeology that Rothbard and Hoppe have employed, and my main point was to affirm what he/she had recognized and provide some supporting quotes and background information.

I appreciate that. I don't see the need to start a new thread. We are on topic here.

Re: Mises video mistake on praxeology

Adam Knott — Thu, 19 Jul 2012 00:14:42 GMT

Hi Graham

Thank you for taking the time to reply and comment.

For the diagram showing the relationship between the definitions of praxeology, economics, and catallactics, in the Misesian conception:

Praxeology: The ascertainment, discovery, or demonstration, of exact laws of human action.

Economics (catallactics): The ascertainment, discovery, or demonstration of exact laws of human action, specifically with regard to market phenomena.

In other words, the the discovery of exact laws of man's actions on the market or man's conduct with regard to the market.

Here is Mises:

Economics is mainly concerned with the analysis of the determination of money prices of goods and services exchanged on the market. (HA-234)

The scope of praxeology, the general theory of human action, can be precisely defined and circumscribed. The specifically economic problems, the problems of economic action in the narrower sense, can only by and large be disengaged from the comprehensive body of praxeological theory. (HA-234)

Considerations of expediency and traditional convention make us declare that the field of catallactics or of economics in the narrower sense is the analysis of the market phenomena. This is tantamount to the statement: Catallactics is the analysis of those actions which are conducted on the basis of monetary calculation. (HA-234)

Thus, Mises clearly conceives that as an economist, he is studying only a circumscribed realm of action. He knows that there are other actions that are not the subject matter of economics as economics. Praxeology is the general science of human action, economics studies man's actions on the market, a specific class of actions.

As I mentioned in the previous post, we can conceive of at least four broad classes of actions:

Physical actions, interpersonal actions, mental actions, and catallactic actions, Economics is primarily concerned with catallactic actions. That leaves three other classes of actions to which three other branches of praxeology might correspond. Mathematics and geometry could be considered forms or types (early forms and rudimentary types) of exact sciences of physical action. I don't claim that mathematics and geometry are, self-consciously, branches of praxeology.

Interpersonal actions are those actions directed by one actor toward another. (helping someone, harming someone, conversing with someone, coercing someone, etc.)

Mental actions are actions directed toward our own mind. (for example, one's attempt to think something through)

Thus, there are conceivable branches of praxeology corresponding to these two broad classes of action. In libertarian social theory, interpersonal actions are generally considered the subject matter of normative ethics. Of course, praxeology is not a normative discipline, and so in praxeology, interpersonal actions are studied with regard to regularity, constant/invariant relations, typical relationships, i.e., exact laws.

Regarding mental actions, this is the realm of action (of intentional activity) that was once the province of "descriptive psychology" but which is now considered a branch of natural or experimental science.

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Regarding how, exactly, Rothbard conceived the relationship between the various realms of human conduct, I would leave that up to Rothbardian scholars to explain. From my point of view, there was a time when Rothbard was more a student of Mises. This is when MES was written, and much of MES follows a Misesian view of things. Later in his life, when Rothbard more strongly developed and asserted his own view of things, this is when his conception of praxeology as largely synonymous with economics became more apparent.

But you can see the seeds of his conception even in the passage from MES you provided above:

"...and violence in the form of government has been treated by political philosophy and by praxeology in tracing the effects of violent intervention in the free market..."

The view of things described here is one where violence, as a mode or form of conduct, is considered in relation to its effect on the market.

What is missing in this conception is the question whether there are any regular occurences or consequences that must occur, generally, when an actor employs violence? In the above conception, the idea is to trace the effects of violent intervention in the market, after which economic laws become operant, and we can then say, "violent intervention in the market ( action X), must cause effect Y".

There is no conception of a praxeological analysis of violence and its necessary effects generally, when violence is employed as a means by an actor generally, regardless whether such violence has an effect on the market or not. That is the oversight.

When Rothbard and Hoppe turn to interpersonal realations, they automatically switch to normative theorizing.

The Ethics of Liberty is a book about violence and non-violence used as means of interpersonal relations. In this book Rothbard explicitly distances himself from the value-free, praxeological approach. Either he did not believe interpersonal relations (the traditional realm of ethics and morals) were an appropriate subject matter of praxeology, or, he did not know how to extend praxeology past its historical association with economics. Maybe it was some of both. The fact is that the realm of interpersonal action is treated by Rothbared and Hoppe, but only treated by them with normative theory, not by praxeology.

(if you are asserting that in Power and Market Rothbard extends praxeology to study violent actions generally, and as such, this would be a great topic for a seperate thread)

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"Are you suggesting that praxeology is a discipline with subsets corresponding to each of these classes of actions?"

Yes, definitely.

"All physical actions require a prior mental action." (action 2 is preceded by action 1)

Whether true or not, an interpretation of a squence of actions would be a matter of thymology not praxeology. Praxeology is concerned with the formal structure of action as such. (concerned with those things that action 1 and action 2 must have in common)

"Catallactic actions are always interpersonal actions"

Perhaps in the objective sense, but not in the subjective sense. If I purchase something from a vending machine, this could count as an action that could be based on monetary calculation, but it is not interpersonal action in the strict sense. I need not act toward another actor (toward another consciousness) to make a vending machine purchase.

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We could possibly start a new thread on some of these issues if you wanted to. In the original post, Vive la Insurrection seems to have independently recognized the alternate conception of praxeology that Rothbard and Hoppe have employed, and my main point was to affirm what he/she had recognized and provide some supporting quotes and background information. In the interpersonal realm of human conduct, the concern of Rothbard and Hoppe has been to try to lend theoretical support to libertarian norms of ethical conduct. Their approach to interpersonal relations has been normative, not analytic (analytic in the value-free sense of the term). The conception wherein praxeology is seen as a method of economics (a method of approaching market phenomena) compliments the viewpoint that sees normative ethics as a method of approaching interpersonal relations.

Mises was an opponent of objective and normative ethics and he believed that interpersonal and political relations were a field to be studied by praxeology. That's why he repeats over and over that economics is but a part or branch, the best elaborated part or branch of praxeology.

For Rothbard, interpersonal relations are treated by natural law, for Hoppe, interpersonal relations are treated by the argumentation ethics. Both of these are normative disciplines. For them, praxeology is "the method" of economics.

For Mises, interpersonal relations are treated by praxeology, the value-free general science of human action.